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ABSTRACT
As the complexity and influence of engineering systems in modern society increases, so
too does their potential to create counterintuitive and catastrophic accidents.
Increasingly, the accidents encountered in these systems are defying the linearized
notions of accident causality that-though developed for the simpler engineered systems
of the past-are prevalently used for accident prevention today. In this dissertation, an
alternative approach to accident prevention based on systems theory-the Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) and STAMP-based hazard analysis
(STPA)-is augmented with the notion of using phase space attractors to evaluate how
well STAMP safety control structures enforce system safety constraints.
Phase space attractors are mathematical results that emerge from the behavior of systems
with dynamic structures that draw or constrain these systems to specific regions of their
phase space in spite of a range of conditions. Accordingly, the goal in using this notion
for the evaluation of safety constraint enforcement is to identify and analyze the attractors
produced by a safety control structure to determine if it will adequately "attract" the
system to safe states in spite of a range of unforeseeable conditions. Support for this
approach to evaluating STAMP safety control structures is provided through the study of
a safety control structure in an existing complex, socio-technical system. This case study
is focused on a safety control process-referred to as Procedure Rework-used in Space
Shuttle Mission Control to update procedures during in-flight operations as they are
invalidated by changes in the state of the Space Shuttle and its environment. Simulation
models of procedure rework are developed through physical and human factors principles
and calibrated with data from five Space Shuttle missions; producing simulation results
with deviations from the historical data that are-as characterized by Theil Inequality
Statistics-small and primarily due to cycles and noise that are not relevant to the
models' purpose. The models are used to analyze the attractor produced by the
Procedure Rework Process across varied conditions, including a notional crewed
spacecraft mission to a distant celestial body. A detrimental effect in the process is
identified-and shown to be potentially far more severe than light delay on a mission to a
distant celestial body-and approaches to mitigating the effect are explored. Finally, the
analysis conducted is described as a generalizeable process for using phase space
attractors to evaluate system safety constraint enforcement in engineering systems.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
"Scientists study the world as it is; engineers create the world that has never
been." -Theodore von Karman, Former NASA JPL Director and Caltech
Professor.
"Sadly, many students have been led to believe that engineering science is
engineering! In a curriculum of 120 or more credits leading to a bachelor's
degree in a branch of engineering, the typical student is required to take one, or
maybe two, courses in design. Everything else, aside from general-education
requirements, focuses on the analysis, rather than the creation, of engineered
objects. Graduate education often has no design orientation at all. So,
engineering as taught really deals with only a part of engineering as it is
practiced. " -Michael D. Griffin (2007), NASA Administrator from 2005 to 2009.
"A focus on design for uncertainty implies a major cultural change in thinking
about the engineering paradigm. This is because the traditional pattern in
engineering is to design to specifications set outside the engineering process; as
by client wishes, design codes or governmental regulations. The traditional
engineering task is to optimize the technology so that it meets a set of criteria." -
MIT Engineering Systems Division Uncertainty Management Committee (2004).
"In systems theory, open systems are viewed as interrelated components that are
kept in a state of dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and
control. Systems are not treated as a static design, but as a dynamic process that
is continually adapting to achieve its ends and to react to changes in itself and its
environment. For safety, the original design must not only enforce appropriate
constraints on behavior to ensure safe operation (the enforcement of the safety
constraints), but it must continue to operate safely as changes and adaptations
occur over time. " -Nancy G. Leveson et al. (2004).
1.1 Motivation
Uncertainty can lead to negative consequences for the cost, schedule, safety, and
scope/performance of engineering endeavors. Thus, engineering researchers and
practitioners have found it prudent to define distinct categories of risk (e.g., cost,
schedule, safety, scope/performance risks, etc.). Additionally, uncertainty can create
opportunities for increased profit, safety, and scope as well as early completion, leading
to similar categorizations of opportunity. The focus of this dissertation is on how safety
is affected by system uncertainty (i.e., safety risk). However, those interested in cost,
schedule, and scope risks and opportunities should not ignore this dissertation, as there
are significant overlaps among these concepts and safety risk.
The author's intention in writing this dissertation is to describe a new way of thinking
about the cause of complex system accidents and the uncertainty that engineers and
operators face in their attempts to prevent them. Accordingly, the following vignettes are
provided to motivate the reader to consider the author's argument. The vignettes deal
with tragic and near-tragic subject matter (a total of fourteen deaths resulted directly from
the first two vignettes and the third vignette involves incidents that could have derailed an
effort to which a number of dedicated people had devoted a large portion of their life).
However, the overall message to take away from these vignettes is meant to be a positive
one: forces were working against the tragic outcomes and though they did not always
succeed, future tragedies may be prevented if we learn how to better foster the forces in
opposition to tragic outcomes.
Each vignette is meant to be a vivid example of how a narrow emphasis on the
elimination of "component failure" is an inferior approach for safety risk management to
a focus on robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in the enforcement of
system safety constraints1. Each vignette identifies a hazard state that the system was not
able to avoid (later, when concepts of STAMP/STPA are introduced, the safety
constraints are explicitly defined). Additionally, each vignette highlights the fallacies in
attributing the accidents to "component failure". Finally, the vignettes also describe the
elements of robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience displayed in these systems;
why these elements fell short in preventing the accidents; and identifies available, yet
excluded, technologies that would have enhanced the robustness, adaptability, flexibility,
and resilience of these systems.
Vignette 1: The Challenger Accident
Much has been written about the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (see Appendix B of
Leveson 1995 for a brief summary and discussion of the events surrounding the
accident). The accident investigation commission (Rogers 1986) established that hot gas
leakage through a pseudo-redundant 2 set of O-rings in the right Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB) was the most probable technical "cause" of the accident. The commission cited
the "relentless pressure" on NASA management due to the Space Shuttle's role as the
nation's principle space launch capability, poor communication among NASA field
centers, and NASA's weak and "silent" safety organization as other contributing causes
to the accident. The report also provides a vivid reconstruction of a teleconference the
night before the launch in which Thiokol3 engineers concerned about the ability of the 0-
rings to seal the hot gases in the cold weather (and equipped with data from previous
launches) were overruled by a handful of NASA and Thiokol managers. One engineering
manager at Thiokol who was initially supportive of his engineers' objections to launching
was apparently asked to "take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat" in
the debate (Rogers 1986). In countless publications and engineering/management ethics
class discussions since the issuing of the report, the decision to launch Challenger on that
cold morning in January of 1986 has rightfully been scrutinized. Even the Columbia
1 These terms and emphases will be defined more precisely throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
2 Though there were two O-rings, both were rendered ineffective by the ambient temperature in the hours
before the launch and the SRB segment joint rotation caused by the firing of the Space Shuttle Main
Engines (SSMEs) six seconds before the ignition of the SRBs.
3 Thiokol produces the Space Shuttle SRBs.
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) (Gehman 2003) aptly identified "echoes" of the
Challenger Accident in their investigation of the subsequent Columbia Accident.
However, a more fundamental question deserves some attention: why is it that the
leakage in the O-rings actually mattered (why were the lives of the astronauts dependent
on it not occurring)? Though the question may seem too obvious or trivial to explore, the
following facts indicate that there are additional degrees of complexity to the issue:
1) the Space Shuttle Orbiter did not disintegrate until seventy-three seconds after
SRB ignition (roughly 60% of the total time that the SRBs nominally remain
attached to the system after ignition) (Rogers 1986),
2) the right SRB continued firing for almost forty seconds after vehicle
disintegration (until the range safety officer issued a destruct command for it)
(Rogers 1986), and
3) the crew probably survived the Orbiter disintegration and possibly remained
conscious until the crew compartment impacted the ocean two minutes and forty-
five seconds after the Orbiter disintegrated (Kerwin 1986).
The purpose of a rocket launch is to accelerate a payload to a certain velocity while
maintaining acceptable acceleration loads on the payload. In order to safely create these
accelerations, the Space Shuttle system must maintain a desired attitude and the structural
integrity of the Orbiter-External Tank (ET)-SRB assembly (the "stack") throughout the
first stage of flight 4. Initially, the O-ring leakage of the right SRB did not prevent the
maintenance of proper attitude or compromise the structural integrity of the stack. For
roughly the first sixty seconds of SRB operation, the leak was not large enough to create
a significant difference in thrust between the left and right SRBs and even in the thirteen
seconds in which it did before disintegration of the stack, the desired attitude was
maintained (Rogers 1986). Even though the leak reduced the axial thrust of the right
SRB and created radial thrust on it, the attitude of the stack was held in check by the
ability of the Orbiter to detect slight deviations in attitude and correct them by pivoting
both the Orbiter's and SRBs' engines. However, even though the thrust mismatch in the
SRBs was being compensated for by engine pivoting, there was another problem: the hot
gases leaking from the SRB were flying directly into the ET and its lower attachment
point to the right SRB. For roughly thirteen seconds, the surface materials of the ET and
its aft SRB attachment strut endured the high temperatures of the leaking gases, and then
the tank ruptured and the strut was severed (or pulled off of the ET) (Rogers 1986).
Ironically, the right SRB separated from the stack and continued flying, albeit in an
uncontrolled manner, until the range safety officer successfully commanded it to destroy
itself (shortly before the time that it would nominally have separated from the stack).
After separation of the right SRB, the stack could neither maintain its attitude nor protect
the cryogenic fuels in the ET from igniting in the atmosphere and thus, the vehicle began
to disintegrate. As a result of the disintegration, the compartment of the Orbiter that
carried the crew was severed from the rest of the Orbiter-possibly remaining intact
enough to continue holding cabin pressure-and several of the crew members activated
4 The liquid fuel in the ET must be stored in a pressured environment (i.e., inside a tank) and kept at
subzero temperatures. A breach in the tank would allow the fuel to rapidly expand and vaporize.
their personal emergency air supplies, which they carried in the event that they had to
evacuate the Orbiter on the launch pad (Kerwin 1986).
Of the nine recommendations the commission provided to NASA (Rogers 1986), six
deserve further attention:
1) changes in NASA management structure, including the hiring of astronauts into
management positions,
2) review of criticality and hazard analysis techniques at NASA and its primary
Space Shuttle contractors,
3) the establishment of a safety organization on the associate administrator level of
the agency,
4) improvements in communication among NASA field centers, with the Marshall
Space Flight Center (i.e., the center employing the NASA employees that
participated in the pre-launch teleconference with Thiokol) being singled out as
needing the most work,
5) the abolition of the nation's reliance on the Space Shuttle as its principle launch
capability, and
6) the introduction of the capability for the crew to escape the system during certain
emergency situations in flight.
The first five of the recommendations listed above seem targeted toward strengthening
the resistance to decisions like those made by the dominant participants in the NASA-
Thiokol teleconference: people with firsthand knowledge of the personal risk the
astronauts take were to be given more power, analysis and interpretation of hazards were
(hopefully) to be improved, advocates for safety were to be more visible and active in the
decision making process, and launch schedule pressure on management was to be
reduced.
The final recommendation, on the other hand, seemingly acknowledges the uncertainty in
the decision making process (and the possible weakening of resistance to unsafe
decisions) and thus seeks to resist the consequences of an unsafe launch decision if it is
made (either in defiance of resistance to the decision or as the result of a legitimate level
of ignorance over the consequences). A crew escape subsystem is typically used to allow
the crew to separate themselves from elements of the system (e.g. an exploding or out of
control booster, a spacecraft unable to safely land, etc.) that will not keep them safe in
their current, hazardous environment. During the Soyuz T-10-1 mission, for example, the
crew escape system was successfully used to separate the crew capsule from the booster
as it exploded on the launch pad (Hall and Shayler 2003). Up until the Space Shuttle was
declared "operational" after its fourth test flight, no human spaceflight system had been
flown without a crew escape system for launch5 . The decision not to include a crew
escape system in the Space Shuttle was not without controversy. In his memoirs, former
5 The first four Space Shuttle missions were considered test flights to be flown by no more than two people
at a time. They also included ejection seats. These ejection seats were removed after these flights and the
standard crew size for subsequent missions was increased.
Space Shuttle Astronaut Richard "Mike" Mullane (2006) attributed this decision to
complacency at NASA following the immensely successful Apollo program:
"The lack of an escape system aboard operational space shuttles-indeed, the
very idea that NASA could even apply the term operational to a spacecraft as
complex as the shuttle-was a manifestation of NASA's post-Apollo hubris. The
NASA team responsible for the design of the space shuttle was the same team that
had put twelve Americans on the moon and returned them safely to Earth across a
quarter million miles of space. The Apollo program represented the greatest
engineering achievement in the history of humanity...The men and women who
were responsible for the glory of Apollo had to have been affected by their
success. While no member of the shuttle design team would have ever made the
blasphemous claim, 'We're gods. We can do anything,' the reality was this: The
space shuttle itself was such a statement."
While it is, in principle, conceivable that a crew escape subsystem could have separated a
crew compartment from the disintegrating stack and negated the fatal implications of the
decision to launch Challenger6, the overall architecture of the Space Shuttle was not
conducive to such a subsystem. Thus, NASA's attempt to implement the crew escape
capability recommendation was hindered by this fact. Ultimately, the Orbiter was
retrofitted with the capability to allow the crew to parachute to safety if the Orbiter, after
using almost all of the fuel in the ET and separating from the stack, could not safely land
(NASA 1987). However, this capability is not intended to be useful for a Challenger-like
scenario (i.e., stack disintegration while rocket engines are firing). Current plans for the
launch system to replace the Space Shuttle include a crew escape capability for
Challenger-like scenarios (Stanley et al. 2006, Stanley et al. 2005).
Challenger faltered not simply because it possessed "failed" components, but because it
could not, as an integrated, socio-technical system, maintain the appropriate velocity and
acceleration in the appropriate direction while preventing its liquid propellants from
being exposed to the atmosphere (or at least maintaining acceptable accelerations and air
pressure in an escape compartment for the crew). On the social side, an unprecedented
architectural decision not to include crew escape capability was made despite opposition
to it and a launch decision was made despite objections from engineers wielding evidence
from previous launches of the system. On the technical side, the right SRB, the
subsystem that housed the "failed" technical component, did not disintegrate and trigger a
chain-reaction disintegration throughout the "stack" nor did it significantly alter the
orientation of the overall stack. The stack's disintegration was triggered by the severing
of an interface between two of its subsystems, the ET and the right SRB, and the nearly
simultaneous puncturing of the tank in the ET that contained cryogenic fuel. Had the hot
gas leaked out the other end of the right SRB (i.e., away from the ET) the stack may have
maintained its attitude and structural integrity until and beyond the nominal separation of
the SRBs from the stack. However, even the point of the leak on the SRB O-ring
6 As mentioned above, the difference in chamber pressure and thrust of the two SRBs was detectable for
several seconds before stack disintegration, the crew compartment remained relatively intact despite stack
disintegration, and the crew was responsive for some unknown time period after stack disintegration.
circumference may be a matter of the interfacing between the SRB and ET. Indeed,
before ruling the point of the leak on the SRB as an unfortunate coincidence, one would
first have to rule out the effect of joint rotation (caused by the SSMEs firing six seconds
before the SRBs) and proximity of the O-ring to the cryogenic fuel7 as factors in
determining where the O-ring would leak. All and all, it was the interactions between
system components that influenced how this tragedy unfolded.
Vignette 2: The Columbia Accident
Like the Challenger Accident before it, the Columbia Accident has also been the subject
of many publications and engineering/management ethics discussions. Additionally, it
too was a matter of the integrated, socio-technical system's inability to maintain the
vehicle's velocity and deceleration in the appropriate direction while maintaining its
structural integrity. In its report (Gehman 2003), the CAIB identified the technical cause
of the accident as a hole in the leading edge of the left wing of the Orbiter created by a
piece of insulating foam that fell from the forward Orbiter/ET attachment and hit it
during launch. This area of the wing experiences high temperatures during the Orbiter's
reentry into the Earth's atmosphere (when the kinetic and potential energy of the vehicle
generated during launch is largely converted to thermal energy) and therefore is thermally
protected by Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels. However, the hole created in one
or more of these panels, in addition to affecting lift and drag on the left wing, allowed hot
gases to damage the wing further, thus affecting the mass of and lift and drag on the wing
further. Eventually, the increasing effects of wing damage on lift, drag, and wing mass
led to a loss of attitude control, thus exposing the Orbiter to extreme and unanticipated
aerodynamic loads that would ultimately disintegrate it".
The CAIB also identified flaws in decision making at NASA by vividly reconstructing
and critiquing NASA's handling of the ET foam debris incidents before and during the
final flight of Columbia. Moreover, while recognizing that some important changes had
occurred at NASA following the Challenger Accident, the CAIB drew parallels in the
state of decision making in NASA during both the Challenger and Columbia accidents
(Gehman 2003):
"By the eve of the Columbia accident, institutional practices that were in effect at
the time of the Challenger accident-such as inadequate concern over deviations
from expected performance, a silent safety program, and schedule pressure-had
returned to NASA."
Ultimately, changes made to improve decision making after the Challenger Accident had
eroded to a state of ineffectiveness in the interval between the two accidents; the CAIB
pointed, in particular, to complacency resulting from the success of eighty-seven
7 In Appendix B of Appendix L of Volume II of the accident investigation commission's report (Rogers
1986), it is noted that the ET likely cooled the SRBs through convection and that the right SRB was likely
cooled more than the left SRB. Figure B.80 of that appendix shows the results of an analysis of the
temperature of the aft segment of the right SRB at different locations around its circumference in the hours
preceding the launch. The portions of the circumference closest to the ET were the coldest.
See NASA JSC (2008) for an analysis of crew survivability following loss of Orbiter attitude control.
missions between the accidents and cost and schedule pressures from the U.S. Congress
and President associated with the completion of the International Space Station (ISS) as
potential contributing factors to this erosion.
In short, the CAIB, like the Rogers Commission, aptly brought both technical and
organizational flaws in the Space Shuttle system to light. However, as was the case in
Vignette 1, it is also worthwhile to examine what may have been working in opposition
to these flaws. The CAIB was helpful in this regard, having explicitly identified eight
"missed opportunities" for discovery of the debris damage to the wing (Gehman 2003,
Volume 1, pp. 140-167):
1) an unaddressed inquiry on Flight Day 4 by Rodney Rocha, NASA's designated
chief engineer for the damaged Thermal Protection System, to determine if the
crew had been asked to inspect the left wing for damage,
2) an unused opportunity by the MCC to ask a crew member on Flight Day 6 to
downlink video he had taken of ET separation (the video may have revealed
missing foam on the ET),
3) a Flight Day 6 discussion between NASA and the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency that produced no request for imagery,
4) a Flight Day 7 discussion between Wayne Hale, the Space Shuttle Program
Manager for Launch Integration, and DoD representatives about imaging assets,
that was not acted on due to the orders of Linda Ham, chair of the STS-1079
Mission Management Team (MMT),
5) a Flight Day 7 discussion between Mike Card, a NASA Headquarters Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) manager and a Johnson Space Center
(JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate representative that did not result
in a request for imagery,
6) a Flight Day 7 discussion between Mike Card and the Associate Administrator
(AA) of OSMA about imagery requests that did not result in a request for
imagery,
7) a Flight Day 8 discussion between JSC Mission Operations Directorate (MOD)
representative Barbara Conte (acting on behalf of Rodney Rocha) and STS-107
ascent/entry flight director Leroy Cain that did not result in an imaging request,
and
8) a Flight Day 14 discussion between Michael Card and the AA for the NASA
Space Flight Directorate that did not result in an imagery request.
Missed Opportunity 7 (i.e., the Flight Day 8 discussion between Barbara Conte and Leroy
Cain) is of particular interest due to the fact that NASA flight directors-as will be
discussed in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Center (MCC) case study in this
dissertation-have the documented authority to conduct any action that they feel is
necessary to ensure the safety of the crew. According to the CAIB, Barbara Conte
encouraged Rodney Rocha to present his concerns directly to the flight directors after
Space Shuttle Program Management had decided against requesting on-orbit imagery, but
he elected not to because he (perhaps mistakenly) believed that Space Shuttle Program
9 STS-107 was the designation for the mission in which the Columbia Accident occurred.
Management would have to support an imaging request by the flight directors. It was
thus up to Barbara Conte to informally relay Rocha's concerns to Leroy Cain who-not
having a chance to hear the concerns formally from Rocha himself-decided not to act on
the information.
Additional information from the CAIB report and a broader view of the accident yields
even more missed opportunities for discovery of the wing damage and crew
escape/survival:
9) Numerous foam loss/Orbiter damage events occurred throughout the history of
the Space Shuttle Program and during STS-112 in particular, less than four
months before the Columbia Accident, a substantial piece of foam fell off of the
ET and struck an SRB at its ET interface (Gehman 2003). As was typically the
case for such events, the working group responsible for tracking launch debris
(i.e., the Intercenter Photo Working Group) identified the event and recommended
that it be classified as an In-Flight Anomaly, a classification that would have
prompted an investigation of the incident that would have to be closed before the
next launch (i.e., STS-113) could be allowed. However, in an unprecedented
decision on how to handle foam strikes, Space Shuttle Program Management
rejected this classification and ultimately decided that the investigation could
remain open until shortly after the STS-107 mission (Gehman 2003).
10) As Space Shuttle Program Management was apparently drifting to a new level of
foam debris impact acceptance during and after STS-112, the Intercenter Photo
Working Group was testing equipment that would allow a new level of
completeness in their documentation of launch debris. The mission included an
experimental camera mounted on the forward end of the ET looking back toward
the right side of the Orbiter (NASA KSC 2002). The footage provided by the
camera used on STS-112 prominently featured the leading edge of the right wing
of the Orbiter before the camera view was obscured by exhaust from the
pyrotechnics that separated the SRBs from the stack'0 . Similar cameras used on
subsequent missions, after being repositioned to avoid the pyrotechnics exhaust
and also to show part of the left wing, have been used to identify a number of ET
foam shedding events (NASA 2005, NASA JSC 2005b). Unfortunately, ET
cameras of this type were not used on STS-113 or STS-107 and thus, the
Intercenter Photo Working Group did not have the type of footage offered by
these cameras at their disposal when they expressed their concerns about the
debris strike to Space Shuttle Program Management. With the footage that they
obtained from other types of cameras, the Intercenter Photo Working Group still
provided Space Shuttle Program Management with what the CAIB referred to as
"remarkably accurate" initial estimates of foam debris size, speed, origin, and the
point of impact (Gehman 2003). However, they were forced to seek visual
confirmation of damage through requests to imaging resources outside of NASA,
an alternative that ultimately was not allowed by Space Shuttle Program
Management.
10 As of the writing of this dissertation, the video footage provided from this camera was available for
download at http://spaceflight.nasa._ov/gallery/video/shuttle/ts- 112/html/fd I.html
11)More than half of the Space Shuttle missions prior to STS-107 included a
Canadian-built robotic arm formally known as the Shuttle Remote Manipulator
System (SRMS) and nicknamed the "Canadarm" (CSA 2006). Because the
SRMS has cameras on its "elbow" joint and "wrist" joint, it has been used for on-
orbit observation of portions of the Orbiter that were not visible to the crew.
During STS-41D, the SRMS was used to observe and remove an icicle from the
wastewater dump port (CSA 2006, Mullane 2006). Ironically, this action was
performed because of Mission Control's concern over the possibility of the icicle
breaking off during reentry and causing damage to the left side of the Orbiter.
Yet, even though this device had potentially saved a crew and Orbiter in the pre-
Challenger era of Space Shuttle operations, it was not considered a mandatory
piece of equipment; mission planners could exclude it from missions in order to
maximize payload mass and minimize crew training. STS-107 was the first flight
since STS-99 not to include the SRMS (CSA 2006), an interval of fifteen flights
and nearly three years. The CAIB's location estimate for damage to the left
wing's RCC panels was well within the SRMS's range of view. Without the
SRMS, the only means available to the Intercenter Photo Working Group and the
ad hoc STS-107 Debris Assessment Team to obtain on-orbit imaging of the wing
damage were to have the crew conduct a contingency spacewalk or request
imaging from government agencies other than NASA. Both options proved to be
unacceptable to Space Shuttle Program Management at the time. Since STS-107,
an instrumented extension to the SRMS referred to as the Orbiter Boom Sensor
System (OBSS) has been designed (NASA 2005) and used along with the SRMS
on every mission to inspect the Orbiter for foam damage. The results of these
inspections have led to contingency spacewalks for Orbiter repair on STS-114 and
other missions" .
12) After the Debris Assessment Team had reluctantly rescinded its request for
imaging 12 the JSC engineer responsible for landing gear/tires/brakes contacted
engineers at the NASA Langley Research Center and NASA Ames Research
Center to evaluate scenarios in which the debris impact led to landing gear
damage (Gehman 2003). According to the CAIB, these engineers conducted
"after-hours" simulations, uncovered potential scenarios for landing attempts
without deploying the landing gear, and distributed information on these scenarios
to JSC engineers, including members of the Debris Assessment Team.
Additionally, they uncovered less favorable scenarios, but chose not to distribute
information on them to as wide of an audience.
13) As was the case during the Challenger Accident, several technical elements of
Columbia worked to compensate for the hazardous changes in vehicle attitude in
the final seconds of the mission. The CAIB noted that as the wing damage caused
unanticipated changes in lift and drag on the wing and wing mass, Columbia's
" Additionally, as discussed in the case study of this dissertation, the OBSS was used in the repair of a
damaged solar array on the ISS.
12 The CAIB reported that though the Debris Assessment Team concluded that the debris damage was not a
"safety-of-flight" issue, they felt that the uncertainty in their analysis (the damage model they used had to
be extrapolated 400 times beyond its validated limits) warranted on-orbit imaging. They maintained this
view throughout the flight, but ultimately stopped trying to convince program management to honor their
requests.
ailerons and thrusters responded in an attempt to maintain vehicle attitude
(Gehman 2003). While the ailerons and thrusters were initially able to maintain
vehicle attitude, they were eventually overwhelmed by the increasing effects on
lift, drag, and wing mass due to additional damage to the wing from hot gases. As
mentioned in Vignette 1, Columbia did include features for crew escape added
after the Challenger Accident, but in order for them to be useful, the ailerons and
thrusters would have had to maintain vehicle attitude long enough for the vehicle
to slow below Mach 113
14) Additional compensatory actions were evident in the actions of STS-107 flight
controllers. During Columbia's final seconds of controlled flight, flight
controllers in the MCC detected and discussed problems with the left side of the
vehicle (four hydraulic sensors in the left wing stopped transmitting data and
shortly thereafter, tire pressure sensors in the left main landing gear went silent)
(Gehman 2003). In fact, the last transmission from the Columbia crew was in
response to an MCC message related to the faulty tire pressure indications
(Gehman 2003). These indications and the discussion that they generated
indicated that, in principle, the MCC had and was processing the information that
it would have needed in order to advise a crew escape action if the vehicle had
somehow managed to maintain attitude until it slowed below Mach 1.
Columbia, like Challenger, did not disintegrate simply because it contained "failed"
components. Each missed opportunity represents an instance in which 1) a system
component exerted additional effort-albeit unsuccessfully-to compensate for the
hazardous behavior of other components or 2) a proven system component that could
have been used for additional hazardous behavior compensation was excluded from the
mission. Moreover, the issue of foam debris is a matter of component interaction rather
than component failure: the foam fell uncontrolled from an interface between two system
components (i.e., the Orbiter/ET forward attachment) and struck other components (i.e.,
RCC panels) that are, by design, subjected to extreme conditions. Thus, a key aspect in
the prevention of accidents like the Columbia Accident is the fostering of compensatory
actions between components to reduce hazardous situations rather than a narrow focus on
the elimination of component failure. Accordingly, even though foam debris still falls
from the ET after extensive effort by NASA to reduce it (NASA 2005, NASA JSC
2005b), select elements of NASA are engaged in increased compensatory behavior (e.g.,
improved imaging of the ET during and immediately after launch, mandatory inspection
of Orbiter RCC panels and thermal tiles with the SRMS and OBSS, the development of
thermal tile and RCC repair methods, etc.) during each post-Columbia mission to ensure
that foam debris damage will never again lead to the loss of a crew.
Vignette 3: Gravity Probe B Radiation Anomalies
Unlike the Challenger and Columbia accidents, little has been written to date about a
series of radiation anomalies encountered during the Gravity Probe B (GP-B) mission.
GP-B was a low-Earth orbit satellite launched on April 20, 2004 to test Albert Einstein's
Theory of General Relativity. The basic idea for the project was first envisioned at
Stanford University over 40 years before the launch date: the spacecraft, once launched,
13 The vehicle was traveling a little under Mach 20 when it lost attitude control (Gehman 2003).
would hold a fixed inertial orientation by pointing at a distant star while instrumented
gyroscopes inside of it (isolated from Newtonian torques) would change orientation as
the spacecraft moved through curves in space-time caused by the Earth (Turneaure et al.
2003).
Throughout the project's developmental phase, tremendous effort was expended towards
overcoming its technological and political uncertainty. The eventual Principle
Investigator (PI) for GP-B and the first person to commit to it full-time, C. W. Francis
Everitt, joined the project in 1962 with little expectation that it would occupy him for the
next forty-five to fifty years (Overbye 2004). However, because the Earth's effect on
space-time is theorized to be very small, it was necessary for the experiment to be carried
out with extreme precision and thus, several new technologies had to be developed. The
developmental cost exceeded $700 million (Hecht 2004) and over ninety doctoral
dissertations related to the project were written and defended at six universities before the
spacecraft had even collected its first bit of data 14. Additionally, while the project dealt
with numerous technical delays, other General Relativity experiments were conducted
and their results were published, undermining the value of the GP-B project in the eyes of
some critics (Clark and Jamieson 2007, Mullins 2004, Overbye 2004). Due to this
waning support for the project in the scientific community and both cost and schedule
overruns, the mission was cancelled at least seven times, and each time the PI and other
scientists had to successfully lobby Congress to get it restored (Hecht 2004, Overbye
2004).
By the time GP-B was inserted into its operational orbit, it appeared as though many of
the project's challenges were behind it . However, the GP-B operations team would
encounter a number of challenges that threatened the success of the project. The basic
difficulties were that GP-B had to collect a large amount of data before its liquid helium
fuel/coolant was exhausted and that interruptions in data collection had negative
consequences-the precision of the result improved as a function of the data collection
interval time.
One source of interruption that arose multiple times during the project's data collection
phase was the rebooting of the spacecraft computers due to radiation anomalies known as
Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs). When radiation particles strike certain types of digital
memory cells in electronics, they sometimes "upset" or change the value of the bit of
information contained in the cell (i.e., change a "1" into a "0" or vice versa) 16. The
implication of upset events is that the upset bit(s), which contain false information as a
result of the upset, may be used by a computing device in the electronics to inform a
14 This dissertation can unofficially be classified as one of the first to result from the data that GP-B
collected. The author worked for the GP-B project at Stanford University as a master's-level graduate
research assistant from October 2003 to August 2005. This experience greatly shaped his manner of
thinking about safety risk management and this dissertation is in part an attempt to describe that manner of
thinking.
15 In fact, the Delta II launch vehicle that carried GP-B spaceward greatly exceeded expectations of the
Frecision in which it would insert the spacecraft into the desired orbit (NASA MSFC 2004).
If only one bit is upset by a particular radiation particle the event is referred to as a Single Bit Upset
(SBU) and if more than one bit is upset the event is referred to as an MBU.
process being controlled by the electronics. In other words, an upset can cause digital
electronics to perform functions in erroneous ways. To counteract the problems
associated with upsets, computing devices often examine bits of information in clusters,
known as logical words, that are arranged to provide both the information for the function
to be performed by the device and information that would indicate if one or more bits in
the logical word have been upset. Next, if it is apparent that one or more bits in an
examined logical word have been upset-conditions referred to as Single Bit Errors
(SBEs) and Multiple Bit Errors (MBEs), respectively-the computing device enacts a
number of corrective responses. For the GP-B spacecraft, the programmed responses to
MBEs sometimes led to computer reboots that interrupted data collection for hours and
days at a time.
The reason that GP-B was programmed to sometimes respond to MBEs through
computer reboots relates to the manner in which MBE uncertainty was represented.
Radiation particle collisions with digital memory cells are understood as stochastic
phenomena: it is not possible to know when an upset will occur or in which logical word
it will occur. It is, however, possible to determine an approximate number of MBEs in a
device over a span of time the memory device is exposed to radiation provided that: 1) a
large set of historical data that is representative the devices' intended usage is available,
2) the time span of exposure is sufficiently large to allow convergence to the statistical
median of the historical data, and 3) the number of logical words in the device is
sufficiently large to allow convergence to the statistical median of the historical data.
Unfortunately, the historical data set used by GP-B engineers to estimate the expected
number of MBEs during the mission was not representative of the behavior of the
memory device selected for use on GP-B. The selected memory device had memory
cells containing bits from the same logical word arranged physically adjacent to each
other while memory cells related to the same word in memory devices from the historical
database were usually scattered (Owens et al. 2006)17. This oversight in the analysis led
to what would prove to be an extremely optimistic estimate of expected MBEs (i.e., less
than five). Ultimately, this estimate suggested that MBEs were not going to be major
problem during the mission and that the following actions would be acceptable for MBE
response (Owens et al. 2006):
1) The spacecraft computers would periodically scan their memory for SBEs and
MBEs. All SBEs-which were expected to occur several orders of magnitude
more frequently than MBEs-would be automatically corrected by the computers
while MBEs would only be recorded by the computers. If necessary, human
operators of the spacecraft would manually correct the MBEs through software
patches or intentional reboots of the computer.
2) Shortly before executing a logical word, the relevant computer would scan it for
SBEs and MBEs, correct any SBEs, and record the MBEs.
17 The physical arrangement of memory cells in a digital memory device is important because radiation
particles colliding with the memory device with sufficient incidence to the plane of the memory device can
pass through a number of adjacent cells and upset the bits of data that they contain (Koga et al. 1993). If
the adjacent, upset bits are related to different logical words, the event will cause multiple SBEs instead of
MBEs.
3) If three MBEs were detected on three consecutive tenth-of-a-second intervals
during the main flight computer's memory scans, that computer would reboot.
4) If an executed MBE prevented the computers from properly resetting their
watchdog timers ", the watchdog timers would reboot the computers.
5) If an executed MBE prevented the function being performed from executing
properly, safety responses associated with that function would presumably reboot
the computer.
Of course, there were other MBE response options available, most notably one that
would correct MBEs automatically once they were detected, but such options would use
up limited computational and data storage resources on the spacecraft and may have had
negative effects on the spacecraft development cost and schedule. If the MBE estimates
were to be trusted, it indeed may have been wasteful for the project to pursue these other
options. Unfortunately, the prediction of zero to five MBEs over the entire mission (i.e.,
roughly fifteen months) was off by an order of magnitude; ironically, the first MBE
occurred within the first few hours of the mission.
During GP-B's data collection phase, the six computers on the spacecraft incurred a total
of at least thirty-eight MBEs, thirty-two of which were corrected manually by spacecraft
operators before a reboot occurred (Owens et al. 2006). Five MBEs led to computer
reboots and another halted data collection for twelve hours without causing a reboot; in
all, three percent of GP-B's data collection opportunities and thousands of GP-B
employee hours were lost to complications caused by MBEs (Owens et al. 2006).
Additionally as illustrated by the prominent data gap in the preliminary results released
by the GP-B science team (see Figure 1), the interruptions led to shorter data collection
intervals.
18 Watchdog timers are devices used to independently check the health of a computing device. They reboot
the computing device after a prescribed time if it is not able to successfully reset the timer periodically (the
action of resetting the watchdog timer is effectively a periodic "statement" by the computer that it is okay).
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Figure 1. Preliminary results of Gravity Probe B data analysis (Everitt 2007).
However, as bad as these outcomes may seem, the situation would have been worse
without the compensatory efforts of the spacecraft operators. In addition to manually
correcting almost every MBE, the operators, as shown in Table 1, reduced the time it
took to recover from an MBE-induced reboot of the main flight computer by nearly half
each time the main flight computer rebooted (Owens et al. 2006). Furthermore, they
confirmed that the MBEs almost exclusively occurred while the spacecraft was in three
well-documented high-radiation regions over the Earth19, see Figure 2 and Figure 3
below, and avoided scheduling critical events whenever the spacecraft was in those
regions. These measures reduced the risk that an MBE occurring in these regions would
lead to a complication that triggered a reboot. Finally, they questioned the utility of the
third MBE response listed above, came to the conclusion that it was more harmful than
helpful, increased its activation threshold from three consecutive MBE indications to nine
consecutive indications, and changed the response from a full reboot of the main flight
computer to a stoppage in its command sequence timeline (Owens et al. 2006).
'9 These regions are the South Atlantic Anomaly, North Polar Region, and South Polar Region. The
heightened radioactive activity in these regions is linked to the structure of the Earth's magnetic field.
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EVENT ID COMPUTER TIME (GMT) IMPACT
MBE A Main Flight [O]-May 3, 2004 05:03:53 -5 day (120 hour)
Computer [R]-May 8, 2004 slippage of data
collection initiation
MBE B Main Science [O]-Nov. 11, 2004 00:59:19 21.2 hour data loss
Computer [R]-Nov. 11, 2004 22:10:27
MBE C Main Flight [O]-Mar. 4, 2005 15:18:12 74.5 hour data loss
Computer [R]-Mar. 7, 2005 17:48:30
MBE D Main Flight [O]-Mar. 15, 2005 07:38:58 29.9 hour data loss
Computer [R]-Mar. 16, 2005 13:32:54
MBE E Main Flight [O]-Mar. 18, 2005 15:18:10 15.4 hour data loss
Computer [R]-Mar. 19, 2005 06:43:15
MBE F Gyro 4 [O]-Mar. 27, 2005 10:14:00 -12 hour stoppage of
Suspension [R]-Mar. 27, 2005 21:59:00 the command sequence
Computer timeline
Note: [O] = Onset of event, [R] = Recovery of capabilities lost
Table 1. A description of the severe MBE Events for GP-B (adapted from Owens et
al. 2006).
Figure 2. The location of the GP-B spacecraft during SBEs.2°
20 SBE data from the Main Flight Computer is not shown in this plot due to corruption of the Main Flight
Computer SBE data caused by the stuck bit(s) described in Owens et al. (2006).
Figure 3. The location of the GP-B spacecraft during MBEs (Owens et al. 2006).
Unfortunately, as was the case in Vignettes 1 and 2, additional capabilities for
compensatory action by the spacecraft operators were excluded from the system design.
MBEs in the main science computer could not be corrected through software patches,
resulting in one reboot (i.e., MBE B in Table 1) that could have been avoided (Owens et
al. 2006). Furthermore, once it was recognized that the project's initial MBE estimates
were overly optimistic, the upset scanning routines could not be altered to correct MBEs
as they were detected and bits in logical words could not be reassigned in a manner that
would reduce the physical adjacency of their memory cells. These exclusions in the
design limited the operations team's efforts to reduce the impact of MBEs and to a
certain extent relegated them to a reactive role when they had the appropriate knowledge
for a more proactive role.
The overall impact of the radiation anomalies on GP-B's data collection and analysis
effort will not be fully known until the final results are published and responded to by the
scientific community. Immediately after the preliminary results were released,
skepticism arose as to whether or not the GP-B team would be able to improve upon the
accuracy of previous General Relativity experiments because of the radiation anomalies
and an unexpected Newtonian torque on the gyroscopes during data collection (Wesson
and Anderson 2008, Jamieson 2007, Clark and Jamieson 2007). In 2008, a review
committee, citing this skepticism over the expected final accuracy of GP-B's results,
recommended that NASA terminate funding for the data analysis by the start of the 2009
fiscal year (Hecht 2008). However, the GP-B team soon issued rebuttals to the review
committee's report citing a more favorable November 2007 assessment of their data
analysis progress by an independent peer review committee and potential inconsistencies
in the NASA review process due to the agency's organizational structure (Everitt 2008,
Stanford University 2008a). As of the writing of this dissertation, NASA has terminated
funding of the project, and the GP-B team has secured funding from alternative sources
to continue reducing the error in their measurements through December 2009 (Wesson
and Anderson 2008, Stanford University 2008b).
What can be said at this point about the complications from the radiation anomalies is
that they, like the destruction and fatalities in the first two vignettes, resulted from the
overall socio-technical system's inability to maintain a goal, which in this case was
continuous data collection. The system did not falter due to "failed" components; in fact,
in this situation it is unclear what one would label as the "failed" component. While the
memory device allowed its data to be corrupted, it reliably provided that data-along
with the data needed to identify the MBEs-to the computing device and overwrote the
data whenever requested. Had the overall spacecraft automation been equipped with the
capability to correct MBEs when they were detected, the memory device would have
reliably provided the computing device with the corrupted data and all of the information
needed to correct it. More to the point, the corrupted data only caused problems when the
computing devices were allowed to use them to control other components in the system.
In order for that to happen, the data corruption would have to persist despite the
compensatory actions of the spacecraft operators and automation. Also, one cannot
neglect the role of external pressures on the system in shaping the situation; had other
General Relativity experiments not allegedly undermined the value of GP-B before it was
launched, the significance of the MBEs would have been reduced and the
financial/schedule pressures on the project when the memory device was selected may
have been different. Once again, component interactions with each other and the
system's environment reigned supreme in determining how the situation would unfold;
an attempt to attribute the matter to a simple "component failure" would grossly
misrepresent it.
Discussion of the vignettes
A common feature in all of the vignettes was that the overall performance of each system
was not equal to the sum performances that all of its individual components would
produce if they were not a part of the system (i.e., the performances of the systems were a
nonlinear aggregation of the performances of their parts). While certain components in
the systems faltered, other components reacted in an attempt to compensate (e.g.,
Challenger's rocket nozzles pivoted to counteract thrust inadequacies due to the O-ring
leak, Columbia's reaction control thrusters fired to oppose the torques caused by the hole-
induced forces on its left wing, space shuttle engineers objected to their management's
willingness to launch Challenger and to proceed with the Columbia mission without
imaging the damaged wing, the GP-B's operations team learned from each MBE-induced
reboot of the main flight computer and reduced the recovery time by nearly half each
time, etc.). Another feature is that there were previously-utilized components that were
excluded from each system (e.g., a crew escape subsystem, the SRMS, error scanning
routines that automatically corrected MBEs, etc.) that potentially could have increased
the systems' compensation for the faltering of some of their components enough to avoid
the two tragedies and one near-tragedy.
In all three vignettes, a decision was made under uncertainty (i.e., to launch Challenger
without a clear understanding of the effect of cold weather on the O-rings, to continue the
mission of Columbia as planned without visual confirmation of the wing damage caused
by the foam strike, and to accept a specific probabilistic representation of uncertainty as
grounds for using a memory device without many commonly used radiation hardening
features) and both political and financial pressure on the decision makers. Though in
hindsight, almost all of these decisions appear to be misguided 21, they were, at the time
that they were made and from the perspective of those making them, reasonable and
perhaps even rational. However, as has been indicated above, these decisions were at
roughly the same time unacceptable from different perspectives and resisted throughout
the vignettes (though unfortunately, the resistance was often not powerful enough).
These instances of portions of the system resisting the intendedly rational (though unsafe)
actions of other parts of the system are examples of system nonlinearities that enhance
the system's robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in opposition to unsafe
decisions and component behaviors.
Before framing the problem of maintaining the safety of complex, engineered systems
despite uncertainty as a matter of establishing robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and
resilience in opposition to unsafe decisions and component behaviors, it is important to
note that such efforts are not a struggle between "good" and "evil" (or even the
blameworthy versus the non-blameworthy). Cause and effect in complex systems are not
closely related in time and space (Senge 2006, Forrester 1971) and thus, those making the
unsafe decisions may do so not because they are "evil," but because they cannot
understand the consequences of their actions. In fact, as time passes and more
information on the effects of the decision become apparent, the very individual that made
the decision might even come to actively resist its consequences (e.g., a number of the
engineers and managers on GP-B that selected the memory device used would later play
instrumental roles in reducing the impact of MBEs on GP-B data collection).
Furthermore, expectations for the performance of complex systems often change along
with the environments that they operate in, further clouding the decision maker's ability
to make safe decisions. Increasing pressure on the GP-B project to justify its continuance
despite the results of other experiments, for example, was a factor in its struggle to avoid
cancellation, but such expectation changes are not limited to systems as "exotic" as fifty-
year-long General Relativity experiments. Even systems that we encounter on a daily
basis can be thrust into roles unforeseen when they were designed: retired subway cars,
for example, are increasingly being used to make artificial reefs along the U.S. Atlantic
Coast (Urbina 2008). The reality of complex system design and operation is that these
systems must face evolving environments and expectations and must be equipped to
safely endure these changes.
Overall, the sources of robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in opposition to
the unsafe decisions and component behavior in the vignettes were underutilized or
overwhelmed. Additionally other potential sources of such robustness, adaptability,
flexibility, and resilience were excluded from the systems so that other priorities could be
21 The decision to use the memory device used on GP-B may be the only exception. It is unclear whether
the GP-B mission could have avoided cancellation with the additional development costs and delays
associated with the use of other memory devices or additional memory device testing. However, it is now
clear that the probabilistic representation of MBE likelihood that was used was misleading and thus, a
different approach to the treatment of MBE uncertainty, such as tracking it as a larger risk before launch
and during the early stages of the mission, would have been more appropriate.
addressed. While these facts create reason to be pessimistic about the safety of complex,
engineered systems (see Perrow 1999), they also suggest areas in which contributions to
our understanding of robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in opposition to
unsafe decisions can improve the safety of these systems. If we can learn to better design
and utilize the sources of robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience for opposing
unsafe decisions and component behavior and to value them enough to include them in
the system design despite competing priorities, we will be better equipped to safely deal
with the complex, dynamic nature of our engineered systems and the environments in
which they operate.
1.2 Background
The Engineering Systems Paradigm for engineering research
What can engineering research teach us about the uncertainties that engineers and
operators faced in the above vignettes and how they could have been better handled?
First, it is necessary to draw distinctions between the science, engineering science, and
engineering systems paradigms for research. Such distinctions will better allow us to
identify the knowledge that the older (i.e., science and engineering science) paradigms
have provided in this regard and the type of knowledge that works in the new (i.e.,
engineering systems) paradigm (such as this dissertation) could provide.
As hinted at in the Theodore von Kirmain and Michael Griffin quotes provided at the
beginning of this chapter, each paradigm of research is meant to further different types of
knowledge. Vincenti (1990) and Pitt (2001) describe science as an effort to explain the
natural universe and engineering as an effort to create artifacts; for science, knowledge is
an end in itself and for engineering, knowledge is a means to any number of ends.
To more clearly illustrate this distinction between science and engineering, the author
shall draw upon an adapted form of the "Vee" model of systems engineering introduced
by Forsberg and Mooz (1992), provided in Figure 4. Slightly above the left leg of the
"Vee" we have a set of stakeholders with a set of needs. The "Vee" begins with the
specification of system-level goals and requirements and proceeds downward to the
specification of system components. Following fabrication of the system components (at
the bottom of the "Vee"), the components are tested (the right leg of the "Vee")
individually at first and then as part of the integrated system to ensure that the goals and
requirements of the system can be met. Finally, above the right leg of the "Vee", the
system as a whole is used to satisfy the stakeholder needs.
System Level:
Stakeholder Need System Utilization
System Goal/
Requirement Integrated System
Specification Testing
Subsystem Subsystem
Specification Testing
Component Level:
Component Component
Specification Testing
Component Fabrication
Figure 4. The "Vee" Model of Systems Engineering (adapted from Forsberg and
Mooz 1992).
The "Vee" in the model provided in Figure 4 is a simple22, descriptive representation of
the process of engineering a complex system. The process of scientific inquiry, on the
other hand, perhaps only draws parallels to the right leg of the "Vee", particularly the
lower portion of it. The scientist examines the already-fabricated components (i.e., the
natural universe) with the hope of explaining their role in the integrated system.
However, while stakeholder utilization of the system may be improved by the scientist's
investigation, the scientist does not necessarily interest him or herself throughout the
process with stakeholder utilization of the system. The scientist proceeds upward from
the bottom of the "Vee" with a primary interest in knowledge and is therefore hesitant to
compromise the robustness of that knowledge in order to reach the upper-right end of the
"Vee". The scientist isolates the components from each other and their environment;
changes one variable of study at time; and whenever possible, approximates the
relationships between variables as linear altogether or linear in the vicinity of critical
points and events in the system. The products of the scientist's labor are theories that
must be subjected to possible refutation (Popper 1934). The process makes for a slow
climb up the "Vee", but if the theories are eventually refuted, the fruit of the scientist's
22 The adapted "Vee" model is not to be used as a prescriptive model of the engineering process. Rarely, if
ever, does the process of translating stakeholder needs into an integrated system to serve those needs
proceed along a monolithic "Vee"-shaped trajectory. Iterations are likely to occur at multiple stages in the
process and the use of legacy hardware, software, or processes may alter the starting point of the process.
Thus, problems could result from "forcing" the process into a "Vee" trajectory. Instead, the key concept to
derive from the model as presented is that when a system is too complex to design and fabricate as an
"irreducible" artifact, there is a series of intermediate steps in the design process in which components must
be conceptualized, created, and integrated into the system in order to prepare it to satisfy stakeholder needs.
labor will be lost or at the very least diminished23 . In other words, the scientist hopes to
create theories impervious to refutation and is not necessarily interested in providing a
means to stakeholders to meet their needs (i.e., in reaching the upper-right end of the
"Vee").
Heretofore, the author has established distinctions between scientists and engineers that
point to differences not only in the types of systems that they examine (i.e., natural vs.
designed), but also in the motivation behind their manner of inquiry. Because the
engineer is concerned with delivering a system that can be utilized for stakeholder needs,
he or she may not be concerned with creating indestructible theories. As stated by Hills
and Tedford (2003):
"Because engineers are problem solvers, they cannot, as do scientists, follow the
line of least resistance and simplify the context to suit their convenience."
However, the generalizations that the author has used up to this point to describe
engineering do not capture key differences within subcultures of engineering, particularly
the academic and non-academic cultures. While engineers are indeed problems solvers,
the types of problems that they face in academia are different than those faced outside of
academia and thus differences have emerged in the ways that engineers approach
problems in academia and elsewhere. For reasons that will not be explored in this
dissertation, a culture of engineering referred to as engineering science has come to
dominate engineering education and research in academia. Researchers that subscribe to
the engineering science paradigm do not stray too far from the scientific method.
Like scientists, engineering scientists tend to isolate the system components from each
other and their environment; change one variable of study at a time; and whenever
possible, approximate the relationships between variables as linear altogether or linear in
the vicinity of critical points and events in the system24. Newberry (2005) refers to
"methodological localization" processes in engineering science (e.g., simplifying
assumptions, idealizing constraints, system decomposition, isolating control volumes,
etc.) meant to reduce the scope and complexity (i.e., to remove contextual/global
considerations) of research and design problems. Even Vincenti (1990) in his attempt to
distinguish engineering from science points to a tendency in engineering science to
ignore the contextual factors of system design by stating that in the lowest levels of the
system design, knowledge is predominantly derived from the internal needs of the design
rather than the contextual factors in which the system as a whole will exist.
Thus, the engineering process described in the simple model provided in Figure 4 is not
fully analogous to the engineering science paradigm of engineering research. In fact, the
23 The fruit of the engineer's labor, on the other hand, will only be lost if the artifact that they wish to create
does not get built or does not work to address the needs of the stakeholder. In this sense engineering
knowledge does not have to apply "universally", it just has to adequately apply for the specific application
that it was created for and therefore, it is not destroyed by refutation as is scientific knowledge (Pitt 2001).
24 These practices will be demonstrated through the discussion of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and
linearization methods in control theory in the chapters to follow.
engineering science paradigm appears to be best represented by the lower-left and lower-
right sections of the "Vee" and as was the case with the scientific paradigm for research,
questions arise on the motivation of the researcher to reach the upper-right end of the
"Vee". If an actual artifact is to be created from the research, the engineer (or more
precisely the engineering organization creating the artifact) has a clear incentive to reach
the top of the "Vee". However, if the research is to be conducted without a clear deadline
for artifact creation, as is the case in many studies in academia, the motivation to reach
the top of the "Vee" may be subjugated to the desire to create robust theories of
engineering utility. While such theories are needed for the success and improvement of
the engineering process as a whole, there is also a need for improved knowledge of the
upper section of the "Vee". Though movement into the upper-right section of the "Vee"
often exposes engineering knowledge to refutation, academia should not abdicate its role
in informing this process by restricting itself to the more refutation resistant portions of
the "Vee". In other words, a new paradigm of engineering research is needed in
academia to complement the engineering science paradigm.
It is the author's belief that the new engineering systems paradigm of engineering
research should complement the engineering science paradigm of engineering research to
inform the engineering process as a whole. This form of symbiotic cohesion of
paradigms in engineering research is analogous to already articulated views of the
relationships between systems engineering/architecting and component/design
engineering in engineering practice. In the original "Vee" model created by Forsberg and
Mooz (1992), a line dividing the upper portion of the "Vee" from the lower portion was
drawn to represent the distinction between system engineering responsibility and design
engineering responsibility. System engineering was said to be responsible for work
above the line with design engineering providing technical assistance, while below the
line, design engineering was responsible with system engineering performing technical
audit. Additionally, Maier and Rechtin (2000) proclaim:
"The art of [systems] architecting, therefore, complements its science where
science is weakest: in dealing with immeasurables, in reducing past experience
and wisdom to practice, in conceptualization, in inspirationally putting disparate
things together, in providing 'sanity checks', and in warning of likely but
unprovable trouble ahead. Terms like reasonable assumptions, guidelines,
indicators, elegant design, and beautiful performance are not out of place in this
art, nor are lemon, disaster, snafu, or loser-hardly quantifiable, but as real in
impact as any science."
In this dissertation, the engineering systems paradigm for engineering research is viewed
as being primarily concerned with the sections of the "Vee" in Figure 4 above the
"Component Level" label. Furthermore, the left and right legs of the "Vee" are seen as
mutually dependent: efficacious specification of the system and subsystems depends on
an understanding of the techniques that will be used to integrate the system and
integration of the components into a system depends on a complete and coherent set of
specifications. Thus, this dissertation is focused on improving our understanding of the
translation of stakeholder needs (characterized by system properties) into system and
subsystem specifications and our understanding of how the products of those
specifications can be used as a whole to produce the desired system properties. In other
words, the author seeks to improve the process of specifying system components for the
engineering scientists to analyze and of making sense of the varied context-neutral
theories that arise from the engineering science analyses in order to create a system with
properties that will meet the stakeholder needs.
A Systems View of Safety Risk Management
The engineering science paradigm has given us several linear models of accident
causality based largely on component failure events, but because safety 25 is an emergent
property of systems (Leveson 2009, 2004, 1995) and not a linear extrapolation of
component-level properties, researchers have sought alternative models (refer to the next
chapter for a review of some of the linear models and the models proposed to replace
them). The accident causality model and associated risk management framework that is
meant to be advanced through this dissertation is the Systems Theoretic Accident Model
and Processes (STAMP) framework and associated STAMP-based Analysis (STPA)
techniques first proposed by Leveson (2002, 2003, 2004). In STAMP and STPA, system
safety engineering is grounded in the control theory paradigm of system state
management: hazards are defined in terms of unsafe system states, constraints are
identified to restrict the hazards, and a safety control structure is engineered and operated
to enforce the constraints despite adaptations within the system and in its environment.
These concepts will be described more fully in later chapters, but for now, the reader is
encouraged to think back to the vignettes described earlier in this chapter. For the two
Space Shuttle accidents, the relevant hazard is "exposure of the crew to unacceptable
accelerations" and in the case of Gravity Probe B, the relevant hazard was "inability to
collect data." In the earliest stages of system specification, the safety constraints that
would follow from the hazards would likely read:
1) "The astronaut crew must never be subjected to accelerations greater than or
equal to Xi forward g's, X2 backward g's, X3 lateral g's, or X4 radians per
second squared and must not be subjected to greater than X5 forward g's, X6
backward g's, X7 lateral g's, or X8 radians per second squared for greater than X9
seconds." Where X1 through X9 represent theorized survivability limits.
2) "The GP-B spacecraft must be able to continuously collect General Relativity
data for X days." Where X is the theorized duration necessary to achieve the
desired measurement accuracy.
Ideally, upon further specification and analysis of the system, safety constraints similar to
the following could emerge on the subsystem and component levels:
25 An accident, as defined by Leveson (2009) is, "An undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss
(including loss of human life or injury, property damage, environmental pollution, etc.)." Accordingly, she
defines safety as "Freedom from accidents (loss events),"
1) "Thrust mismatches in the left and right SRBs must not lead to crew compartment
attitude errors of Y1 degrees or Y2 degrees per second." Where Y1 and Y2 are the
theorized limits for rotational stability of the crew compartment during launch.
2) "Depressurization of the ET propellant tanks, at either nominal or off-nominal
rates, must not lead to crew compartment attitude errors of Yi degrees or Y2
degrees per second."
3) "The RCC panels on the Orbiter must be inspected before the vehicle is
committed to a nominal re-entry."
4) "All software and all data written by the software must be read for execution as
written by the software logic or human programmers" (Owens and Leveson
2006).
These constraints put an emphasis on preventing hazardous states rather than the
elimination of component "failure" where the term "failure" is used with respect to the
nominally expected performance of component. They leave room open for component
"failure" (including the occasional poor decision by decision makers) provided that other
components can detect and compensate for these failings. Furthermore, though these
constraints may suggest certain levels of component functionality (e.g., the first two
safety constraints in particular strongly suggest a need for crew escape capability and the
third strongly suggests the usage of an SRMS, etc.), there is no set manner in which to
satisfy them; ultimately, the component behavior is of secondary concern to the system's
ability to obtain its desired results.
1.3 Dissertation Research Question and Approach
The research described in this dissertation is driven by the question:
"How can we evaluate and improve the robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and
resilience of complex socio-technical systems in order to oppose the unsafe
decisions and component behaviors occurring in them under uncertainty?"
The research builds on recent developments in STAMP and STPA (see the next chapter)
through the creation of techniques for advanced dynamic analysis of control flaws in a
safety control structure (i.e., conditions that can potentially lead to hazard states). The
notion that a safety control structure is an "engine" for robustness, adaptability,
flexibility, and resilience to oppose unsafe decisions and component behaviors should be
self-evident, but the issue of modeling the behavior of the safety control structure under
both certain and uncertain conditions to inform safety control structure design and
operation is still (and perhaps always will be) a matter of scholarly debate. In this
dissertation, the author takes the approach of modeling the output of system safety
control structures as phase space attractors (to be described in later chapters) with
nonlinear, continuous dynamics subject to uncertain initial (or disturbance) conditions.
In a way, taking this approach is an assertion of the following hypothesis:
"Modeling the output of system safety control structures as phase space
attractors with nonlinear, continuous dynamics subject to uncertain initial (or
disturbance) conditions will provide useful insights in the design and operation of
system safety control structures. "
However, it is acknowledged that this hypothesis is notoriously difficult to refute using
the notions of refutation held in the science and engineering science paradigms. In some
systems such a representation may capture the dynamics adequately while in others, it
may not (e.g., a model using discrete dynamics may be better). Furthermore, while such
a representation may only represent the actual dynamics of some systems crudely, it may
also facilitate a "great leap forward" in the system-level designers' and decision makers'
understanding of these systems (and on the other hand, it may represent a backward leap
in some systems). In other words, the "theory" purported by this hypothesis cannot be
context-neutral because it is context that makes each engineering system unique and
worthwhile to build and operate.
With that said, support for the hypothesis is presented through the case study of the real-
time procedure update process in Space Shuttle Mission Control. Procedures are a means
of knowledge transfer in spaceflight operations between the in-depth operational and
engineering expertise on the ground (i.e., Earth) and the executive capability on the
spacecraft. In human spaceflight, procedures serve as a basis for astronaut training and in
robotic and human spaceflight alike, procedures and directives dictate the specific actions
of spacecraft automation. However, all procedures are based on assumptions about the
operational state of the spacecraft and its environment and it is thus possible for these
assumptions to be invalidated over the course of a mission. Accordingly, a process that
the author calls Procedure Rework has emerged as a primary function of real-time ground
operations teams in order to update invalid procedures before astronauts or the spacecraft
automation execute them. This process is a system safety control substructure to reduce
the impact of a control flaw-similar to the control flaw presented by MBEs on GP-B-
in which invalid information is used to conduct a function relevant to the system-level
behavior.
In the case study, a set of models for numerical simulation of procedure rework is
developed through physical and human factors principles and calibrated with data from
five Space Shuttle missions. These models produce simulation results with deviations
from the historical data that are-as characterized by Theil Inequality Statistics-small
and primarily due to cycles and noise in the data that are irrelevant with regard to the
purpose of the models. These models are used to analyze the attractor produced by the
Procedure Rework Process across varied conditions, some of which NASA is expected to
encounter in future human spaceflight missions. Accordingly, a detrimental effect in the
Procedure Rework Process is identified and approaches to mitigating the effect are
explored.
This analysis and the insights that resulted from it are discussed in the case study along
with the overall implications of using phase space attractors with nonlinear, continuous
dynamics as a model of system safety control structure output. A process-derived as a
result of this analysis-is proposed to assist STPA analysts in evaluating and potentially
re-engineering the continuous dynamics of safety control structures in engineering
systems. This process is meant to occur within the overall context of a safety-driven
design effort and is derived from a type of reasoning that rejects the notion of random
component failures, random initiating events, and the linear superposition of the
component contributions to risk as the central concepts in safety risk management.
Instead, nonlinear component interactions are accounted for by conducting analyses
throughout the process on the system-level of abstraction. Though there is uncertainty in
the system's inputs and some aspects of its internal dynamics-and the system's behavior
might therefore "appear" random-the system is tuned throughout the process to be
attracted to safe system states. Overall, the analysis presented in the case study: 1)
demonstrates how to use phase space attractors to evaluate system safety constraint
enforcement, 2) identifies potential improvements for current and future Mission Control
procedure rework processes, and 3) provides an example that other systems can learn
from in order to develop safe procedure rework processes.
1.4 Dissertation Synopsis
In this chapter, three vignettes relating to accidents and incidents in complex socio-
technical systems were presented to highlight the nonlinearity of these systems and their
potential for robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in opposing unsafe
decisions and component behavior under uncertainty. The question was then raised as to
how engineering research could be used to improve such resistance to these types of
decisions and behaviors. Distinctions were then drawn between the science, engineering
science, and engineering systems paradigms of research in order to frame the manner in
which this question would be approached. Safety risk management was defined as a
subset of uncertainty management and the author's preferred framework for safety risk
management (i.e., STAMP/STPA) was identified. Finally, the specific research question
and approach for this dissertation were discussed.
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the literature for which this dissertation's contributions
are targeted. Linear risk management models are critiqued along with several
organizational models proposed to replace them. Literature promoting an emerging
notion of resilience, adaptability, flexibility, and robustness to manage uncertainty (both
its upside, opportunity, and its downside, risk) is then discussed (the STAMP and STPA
literature is included in this discussion). Finally, the "macro-human factors" literature
(i.e., an intersection of human factors and organizational research) is mentioned to
highlight human-induced nonlinearities and robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and
resilience in the design and operation of complex socio-technical systems.
In Chapter 3, the fundamental concepts of control theory are discussed to provide the
reader with sufficient background to understand the remainder of the dissertation. The
parts of a control system and notion of variables of system state are defined along with
the concept of control authority over system states for the purpose of task execution,
disturbance rejection, and adaptation. Furthermore, a simple demonstration of these
concepts is provided through the analysis of a linear control system, followed by a
discussion of how these concepts differ in linear and nonlinear systems. Finally, a brief
summary of paradigms for nonlinear control system analysis is provided.
Chapter 4 contains an explanation of the theoretical concepts involved in modeling and
engineering the phase space attractors produced by safety control structures. Phase space
attractors are explained and previous mathematical representations of STAMP/STPA
safety control structure behavior are reviewed. Real-world examples are then provided
of phase space attracters in social and technical systems, and the relationship between the
concept of phase space attractors and safety-driven design is explained. Finally, a
preview of a case study application of the concept of using phase space attractors for
system safety constraint enforcement-which is presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7-is
provided.
Background information for the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework Case
Study is presented in Chapter 5. A historical overview of Mission Control throughout the
various U.S. human spaceflight programs is provided. Flight Controller responsibilities,
facilities, staffing, and training are then detailed with an emphasis on how they enhance
flight controller capability for original thought and problem solving in real-time
operations. Then the Procedure Rework Process is described in order to prepare the
reader for the formal analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Finally the research
literature pertaining to Mission Control is reviewed in order to highlight the gaps in
knowledge that could potentially be filled by using the notion of phase space attractors to
model safety control structure behavior.
The purpose, scope, and methodology of the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study are discussed in Chapter 6. First, the case study purpose and scope
are described. Next, the initial actions taken to develop dynamic models of the Procedure
Rework Process are discussed along with the actions taken for data collection and
processing. Then, a description is provided of the dynamic models and how they were
calibrated.
The analyses performed in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework Case
Study, along with their results and limitations, are detailed in Chapter 7. These analyses
explore a range of flight conditions that NASA is expected to encounter as it executes its
vision for space exploration and highlight potential ways in which the Procedure Rework
Process can be improved. Additionally, a general process for using phase space attractors
to evaluate and improve safety control structures is presented with the case study serving
as an example application.
In Chapter 8, the author closes his argument. First, the author's hypothesis is revisited
and his contributions to the management of uncertainty in engineering systems are
summarized. Next, the author's contributions to procedure rework processes in human
spaceflight and in general are reviewed. Then, the author describes possible directions
for further research. Finally, the author summarizes the entire dissertation and provides a
closing statement.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
"The odd term normal accident is meant to signal that, given the system
characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable.
This is an expression of an integral characteristic of the system, not a statement of
frequency. It is normal for us to die, but we only do it once." -Charles B. Perrow
(1999).
"The meaning of probability has been in debate ever since the concept was first
developed at the end of the seventeenth century and, perhaps contrary to popular
imagination, is still far from agreed." -Stephen R. Watson (1994)
"Probability is a model, with a unique characteristic: It exists as a description of
the likelihood of outcomes prior to an event but collapses at the instant of the
event and thereafter. These events are 'gambles' with positive and negative
values assigned to the outcomes. Risk is the downside of such a gamble.
Underlying all probability models is the belief that the future will behave as in the
past. " -William D. Rowe (1994).
"As a psychology ofpragmatics, human factors adopted the Cartesian-Newtonian
view of science and scientific method...These views are with us today. They
dominate thinking in human factors and system safety. The problem is that linear
extensions of these same notions cannot carry us into the future. The once
pragmatic ideas of human factors and system safety are falling behind the
practical problems that have started to emerge from today's world." -Sidney W.
A. Dekker (2005)
"Operators and craftspeople who have their hands on the equipment are
concerned with resilience, coping with the expected and unexpected deviations
from the designers' image of perfection." -John S. Carroll (1998).
2.1 Chapter Overview
The issue of uncertainty management in complex systems-especially as it relates to
system safety-spans several areas of research. In this chapter, the literature that was
targeted for the key contributions of this dissertation is discussed (i.e., the safety risk
management literature). Work from other literatures (e.g., the control theory literatures,
etc.) that were targeted for secondary contributions of the dissertation or that are simply
being invoked to enhance the literature described in this chapter, are mostly discussed
throughout the other chapters of this dissertation.
2.2 Linear Accident Models
Currently, the most widely used accident models in safety risk management are what
Hollnagel (2006) refers to as the simple and complex linear accident models26. In these
models, accidents are viewed as the result of a linear sequence or chain of events and
thus, it is believed that preventing any one of the events will prevent the accident
(Leveson 1995). The simplest linear accident models can be represented graphically in
event tress and fault trees (Pat6-Cornell 1984) or combinations thereof referred to as
"bow-ties" (see Chevreau et al. 2006 for an example), while the more complex linear
accident models can only be represented graphically in a rudimentary manner. Perhaps
the most famous complex linear accident model is the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason
1995, Reason 1990), which depicts technical and organization barriers to event
propagation as slices of Swiss cheese with "holes" that could align and provide a
trajectory for events to cascade into an accident.
One of the most compelling indictments of the completeness and accuracy of linear
accident models is the difficulty in using them to describe an increasingly recognized
"drift into states of high risk" phenomenon associated with major accidents in socio-
technical systems. In the "drift into states of high risk" phenomenon, systems slowly
migrate over time to a hazardous state in which they became practically defenseless
against a number of accident scenarios (Leveson et al. 2006, Woods 2006, Dekker 2005,
Leveson 2004, Rasmussen 1997). Dekker (2005) provides the following account of "drift
into states of high risk" in explaining the maintenance procedures on an aircraft
component that failed in flight, causing an accident:
"Starting from a lubrication interval of 300 [flight] hours, the interval at the time
of the Alaska 261 accident had moved up to 2,550 hours, almost an order of
magnitude more. As is typical in the drift toward failure, this distance was not
bridged in one leap. The slide was incremental: step by step, decision by
decision. In 1985, jackscrew lubrication was to be accomplished every 700
hours, at every other so-called maintenance B check (which occurs every 350
flight hours). In 1987, the B-check interval itself was increased to 500 flight
hours, pushing lubrication intervals to 1,000 hours. In 1988, B checks were
eliminated altogether, and tasks to be accomplished were redistributed over A
and C checks. The jackscrew assembly lubrication was to be done each eighth
125-hour A check: still every 1,000 flight hours. But in 1991, A-check intervals
were extended to 150flight hours, leaving a lubrication every 1200 hours. Three
years later, the A-check interval was extended again, this time to 200 hours.
Lubrication would now happen every 1,600 flight hours. In 1996, the jackscrew-
assembly lubrication task was removed from the A check and moved instead to a
so-called task card that specified lubrication every 8 months. There was no
longer an accompanying flight-hour limit. For Alaska Airlines, 8 months
26 According to Hollnagel, the difference between simple and complex linear accident models is whether or
not the model is static or dynamic, respectively. In a complex linear model, the likelihood of the events in
the chain are acknowledged-qualitatively or quantitatively-to change over time. In the Swiss Cheese
model-which Hollnagel provides as an example complex linear model-the barriers can erode or
otherwise change over time, thus changing the likelihood of an accident over time.
translated to about 2,550 flight hours. The jackscrew recovered from the ocean
floor, however, revealed no evidence that there had been adequate lubrication at
the previous interval at all. It might have been more than 5,000 hours since it had
last received a coat offresh grease. "
Fitting "drift into states of high risk" scenarios like the one mentioned above into a
simple linear chain of events model before the fact is a difficult, if not intractable task.
An alternative approach that has been used in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
community is to model "drift into states of high risk" through complex linear chain of
events models in which the probability of each event is treated as a Markov process (see
Pat6-Cornell et al. 1996 for an example related to anesthesiology). Markov processes are
a special type of system evolution process based on memory-less system state transitions,
and while their use in complex linear chain of events models enhances model
completeness, it also adds assumptions and complexity that further cast doubt on model
accuracy, especially if the models are to be used for system optimization.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
In safety risk management based on linear accident models, uncertainty is often
accounted for quantitatively through probabilistic estimates of event likelihood. Pat6-
Cornell (1996) describes six levels of the treatment of uncertainty in risk analysis ranging
from least quantitative to most quantitative: 1) hazard and failure mode identification, 2)
description of the "worst case" scenario, 3) description of "quasi-worst cases" or worst
case scenarios that can be reasonably expected, 4) best and/or central value (i.e., mean,
median, or mode) estimates, 5) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) yielding a single
risk curve, and 6) PRA yielding multiple risk curves. This classification largely implies
that the use of probabilistic methods is necessary to achieve increasing levels of
sophistication in the treatment of uncertainty and indeed, if an event-based accident
model is accepted, the effective use of deterministic methods may be precluded.
However, as will be shown in Chapter 4, alternative accident models (i.e., accident
models based on system state) allow for a blend of deterministic and probabilistic
methods.
Although PRA is widely used, it has received a great deal of criticism in the mainstream
media (Rickards 2008, Davidson 2003) and scholarly literature (Perrow 1999, Leveson
1995) and, as acknowledged by PRA advocates, is often viewed with great skepticism
when it is introduced into a new industry (Apostolakis 2004, Seife 2003, Pat6-Cornell
and Dillon 2001). A key issue fueling the criticism and skepticism of PRA is its use as
part of an optimization process. A common goal of PRA analyses is to identify risk
reduction investments that will lead to the most risk reduction per dollar (or other metrics
of value) so that those investments can be prioritized over others (see Dillon et al. 2003
for an example related to NASA unmanned spacecraft missions). However, optimization
is always a relative, rather than absolute concept. Whenever an analyst provides a
characterization of optimality, be it a probabilistic or deterministic characterization, that
characterization depends on the analyst's model of the system's behavior and the criteria
that the analyst used to distinguish good behavior from undesirable behavior. In other
words, the characterization of an optimal solution depends on the characterizer's
perception of all of the system's possible futures and what makes one future "better" than
another. That perception could be inappropriate or outright wrong27
The first and most basic complication associated with using PRA for optimization relates
to the meaning of probability. As suggested in the quote by Watson (1994) at the
beginning of this chapter, the very definition of probability is a source of controversy.
Essentially, there are "objective" and "subjective" schools of thought on what probability
should mean. The objective school-often referred to as the frequentist school-views
probability as the limit of the relative frequency of certain events among an overarching
set of events as the number of events in that set goes to infinity. The subjective school-
sometimes referred to as the Bayesian school-views probability as a degree of belief in
event likelihood. Most PRA advocates subscribe to the subjective school of thought on
the meaning of probability (Pat6-Cornell 1996). According to Watson (1994):
"...[probabilistic safety assessment] PSA should be interpreted as reasonable
argument, rather than an objective representation of truth."
Furthermore, Apostolakis (1990) states:
"Probability is always a measure of degree of belief.. it is important at this time
and in light of the confusion that persists in practice to clearly state that there is
only one logical and workable interpretation of probability and it is that of
degrees of belief "
While a subjective view of probability is not necessarily problematic in and of itself-
and in fact may be more aligned with the engineering systems paradigm for engineering
research than the frequentist view28-using this view as a basis for optimization is perhaps
paradoxical. Optimization is fundamentally a process of utilizing an objective basis to
customize a system for an assumed future (or set of futures) and often results in the
removal of potential sources of resilience, robustness, flexibility, and adaptability-see
Table 2 for definitions of these terms-that the system could use to respond to alternative
futures. Thus, in using the subjective view of probability for optimization, one could
simultaneously acknowledge the potential inadequacy of their assumed future-
probability estimates would after all be impossible to objectify "degrees of belief'-
while seeking to objectively remove the capabilities that the system could need for
alternative futures. Furthermore, as noted by Apostolakis (1990), most engineers and
scientists associate with the objective view of probability by virtue of their education and
27 Refer to Freudenburg (1988) for a discussion on typical errors made by probabilistic risk assessors,
including the omission of knowledge from the social sciences and the disregard of public opinion in matters
of high consequence, low consensus, scarce experience with the relevant technology or system, and
unequal distribution of burdens and benefits.
28 As discussed in Chapter 1, the contextual factors of complex, socio-technical systems are crucial in the
engineering systems paradigm for engineering research. These factors make the systems and their behavior
highly unique, thus limiting the usefulness of knowledge relating to the limiting relative frequency of
certain system events.
training, thus leading to a great deal of confusion in the conduct and interpretation of
PRA in engineering trade studies
TERM DEFINITIONS IN THE LITERATURE
Adaptability 1. "The property of a system that can change its structure, processes, and behaviour
to meet changing requirements in its environment; in biology when adaptation is
successful the organism will increase the likelihood of its reproduction; the
changes under adaptability may be more complex than is available from
flexibility" -MIT ESD Symposium Committee (2002)
2. "A type of system changeability in which the agent of change is internal to the
system" -Ross et al. 2008
3. "A characteristic of a system amenable to change to fit altered circumstances,
where 'circumstances' include both the context of a system's use and its
stakeholders' desires. " -Engel and Browning (2008)
Flexibility 1. "The ability of a system to undergo changes with relative ease in operation,
during design, or during redesign. The basic metric is the degree of change per
unit of effort (or cost including engineering, investment, etc.)" -MIT ESD
Symposium Committee (2002)
2. "A type of system changeability in which the agent of change is external to the
system " -Ross et al. 2008
Resilience 1. "The property of a system that can quickly return to its original function and
performance following a disturbance or shock; a resilient system may use its
flexibility to achieve robustness" -MIT ESD Symposium Committee (2002)
2. "In our conception, resilience is the ability of systems to prevent or adapt to
changing conditions in order to maintain (control over) a system property." -
Leveson et al. (2006)
Robustness 1. "Related to resilience, demonstrated or promised ability to perform under a
variety of circumstances; ability to deliver desired functions in spite of changes in
the environment, uses, or internal variations that are either built-in or emergent"
-MIT ESD Symposium Committee (2002)
2. "The ability to remain "constant" in parameters [i.e., physical, functional, and
other performance aspects of a system] in spite of system internal and external
changes "-Ross et al. (2008)
Table 2. Definitions of adaptability, flexibility, resilience, and robustness in the
literature.
Second, in addition to the issues with the interpretation of probability, the completeness
and accuracy of PRA analyses in complex, socio-technical systems has consistently been
an area of concern. Even PRA advocates have acknowledged that the following items are
either not handled well or at all by current quantitative risk assessments (Apostolakis
2004): human "errors" in system operations, manufacturing, and design; "software
29 Reconciling this confusion among informed system stakeholders-which is a vastly important issue in an
optimization process-may be more than a simple matter of training engineers and scientists to accept a
subjective view of probability. Indeed such confusion may be inherent to the subjective nature of the
analysis as each system stakeholder is bound to have his or her own degrees of belief in event likelihood.
failures"; and safety culture. One controversial aspect of analysis completeness in
particular is the selection of the first or "initiating" event in the chain (the last event is the
accident or alternative outcomes). The selection of an initiating event is subjective and
varies widely among analysts (Leveson 1995). Though a small group of researchers have
attempted to quantitatively trace the initiating event back to organizational factors30
(Pat6-Cornell 1990, Pat6-Cornell and Murphy 1996, Murphy and Pat6-Cornell 1996,
Pat6-Cornell et al. 1996), many analyses do not trace the initiating event beyond the more
easily quantifiable technical factors related to the accident or final outcome. Accuracy of
PRA analyses is contentious as well, particularly when probabilistic characterizations
have to be made for events related to system components for which little to no data is
available on their performance as part of the integrated system in its ultimate operating
environment. It is common for the probability estimates to be derived from tests of the
component's performance outside of the integrated system or the system's ultimate
operating environment. Another approach is to rely on expert opinion to derive estimates
of the integrated system's performance (Pat6-Cornell 1996), but that approach is subject
to potential inaccuracies stemming from the many heuristics and biases affecting human
decision making under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
Finally, there is the issue of achieving a consensus among system stakeholders as to what
metrics the analysts should use to derive the optimal solution. The most contested of the
metrics often necessary in the use of PRA for optimal risk reduction is the value of a
human life. Graham and Vaupel (1981) argued as early as the first issue of the journal
Risk Analysis that the actual value assigned does not always impact the conclusions of the
analysis or that the assignment of a number can be avoided altogether through relative
metrics such as cost per life saved. Since then, many others have made similar
arguments. However, as illustrated by the following comment by Perrow (1999), the
issue of valuing a human life and other valuables at risk is deeply complex and perhaps
not conducive to objective quantification:
"Death by diabetes should have the equivalent impact on people as death by
murder, is the implication of a study that deplores the public's unawareness that
the former is a cause of many more deaths than the latter...But consider how a
murder death affronts human values such as dignity, and the desire for security
and predictability; the researchers themselves note it is not to be equated with a
diabetes death, and public estimations of death rates reflect that, but the public is
still held to be 'biased'. To take another case, for some economists and risk
assessors (often the same people) there is no difference between the death of fifty
unrelated people from many communities and the death of fifty from a community
of one hundred. Social ties, family continuity, a distinctive culture, and valued
human traditions are unquantified and unacknowledged."
Weinberg (1972) referred to such questions of valuation as "trans-scientific" questions
because they attempt to take a scientific approach to assessing issues based on judgment
30 Note that such efforts still assume a linear relationship between these organizational events and the
technical factors that follow.
rather than fact. Accordingly, Leveson (1995) argues that the role of the system safety
scientist is to identify the boundaries between scientific and trans-scientific issues and
work on the scientist's side of the boundary while leaving the trans-scientific issues to be
solved through political processes.
Ultimately, an attempt to optimize a system with respect to safety risk, assuming
stakeholder alignment on system priorities, is an attempt to remove its resilience,
flexibility, robustness, and adaptability in response to uncertainty (i.e., to "fine-tune" the
system for a specific prediction of the system's future)31. Such an act can be desirable
when system uncertainty is well characterized, as system elements enhancing resilience,
flexibility, robustness, and adaptability can be wasteful in such situations. However,
when the technical and organizational uncertainty of a system cannot be sufficiently
characterized, resilience, flexibility, robustness, and adaptability are helpful in ensuring
the avoidance of disasters and even the realization of unforeseen opportunities for system
improvement.
The Swiss Cheese Model
As mentioned above, the Swiss Cheese Model depicts technical and organization barriers
to event propagation as slices of Swiss cheese with holes that could align and provide a
trajectory for events to cascade into an accident. It qualitatively traces accident
sequences beyond the proximate technical factors to organizational decisions, referred to
as latent failures (Reason 1995, Reason 1990). It is considered to be a complex linear
accident model because it partially acknowledges "drift into states of high risk" in the
sense that the latent failures or "holes" accumulate and potentially lie dormant for long
periods of time (and presumably can be corrected during this time). However, the linear
representation of the events leading to the accident directs attention towards the "holes"
in the barriers (i.e., failures) rather than the processes creating the "holes" and
oversimplifies the interactions between the barriers by assuming independence in the
formation of "holes" in the different barriers. Nevertheless, the Swiss Cheese Model has
been widely accepted as a non-quantitative alternative to PRA in research fields in which
qualitative methods are typically favored, such as human factors. The aviation human
factors community in particular has widely adopted the Swiss Cheese Model in their
processes for investigating and classifying aviation accidents (Wiegmann and Shappell
2003).
2.3 Organizational Risk Theories
In the 1980s and 1990s, two sociological schools of thought emerged to develop an
understanding of the organizational aspects of system safety: Normal Accident Theory
(NAT) and the theory of High Reliability Organizations (HRO).
Normal Accident Theory (NAT)
Charles Perrow developed NAT in the aftermath of the near disaster at the Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant and popularized it through his book Normal Accidents: Living
31 Indeed, "drift into states of high risk" as exemplified by the Alaska Airlines crash, often coincides with
the removal of system resilience, flexibility, robustness, and adaptability through optimization processes
during system operations that emphasize system priorities other than safety (e.g., profitability).
with High-Risk Technologies, which was first released in 1984 and updated in 1999
(Perrow 1999). In the time since the release of Normal Accidents, Perrow and other
scholars-most notably Sagan (2004a, 2004b, 1993)-have promoted and advanced
NAT in a number of disciplines and application areas. Perrow criticized PRA and
traditional engineering risk management techniques (e.g., redundancy) for many of the
reasons mentioned above. He also identified two system properties that he believed
would make major accidents inevitable in a number of complex, socio-technical systems:
interactive complexity 32 and tight coupling 33. His proposed solution to the problems of
interactive complexity and tight coupling is to reduce these properties in our systems
when possible or abandon these systems if such a reduction is not possible.
Leveson et al. (2009) re-iterated the importance of Perrow's contribution in identifying
interactive complexity and tight coupling as contributing factors to system accidents, but
also proclaimed NAT as incomplete and pessimistic. Their criticism centered on
Perrow's vague and sometimes shifting definitions of accidents and complexity; tendency
to confuse reliability with safety; classification of whole industries as interactively
complex and tightly coupled rather than specific engineering designs; and his implication
that traditional safety risk management techniques, especially redundancy, are the only
tools that we have or ever will have to ensure safety in complex, socio-technical systems.
They then conclude their argument by proposing the abandonment of traditional
(primarily event-based) safety risk management techniques for systems approaches to
safety risk management, one of which (i.e., STAMP and STPA) will be discussed in
detail throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
High Reliability Organizations (HRO)
The theory of HROs arose as a response to NAT, initially promoted by Karlene Roberts,
Gene Rochlin, Karl Weick, Todd La Porte, and Paula Consolini (Weick et al. 1999, La
Porte 1996, La Porte and Consolini 1991, Roberts 1990a, Roberts 1990b, Rochlin et al.
1987, Weick and Roberts 1993, Weick 1987). Instead of focusing on accidents and
hazardous behavior, HRO researchers attempted to place emphasis on what behaviors and
structures made organizations successful in spite of interactive complexity and tight
coupling. They defined HROs as organizations that averted catastrophic consequences
on a regular basis (e.g., tens of thousands of times) and they qualitatively described what
they believed were key aspects of high reliability operations. Some of the more
commonly cited aspects include: a drive for technical predictability (La Porte and
Consolini 1991); prioritization of both safety and performance (La Porte and Consolini
1991); simultaneously decentralized and centralized operations (Weick 1987);
imagination, vicarious experiences, stories, simulations, and other symbolic
representations of technology and its effects as substitutes to learning through trial-and-
error (Weick 1987); and extensive use of redundancy (La Porte 1996, La Porte and
Consolini 1991, Roberts 1990b). As noted by Roberts (1990b), while it is unclear that
32 Interactive complexity is a property in which components of the system interact through unfamiliar,
unplanned, or unexpected sequences that are either not visible or not immediately comprehensible (Perrow
1999).
33 Tight coupling is a property in which changes to one part of the system rapidly affect other parts of the
system (Perrow 1999).
the HRO properties identified from any observational study of one type of HRO
universally apply in other types of HROs, it is suspected in the HRO community that
those organizations that have few, if any, of the properties will probably be accident
prone.
In the updated edition of his seminal book, Perrow (1999) characterizes HRO research as
too optimistic. First, he cites a fundamental lack of incentives (and presence of
disincentives) for system "elites" to prioritize safety over or alongside performance as an
obstacle to avoiding normal accidents in interactively complex and tightly coupled
systems. Next, he claims that effective organizational learning is easier said than done in
interactively complex, tightly coupled systems. Finally, he suggests that the
recommendations of HRO researchers may be helpful for some systems, but not the ones
that he had argued to abandon.
Leveson et al. (2009) offer a number of criticisms on the consistency and applicability of
the HRO literature. First, they point out that the "high reliability" label and
accompanying definitions of an HRO appear to highlight confusion in the literature on
the key differences between reliability and safety. For example, they note that HRO
researchers tend to correctly point out the need for operators to occasionally break
established rules in order to prevent accidents (a safety enhancing behavior), but
incorrectly label the behavior as reliable. Next, they assert that a number of the systems
studied by HRO researchers do not have significant conflict between safety and other
goals (as most complex, socio-technical systems do) and are not sufficiently interactively
complex and tightly coupled to draw conclusions from on how to effectively cope with
these properties. In fact, they point out that even HRO researchers cast doubt on the
interactive complexity of these systems by claiming that HROs can establish technical
predictability-noting that technical uncertainty is inherent in the definition of interactive
complexity. Furthermore, they note that while the use of redundancy and simultaneously
centralized and decentralized operations may be effective in the systems observed by
HRO researchers, it may actually lead to accidents in systems that must deal with higher
degrees of interactive complexity and tight coupling.
2.4 An Emerging Notion of Resilience, Flexibility, Adaptability, and
Robustness to Manage Uncertainty
As mentioned above, Leveson et al. (2009) highlight inadequacies of the organizational
risk theories while promoting the use of systems approaches to risk management. They
also note that other researchers (Dekker 2005, Woods and Cook 2002, Rasmussen 1997)
have made similar calls for systems approaches. Systems approaches center on emergent
properties of the systems under study. These properties are not revealed through
examination of the system components outside of their operational context, but through
analysis of the integrated system as it exists in its environment. Key emergent system
properties in the management of safety risk in particular and uncertainty in general
include: resilience, flexibility, adaptability, and robustness. In the paragraphs below,
recent research into the relation of these properties to uncertainty management is
highlighted.
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) Framework
Introduced by Leveson (2002, 2003, 2004), the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and
Processes (STAMP) framework emphasizes control of system state rather than the
reduction of event probability. In STAMP, hazards are viewed not as events, but as
system states that would permit accident events when combined with certain conditions
in the system's environment. It thus follows that safety-which is viewed as an emergent
system property--can only be actively maintained through constraint of the states of the
system (refer to the water contamination accident analysis by Leveson et al. 2004 for an
example of inadequate constraint enforcement on a system state). Enforcement of
constraints on system state is tasked to hierarchical control structures that must
encompass the entire socio-technical system and adapt as necessary throughout the life of
the system.
Early work into the development of the STAMP framework and STAMP-based Analysis
(STPA) is ongoing and has centered on basic principles for developing safety control
structures (Leveson 2004, Dulac and Leveson 2004, Leveson 2003), the definition of the
property of resilience within the STAMP framework (Leveson 2006), using system
dynamics modeling to evaluate safety control structure adaptation (Dulac 2007, Dulac et
al. 2007a, Dulac et al. 2007b, Dulac et al. 2007c), and the development of STPA-related,
safety-driven systems engineering processes (Stringfellow 2008, Stringfellow et al. 2008,
Owens et al. 2008, Weiss et al. 2006). As mentioned in Chapter 1, further advancements
to STAMP and STPA are explored in this dissertation.
Engineering Resilience
Engineering resilience was recently the topic of a symposium that produced an
accompanying book (Hollnagel et al. 2006). The book includes contributions from
several researchers (Woods and Hollnagel 2006, Hollnagel 2006, Woods and Cook 2006,
Dekker 2006, Leveson et al. 2006, McDonald 2006, Dijkstra 2006, Sundstrom and
Hollnagel 2006, Wreathall 2006, Woods 2006, Cook and Woods 2006, Hollnagel and
Sundstrom 2006, Hollnagel and Woods 2006) that stress the need to move beyond linear
accident models and to make use of the adaptive capabilities of humans in the system in
order to cope with "drift into states of high risk". The researchers provide definitions of
resilience, descriptions of resilient system properties, guidelines for designing resilience
into systems, and brief accounts of resilient operations in industry. The overall result of
the symposium is not an authoritative characterization of resilience, but rather the
beginnings of the "confused consensus" (Dekker 2006) from which to move forward.
The following definition of resilience, provided by Leveson et al. (2006), serves as a key
building block for the research described in this dissertation:
"In our conception, resilience is the ability of systems to prevent or adapt to
changing conditions in order to maintain (control over) a system property."
Real Options and Design for the "-ilities"
Much attention is paid throughout this dissertation to the management of safety risk.
However, it is worth noting that uncertainty has advantages as well as disadvantages. For
example, demand for a product can vastly exceed expectations, potentially leaving the
product producer with an opportunity to increase profit by deviating from its initial
business plan. Thus, some work has recently been devoted to managing both the
advantages and disadvantages of uncertainty (MIT ESD Uncertainty Management
Committee 2004). For example, the concept of "Real Options" (which was derived from
financial options theory as described in De Neufville 2003), has been suggested for the
mitigation of financial risk related to market uncertainties for spacecraft constellations
(Hassan et al. 2005, De Weck et al. 2004) and other systems. Additionally, leading
systems engineering researchers have called for systems to be designed for a host of "-
ilities" related to the management of uncertainty: changeability (Ross et al. 2008,
McManus and Hastings 2006, Fricke and Schulz 2005), adaptability (Engel and
Browning 2008), survivability (Richards et al. 2008), reconfigurability (Siddiqi 2006),
etc.
2.5 "Macro-Human Factors"
If increased emphasis on resilience, flexibility, adaptability, and robustness to counter or
even benefit from uncertainty in complex systems is to be adopted-as suggested in the
previous section-it may be necessary to allocate more responsibility to the operators of
these systems. The engineering discipline normally used to evaluate how the systems
should be designed to accommodate the humans within them is referred to as human
factors. While much of the work in human factors prior to the 1990s focused on the
immediate human-system interface (Carroll 1993, Reason 1990), developments in the
field, such as Reason's Swiss Cheese Model described above, have broadened the scope
of the field to include the role of organizational factors on human performance.
Additionally, there are calls for cross-fertilization and debate between management
scholars and engineers on issues such as organizational design (Bourrier 2005). Thus,
one might instead characterize the new direction of the field as "Macro-Human Factors."
In the paragraphs below, some of the "Macro-Human Factors" issues most relevant to
system safety will be discussed.
Human Error and Blame
The question of whether or not humans-particularly front-line operators-cause
accidents is central to the debate on the role that humans should play in complex, socio-
technical systems. Many accidents have been attributed to human error (Leveson 1995),
but when evaluating what decisions should follow from blame, it is important to
understand what one is trying to accomplish when they assign blame. Blame can be
issued absent of a sound causal justification and thus one should be cautious in using it to
guide safety risk management decisions. For example, Zemba et al. (2006) noted
differing logics for blame in collective- versus individual-agency cultures, citing a
tendency for collective-agency cultures to blame casually innocent individuals as a
symbolic proxy for the culpable collectivity. Furthermore, as pointed out by Rasmussen
(1990), if one is constructing an event chain model of an accident, a human error
provides a convenient stopping point in the subjective task of defining the first event in
the accident sequence.
In recent years, researchers have begun to look past blame in the interest of
understanding how to reduce safety risk. According to Woods and Hollnagel (2006):
"When researchers in the early 1980s began to re-examine human error and
collect data on how complex systems had failed, it soon became apparent that
people actually provided a positive contribution to safety through their ability to
adapt to changes, gaps in system design, and unplanned for situations."
Leveson (1995) pointed out that 1) humans do make errors, but they also correct them
and 2) while almost every accident is traceable to a human error of some kind, an
operator who fails to prevent an accident caused by design deficiencies is more likely to
be blamed than the designer. Rasmussen (1990, 1987) argues that human workers are in
a continuous state of learning and adaptation characterized by movement through three
levels of cognitive control (skill-based behavior34, rule-based behavior35 , and knowledge-
based behavior 36) from which "errors" cannot be studied separately 37.
These points help to highlight a view of system operators not as potential sources of
error, but as individuals with the potential to correct design deficiencies. Consider
Rasmussen's levels of cognitive control in the context of the lifecycle of a system. In
system design and operations, all levels of behavior are relevant in each lifecycle phase,
but for the most part, the designer's work is more often associated with the knowledge-
and rule-based behaviors than the work of the operator. "Errors" in the skill- and rule-
based levels are perhaps most amenable to identification by an independent observer
(they also are probably the most easily correctable by the individual who committed them
or his colleagues) 38. However, when we look to knowledge-based behavior, particularly
in system design, making the distinction between "errors" and "compromises" is difficult.
Design tasks are highly iterative-refer to Eppinger et al. (1994) for a general method for
representing design task coupling and a specific example of such coupling in
semiconductor design at Intel. In order to make progress on an interrelated set of design
tasks, the tasks must occur concurrently or assumptions about the outcome of one or
more of the tasks must be made so that the other tasks can begin. Once the tasks are
complete, the assumptions can be revisited through analysis and testing and if they are
deemed unreasonable, the entire set of tasks can be reiterated. However, system
development budgets and schedules may only allow for a limited number of iterations
when they are anticipated and none if they are discovered late in the design process 39. As
a compromise, system designers may decide to leave these unresolved issues for the
34 Skill-based behavior involves work (e.g., walking, driving, etc.) that can be performed with little
cognitive effort after an initial period of learning (i.e., migration from the knowledge- and rule- based
behavior levels).
35 Rule-based behavior involves work requiring the recognition of cues to invoke a set of stored procedures.
36 Knowledge-based behavior involves reasoning and cognitive effort beyond what is required for skill- and
rule-based behaviors.
37 Norman et al. (2003) provide a similar three-level model of affect and cognition in humans that includes:
the reaction level, the routine level, and the reflection level.
38 Indeed, Norman (1983) created a classification system for operator errors in order to develop design rules
to reduce these errors. The error class in this system that has perhaps received the most attention-and
relates most to the skill- and rule-based levels-is a slip. Norman defines a slip as an error in which the
operator fails to properly carry out an intent that could either be appropriate or inappropriate.
39 Interestingly, a self-reinforcing blame dynamic is said to occur when design assumptions are found to be
inappropriate late in the design process and design tasks must be re-iterated (Repenning 2001). However,
in such situations, the designers are blamed for compromising schedule and budget rather than safety.
system operators to work around. In other words, the designers may leave it up to the
system operators to use their knowledge-based behaviors in order to develop the rules
and skills necessary to operate the system despite the compromises made by the system
designers. Indeed, Dulac (2007) and Dulac et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), in their
investigation of the development of human spaceflight systems at NASA, collected
interview data acknowledging the existence and effects of the practice of accepting
design work with unresolved integration and safety problems and accordingly, modeled it
as a negative factor in the ultimate safety of the operational systems.
Of course, there is also the matter of design inconsistencies that go unrecognized
throughout the entire system design process, designs purposefully placing extraordinary
demands on system operators, or design assumptions failing to capture the evolution of
the system's operating environment throughout its lifecycle. Arguments can be made
that these are knowledge-based behavior "errors" on the part of the designers as well and
that they are left to the operators to cope with through knowledge-based behavior.
Organizational Design, Learning, and Change
The design of an organization and its ability to learn and change determines the context
in which work is performed and evaluated. The literatures on organizational design,
learning, and change-literatures far too large to review semi-exhaustively in this
dissertation40-have stressed emergent and nonlinear behavior as inherent aspects of
organizational life and therefore point us away from our traditional, linear approaches to
safety risk management.
Dunbar and Starbuck (2006) emphasize the need to evolve organization designs to be
contextually relevant (i.e., to focus on emergent fits). Bourrier (2005) seconds this need
for emergent fit and argues that organizational design is at the center of the debate on
organizational factors of safety as it can influence deviation from expected behavior.
Carroll et al. (2002) present a stage model, based on empirical work, of organizational
learning in high-hazard organizations acknowledging that different parts of the
organization can be "in" different stages at a given time and that being "in" a stage does
not restrict behavior to the behaviors of that stage alone. Furthermore, Carroll (1998)
identifies logics of incident review in high-hazard industries indicating a lack of
appreciation for resilience and learning.
Further descriptions of nonlinearities in organizational life abound. Senge (2006)
describes linear thinking as an obstacle to organizational learning and provides several
nonlinear behavioral archetypes to explain undesirable system adaptations resulting from
people clinging to linear perceptions of their systems. Morgan (1997) uses the nonlinear
dynamics and chaos theory concept of attractors and their bifurcations as a metaphor for
organizational change. Additionally, research into the temporal structuring of
organizations (Ancona and Waller 2007, Ancona et al. 2001a, Ancona et al. 2001b),
suggests that the timing of work (in terms of synchronization of its internal elements and
40 For example, Huber (1991) summarizes the organizational learning literature into four constructs
(knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and organization memory),
each with their own sub-constructs and sub-sub-constructs.
synchronization with environmental disturbances to the system) leads to performance
effects that would not exist if the behaviors of the system components truly were
additive.
2.6 Safety Risk Management Literature Summary
Overall, one could speculate that the safety risk management literature is in the midst of a
"paradigm shift" in the sense described by Kuhn (1970). Linear accident models-
particularly when they are used for safety risk optimization-are failing to suffice in the
management of safety risk in the increasingly relevant complex, socio-technical systems
that modem societies engineer. Some proclaim that "business as normal" will inevitably
lead to unacceptable accidents and that the only appropriate course of action would
therefore be to abandon these systems. Others are instead questioning the utility of linear
accident models and looking elsewhere for solutions to contemporary safety risk
management. It is becoming increasingly recognized that system nonlinearities can no
longer be ignored and that emergent system properties such as resilience, flexibility,
adaptability, and robustness must be fostered in response to both the upside and downside
of uncertainty. Additionally, some are recognizing the need for an increased role of
system operators and organizational designers to properly ensure that these emergent
properties come to fruition in beneficial ways.
In the preceding chapter of this dissertation, the role of system nonlinearities in three
accidents/incidents was briefly described along with a new paradigm for engineering
research (i.e., the engineering systems paradigm) that is perhaps better positioned to
investigate these nonlinearities than the traditional engineering research paradigm. In the
remaining chapters of this dissertation, this new paradigm in general-and the
STAMP/STPA framework in particular-is put into action to begin addressing the gaps
in the literature described in this chapter.
Chapter 3: Control Theory Concepts
"The central problem in control is to find a technically feasible way to act on a
given process so that the process adheres, as closely as possible to some desired
behavior. Furthermore, this approximate behavior should be achieved in the face
of uncertainty of the process and in the presence of uncontrollable external
disturbances acting on the process. " -Graham C. Goodwin, Stefan F. Graebe, and
Mario E. Salgado (2001)
"An advantage of the closed-loop control system is the fact that the use of
feedback makes the system response relatively insensitive to external disturbances
and internal variations in system parameters. It is thus possible to use relatively
inaccurate and inexpensive components to obtain the accurate control of a given
plant, whereas doing so is impossible in the open-loop case. From the point of
view of stability, the open-loop control system is easier to build because system
stability is not a major problem. On the other hand, stability is a major problem
in the closed-loop control system, which may tend to overcorrect errors that can
cause oscillations of constant or changing amplitude. It should be emphasized
that for systems in which the inputs are known ahead of time and in which there
are no disturbances it is advisable to use open-loop control. Closed-loop control
systems have advantages only when unpredictable disturbances and/or
unpredictable variations in the system components are present." -Katsuhiko
Ogata (1997)
"Control is essential to the operation of systems from cell phones to jumbo jets
and from washing machines to oil refineries as large as a small city. The list goes
on and on. In fact, many engineers refer to control as a hidden technology
because of its essential importance to so many devices and systems while being
mainly out of sight. " -Gene F. Franklin, J. David Powell, and Abbas Emami-
Naeini (2002)
3.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the fundamental concepts of control theory are discussed. The parts of a
control system and notion of variables of system state are defined along with the concept
of control authority over system states for the purpose of task execution, disturbance
rejection, and adaptation. Furthermore, a simple demonstration of these concepts is
provided through the analysis of a linear control system, followed by a discussion of how
these concepts differ in linear and nonlinear systems. Finally, a brief summary of
paradigms for nonlinear control system analysis (i.e., linearization of nonlinear systems,
nonlinearity exploration and exploitation, optimal control, and "-ilities" control) is
provided.
3.2 Variables of System State
The use of the word "control" in control theory differs from its use in everyday language.
In the context of individuals, groups, and organizations, for example, one may view the
word control as synonymous with coercion or dominance and associate it with militaristic
"Command and Control" hierarchical organizational structures. However, in control
theory, the word control means to deliberately affect the state of a dynamic system 41' 42
When a control theorist or engineer talks about the system state that he or she wishes to
affect, he or she can be referring to a number of things: the pitch of an airplane, the
velocity of a car, the amount of carbon dioxide in the cabin of a space station, the
temperature of a room, etc. Often, control theorists and engineers focus on system state
as it applies to physical (i.e., electromechanical) systems, but the concept of system state
can also apply to biological systems, economic systems, social systems, and so forth
(Ogata, 1997). Therefore, the concept of system state can also encompass system
properties-such as the production capacity of a manufacturing company, the number of
employees of a firm in a service industry, the number of soldiers willing to obey the
orders of their commanding officer, etc.-that managers, politicians, and other leaders
attempt to affect in their daily work.
In other words, in the context of socio-technical systems, the word control need not be
associated with the control of people or the militaristic "Command and Control"
hierarchy. In cases where one of the system states that we wish to affect is the obedience
of some workforce, the goal is to control some aspect of a person's or group's behavior
and the militaristic "Command and Control" hierarchy may be appropriate. However, in
cases in which it is desired to control the safety of the system and the ability of the
organization running it to learn from its own mistakes, for example, the "Command and
Control" hierarchy may inhibit learning as suggested by Carroll et al. (2002) after their
observation of incident investigation and response at nuclear power plants.
Thus, the central concept of control theory is the identification of which system state
variables to control and the appropriate means to control these variables. Leveson
(1995), for example, defines a hazard as "a state or set of conditions of a system (or an
object) that, together with other conditions in the environment of the system (or object),
will lead inevitably to an accident (loss event)." With this view of hazards as system
states, safety risk management can be approached as a control problem; the desired
system states and constraints on system behavior to keep the system in those states can be
identified and a socio-technical control structure can be engineered to enforce the system
41 Ogata (1997) defines the state of a dynamic system as, "the smallest set of variables (called state
variables) such that the knowledge of these variables at [an initial reference time], together with the
knowledge of the input [to the system after the reference time], completely determines the behavior of the
sstem for any time [after the reference time]."Forrester (1968) classifies system state variables, which he refers to as "levels", as one of the two
fundamental variable types that form the feedback loops that create a system (the other variable type that he
refers to are "rates", which are the instantaneous changes in or time derivatives of the state variables). He
also states that state variables are the accumulation of the effect of past action in and on the system that
continue to exist even if there is no activity in or on the system and determine (along with constants, which
can be thought of as fixed state variables) the behavior of the rate variables. Thus he asserts, "Levels
completely describe the system condition."
safety constraints (Leveson 2004, Dulac and Leveson 2004, Leveson 2003). As implied
in the analysis throughout this dissertation, it is often the case that the control structure or
means to control the relevant system states depends upon the physical and organizational
structure of the system.
3.3 Components of a Control System
In the application of control theory, once the desired system state or goal of the system is
established, it is then input into a system of logical and physical elements referred to as
the control system or control structure. The control system converts the goal into actions
upon the system to be controlled that are intended to achieve or maintain the goal. There
are two basic forms of control systems: open-loop control structures and closed-loop or
feedback control structures. The fundamental elements of control systems are described
in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 5.
CONTROL
SYSTEM
ELEMENT: DESCRIPTION:
Controller The controller is the logic of the control system (stored in electronics, human minds,
regulations, procedures, etc.) that determines the control actions to be pursued. The
controller contains a model of the rest of the system, including the other control
elements.
Actuator The actuator is the physical object or agent that imposes the intent of the controller on
the system by executing the control action.
Observer The observer is the element of the control system (e.g., electromechanical sensor and
estimation logic, person, etc.) that ascertains the system state.
Table 3. Description of control system elements.
In open-loop control, the observer, if one exists, does not feed system state information
back to the controller. In other words, the controller does not take real-time system state
information into account when determining the appropriate control actions to command
the actuator to perform. Thus, in open-loop control, the implicit assumption is that the
controller's model will accurately predict the state of the system throughout the control
action.
In closed-loop control or feedback control, the observer (or observers) feeds system state
information back to the controller (or controllers). The controller compares this
information with the goal and then determines (through use of its system model) a control
action to move the system into that state. In some control systems, the controller uses the
information from the observer to update its model and change the manner in which it
controls the actuator or even to control a different actuator. For example, in the Apollo
13 crisis, the lunar module, an actuator for achieving lunar landing goals, was used as an
actuator for survival goals once it became apparent that the landing was not going to
happen. Thus, the implicit assumption made for closed-loop control is that the
controller's model will not be able to accurately predict the state of the system prior to
and throughout the control action, but it will be able to drive the system to the desired
state as information of its present state becomes available.
output
Goal
Open Loop Control (e.g. washing machine)
Single Loop Feedback Control (e.g. cruise control)
Multiple Loop Feedback Control (e.g. driver and cruise control)
Figure 5. The elements of basic control systems.
3.4 Control Authority
There are three main uses for control systems: task execution, disturbance rejection, and
adaptation. These uses are closely related to each other (reclassification of a use in a
given system can usually be achieved simply by redefining the system boundaries or
goals) and it is often the case that a control system will serve more than one of these uses
throughout its lifecycle. In the paragraphs below, these uses are described in order to
develop the concept of control authority, a system property that permits the ability to
affect the system state.
Task Execution
Task execution is the planned alteration of system state under an assumed system
environment and goal. When the uncertainty in the control system's ability to make the
desired alteration of system state is perceived to be non-existent or negligible, the
designer(s) of the control system may choose an open-loop control approach. As an
External
Disturbances
example, a manager may assume that writing a procedure, assigning it to an employee to
execute, and trusting him or her to follow it verbatim will lead to the achievement of the
desired state change. However, when the control systems or system under control are
complex, there is a possibility for unanticipated and undesired interactions between
system components during task execution (e.g., the system state at the beginning of the
task may be uncertain, higher order effects of the task processes may be unpredictable,
etc.). In other words, the possibility of internal inconsistencies 43 in the planned system
state changes is a major source of uncertainty in task execution. In cases in which this
uncertainty is present and recognized, the designer(s) of the control system may choose a
closed-loop control approach.
For system safety constraint enforcement during task execution, it is important to
eliminate as many internal inconsistencies as possible and include the capability to delay
or alter task execution when internal inconsistencies are identified. Adherence to
completeness criteria defined by Leveson (1995, Ch. 15), for example, is a means of
ensuring that requirements for the system's behavior, especially as related to software,
contain as few inconsistencies as possible.
Disturbance Rejection
Disturbance rejection is the alteration of system state to nullify undesired changes in
system state due to external (i.e., environmental) influences on the system. It is perhaps
the control system use most strongly associated with robustness44 in that its purpose is to
minimize deviance from expected system behavior. Open-loop control systems can resist
disturbances through adding sources of energy dissipation (e.g., physical barriers,
damping, etc.). However, closed-loop control systems can often be far more effective
than open-loop control systems in rejecting disturbances (Franklin et al. 2002).
Many of the risk management techniques used in reliability engineering are intended for
disturbance rejection. Redundancy, for example, is often intended to allow a system to
nullify a disturbance to system state that induces the failure of a system component by
shifting the failed component's function to another component (i.e., serial redundancy) or
duplicating its functionality with another component (i.e., parallel redundancy).
Similarly, modularity allows the failed component to be removed from the system and
replaced.
Adaptation
Adaptation is the change of system structure or settings in response to changes in system
context or goals. It is perhaps the control system use most strongly associated with
changeability in that its purpose is to make more use of the system's operating envelope
than task execution. A system can adapt in order to continue effective enforcement of
safety constraints or-as exemplified by the Alaska Airlines jackscrew maintenance
43 Internal inconsistencies can appear in many forms: the resource usage by two or more actuators/sensors
may exceed the resources available at a given time; actuators might end up using obsolete data; task outputs
can be nondeterministic; steps can occur out of sequence; steps can be started, but not completed or
unexpectedly paused; etc.
44 See Chapter 2, Table 2.
problems described in Chapter 2-to serve properties of the system that compete with the
enforcement of safety constraints.
Though system adaptation is by definition not planned in the initial architecting of the
system, system architects have many tools at their disposal to allow system operators,
maintenance personnel, manufacturers, and re-designers to adapt the system when
needed. Real Options, which are defined as rights but not obligations to change systems,
have received a good deal of attention recently as tools for uncertainty management
through adaptation (MIT ESD Uncertainty Management Committee 2004, De Weck et al.
2004, De Neufville 2003). Additionally, modularity allows the removal and replacement
of system modules with newly designed modules.
The interplay of task execution, disturbance rejection, and adaptation
As mentioned above, it may be necessary in the design of a control system to consider all
three of the uses for control systems listed above. In system operations, disturbances
occurring during task execution may need to be rejected. Additionally, it may be
discovered that an internal inconsistency in the system's design or manufacturing will
prevent task execution as planned and thus adaptation would be necessary to work around
the inconsistency. It is also possible that the system's operating environment may evolve
in a manner that makes rejection of the disturbances from the environment increasingly
less desirable in comparison to adaptation to the environment (in other words, at some
point it may be wise to stop resisting the environmental disturbances and evolve in a
manner to take advantage of or simply tolerate them). Hardware and software providing
capability for disturbance rejection or system adaptation may increase system complexity
leading to the introduction of internal inconsistencies in task execution 45 . Finally, it may
be the case that the system components adapt asynchronously (Leplat 1987), creating
internal inconsistencies in the system that would hinder task execution or disturbance
rejection as planned unless the system can adapt in another part of the system to
counteract the negative effects of the initial adaptation.
The relation of control authority to robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and
resilience
Given the preceding discussion, control authority can be defined as the ability to change
system state on a certain timescale for the purpose of system task execution, disturbance
rejection, or adaptation. Referring back to the standard control loop elements in Figure 5,
control authority is affected by elements of system structure and the logic involved in the
actuation of control and observation of the system.
When designing control authority into a system or evaluating the control authority in an
existing system, a number of factors must be considered, each dependent on
circumstances that the system will encounter. For some applications, large changes in
state may be required and thus, the upper bound of the control authority may be
paramount. In other applications, the ability to make precise changes to system state (i.e.,
changes that are tiny or have minimal direct impact on state variables other than the one
45 Indeed, Sagan (2004a, 2004b, 1993), Perrow (1999), and Leveson (1995) point out that redundancy can
increase interactive complexity in complex, socio-technical systems.
targeted for change) may be paramount46 . In still other applications, the frequency at
which the system state can be changed may be of most importance. Additionally, in
some applications great importance may lie in whether control authority is allocated to
front-line system operators (i.e., an operations-centric approach to control authority)
instead of system designers/re-designers (i.e., a design-centric approach) or vice versa.
Finally, the sustainability of these properties of control authority throughout systems'
lifecycles could be the difference between systems that age gracefully and systems that
drift into states of high risk, low profitability, etc.
Building on the definitions for robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in Table
2 in Chapter 2 and the above descriptions of the three control system uses (i.e., task
execution, disturbance rejection, and adaptation), the following statements are provided
to summarize the relationship of these overlapping properties to control authority:
* A resilient system must maintain and make appropriate use of the desired
properties of its control authority for task execution, disturbance rejection, and
adaptation throughout the system's lifecycle,
* Flexible and adaptable systems must have an appropriate level of control
authority for responding to changes in their context or goals (i.e., adaptation), and
* A robust system must have an appropriate level of control authority for
disturbance rejection and must use its control authority for task execution in an
internally consistent manner.
It follows from these statements and Leveson's (2004) description of safety as a system
property maintained by a safety control structure, that safety relies on a delicate balance
of the system's robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in the enforcement of
safety constraints and these properties are made possible by control authority.
3.5 Linear Control Theory Concepts
In order to firmly develop the concept of control authority, in a mathematical sense, as it
relates to resilience, flexibility, robustness, and adaptability in complex socio-technical
systems, a discussion of both linear and nonlinear dynamics is warranted. The dynamics
of socio-technical systems are governed by multiple state variables and because chaotic
and otherwise nonlinear behavior is believed to be more common than linear behavior as
the number of system states increases (Dechert et al. 1999, Strogatz 1994, Lorenz 1993),
it follows that nonlinear behavior is likely to be the rule rather than the exception in
socio-technical systems. In the paragraphs below, the concept of control authority as it
relates to task execution, disturbance rejection, and adaptation is demonstrated through
the dynamics of a linear, time invariant system. Nonlinear dynamics are discussed in the
next chapter.
Linear, time-invariant systems are systems in which the effects of system components on
system state are additive and depend on the system state rather than time (i.e., the
46 Imprecise control authority is a potential source of interactive complexity and tight coupling in complex,
socio-technical systems.
response of the system will be identical at two distinct times if the state is the same at
each time). The following equation describes the general form of an autonomous 47
system of linear differential equations:
dX[Eq. 1] dX =AX
dt
where X is a vector of state variables, X ={X1, X2,...XN), and A is an NxN
matrix of state variable coefficients that remain constant if the system is time
invariant or else change as a function of time.
If the linear system has inputs, its general form is represented by the following equation:
dX[Eq. 2] X= =AX + Bu
dt
where X is a vector of state variables, X =[{X, X2,.... XN, A is an NxN matrix of
state variable coefficients, u is a vector of input variables, u = {uj, u2.... u,, and
B is an rxr matrix of input coefficients.
The outputs of a linear system, if they are affected by the system's inputs both directly
and indirectly (i.e., through the system's reaction to the inputs) is as follows:
[Eq. 3] Y=CX+Du
where Y is a vector of outputs Y ={YI, Y2 .... Yn], X is a vector of state variables,
X =[X1, X2,.... XN, C is an NxN matrix of state variable coefficients, u is a
vector of input variables, u = {(u, u2,. .. ur, and D is an rxr matrix of input
coefficients.
The control authority of linear, time invariant feedback control systems with single inputs
and single outputs is commonly described through a Bode Diagram. Figure 6 is a Bode
Diagram for three variants of the following open-loop example system (Franklin et al.
2002, pg. 317):
[Eq. 4] X, -= - -2X, - 2501X 2 - 2500X 3 +udt
[Eq. 5] X2 = 2  X
dt
dX
[Eq. 6] X3 "- 3 - X2dt
47 An autonomous system has no inputs or "forcing."
[Eq. 7] X 4  d X 4  X 3dt
[Eq. 8] Y = 2500X 4
The closed-loop response of the simplest variant, labeled as the "Uncompensated"
variant, is dictated only by the observed difference between the desired system state and
the actual system state. The responses of the other two variants are based on the
amplification and altering of the observation of the difference between the desired system
state and the actual system state48. The amplification and altering is a means of
compensating for the relatively inadequate response of the "Uncompensated" variant. A
Bode Diagram depicts the response of the system (including any compensation that may
apply) to sinusoidal inputs to the system. In linear, time-invariant systems the response
to a sine wave input is always a delayed and amplified or attenuated sine wave of the
same frequency as the input sine wave. The upper plot of the Bode Diagram shows the
magnitude of the amplification of the sine wave as a function of its frequency while the
lower plot of the Bode Diagram shows the delay (or phase lag) of the output sine wave as
a function of frequency.
The Bode Diagram is useful for illustrating the control authority of linear, time-invariant
systems not because we are interested in sinusoidal differences between desired and
actual state per se, but because it provides an indication of the different speeds at which
the system will alter system state and the magnitude of the changes at the different
speeds. If we were to envision each frequency as a different component or individual in
the system, the Bode Diagram would tell us how each component or individual would
respond to directions to change system state. Because the contributions of each
component or individual are additive, we would therefore have an indication of the
overall system response. For example, if we see that one component or individual
amplifies the input with a delay on the order of the amount of time it takes the input to
reverse in direction (i.e., -180 degrees of phase lag), we would be able to tell that that
component or individual would continuously change the system state in the opposite
direction of where it needs to be changed. In other words, this component or individual
would continuously drive the system further and further from its desired state, and
because this component or individual's contribution is additive with the contributions
from other components or individuals, the system would never get to the desired state (in
fact, it would diverge away from it towards infinity).
48 The label "Lead-Lag" indicates that the state observation is conditioned with lead and lag filters while
the label "Lead-Lag-Notch" indicates that the state observation is conditioned with lead, lag, and notch
filters (see Franklin et al. 2002).
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to the desired state if the input stabilizes. Additionally, we can infer that the
uncompensated system will respond slower than the compensated systems because the I
compensated systems amplify the input signa I I l at higher frequencies (i.e., they have more
control authority at these frequencies). Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 demonstrate howthe three variants of the system perform in an example of task execution, disturbance
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Task Execution in the Time Domain
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Figure 7. Example of task execution in a linear, time-invariant feedback control
system.
In the task execution example, the system is directed to steadily increase the system
output (e.g., temperature, pressure, etc.)-which, as indicated in [Eq. 8] is directly related
to the state variable, X4 -from an initial condition that may or may not be known
beforehand to a desired state that it shall maintain for five seconds before steadily
decreasing the system state back to its initial condition. As shown in Figure 7, the
uncompensated variant, which has less control authority at higher frequencies, is slower
to respond to the directive than the compensated variants and does a poorer job of
maintaining the desired system output for five seconds.
Disturbance Rejection in the Time Domain
Figure 8. Example of disturbance rejection in a linear,
control system.
time-invariant feedback
In the disturbance rejection example, the system is directed to maintain the controlled
system output at a value of zero. However, an unexpected, temporary disturbance at the
start of the simulation shown in Figure 8 places the system output at a value of three. As
can be seen in the figure, the uncompensated variant nullifies the disturbance more
slowly than the compensated variants. Also, it is apparent that the "Lead-Lag" variant
has more high frequency oscillation in its response than the "Lead-Lag-Notch" variant.
This oscillation is due to additional control authority at a specific frequency (refer to
Figure 6 and compare the upper plots of the two compensated variants). It could be the
case that in certain applications, this high frequency oscillation in the response, resulting
from the extra control authority at the key frequency, is unacceptable and would therefore
need to be removed-a function performed by the notch filter in the "Lead-Lag-Notch"
variant.
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System Adaptation in the Time Domain
Figure 9. Example of system adaptation in a linear, time-invariant feedback control
system.
Finally, in the system adaptation example, the system is given a new goal: to increase the
output to a value of one and maintain it at that value instead of the zero value. The
simulation shown in Figure 9 begins with the initiation of the new goal. As can be seen
in the figure, the uncompensated variant is slower than the compensated variants in
adapting the system to the new goal. However, it should also be pointed out that the
compensated variants both temporarily overshoot the desired system state to a greater
extent than the uncompensated variant. In certain applications, the overshoot induced by
the extra control authority in the compensated variants may be unacceptable and
therefore, for the purpose of the adaptation occurring in the example it may be desirable
to temporarily or permanently disable the compensation.
The breakdown of linearity and time invariance in socio-technical systems
The example above details some of the design considerations in the allocation of control
authority in linear, time-invariant systems. However, socio-technical systems are often
neither linear nor time-invariant, due to the following non-exhaustive and non-mutually
exclusive list of issues:
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* Saturation nonlinearity: the output of an actuator may saturate at high input
signals (Ogata 1997) or the absorptive capability of a "sink" inside the system
or in its environment may saturate at high system or component output levels;
* Dead-zone nonlinearity: an actuator or observer may not respond to their
inputs over a given range of input variation (Ogata 1997);
* Square-law nonlinearity: the output of an actuator or observer may only have
an approximately linear relationship to their input for a small range of input
variation, (e.g., the relationship between signal input and output may follow a
"square-law") (Ogata 1997);
* Aging and wear: actuators and observers may deteriorate over time, leading to
eroding control authority;
* Resource depletion or conflict: the resources that actuators, observers, and
controllers use to function may become depleted over time or unavailable at
times due to resource conflicts;
* Experience curves: actuators, observers, and controllers can become more
efficient as they gain experience with a certain control function;
* Drifting time delays: the amount of time that it takes for material, information,
and energy to travel between controllers, actuators, observers, and
combinations thereof can change over time (e.g., light delays 49 on
interplanetary spacecraft missions).
* Drifting control logic: expectations of system performance and environmental
conditions can change, leading to more/less conservative control strategies,
* Net material/information/energy gain or loss: a sustained, net inflow or
outflow of material, information, or energy can lead to changes in
fundamental system properties relevant to its system dynamics (e.g., the
depletion of the mass of a spacecraft over the course of its mission).
Therefore, nonlinear analytical tools are needed to further develop the concept of control
authority as it relates to resilience, flexibility, robustness, and adaptability of safety
control structures in complex, socio-technical systems. A set of these tools is discussed
in the next chapter.
3.6 Paradigms for Nonlinear Control Engineering Research
and Practice
Though most developments in the mathematical rigor of the control of nonlinear
dynamical systems have occurred within the last century, research and practice in this
field can be traced back to antiquity (Bennett 1996, Lewis 1992, Ch. 1). Additionally, as
suggested in the quote by Franklin et al. (2002) at the beginning of this chapter,
engineering artifacts created with the help of knowledge accrued in control theory have
infiltrated a wide swath of modem society. Thus, reviewing the key accomplishments of
and approaches to nonlinear control research and practice in this dissertation is not
possible. What is possible, however, is a brief overview of the key paradigms that shape
the way in which researchers and practitioners view the process and usefulness of
49 Light delay is the amount of time it takes for information transmitted at the speed of light to travel from a
sender to a receiver.
nonlinear control research and practice. The paradigms listed below are not necessarily
collectively exhaustive and may not necessarily be invoked by researchers and
practitioners in a mutually exclusive manner.
Linearization of Nonlinear Systems
For a large number (perhaps even a majority) of control theory researchers and
practitioners, one of the first thoughts that come to their mind when presented with a
nonlinear system is how to "linearize" that system. Linearization of nonlinear systems
involves the development of linear models (i.e., a set of linear differential equations) that
approximate the nonlinear dynamics of the system near equilibriums and critical
operating points or the cancellation of system nonlinearities through alteration of the
system (Franklin et al. 2002, pg. 68; Ogata 1997, pg. 100-105). Interestingly, this
paradigm is not motivated by the ubiquity of linear systems-in fact, it could be said that
the only "true" linear systems are the ones imagined by scholars-but by the established
base of knowledge, which is more developed in regards to linear system analysis
techniques than nonlinear system analysis techniques50 . Thus, even though this paradigm
has been used with much success in a number of applications, there are legitimate
concerns relating to its appropriateness as a default worldview.
Nonlinearity Exploration and Exploitation
Linearization, while prevalent, is not always the preferred approach to addressing a
control problem. Many scholars and practitioners will only pursue linearization to a
reasonable limit. Additionally, some scholars and practitioners even prefer to investigate
and exploit the nonlinearities in the systems they study. The major accomplishments and
views of one such research community-the System Dynamics community-are
described below as an example of research driven by this paradigm. While the works of
this community comprise only a subset of the established knowledge in nonlinearity
exploration and exploitation, they are the most influential to the work in the case study of
this dissertation.
System Dynamics
The field of System Dynamics was developed in the 1950s at the MIT Sloan School of
Management by computing pioneer Jay Forrester 51. Distinguishing System Dynamics
from other nonlinear control theory research fields-especially those that subscribe to the
nonlinearity exploration paradigm-is difficult. The following traits are common, but not
necessarily required in System Dynamics research:
a primary focus on social, socio-ecological, and socio-technical systems,
rather than purely technical systems (probably due of the origin of the field in
a school of management);
50 Not surprisingly, this knowledge base was built through the science and engineering science paradigms
of research, which as mentioned in Chapter 1, favor linear and reductionist approaches to the creation and
refutation of knowledge.
51 Jay Forrester is also known for inventing random access magnetic core memory in the development of a
flight simulator for the U.S. Navy (see http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/everett=forrester.html).
* a belief that all decisions are made with models (either formal or mental), all
models have inconsistencies and limitations (i.e., "all models are wrong"), and
that numerical simulation is often needed to identify inconsistencies in mental
models (even if numerical relationships between variables are poorly
understood) (Sterman 2002, Sterman 2000, Forrester 1968);
* a focus on capturing the dynamics of a system by closing feedback loops
rather than relying on time-dependent forcing functions (i.e., making the
dynamics endogenous to the system rather than exogenous), identifying the
reinforcing and balancing dynamics in the loops (i.e., positive and negative
feedback, respectively), and the relative strength of feedback loops (i.e., loop
dominance);
* visualization methods such as: causal loop diagramming (Senge 2006,
Sterman 2000) and stock and flow structures 52 (Sterman 2000) to explicitly
show feedback relationships rather than condensing them with matrix
notation;
* human decision modeling through assumptions of bounded rationality of the
decision maker rather than the contemporary economics and game theory
assumptions of rational expectations (Sterman 2000, Morecroft 1983);
* model development primarily through principles of the system's physical and
informational structure (including policies that guide decision-making) instead
of statistical analysis of time-series data (Forrester 1971);
* a focus on political and technical solutions exploiting long-term, high-
leverage dynamics (which are usually nonlinear) rather than short-term, low-
leverage dynamics (which are usually linear); and
* inspiration from a broad literature that is loosely centered on the seminal
works of Forrester (1961, 1968), Sterman (2000), Senge (2006), and articles
in the journal System Dynamics Review.
According to Meadows et al. (1982):
"Thomas Kuhn [1970] has observed that a major part of the training of scientific
disciplines is, in effect, a process of socialization to a particular world view.
Included in this view is a host of subconscious and unrecognized values and
assumptions about the nature of the world. For example, the systems dynamics
modeler sees the world as a collection offeedback loops and non-linear relations.
He or she values the kind of understanding that comes from clarifying relations
between causal structure and dynamic behaviour."
Furthermore, Sterman (2002) states:
"While it's hard to define what system dynamics is, I don't have any trouble
answering why it is valuable. As the world changes ever faster, thoughtful
leaders increasingly recognize that we are not only failing to solve the persistent
52 In a stock and flow structure, the state variables of the system are represented in boxes called "stocks"
while the time derivatives of the state variables are represented by pipes called "flows." A flow may
connect two state variables or it may connect a state variable to a source or sink represented by a cloud.
problems we face, but are in fact causing them. All too often, well-intentioned
efforts to solve pressing problems create unanticipated 'side effects.' Our
decisions provoke reactions we did not foresee. Today's solutions become
tomorrow's problems. The result is policy resistance, the tendency for
interventions to be defeated by the response of the system to the intervention itself
From California's failed electricity reforms, to road building programs that
create suburban sprawl and actually increase traffic congestion, to pathogens
that evolve resistance to antibiotics, our best efforts to solve problems often make
them worse. At the root of this phenomenon lies the narrow, event-oriented,
reductionist worldview most people live by. We have been trained to see the
world as a series of events, to view our situation as the result of forces outside
ourselves, forces largely unpredictable and uncontrollable.. .System dynamics
helps us expand the boundaries of our mental models so that we become aware of
and take responsibility for the feedbacks created by our decisions."
Overall, the emphasis of System Dynamics research is not to identify ways in which the
system of study can be linearized, but to identify ways in which the system of study
might wrongly be linearized. As suggested by the above quote by Sterman (2002),
linearized perceptions of a control problem at hand can lead to solutions that may be
desirable in the short-term, but disastrous in the long-term. Additionally, as suggested by
Forrester (1971), by appreciating the nonlinear dynamics of a system, one can identify
ways to use nonlinear effects to his or her advantage over time53 . Key accomplishments
in this field include:
* an urban growth model (Forrester 1969) that inspired both intense political
debate and an immensely popular video game series (Seabrook 2006) by
suggesting that all major urban policies in the U.S. at the time were "between
neutral and highly detrimental" in terms of effectiveness towards their stated
goals (Forrester 2007a);
* the Limits to Growth series of human population growth models (Meadows et al.
2004, Meadows et al. 1992, Meadows et al. 1982, Meadows et al. 1974, Forrester
1973, Meadows and Meadows 1973, Meadows et al. 1972) that led to
Congressional hearings and reportedly inspired a man to successfully run for
Congress (Forrester 2007b);
* a number of world-famous interactive games or "management flight simulators"
used for K-12, university, and executive education (Meadows 2007); and
* numerous consultations of government and industry projects, including the
resolution of legal disputes involving project management (Lyneis et al. 2007,
Lyneis et al. 2001, Sterman 2000).
53 Indeed, there is another subfield of nonlinear control theory referred to as chaos control that seeks to take
advantage of the fact that certain nonlinear systems (i.e., chaotic systems) are highly sensitive to small
changes in initial conditions (Boccaletti et al. 2000). Essentially, the sensitivity of these systems to
initial/disturbance conditions allow for control solutions in which a small amount of control effort can be
used to dramatically impact the dynamics of the system in a desirable way.
Optimal Control
The optimal control paradigm relates to the use of feedback control to minimize task
operating time or some other performance index associated with system task execution
(Bryson 1996, Lewis 1992, Ch. 1). In other words, the design problem associated with
this paradigm is not simply to create a stable controller, but to create the "best" controller
(which includes the challenge of determining the meaning of "best") (Bennett 1996).
Accordingly, great emphasis is placed on model exactness in this paradigm, which can
discourage researchers from analyzing systems with uncertainties or encourage them to
neglect key uncertainties. According to Bennett (1996) one leading researcher publicly
lamented in 1984 (after the emergence of the optimal control as a dominant paradigm in
academia) that:
"It is amazing how many [control theory Ph.D.'s] are unaware that the primary
reason for feedback in control is uncertainty."
Additionally, a number of early controllers developed through the principles of optimal
control had "serious robustness problems" (Bryson 1996). Thus, in recent years the need
to balance control system "optimality" and capability for coping with uncertainty has
become more widely recognized (Lewis 1992, Ch. 1).
"-ilities" Control
The final paradigm in this list emphasizes the attainment/maintenance of desired system
properties in the face of uncertainty, rather than the minimization of a performance index.
Thus, this paradigm can be described as "-ilities" control for its focus on system "-ilities"
(e.g., two modem control theory subfields of this paradigm, adaptive control and robust
control, emphasize the system properties of adaptability and robustness, respectively).
Though the focus on system properties despite uncertainty embodied by this paradigm is
said to have been largely absent in control theory research during the early years of the
"Modem" period of control theory, it is said to have been prevalent in both research and
practice in the "Classical" period and in the midst of a revival in the last decades of the
2 0 th Century (Bennett 1996, Lewis 1992, Ch.1).
3.7 Chapter Review
In Chapters 1 and 2, the importance of nonlinearities in the management of safety risk for
complex socio-technical systems was established. Additionally, the STAMP/STPA
framework and its inherent philosophy of treating safety as a control problem was
introduced and vetted against linear safety risk management approaches. In this chapter,
the fundamental concepts of control theory (i.e., variables of system state, the
components of control systems, and control authority) were introduced. Next, a
mathematical description of these concepts was presented in the context of an example
linear system. This linear example was used not because linear control theory will play a
major role in the remainder of this dissertation, but to help the reader develop an intuition
for the fundamental control concepts (which, at present, can perhaps be most easily
described in terms of linear systems) and the deficiencies involved in viewing a nonlinear
system as though it were linear. Indeed, the paradigms that primarily motivated the
research described in the remainder of this dissertation are the nonlinearity exploration
and exploitation and "-ilities" control 54 paradigms, which were discussed along with
several other paradigms for nonlinear control engineering towards the end of this chapter.
In the next chapter, an approach for the analysis and design of nonlinear safety control
structures is introduced.
54 Recall that in STAMP and STPA, safety is defined as an emergent system property or "-ility."
Chapter 4: Phase Space Attractors and their
Relevance in System Safety Constraint
Enforcement
"The space shuttle flies with five redundant computers. Any fully digital airliner
has a minimum of three. Apollo had only one. It never failed in flight... [the
designers of the Apollo computer] took the position that there is no such thing as
a random failure; rather, failures always occur 'based on cause and effect
principles' (an approach credited with success in other parts of Apollo as well).
All failures had a source, and for electronic devices, most of those were 'the
result of poor process control or the vendor's lack of complete technical
knowledge of his process.' Reliability was not simply a matter of statistics, but
also 'always an integral and basic part of design, or procurement, and of
operation,' best left to the 'judgment and wisdom of the engineers' [Draper et al.
1963]. Key to this approach was standardization-build systems out of the
smallest possible numbers of different parts and focus a great deal of effort on
improving every aspect of the process of producing them." -David A. Mindell
(2008).
"The focus on attractor patterns thus creates a powerful perspective for the
management of stability and the management of change, suggesting that
transformational change ultimately involves the creation of 'new contexts' that
can break the hold of dominant attractor patterns in favor of new ones." -Gareth
Morgan (1997)
"Planners are not, after all, scientists. Planners seek understanding not as an
end in itself but as a means to an end-namely, as a basis for making informed
judgments about the effects of intervention. Rather than looking for ever more
detailed information on and ever more accurate models of their systems, planners
should look instead for patterns of system behavior, or points to which systems
seem to return (which mathematicians call "attractors"), even if not in any
predictable way. " -T. J. Cartwright (1991)
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter contains an explanation of the theoretical concepts involved in modeling and
engineering the phase space attractors produced by safety control structures. Phase space
attractors are explained and previous approaches for quantitative modeling of
STAMP/STPA safety control structure behavior are reviewed. Real-world examples are
then provided of phase space attracters in social and technical systems. Finally, the
relationship between the concept of phase space attractors and safety-driven design is
presented along with a preview of the dissertation case study.
4.2 Phase Space Attractors
The phase space of a system is the space encompassing all possible states of the system
(i.e., all possible values of all of the system's state variables). For example, in a bounded,
two-dimensional system (i.e., a system with two state variables), the phase space can be
depicted on a plot with the possible values of the two state variables represented on the
horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. A phase space attractor is a mathematical
result achieved when the system converges to or remains in a certain region of the phase
space despite being subjected to a range of initial and disturbance conditions for the state
variables. As is mentioned below, these concepts relate to safety control structures
because they describe how the system responds to unpredictable, but not uncontrollable
system inputs or internally-induced (i.e., endogenous) changes in system state.
Referring back to the quote provided at the beginning of this chapter by Mindell (2008),
it is stated that MIT IL engineers rejected the notion of a "random" failure in designing
the Apollo Guidance Computer and relied on a more deterministic mindset for the
overlap of reliability and safety risk management. This mindset, when contrasted with
the more stochastic mindset adopted in probabilistic risk assessment, raises a number of
questions about the relative importance of the mindsets and their relative usage as a basis
for safety risk management. PRA is an optimization-centric approach; accepting the
notion of random failures leads to a black-box, "take it or leave it" view of safety risk
management in which the objective is to buy and arrange the black-boxes (i.e., the
components) in a manner that minimizes perceived risk. Of course, optimization is
desirable for obvious reasons, however, the difficultly of defining and proving optimality
is immense in systems characterized by uncertainty. Consider the following statement
from Sterman (1991):
"Whenever the problem to be solved is one of choosing the best from among a
well-defined set of alternatives, optimization should be considered. If the meaning
of best is also well defined, and if the system to be optimized is relatively static
and free of feedback, optimization may well be the best technique to use.
Unfortunately, these latter conditions are rarely true for the social, economic, and
ecological systems that are frequently of concern to decision makers."
While the objective of finding an optimal way to reduce risk looms large over the field of
risk analysis, an overly utilitarian focus for risk analysis may distract us from looking for
sound risk reduction opportunities in the interactions of system components, especially
when uncertainties abound.
In contrast to the stochastic mindset in which component/system failures (and their
successes) are perceived to be random, the deterministic mindset attributes safety-where
it overlaps with reliability-to the system's built-in reactions to system state. Through
cycles of feedback, the states of the components are affected by the states of the system,
which are affected by the states of the components and the system's environment.
Components therefore tend to interact with each other through their reaction to system
state, essentially compensating for the faltering of each other or interfering with each
other (refer to the vignettes in Chapter 1 for examples). Thus, it is necessary in the
deterministic mindset to eliminate the "black-box" boundaries around components (i.e.,
to conduct analysis at a system level of abstraction) and account for system interactions
and their effects on the desired system states.
With that said, it is necessary to address what could be perceived as a paradox. In
considering a system characterized by uncertainty, one might ask how one would know
enough about the system to characterize the system's interactions as suggested by the
deterministic mindset. This question is exactly where the concept of attractors (and
system testing55) is useful. As suggested in the quotes by Morgan (1997) and Cartwright
(1991) at the beginning of the chapter and demonstrated throughout the rest of this
chapter, phase space attractors result from dynamic structures that respond strongly to
unpredictable disturbances to the system and unexpected endogenous dynamics. Thus,
due to the random inputs to the system and unforeseen changes in system state caused by
endogenous dynamics, the actions of a system capable of producing an attractor may
"appear" random and unpredictable, but in fact, its behavior is deliberately tuned to
system state.
Equilibrium Point Attractors
Equilibrium Point Attractors are values in the phase space to which the system converges.
In other words, if the system has an equilibrium point attractor, but does not "start out" at
that attractor or is displaced from it by a disturbance, the system will return to that
attractor over time. Depending on the damping properties of the system, the system will
either return to the attractor with or without overshooting it. Whenever a system
overshoots its equilibrium point attractor in the process of converging to it, a spiral-like
trajectory is produced in its phase space and thus the attractor is referred to as a spiral-in
equilibrium. The following system produces a spiral-in equilibrium point attractor
(Boyce and DiPrima 1997, pg. 382):
dX[Eq. 9] X= =aX +bY where a = -0.5 and b = 1dt
dY[Eq. 10] Y= = cX + dY where c = -1 and d = -0.5
dt
When using the "stock and flow structure" notation of System Dynamics, [Eq. 9] and
[Eq. 10] are represented as shown in Figure 10.
55 System testing is one approach to reducing system uncertainty.
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Figure 10. Stock and flow structure of the system modeled by [Eq. 9] and [Eq. 10].
Because this system is attracted to an equilibrium point, it will converge to this point
despite a range of initial conditions. As shown in Figure 11, the "spiral-in" trajectories to
the equilibrium point (X = 0, Y = 0) are produced in the X-Y Phase Space for each of
three simulated initial conditions for the system (i.e., X = -1.35, Y = -2.1; X = 2, Y = 2;
and X = -2.4, Y = 2.25).
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Figure 11. Phase Portrait for three simulation runs of the system modeled by [Eq.
9] and [Eq. 10], each with different initial conditions.
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The system's attraction to point (X = 0, Y = 0) can also be determined by looking at the
time histories of state variables X and Y, Figure 12 and Figure 13, respectively.
However, as will be shown later when more complex attractor structures are discussed,
attraction tendencies of the system will not be as easily decipherable when examining
state variable time histories alone.
Figure 12. Time history of the state variable X after three simulation runs of the
system modeled by [Eq. 9] and [Eq. 10], each with different initial conditions.
Figure 13. Time history of the state variable Y after three simulation runs of the
system modeled by [Eq. 9] and [Eq. 10], each with different initial conditions.
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In the context of safety control structures, it may be desirable in a number of applications
for the structure to produce an equilibrium point attractor in order to hold one or more
state variables at or near a safe state (characterized by the equilibrium point) despite
unforeseeable (and perhaps unavoidable) initial conditions and disturbances. An example
of such a situation is provided in the case study analysis in Chapter 7.
Attracting Limit Cycle
An attracting limit cycle is a stable, periodic oscillation to which certain dynamical
systems can be drawn following a range of initial/disturbance conditions. The following
system, described by the Van der Pol Equations, produces an attracting limit cycle
(Boyce and DiPrima 1997, pg. 527):
dX[Eq. 11] dX =Y
dt
dY[Eq. 12] I dY -X +/ (1- X 2)Y
dt
where pi = 1
An alternative (i.e., stock and flow structure) representation of these equations is shown
in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Stock and flow structure of the Van der Pol Equations.
As can be seen in Figure 15, the system converges into a closed trajectory or "orbit" in
the X-Y Phase Space for each of three simulated initial conditions for the system (i.e., X
= 1, Y = 0; X = 3, Y = 2.4; and X = 1.65, Y = -2.4). The closed orbit in the figure is the
attracting limit cycle.
The system's attraction to a stable, periodic oscillation can also be seen in the time
histories for state variables X and Y, shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17, respectively.
However, due to the difference in initial conditions, the oscillations are not synchronized
in the time history, making it slightly more difficult for the analyst to interpret attraction
tendencies.
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Figure 15. Phase Portrait for three simulation runs of the Van der Pol Equations,
each with different initial conditions.
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Figure 16. Time history for the state variable X after three simulation runs of the
Van der Pol Equations, each with different initial conditions.
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Figure 17. Time history for the state variable Y after three simulation runs of the
Van der Pol Equations, each with different initial conditions.
In the context of safety control structures, limit cycle attractors may be desirable results
of the structure's performance in a number of applications. With the many delays
inherent to "actual" safety control structures, a stable oscillation of the system through a
desirable (i.e., non-hazardous) portion of the phase space may be a more obtainable goal
in certain situations than the degree of system constraint implied by an equilibrium point
attractor (refer to the Tsembaga example later on in this chapter). However, one
important caveat must be considered in designing safety control structures to produce
attracting limit cycles: true limit cycles can only occur in systems with only two state
variables and thus, in systems with more than two state variables one can only hope for
behavior approximating an attracting limit cycle. As will be shown later, behavior
approximating that of an attracting limit cycle is possible in systems with more than two
state variables and can be used to enforce safety constraints in these systems.
Strange or "Chaotic" Attractors
Strange or "chaotic" attractors, like equilibrium point attractors and attracting limit
cycles, result from the confinement of a dynamical system to a given region of its phase
space despite a range of initial/disturbance conditions. However, systems that produce
strange/chaotic attractors do not settle into equilibrium or stable oscillations and are
highly sensitive to initial/disturbance conditions. Accordingly, the time histories of state
variables in systems producing strange/chaotic attractors can vary so much when given
even a minor variation in initial/disturbance conditions that observers of these systems
may be unable to comprehend their dynamics and may conclude that their behavior is
"random."
The most famous strange/chaotic attractor, known as the Lorenz Attractor, was developed
to demonstrate the futility of long-term, deterministic weather forecasting (Lorenz 1993).
Lorenz (1963) first used this attractor-which was the simplest example of a
strange/chaotic attractor that he could think of-to imply that even tiny measurement
errors in determining the initial conditions used for weather simulation would render the
simulation results unreliable. The following equations produce the Lorenz Attractor:
dX[Eq. 13] X a (Y - X)
dt
dY[Eq. 14] Y= - rX - Y - XZ
dt
dZ[Eq. 15] Z- dZ XY- bZ
dt
An alternative (i.e., stock and
provided below in Figure 18.
where a = 10
where r = 28
8
where b = -
3
flow structure) representation of these equations is
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Figure 18. Stock and flow structure of the Lorenz Equations.
As can be seen in Figure 19, the time history of state variable Y is drastically affected by
a relatively small variation in its initial condition 56. Over the 2,000 simulation runs
shown in the figure, the range of values for Y after ten seconds is roughly fifty times the
range of variation in the initial condition of Y.
56 The time histories of state variables X and Z are affected to a similar degree by the same variation in the
initial condition of state variable Y.
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Figure 19. The time history of state variable Y after 2000 simulation runs of the
Lorenz Equations in which the initial value of Y ranges between 0.01 and 1.
If one were to empirically observe this system at given points in its time history
following multiple disturbances, he or she could easily (and mistakenly) infer that this
system is random and that stochastic reasoning would be necessary to understand it57.
Indeed, as illustrated by the histogram in Figure 20 of Y values after 10 seconds in the
simulation runs, he or she could make a claim at knowing the system's "probability
density function."
57 The author's use of the term "random" comes with a caveat: pure or complete determinism is effectively
a mathematical abstraction and thus, some degree of randomness would exist in empirical observations of
any system. In fact, the initial values for state variable Y in the simulation runs shown in Figure 19 were
produced using a random number generator set to create a random uniform distribution of initial Y values
from 0.01 to 1. However, it is clear from the time history that the deterministic dynamics of this system
ultimately account for much more variation in the results than the initial random variation, and therefore
labeling the system as "random" would undermine the importance of the deterministic dynamics. For a
deeper discussion on what it means for a system to be random as opposed to just looking random, see the
first chapter of Lorenz (1993).
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Figure 20. Histogram of values for state variable Y after 2000 simulation runs of
the Lorenz Equations in which the initial value of Y ranges between 0.01 and 1.
However, a look into the phase space of the system reveals information about the
system's feedback relationships that is conveyed with more subtlety in its time history.
Figure 21 contains four portraits of the X-Y phase space of the system after four runs
with substantially different initial values of state variable Y. Though these four initial
values produce vastly different time histories of the system, as illustrated above, their
effect on the phase portraits is relatively small. Each phase portrait in Figure 21 shows
the region in phase space to which the system is attracted and illustrates the "back and
forth" feedback relationship between state variables X and Y. At first, state variables X
and Y increasingly counteract each other; in other words, they produce a trajectory that
spirals out from a given point. Then, rather than spiraling out to infinite values of X and
Y, the system moves towards a point in the opposite quadrant of the XY phase space only
to spiral out from that point back towards the original point. Similarly, the X-Z and Y-Z
phase portraits of the system-which are not shown below in the interest of brevity-
indicate that "back and forth" feedback relationships also exist between state variables X
and Z and Y and Z, respectively.
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Figure 21. The phase portraits in X-Y phase space produced by the Lorenz
Equations following four simulations with different initial values of state variable Y.
Overall, the phase portraits illustrate that the feedback relationships between state
variables X, Y, and Z are balanced in the sense that no feedback relationship dominates
the system's dynamics. While this information may also be discernible from the system's
equations and state variable time histories, the relative ease of inferring the nature of
these feedback relationships from these sources is debatable. What can be said is that the
phase portraits, time histories, and the system's equations comprise a set of analytical
tools that together provide a range of perspectives on the system's dynamic "story".
In the context of safety control structures, strange/chaotic attractors may be desirable
results of the structure's performance in a number of applications. In fact, given the
complexity and resource conflict inherent in "actual" safety control structures, the chaotic
confinement of systems to desirable (i.e., non-hazardous) portions of the phase space may
often be more obtainable than the degree of constraint implied by attracting limit cycles
and equilibrium point attractors (though not directly related to system safety, the Genesis
spacecraft trajectory example later on in this chapter illustrates this point). Moreover,
XY Phase Portrait XY Phase Portrait
numerical studies suggest that chaotic behavior becomes more common as the number of
system state variables increases (Albers et al. 2006, Dechert et al. 1999, Sprott 1993).
Attractor Bifurcations
In some systems, it is possible to bifurcate an attractor or fundamentally change its
qualitative structure by varying a parameter of the system (Strogatz 1994). For example,
referring back to [Eq. 9], as the parameter a is varied from -0.5 to 0.5, it takes the system
longer to converge to the equilibrium point at X = 0, Y = 0. However, as shown in
Figure 22, once a reaches a value of 0.5, the system no longer spirals in towards the
equilibrium point. Instead, it spirals out toward infinity. In other words, the spiral-in
attractor has been destroyed by the variation in the parameter a, representing one type of
bifurcation to which attractors are susceptible58.
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Figure 22. X-Y Phase portrait for three simulation runs of the system modeled by[Eq. 9] and [Eq. 10] with a = 0.5 and three different initial conditions (i.e., X = 3, Y =
3; X = 0, Y = 3; and X = -1.5, Y = 0).
In the context of safety control structures, attractor bifurcations are important because
they represent ways in which the control structures can be weakened or strengthened. A
58 Note that if the parameter a were varied in the opposite direction (e.g., from a =1 to a = 0.5-), a spiral-in
attractor would be created.
safety control structure's responsibility is to constrain the system state in a certain
manner or, in mathematical terms, to produce a phase space attractor. Because
bifurcations can create, destroy, or otherwise alter phase space attractors qualitatively,
they can lead to violations of safety constraints. Therefore it may be necessary to alter
the system or constrain its parameter values to prevent such bifurcations. On the other
hand, certain types of bifurcations can improve the manner in which safety control
structures enforce a constraint, and therefore, it may be beneficial to design the system to
facilitate the parameter values associated with the bifurcation.
4.3 Engineering Phase Space Attractors to Enforce Safety
Constraints
Before proceeding with the analysis of the phase space attractors produced by safety
control structures, the following question must be addressed:
"Why is it necessary to introduce the abstract mathematical concepts of phase
spaces, attractors, and their bifurcations in order to improve our understanding
of safety control structure performance ? "
The purpose of a safety control structure is to prevent the system from entering hazardous
states to the extent that it is possible and to ensure that if a system ends up in a hazardous
state-due to some unanticipated disturbance or internal flaw in the structure-that it will
return to a safe state in a manner that causes the least damage possible. This purpose is
the classical control paradigm and its mathematical result, if successful, is an attractor in
the phase space of the system. Additionally, a phase portrait of a system's performance
provides information about the feedback relationships in the system that may not be as
easy to grasp when shown in a time history of the relevant state variables. If one looks,
for example, at the time history of the state variable Y in the Lorenz Attractor (see Figure
19), the conclusion that may be drawn is that the system's behavior is "random" or
without a high degree of order. Alternatively, when one looks at the phase portraits of
state variables X and Y under a range of initial conditions (see Figure 21), it is clear that
the feedback relationships of these state variables are sufficiently balanced to constrain
the system to a certain region of the phase space without allowing it to settle into an
equilibrium.
Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the "abstract" mathematical concepts of phase
spaces, attractors, and their bifurcations because they provide mathematical tools and
descriptions for advanced analysis of safety control structures. While it may not be
necessary to use such terminology in presenting the results of an analysis to system
stakeholders and decision makers or even STPA novices, advanced STPA practitioners
and researchers should benefit from knowledge of these concepts. In the following
subsections, state-of-the-art processes and methods for prior and potential safety control
structure evaluation are reviewed and comments are made regarding how the
mathematical concepts of phase spaces, attractors, and their bifurcations are relevant to
these processes/methods.
Safety Control Structure Modeling based on Discrete and Hybrid Dynamics
In a number of situations, the behavior of safety control structures can be described
through discrete59 or hybrid60 dynamics. An example mathematical formulation to
describe discrete system behavior (or the discrete dynamics of a hybrid system) is a state
machine model, which characterizes a system's behavior through a finite number of
system states and transition paths between those states. The goal when using a state
machine model for hazard analysis is to determine how a system can reach a hazardous
state. With this knowledge, one could then re-engineer the system to prevent such
transitions.
Traditional State Machine Hazard Analysis involves forward searches from an initial
state in a state machine to determine if the system can reach the unsafe states. However,
the number of system states and state transition paths "explodes" as the requisite
complexity is added to make state machines realistically represent the behavior of real-
world systems. This explosion of state machine complexity sometimes makes effective
hazard analysis computationally impossible and thus, an alternative approach was
developed by Leveson before STAMP and STPA were introduced (Leveson and Stolzy
1987). This method-and variants of it, such as Neogi's (2002)-employs backward
searches from hazardous states and only requires portions of the state machine to be
specified (the hazard states and the states that transition into them). This approach allows
for the identification (and elimination) of transitions to hazardous system states while
limiting the complexity of the state machine. However, its drawback is that some of the
hazardous states may not have been reachable anyway and thus, system designers may be
led to take action to prevent unrealistic state transitions.
Ultimately, when using a state machine or other discrete representations of system
behavior to identify and prevent transitions to hazardous states, the objective is to
strengthen the system's attraction to safe system states (i.e., the safe regions of the
system's state space). In other words, while the mathematical details of system attraction
to safe states differ for discrete systems and continuous systems (which are the focus of
this dissertation), the fundamental objective is the same. In fact, hybrid systems may
require the simultaneous use of mathematical concepts from both types of systems for
proper safety constraint enforcement.
Modeling Safety Risk Management at NASA
Recently, attempts were made to quantitatively evaluate aspects of NASA's safety
control structures for crewed spaceflight operations and spacecraft/launch vehicle
development-the systems studied were the NASA Independent Technical Authority
(ITA) (Dulac 2007, Leveson et al. 2005, Dulac et al. 2005) and the NASA Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) (Dulac 2007, Dulac et al. 2007a, Dulac et al.
2007b, Dulac et al. 2007c). The inspiration for the quantitative approaches in these
studies was from the System Dynamics field of nonlinear control theory research-
59 Discrete dynamics-as opposed to continuous dynamics-involve system changes over time (i.e.,
" umps") between a finite set of system states rather than an infinite continuum of states.
Hybrid dynamics involve both continuous and discrete dynamics. The system can transition or "jump"
between a finite set of states while continuously evolving within each of those states.
discussed in the previous chapter-and the ultimate result was a STAMP-related
methodology (Dulac 2007) intended to engage STAMP novices61 in dynamic safety risk
management modeling.
Because the methodology is targeted towards STAMP novices, it is somewhat beside the
point to comment on how the methodology itself would benefit from the addition of the
concepts presented in this chapter. It is appropriate, however, to comment on the
advantages that advanced STAMP practitioners and researchers would realize in applying
these concepts, along with the methodology. First, there was a great deal of interest
throughout both studies in the identification of "tipping points" in the safety control
structure's dynamics-see Figure 2362. These "tipping points" are merely bifurcations of
the relevant attractors in the system and perhaps could be easier to identify with more
theoretical grounding in the concept of bifurcation. Next, most (if not all) analysis of the
models was scenario-based and results were drawn only from time histories of the state
variables, their time derivatives, and their auxiliary variables. For simple models, such
an approach can be adequate for a relatively complete and efficient analysis. However,
the completed ITA and ESMD models contained more than thirty and seventy explicitly
modeled state variables, respectively, and several more state variables implicitly modeled
in Table Functions63. With this level of model complexity, this approach to analyzing the
model was cumbersome and required a good deal of modeler "intuition" in order to
efficiently glean key insights into the dynamic behavior of the system. As demonstrated
above and later in the case study analysis in Chapter 7, phase portrait analysis provides
another perspective on the dynamic "story" of the system and is helpful in analyses
involving models this complex (or more complex).
61 Dulac's (2007, pg. 126) target audience for his methodology are described as system stakeholders,
including engineers, managers, and safety analysts with acceptable training, as opposed to STAMP-
specialized consultants acting as facilitators, model-builders, and analysts.6 This "tipping point" involves two behavior modes-indicated by a 1 and 2 in the figure-associated with
variation in the amount of work NASA contracted out. According to Dulac (2007, pp. 180-182) this result
was achieved by varying the fraction of work contracted out from 4% to 96% in the ITA model.
63 Table Functions are mathematical functions commonly used in System Dynamics models to describe the
relationship between two variables. In a Table Function, the relationship between the two variables is
described by a table of data points rather than an analytic function (Sterman 2000, Chapter 14). In using a
Table Function to describe a nonlinear relationship between two variables, the modeler does not need to
explicitly identify the state variables inducing the nonlinearity (he or she only needs to specify data points).
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Figure 23. A "tipping point" in ITA effectiveness and credibility (Dulac 2007, Dulac
et al. 2007c, Dulac et al. 2005, Leveson et al. 2005).
Bifurcation Control
One set of approaches to making safety control structures produce allowable attractors
involves altering or exploiting the bifurcation properties of the attractor. Bifurcation
Control is a relatively new subfield of nonlinear control systems research involving the
design of a control system to produce desirable bifurcation characteristics for a nonlinear
system (Efimov and Fradkov 2006). Until the writing of this dissertation, no one had
explicitly attempted bifurcation control of the phase space attractors produced by safety
control structures.
Typical objectives of bifurcation control include delaying the onset of an inherent
bifurcation, stabilizing a bifurcated solution, changing the parameter value of an existing
bifurcation point, modifying the shape or type of a bifurcation chain, introducing a new
bifurcation at a preferable parameter value, optimizing system performance near a
bifurcation point, or a combination of some of these objectives (Chen et al. 2000).
For example, one could simply bifurcate the attractor into another type of attractor. As
shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25, the Lorenz Attractor bifurcates into a spiral-in
equilibrium point attractor that stabilizes at a positive Y value whenever parameter a in
[Eq. 13] is decreased from 10 to 2.82 or parameter r in [Eq. 14] is decreased from 28 to
12.05, respectively. Such bifurcations would eliminate the internal chaotic behavior of
the original system that occasionally attracts the system to specific regions of the phase
space that could be undesirable in certain applications.
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Figure 24. The X-Y phase portraits of the spiral-in equilibrium point attractors
produced by bifurcating the Lorenz Attractor through varying two of its
parameters.
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Figure 25. The state variable Y time histories of the spiral-in equilibrium point
attractors produced by bifurcating the Lorenz Attractor through varying two of its
parameters.
These bifurcations could be realized by constraining the parameter values of the system,
if possible, or by changing the system's response to these parameters. For example,
consider the alternative systems shown in [Eq. 16] through [Eq. 19] and [Eq. 20] through
[Eq. 22], respectively.
dX[Eq. 16] dX =a(Y - X)
dt
dY[Eq. 17] dY = rX - Y - XZ
dt
where a = 10
12 14
XY Phase Portrait
dZ[Eq. 18] Z= = XY -bZ
dt
8
where b = -3
dr r - (Desired r)[Eq. 19] i= -= f(t)dt Time to Change r
where Desired r = 11.5 and Time to Change r = 0.05 seconds
Initial X
Initial r
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Figure 26. Stock and flow structure of the Lorenz Equations with the bifurcation
control scheme described by [Eq. 19].
The bifurcation control scheme used in the system described by [Eq. 16] through [Eq. 19]
and Figure 26 employs simple proportional control of the former parameter r. In this
system, r is considered to be a state variable rather than a parameter, and as indicated in
[Eq. 19], its time derivative is subject to a disturbance input modeled as an exogenous
function of time, f(t). The controller in the system (i.e., the second term in [Eq. 19])
compares the most recent value of r with a desired value of r (i.e., Desired r) and divides
this value by a time constant (i.e., Time to Change r) in order to produce a change in the
time derivative of r that is proportional to the difference between the desired and actual
value of r. This particular scheme is capable of bifurcating the attractor to its spiral-in
form despite a wide range of initial conditions for r. Additionally, it is capable of
preventing the bifurcated attractor from reverting to its chaotic form in spite of a number
of potential magnitudes and behavior modes of f(t) (e.g., step input, sinusoidal input,
pulse input, etc.).
Alternatively, one could employ a variety of other bifurcation control schemes, such as
the one used in the following system:
dX[Eq. 20] dX (Y - X)dt
where a = 10
Initial Z
dY[Eq.21] dY = 0.43rX - Y - XZ where r = 28dt
dZ 8[Eq. 22] Z= = XY- bZ where b = -
dt 3
Note that the only difference between this system and the original Lorenz Equations is
the multiplication of parameter r by a factor of 0.43 in [Eq. 21]. The factor of 0.43
effectively changes the bifurcation point of the system from r = 12.05+ to r = 28-, thus
allowing the desired bifurcation to occur without changing the value of the parameter.
Such an approach may be preferable when changing the parameter value is more difficult
than changing the system's response to the parameter value64
Flow Control
Another set of approaches to producing an allowable attractor involves altering the rates
or "flows" (i.e., the time derivatives) of the state variables of the system. This set of
approaches-hereafter referred to as flow control in this dissertation-has a different
objective than bifurcation control (i.e., to induce temporary and/or moderate alterations of
the attractor rather than bifurcating it). Examples of flow control are provided in the case
study of this dissertation.
Discussion of the Relative Advantages of Bifurcation Control and Flow Control
As demonstrated later in the dissertation case study, flow control can require significantly
more real-time effort from the control elements to enforce the safety constraint than
bifurcation control. In general, the choice between bifurcation control and flow control
approaches can invoke many of the trade considerations commonly explored when
determining whether or not to include system operators (whether human or automated) as
part of the solution to an engineering problem. While bifurcation control schemes can
provide elegant, operator-less solutions to safety constraint enforcement-if they are
physically possible for the given application-they could require an upfront investment
in equipment, research, and testing in order to physically implement the scheme or
sufficiently reduce uncertainty over the values of the system parameters. Furthermore,
bifurcation control schemes may over-constrain the system. For example, consider the
vast difference between the chaotic Lorenz Attractor and the spiral-in attractor produced
after bifurcation of it; if optimal system output were to result from behavior more closely
approximating the chaotic form of the attractor, for example, bifurcating the system to a
spiral-in attractor could be very inefficient. Flow control schemes, on the other hand,
address some of these issues while introducing other potential problems65. Ultimately,
64 As noted earlier, Forrester (1968) claims that there are only two fundamental variable types: state
variables and their time derivatives. Parameters are essentially state variables that maintain a constant
value throughout the simulation timeframe of the model. In some situations, it may be practical to
intentionally alter and regulate the value of a parameter within the simulation timeframe of the model. In
other situations, it may not be practical to alter or regulate the value of the parameter within the simulation
timeframe or even the lifespan of the universe.
65 One set of problems introduced by flow control relates to the system's ability to consistently respond to
system state changes according to the control law throughout the system's operational lifetime, especially
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any given application may require either type of scheme or some combination thereof and
it is therefore necessary for a system designer to understand what both types of schemes
offer in his or her application.
4.4 Practical Applications of Phase Space Attractor
Engineering
While the concept of engineering phase space attractors into socio-technical systems may
seem abstract, it should be noted that such behavior has been common in the design of
technical systems and has even been observed in "primitive" social systems. In the
following two subsections, examples are provided of practical applications of phase space
attractors in social and technical systems, respectively. These examples, when combined
with the case study of a socio-technical system in the next two chapters, will hopefully
build up the reader's intuition in applying the abstract concepts presented in this chapter
to real problems.
Example Phase Space Attractor in a "Primitive" Social System
One example of the reliance of a social system on a phase space attractor is the
population control mechanism of a tribal society observed during Roy Rappaport's
(1968) classic anthropological study of the Tsembaga tribe of the New Guinea highlands.
Due to the terrain that the Tsembaga tribe lived in, expansion of their agricultural land
was limited and thus, they required some form of population control to prevent
overcrowding and collapse of their society. What Rappaport (1968) observed was a
Tsembaga ritual in which the pig-herding tribe would ceremonially slaughter a portion of
their pig herd when it grew too cumbersome to maintain and simultaneously declare a
short war on neighboring tribes. Shantzis and Behrens (1973) developed a simulation
model of this ritual based on Rappaport's observations and showed that the ritual created
a pseudo-limit cycle 66 in the phase plane of the human and pig populations, thus
preventing overcrowding over a wide range of possible initial conditions for these two
state variables. Moreover, they demonstrated that suppression of the ritual in simulation
runs led to overcrowding and a subsequent collapse in both the yield of Tsembaga
agricultural lands and the tribe population. Additionally, years later, when Kampmann
(1991) identified and fixed several technical errors in the model (e.g., strong sensitivity to
the simulation time step, problems in how food was divided among the tribesmen and
pigs, the possibility for the pig slaughtering value to be negative, etc.) the pseudo-limit
cycle persisted, indicating the robustness of it not only to initial/disturbance conditions,
but also to subtleties in model structure.
The phase portrait of the human and pig populations provided in Figure 27 is derived
from a simulation run of 500 years using Kampmann's (1991) version of the Tsembaga
model. Initially, the human and pig populations are 196 people and 40 pigs, respectively.
Throughout the simulation, the system moves towards the left of the phase portrait until it
when human operators are involved in the response. Another set of problems relates to the compressed
time frame associated with altering system state during real-time operations.
66 Recall that a limit cycle can only exist in a two-dimensional system and thus, systems with more than
two dimensions, like the Tsembaga system as modeled by Shantzis and Behrens (1973), can only
approximate the behavior of limit cycles.
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reaches a nearly closed orbit that it cycles along throughout the remaining duration of the
simulation. If the initial human population is held constant while the pig population is
varied from values of 7 pigs to 90 pigs in separate simulations, this behavior of leftward
drift to the pseudo-limit cycle persists (a rightward drift to the pseudo-limit cycle ensues
when the initial pig population is varied from 90 pigs to 2320 pigs). Similarly, a leftward
drift to the pseudo-limit cycle persists if the pig population is held constant and human
population is varied from 182 people to 462 people (a rightward drift to the pseudo-limit
cycle occurs when human population is varied from 7 people to 182 people).
Figure 27. The phase portrait of the Tsembaga human and
from Kampmann 1991).
pig populations (derived
The ability of the Tsembaga to serendipitously construct a set of customs that produces a
pseudo-limit cycle and the persistence of this attractor in spite of wide variation in
initial/disturbance conditions and some aspects of the model structure speaks to the
practicality and power of creating phase space attractors to mitigate the effects of
uncertainty. Furthermore, analysis of this attractor using the conceptual tools presented
in this chapter speaks to the potential applicability of these tools in real-life situations.
Identifying bifurcations of the attractor, for example, provides clues on the control flaws
that can develop in this safety control structure for the tribe population. The Tsembaga
essentially used the pig population as a leading indicator of impending problems for their
population: when the pig population was deemed to be too large, the humans took steps
to reduce their own population and the pig population. This feedback relationship leads
to some sort of attractor in the Human Population-Pig Population phase space. If the
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human and pig food needs are balanced with the agricultural capacity of the land, the
resulting attractor is a pseudo-limit cycle, otherwise, the pseudo-limit cycle is bifurcated
or "broken." As shown in Figure 28 below, allowing the pig population to grow larger
before initiating the ritual67 causes the attractor to bifurcate within a 500 year time span
from a pseudo-limit cycle to an equilibrium corresponding to a significantly reduced
human population. Such a situation would represent a control flaw in the safety control
structure and thus, an additional safety constraint could be placed on the pig population
threshold before initiating the ritual or on other food consumption parameters
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Figure 28. The phase portrait of Tsembaga human and pig populations when a
slightly larger pig population is allowed (derived from Kampmann 1991).
Alternatively, one could look to flow control techniques to develop a safety control
structure that avoids the concept of a ritualized war, which is a practice considered to be
unacceptable in most modern societies. As discovered by Shantzis and Behrens (1973),
improving the human mortality rate of the Tsembaga or simply eliminating war from the
ritual produces a disastrous bifurcation of the attractor in the Human Population-Pig
Population phase space. However, as shown in Figure 29, an attracting limit cycle can be
67 In other words, increasing the Critical Rate of Pig Incidents parameter in Kampmann's (1991) model
from 6 incidents per year to 6.8 incidents per year.
68 Reducing the Desired Food Per Capita parameter in Kampmann's (1991) model from 742,000 calories
per person per year to 692,875 calories per person per year, for example, preserves the pseudo-limit cycle
even when the Critical Rate of Pig Incidents parameter is 6.8 incidents per year.
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created by improving human mortality rate in the manner suggested by Shantzis and
Behrens (1973) and restructuring the ritual so that the wars are eliminated and births are
prohibited every other time period between festivals 69.
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Figure 29. The phase portrait of Tsembaga human and pig populations under an
alternative ritual cycle (derived from Kampmann 1991).
Example Phase Space Attractors in Technical Systems
Phase space attractors are developed in a number of technical applications, but perhaps
no application of this concept is more transparent than the use of phase space attractors in
spacecraft trajectory design. Instead of exploiting attractors in abstract conceptions of
phase space 7 , spacecraft trajectory design makes use of the attracting force of gravity to
effectively maneuver an engineered object through an intuitive conception of phase space
(i.e., physical space). A simple orbit around a single gravitational body is a trajectory
that uses the gravitational force of the body in the form of an extremely slow spiral-in
attractor. The slow spiral-in time allows the spacecraft, once inserted into the orbit, to
69 To implement this flow control scheme, the mortality rate (i.e., the Net Human Births rate in the model)
is improved as suggested in Kampmann's (1991) better health scenario and wars are eliminated using the
Fraction of Humans Transferred to War parameter. Additionally, births were suppressed every other time
period between festivals (roughly 10 years at a time) by setting Net Human Births to 0 humans per year
during the birth prohibition years and introducing a death rate during those years consistent with an average
life expectancy of 50 years (that number is based on the WHO 2000 life expectancy estimate of 53 years
for the entire population of Papua New Guinea). It is important to note that this particular flow control
scheme is a simplified demonstration of concept that has not been optimized against all parameters of the
festival structure, agricultural practice, and other social considerations.70 For example, the human population-pig population phase space of the previous subsection.
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remain at some altitude above the gravitational body while continually circumnavigating
it for some time with minimal or no additional expense of fuel. Similarly, the more
complicated trajectories that include gravity assists, free returns, halo orbits around
libration points, and so forth make use of chaotic attractors created by the gravitational
force of multiple bodies. For example, the trajectory for the Genesis solar wind sample
return mission, shown in Figure 30, was designed to exploit a chaotic attractor formed by
the gravitational forces of the Sun, Earth, and Moon in order to reduce fuel consumption
enough to make the mission feasible (Koon et al. 2008, Stark and Hardy 2003, Lo et al.
1998, Howell et al. 1997).
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Figure 30. Phase portraits of the Genesis spacecraft trajectory (Lo et al. 1998).
4.5 Phase Space Attractors and Safety-Driven Design
In this section, attention is shifted toward the question of how the concepts in this chapter
can be used as part of an overall safety-driven design effort. The author discusses how
these concepts complement the many STPA-related processes and methodologies that
have been published to date and previews the case study of the Procedure Rework
Process in Space Shuttle Mission Control.
Qualitative system safety constraint enforcement evaluation in previously published
STPA methodologies/processes and the need for quantitative evaluation
Since the introduction of STAMP and STPA, a number of processes and methodologies
for utilizing STAMP and STPA as part of a safety-driven systems engineering effort have
been published (Stringfellow 2008, Stringfellow et al. 2008, Owens et al. 2008, Weiss et
al. 2006, Dulac and Leveson 2004, Leveson 2003). While each of these published
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processes/methodologies reflect the evolution of STPA and the synthesis of it with other
systems engineering techniques in safety-driven design, many fundamental elements of
STPA have appeared in all of these processes/methodologies. One element of STPA that
has been essential from the introduction of STPA (Leveson 2003) to the most recently
proposed process/methodology (Stringfellow 2008) is the evaluation of the safety control
structure's ability to enforce the safety constraints that are defined. Figure 31 through
Figure 33 contain the key qualitative elements necessary for an evaluation of the safety
control structure's ability to enforce safety constraints. The potential types of inadequate
control actions that can be taken by the safety control structure-originally defined by
Leveson (2003) and since updated-are listed in Figure 31. These inadequate control
actions can result from problems with one or more of the elements or environment of the
feedback control loops in the structure, a generic example of which is shown in Figure
32. These potential problems--defined in Figure 33 as control flaws and inadequate
control executions-are identified throughout the safety control structure evaluation
portion of each process/methodology and accordingly, new safety constraints are defined
that, if necessary, lead to redesign or expansion of the safety control structure.
1. A required control action is not provided or is inadequately executed.
2. An incorrect or unsafe action is provided.
3. A potentially correct or adequate control action is provided too late or at the
wrong time.
4. A correct control action is stopped too soon or continued too long.
Figure 31. Leveson's taxonomy for inadequate control actions (Leveson 2009,
Stringfellow 2008, Stringfellow et al. 2008, Owens et al. 2008).
Process
U InputCommands
OutputObserved
Output
Measurements
Figure 32. Generic STPA low-level process control loop (Owens et al. 2008).
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Control Flaws:
1. Design of the control algorithm does not enforce constraints
* Flaw(s) in creation process
* Process changes without appropriate change in control algorithm
(asynchronous evolution)
* Incorrect modification or adaptation
2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect
* Flaw(s) in creation process
* Flaw(s) in updating process
* Inadequate or missing feedback
o Not provided in system design
o Communication flaw
o Time lag
o Inadequate sensor operation
* Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for
* Expected process inputs are wrong or missing
* Expected control inputs are wrong or missing
* Disturbance model is wrong
o Amplitude, frequency or period is out of range
o Unidentified disturbance
3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers
Inadequate Control Executions:
1. Communication flaw
2. Inadequate actuator operation
3. Time lag
Figure 33. Leveson's taxonomy of control flaws and inadequate control executions
(Leveson 2009, Stringfellow 2008, Owens et al. 2008).
While many potential control flaws and inadequate control executions can be identified
through qualitative analysis, there eventually comes a point in which quantitative analysis
(e.g., numerical simulation) and experimentation/testing is needed to further identify the
potential control flaws, especially those control flaws relating to problems with the
control algorithms and process models. Consider the following statement by Forrester
(1971):
"Inability of the human mind to use its own mental models becomes clear when a
computer model is constructed to reproduce the assumptions contained in a
person's mental model. The computer model is refined until it fully agrees with
the perceptions of a particular person or group. Then, usually, the system that
has been described does not act the way the people anticipated. There are
internal contradictions in mental models between assumed structure and assumed
future consequences."
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This statement provides an argument for numerical simulation of safety control structure
behavior to partially verify the consistency of assumptions about the control structure
behavior. Any inconsistencies found in the simulation process are potential control flaws
that could potentially necessitate additional safety constraints and redesign/expansion of
the safety control structure.
Preview of the dissertation case study
In the case study of this dissertation, a process was created for using the concepts in this
chapter to evaluate safety control structures. This process is proposed in Chapter 7 for
more general use. It is meant to assist the STPA analyst in evaluating and potentially re-
engineering the continuous dynamics of safety control structures. This process is
intended to be self-contained enough to increase the depth of the STPA involved in
safety-driven design efforts. In this regard, the process can thus be considered as a "sub-
process" of any of the currently existing (or yet to be specified) STPA-related safety-
driven systems engineering processes/methodologies. Furthermore, the process is
intended to be useful, with little modification, in efforts to treat the attainment and
preservation of other system-level properties (e.g., security) as a control problem.
While the process is meant to be complementary to Dulac's (2007) methodology for the
development of risk management models of a safety control structure, it differs from it in
several important ways. Dulac's methodology-developed during cases studies
involving the NASA ITA (Leveson et al. 2005, Dulac et al. 2005) and NASA exploration
system development (Dulac et al. 2007a, Dulac et al. 2007b, Dulac et al. 2007c)-is
meant to engage STAMP novices in dynamic safety risk management modeling by
centering the modeling effort on a repository of generic, customizable dynamic models of
safety control structure components. The process proposed in this dissertation, on the
other hand, is meant to guide the work of advanced STPA practitioners on less
generalizable problems or those problems in which a necessary generic model has yet to
be created for the repository available to practitioners of Dulac's methodology 71.
Furthermore, the process proposed in this dissertation introduces model analysis tools
from dynamical systems theory to complement the primarily scenario-based analysis
tools proposed by Dulac (2007, Ch. 5).
The process laid out in this dissertation for analyzing phase space attractors produced by
safety control structures is a modeling and design process meant to occur within the
overall context of a safety-driven design effort. The process is derived from a type of
reasoning that rejects the notion of random component failures, random initiating events,
and the linear superposition of the component contributions to risk as the central concepts
in safety risk management. Instead, nonlinear component interactions are accounted for
by conducting analyses throughout the process on the system-level of abstraction.
Though there is uncertainty in the system's inputs and some aspects of its internal (i.e.,
endogenous) dynamics-and the system's behavior might therefore "appear" random-
the system is tuned throughout the process to be attracted to safe system states.
71 Needless to say, the output of the process proposed in this dissertation can further populate the repository
of generic models available to practitioners of Dulac's methodology.
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The process is meant to be used in situations in which useful insights into the safety
control structure's behavior can be gained through modeling this behavior with primarily
continuous dynamics. With that said, it is important to note that such situations exist in
the design of complex, socio-technical systems more often than one might presume. In
the next two chapters, the process is used to evaluate an existing attractor (i.e., the Space
Shuttle Mission Control "Procedure Rework Attractor") in a system that involves
individuals altering discrete artifacts relating to highly unique missions. Intuition might
suggest that such a system is not compatible with the assumptions of continuous
dynamics; however, the process is nonetheless used to derive useful insights into the
behavior of the system. Overall, the analysis: 1) demonstrates the use of the process in
an actual complex, socio-technical system, 2) identifies potential improvements for
current and future Mission Control procedure rework processes, and 3) provides an
example that other systems can learn from in order to develop safe procedure rework
processes.
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Chapter 5: Case Study Background - Space
Shuttle Mission Control
"I don't care what anything was designed to do; I care about what it can do!" -
Former NASA Flight Director Eugene Kranz as portrayed by Ed Harris in the
1995 film, Apollo 13.
"Based on past experience, it is probably safe to assume that the next five years
will not necessarily turn out exactly as we foresee it today, and flexibility will be
required to overcome future challenges." -John J. Uri (2005) discussing the first
five years of NASA research on ISS.
"As evidenced by all previous spacecraft programs, design and operations
personnel will learn a great deal about the spacecraft during flight." -Alan R.
Crocker (2005).
"[MIT IL engineer Hugh Blair Smith] allows that the Apollo 11 program alarms
could be called a software problem, but only if one realizes that 'the crew
procedures are part of the software, as are the ground procedures. '...These
[procedures] governing people's behavior were as important as the programs
controlling the computer, and similarly embodied assumptions and links between
organizations (recall that Apollo overall was called a program). In the human-
machine system of Apollo, it often was not possible to distinguish between
instructions for machines and instructions for people." -David A. Mindell
(2008).
5.1 Chapter Overview
Background information for the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework Case
Study is presented in this chapter. First, a historical overview of Mission Control
throughout the various U.S. human spaceflight programs is provided. Flight Controller
responsibilities, facilities, staffing, and training are then detailed with an emphasis on
how they enhance flight controller capability for original thought and problem solving in
real-time operations. Next, the Procedure Rework Process is described to prepare the
reader for the formal analysis of it presented in the next chapter. Finally, the research
literature pertaining to Mission Control is reviewed in order to highlight the gaps in
knowledge that could potentially be filled through application of a process for safety
control structure evaluation using the notion of phase space attractors.
5.2 Overview of Mission Control throughout NASA's Human
Spaceflight Programs
Since 1961, every organization that has sent humans into space has relied on the same
basic formula for mission success during spaceflight operations. This formula has been
to put individuals whose training emphasizes breadth rather than depth in human
110
spaceflight topics-except in the area of vehicle piloting-into the spacecraft and link
them through radio frequency communications to a team of engineers on the ground, each
highly trained in a specific area of spaceflight. In NASA, the most visible portion of this
engineering team is called Mission Control. The people that work in Mission Control are
referred to as flight controllers and their responsibilities include monitoring of crew,
payload, and spacecraft health and status; spacecraft commanding; management of
spacecraft consumables and supplies; crew activity planning; development and upkeep of
spaceflight procedures, operational requirements, and flight controller reference material;
and participation in crew training. The work environment of flight controllers during
missions and highly realistic practice for missions-referred to as immersive or
integrated simulation-are control rooms and support rooms equipped with workstations
capable of customizable data display, processing, and transmission, connected to each
other through a digital voice communications network referred to as the "voice loops."
Generic training for flight controllers involves several years of study and immersive
simulation in control rooms, support rooms, and other facilities for the areas of
specialization they practice, culminating in a series of trials that must be passed before
they accept the responsibilities of their specialization.
In this section, the Mission Control function is organizationally scoped and a brief
description of its evolution throughout NASA's human spaceflight programs is given.
The Organizational Boundaries of Mission Control
Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, the term Mission Control will be used to
refer to a specific organizational division of NASA. This organization is currently based
at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas and is involved directly in the
control of NASA human spaceflight missions. Teams involved in the control of
unmanned spacecraft at the Goddard Space Flight Center, JPL, and other U.S. mission
operations centers (e.g., the GP-B control center at Stanford University), are not included
in this group. Furthermore, flight control teams of NASA's international partners in
human spaceflight and remote payload operations centers for human spaceflight, such as
the Payload Operations Center (POC) at the Marshall Space Flight Center, are excluded
in the usage of this term.
Even though many flight controllers have engineering backgrounds, are paid on
engineering pay-scales, and generally consider themselves to be engineers, they are
hierarchically organized separately from what is officially referred to as the
"engineering" community or Engineering Directorate at JSC. Officially, the flight
controllers belong to the "operations" community or Mission Operations Directorate
(MOD) at JSC and the engineers who manage the development, maintenance, and
evolution of flight hardware and software belong to the engineering community (Watts et
al. 1996). The Mission Evaluation Room (MER) is located in the same building that
houses the Flight Control Rooms (FCRs, pronounced "fickers") and Multi-Purpose
Support Rooms (MPSRs, pronounced "mip-sirs") in which the flight controllers work.
The MER is a facility for employees in the engineering community at JSC to access
telemetry at workstations similar to those used by the flight controllers and keep apprised
of the events that occur during a mission. Due to their detailed knowledge of the flight
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hardware and software, MER engineers often contribute to flight control processes by
performing analyses and hardware/software tests at the request of flight controllers and
by providing an independent assessment of the analyses done by the flight controllers. In
order to keep interactions between MER engineers and flight controllers from congesting
the voice loops, most of the communication is done through formal MER memos or the
Spacecraft Analysis Room (SPAN), which is a room staffed by individuals that mainly
perform coordination functions between the various entities involved in spaceflight
operations (Rusnak 2002).
Additionally, Mission Control flight controllers do not lead the launch preparations and
final launch countdown at the launch site. Those functions are led by the Launch Control
Center (LCC) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Mission Control is said to assume the
lead in spacecraft operations from the time that the launch vehicle clears the launch tower
to the time that the spacecraft "splashes down" (in the case of capsule spacecraft) or rolls
to a stop (in the case of the space shuttle).
Finally, while the MER, SPAN, POC, and LCC are on the horizontally adjacent
boundaries of Mission Control in the overall organizational hierarchy, the Mission
Management Team (MMT) resides above its vertical boundary as shown in Figure 34.
The MMT is a decision-making body consisting of senior NASA management presiding
over flight certification, launch preparation, and in-flight activities for any given mission.
MMT
I LCC POC I SPAN MER Mission I
I I I Control I
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Figure 34. The organizational boundaries of Mission Control and the
organizational groups at NASA with which it primarily interfaces during a mission.
Mission Control during Project Mercury
NASA's first human spaceflight program, Project Mercury, included six crewed missions
between May 1961 and May 1963, each with a single astronaut (for a historical account
of the program from the perspectives of two leading flight controllers, see Kraft 2001 and
Kranz 2000). These spaceflights were primarily controlled out of a facility, shown in
Figure 35, at the NASA center now referred to as KSC in Florida. However, because
NASA relied on ground stations during this era rather than communications satellites for
communications with the controlled spacecraft, flight controllers were stationed at remote
ground stations around the world.
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Figure 35. The primary flight control room used for Project Mercury and the initial
flights of Project Gemini (source: http//:spaceflight.nasa.gov/).
Mission Control during Project Gemini
The follow-up program to Project Mercury, referred to as Project Gemini, consisted of
ten human spaceflights between March 1965 and November 1966, each with a pair of
astronauts (see Kraft 2001 and Kranz 2000 for historical accounts of this program from
the perspective of leading flight controllers). For this program, starting with the second
crewed flight (Gemini IV), the majority of the Mission Control function-the work done
at remote ground stations excluded-was moved to Building 30 of the NASA center now
referred to as JSC in Houston, Texas. The leading flight controllers for any given
mission controlled the flights from one of two Mission Operations Control Rooms
(MOCRs, pronounced "moe-kers"), such as the one shown in Figure 36, while a staff of
supporting flight controllers assisted them from what are now called MPSRs.
Figure 36. One of the MOCRs used during Gemini, Apollo, and early Space Shuttle
missions (source: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Mission Control during Project Apollo
The purpose of Project Gemini was to develop key engineering and operational skills and
knowledge for Project Apollo, the first-and so far only-program to land humans on the
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moon. Project Apollo consisted of sixteen crewed missions between January 1967 and
July 1975, each with a three-astronaut crew. Overall, six of these missions successfully
landed on the moon, one safely aborted a moon landing, eight 72 successfully completed
mission objectives in earth and/or lunar orbit, and one ended with a fatal launch pad fire
(see Liebergot and Harland 200673, Kraft 2001, and Kranz 2000 for historical accounts of
the program from the perspectives of flight controllers). As was the case for Project
Gemini, the majority of the Mission Control function-the work done at remote ground
stations excluded-was conducted in the MPSRs and two MOCRs at JSC.
Mission Control during the early Space Shuttle/Pre-ISS Era
NASA's next human spaceflight program, the Space Shuttle Program, began with
crewed, atmospheric approach and landing tests of a Space Shuttle orbiter in 1977 and
four crewed orbital test flights in 1981 and 1982. The Mission Control function for these
missions and the next 66 Shuttle missions74 was conducted in the two Gemini/Apollo Era
MOCRs. However, unlike Apollo and Gemini, the importance of remote ground stations
was gradually reduced by the launching of communications satellites during several of
these missions. Additionally, the workstations in the MOCRs and MPSRs were upgraded
several times (Kearney 1987) before the Mission Control function was moved into a
modern FCR built in Building 30 at JSC-see Figure 37.
Figure 37. The current FCR for Space Shuttle Mission Control (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
72 These missions included the Apollo 7 and Apollo 9 "shakedowns" of Apollo spacecraft hardware and
software in earth orbit, the Apollo 8 and Apollo 10 lunar orbit flights, three missions to the Skylab space
station, and one mission to rendezvous with a crewed, Soviet spacecraft.
73 Liebergot and Harland (2006) even include a CD-ROM with voice loop audio files from Apollo
missions.
74 STS-70 in July, 1995 was the first mission in which the modern Space Shuttle FCR was used for the
Mission Control function. The transition from the MOCR to the FCR occurred during the mission.
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Mission Control during the Space Shuttle/ISS Era
The current Space Shuttle/ISS Era effectively began during the ten Space Shuttle
missions to the Russian space station Mir from 1995 to 1998. It was during these
missions that the coordination of the Space Shuttle Mission Control function with
international operational entities became routine75. Once ISS on-orbit construction began
in 1998, a separate Mission Control team developed for the ISS Mission Control
function. This team and its function grew in size and complexity as the space station
progressed through its assembly. Accordingly, the ISS Mission Control function
ultimately moved through several small, temporary FCRs and MPSRs in Building 30
before eventually settling into a refurbished Gemini/Apollo/Early Shuttle Era MOCR 76
see Figure 38. Additionally, the POC opened at the Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville, Alabama to coordinate science operations with ISS Mission Control.
Figure 38. The current FCR for ISS Mission Control (source:
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/multimedia/lSS_FCR.html).
Notable Accomplishments of Mission Control
Along with the engineers in the MER, flight controllers have assisted astronaut crews in
executing tasks, rejecting system disturbances, and adapting to unforeseen situations on
numerous occasions. The following list is a small sample of these accomplishments
provided to help the reader appreciate the level of original thought and problem solving
required to perform the Mission Control function:
75 For ISS operations, Mission Control currently coordinates with the Columbus Control Center in
Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany; the Automated Transfer Vehicle Control Center in Toulouse, France; the
Japanese Experiment Module and H-II Transfer Vehicle Control Center in Tsukuba, Japan; and the Russian
Federal Space Agency Mission Control Center in Korolyov, Russia.
76 The other Gemini/Apollo/Early Shuttle Era MOCR has been restored to its Apollo configuration and
designated as a Registered Historic Place by the U.S. Government.
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* During Apollo 13, an oxygen tank that was damaged during ground testing
exploded and crippled the Command and Service Module (CSM) that the crew
needed to perform almost all critical tasks. As a result, Mission Control and the
MER had to make the critically depleted consumables on the spacecraft last for
more than three days as the spacecraft returned to earth and use the Lunar Module
for a number of tasks for which it was not designed. The crew safely returned to
earth and the mission is widely referred to as a "Successful Failure." The event is
detailed in a number of astronaut and flight controller memoirs (Liebergot and
Harland 2006, Kraft 2001, Kranz 2000, Lovell and Kluger 1994) and television
documentaries and it is dramatised most famously in the 1995 film, Apollo 13.
* During the launch of Apollo 12, the launch vehicle was stuck twice by lightning
and the electrical surge disabled many CSM subsystems. However, a flight
controller for that flight, John Aaron, immediately identified a corrective action
after recalling a launch pad test power anomaly that he had witnessed and
investigated a year earlier. The Apollo 12 crew ultimately landed on the Moon
and safety returned to earth. The event is detailed in several memoirs and oral
histories (Liebergot and Harland 2006, Kraft 2001, Rusnak 2000, Kranz 2000)
and is dramatised most famously in the 1998 cable miniseries, From the Earth to
the Moon.
* During the unmanned launch of the Skylab space station, a portion of its thermal
insulation/micrometeroid shield and one of its two solar panel wings fell off (the
other was consequently obstructed in a manner that prevented it from properly
deploying) 77. This situation left the station severely low on power and thermal
protection. As a result, the first crewed mission to Skylab was delayed until a
makeshift shield could be developed for the station and it was thus left up to both
Mission Control and the MER to keep the damaged space station "alive" in the
interim through remote commanding (Liebergot and Harland 2006).
* The assembly sequence of the ISS called for the station's power system to be
assembled one pair of Solar Array Wings (SAWs) at a time. Moreover, the first
pair of SAWs (referred to as the "P6" array) was to be deployed at a temporary
location on the ISS, retracted several missions later, moved to a permanent
location, and redeployed. However, the SAWs neither deployed nor retracted as
easily as its designers had anticipated and one partially ripped when it was
ultimately redeployed. Nonetheless, Mission Control and the MER quickly
developed procedures to overcome the deployment/retraction problems and fix
the tear in the SAW. Furthermore, they updated SAW deployment procedures so
that the second and third SAW pairs deployed without significant difficulties.
These events are detailed and investigated in the next two chapters of this
dissertation.
* As Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin descended towards the lunar surface during
the first crewed landing on the Moon (Apollo 11), several computer alarms rang,
adding anxiety and confusion to an already tense and intellectually demanding
situation. Though the alarms were relatively inconsequential , it is not
77 Liebergot and Harland (2006) state that design engineers opted to qualify the shield "by analysis" rather
than subjecting it to aerodynamic stress tests.
78 The alarms merely indicated that the computer was overloaded and dropping low priority tasks.
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unreasonable to speculate that an operator in such a situation might wrongly call
for an abort of the landing-in fact, that is exactly what happened in a sim that
occurred several weeks before the mission. However, due to the experiment-
based approach (i.e., simulation) to the refutation of procedural knowledge taken
by Mission Control, the flight control team responsible for the computer alarms
recognized the irrelevance of the alarms. Overall, the events are discussed in
several publications (Mindell 2008, Liebergot and Harland 2006, Kraft 2001,
Kranz 2000) and are dramatised most famously in the 1998 cable miniseries,
From the Earth to the Moon. Mindell's (2008) account of the events is of
particular interest when assessing the role of designers and operators in such
situations. He casts doubt on the potential for an abort-suggesting that aborts in
sims are much more likely than aborts in real life-in that situation, lauds the
computer's ability drop low priority tasks as a robust design feature, and points
out that a procedure change by Buzz Aldrin put the system into a configuration
that overloaded the computer. These arguments taken alone might suggest that
the operators added little-or even negative-value to the situation. However, he
also indicates that the designers made the situation unnecessarily difficult for the
operators by stating the following two facts and opinion: the program alarms only
existed for use in ground testing, the IL engineers approved Aldrin's procedure
change because their testing facilities and processes misrepresented the affect of
the change, and the decision to make the computer issue a program alarm when it
dropped low priority tasks was "too dramatic and intrusive in proportion to the
nature of the problem."
5.3 Current Mission Control Responsibilities, Workstations,
and Staffing
Overall, the Mission Control function consists of a number of responsibilities and
requires special human interfaces and staffing plans. These responsibilities, interfaces,
and staffing plans are described throughout this section.
Monitoring of Crew, Payload, and Spacecraft Health and Status
A primary responsibility of flight controllers is to monitor the health and status of the
crew, payload, and spacecraft throughout the mission and recommend corrective actions
when they observe unplanned events and phenomena. There are several types of data
available to flight controllers to perform this function, including: telemetry, voice/text
messages from the crew, and video downlink from the spacecraft. While voice, text, and
video data from the spacecraft and crew are processed entirely by humans, automation
(both on the spacecraft and on the ground) is used to process the telemetry data. While
this automation enables flight controllers to handle the large volume of data and focus on
other responsibilities, flight controllers are also expected to monitor the automation itself
and stay ahead of it whenever possible.
Spacecraft Commanding
There are essentially two types of interfaces through which humans can command a
spacecraft: hardware interfaces (e.g. switches, circuit breakers, dials, keyboards, etc.)
and software interfaces (e.g. digitized commands). While flight controllers can provide
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specific instructions (e.g. switch throws) in helping the crew command the spacecraft
through hardware interfaces, they cannot interface directly with the spacecraft through
these interfaces. One of the two crewed U.S. spacecraft in operation today, the Space
Shuttle, is commanded almost exclusively through hardware interfaces and thus, flight
controllers play mostly an indirect role in its commanding. The other spacecraft, the ISS,
is commanded mostly through software commands originating from either the on board
computers operated by the crew or RF signals from Mission Control. As an example of
the frequency of flight controller commanding of the ISS, it's estimated that over 125,000
commands were uplinked to the ISS from Mission Control in the first year of ISS crewed
operations (Crocker 2005). Each command from Mission Control is broken up into
digital packets and modulated onto the RF signals sent to the ISS from Mission Control.
Because bits in the packets can get lost or flipped in the transmission process, flight
controllers must verify that every command is sent, received, checked for errors, and
properly executed.
Management of Spacecraft Consumables and Supplies
Each human spacecraft and its crew consume physical resources such as air, food, water,
propellant, and so forth in the course of operations. Additionally, certain reusable items
or supplies such as tools, computers, clothing and so on are utilized frequently by the
crew. Ultimately, it is up to the flight controllers to closely monitor and control the usage
of the consumables in order to ensure that there will always be enough consumables
available to successfully and safely complete the mission. Also, they are in charge of
tracking the location and usage of the reusable items in order to:
1) tell the crew exactly where they are if they are needed for a task,
2) make arrangements for the mitigation or prevention of the failure or overuse
of them, and
3) determine the distribution of mass throughout the spacecraft. This
information is vital for accurate orbital maneuvering and vehicle pointing as
well as determining whether certain items and locations on the spacecraft are
inaccessible due to clutter.
Crew Activity Planning
Mission Control is responsible for both planning and re-planning the crew's daily
activities. The plan produced by Mission Control, exemplified in the 12-hour Gantt
Chart in Figure 39, details the actions of each crewmember-as well as the day/night
cycle, RF communications opportunities, and spacecraft attitude schedule-down to five
minute intervals. For missions with durations on the order of weeks (e.g., typical Space
Shuttle missions), the entire flight plan is produced before the mission and revised every
day during the mission. For long duration missions (e.g., ISS crew expeditions), a long-
term plan is produced periodically throughout the mission and updated daily.
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Figure 39. An example twelve-hour, re-planned portion of a flight plan for a Space
Shuttle mission.
Development and Upkeep of Spaceflight Procedures
Flight controllers are responsible for developing both the generic and mission specific
procedures for U.S. human spaceflight operations. Because these procedures are very
detailed, both minor changes in the spacecraft hardware configuration and anomalies that
arise in operations often make it necessary for the flight controllers to update the
procedures both between and during the missions.
Development and Upkeep of Spaceflight Operational Requirements
Flight controllers are responsible for developing generic and mission specific operational
requirements, referred to as "Flight Rules", in order to make sure that their roles and
expectations are sufficiently regulated and defined to accomplish the goals of the
individual missions and the program as a whole. Because goals vary from mission to
mission and throughout the lifecycle of the program, it is necessary to develop new
operational requirements and revise the old ones frequently.
Development and Upkeep of Flight Controller Reference Material
To ensure the quick accessibility of information vital to the Mission Control function,
flight controllers spend a significant portion of their time between missions compiling
generic and mission specific reference material into documents that are to be used at their
workstation. Because the material in these documents (e.g. vehicle schematics, payload
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list, etc.) often changes from mission to mission, it is necessary to develop new
documents and update the old ones frequently.
Participation in Crew Training
Because flight controllers are heavily involved in procedure development, it is sometimes
necessary for them to be directly involved in the training of astronauts even though there
is a dedicated staff for training both the astronauts and flight controllers. This training
usually consists of informal sessions organized by the flight controller.
Mission Control Organizational Structure and Decision Making
The Mission Control function requires a clear division of authority and required expertise
among the flight control team. Furthermore, it requires a coherent staffing plan that
ensures that there are flight controllers on duty whenever they are needed and that these
flight controllers are well rested and well informed on the issues that arose while they
rested. In this subsection, the organizational structure and decision making process used
by NASA for the Mission Control function is discussed.
Staffing
During U.S. human spaceflight operations, Mission Control is staffed 24 hours a day by a
large number of highly trained experts in spacecraft subsystems. Currently, there are two
major types of spaceflight operations being conducted by the U.S.: Space Shuttle
operations and ISS operations. Each involves its own flight control team and FCR.
Figure 40 below contains a labeled illustration of the flight controller workstations in the
Space Shuttle FCR. The current positions associated with the workstations are described
in Table 5 and Table 5. Almost every flight controller in each of the two FCRs is
supported by a team of less experienced, but more specialized flight controllers located in
one of the many MPSRs in Building 30. Because the total number of MPSR positions
greatly exceeds the number of FCR positions they are not listed individually in this
dissertation.
Figure 40. Labeled schematic of Space Shuttle FCR workstations (image from
http//:spaceflight.nasa.gov/).
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FLAGGED POSITION NAME RESPONSIBILITY
POSITION
NUMBER
1 ACO (Assembly and ACO is responsible for development of ISS assembly, activation,
Checkout Officer) and checkout operations.
2 BOOSTER (Booster BOOSTER monitors and evaluates the Shuttle main engines,
Systems Engineer) solid rocket boosters, and external tank performance during pre-
launch and ascent phases of missions
3 CAPCOM (Spacecraft CAPCOM serves as the prime communication link between
Communicator) Mission Control and the crew aboard the Shuttle and Space
Station. In the days of Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, the initials
stood for "Capsule Communicator."
4 DPS (Data Processing DPS determines the status of data processing systems including
Systems Engineer) the five Shuttle onboard general purpose computers, flight-critical
and launch data lines, the multifunction display system, mass
memories, and system-level software.
5 EECOM (Emergency, EECOM is responsible for passive and active thermal control
Environmental, functions and life support systems including: cabin atmosphere
Consumables Manager) control, avionics cooling, supply/waste water system
management, and fire detection/suppression.
6 EGIL (Electrical EGIL, pronounced "Eagle," monitors Shuttle electrical systems,
Generation and fuel cells, and associated cryogenics; AC and DC power circuits;
Illumination Engineer) vehicle pyrotechnics and lighting; and hardware caution and
warning systems.
7 EVA (Extravehicular EVA monitors all aspects of the spacewalks based out of the
Activities Officer) Shuttle and Space Station. This includes monitoring the technical
operation of the spacesuits and the spacewalk activities carried
out during the mission.
8 FAO (Flight Activities FAO plans and supports crew activities, checklists, procedures,
Officer) and schedules and plans and manages the orientation of the
Shuttle in space.
9 FDO (Flight Dynamics FDO, pronounced "Fido," plans Shuttle maneuvers and monitors
Officer) trajectory in conjunction with the guidance officer.
10 FLIGHT (Flight "FLIGHT" serves as leader of the flight control team and is
Director) responsible for the conduct of the overall team. Flight acts as the
focal point for all decisions made relative to the on-orbit mission.
11 GC (Ground GC directs maintenance and operation activities affecting
Controller) Mission Control hardware, software, and support facilities. GC
coordinates the Ground Space Flight Tracking and Data Network
and the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System used for data
and voice transmissions between the Mission Control and the
Shuttle or Space Station.
12 GDO-Rendezvous Rendezvous supports Shuttle missions during deploy,
(Rendezvous Guidance rendezvous, proximity operations phases, docking, and
and Procedures Officer) undocking; and whenever complex crew procedures are affecting
orbit dynamics.
13 GNC (Guidance, GNC monitors all space shuttle guidance, navigation, and control
Navigation, and systems; notifies Flight Director and crew of impending abort
Control Systems situations; and advises the crew regarding guidance hardware
Engineer) malfunctions.
Table 4. Brief descriptions of Space Shuttle FCR console positions (Part 1 of 2,
adapted from NASA JSC 2005a).
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FLAGGED POSITION NAME RESPONSIBILITY
POSITION
NUMBER
14 INCO (Integrated and INCO plans and monitors in-flight communications and
Communications instrumentation systems configuration, and controls Shuttle
Officer) television from the ground.
15 MMACS MMACS, pronounced "Max," monitors the Orbiter's hydraulic,
(Maintenance, structural, and mechanical systems. MMACS is also responsible
Mechanical, Arm, and for onboard crew equipment and In-Flight maintenance
Crew Systems Officer) procedures.
16 MOD (Mission MOD provides a link from the Flight Control Room to top NASA
Operations Directorate and mission managers.
Manager)
17 PAO (Public Affairs PAO provides mission commentary to supplement and explain
Officer) air-to-ground transmissions and flight control operations to the
news media and public.
18 PAYLOADS (Payloads PAYLOADS coordinates onboard and ground system interfaces
Officer) between the flight control team and Shuttle payload user, and
monitors in-cabin and cargo bay systems, experiments, and
satellites.
19 PDRS (Payload PDRS monitors operation of the SRMS, used to deploy, retrieve,
Deployment and and position satellites, the OBSS, and other cargo in the payload
Retrieval Systems) bay.
20 PROP (Propulsion) PROP monitors and evaluates Shuttle reaction control and orbital
maneuvering system jets and propellants and other consumables
available for maneuvers.
21 SURGEON Surgeon monitors crew health, provides crew consultations,
coordinates crew medical operations and advises the Flight
Director of any related issues that may affect mission success.
Table 5. Brief descriptions of Space Shuttle FCR console positions (Part 2 of 2,
adapted from NASA JSC 2005a).
Every flight control team consists of at least three shifts-occasionally a fourth shift is
called in during highly anomalous situations. In order to ensure that information is
adequately transferred between flight controllers working on different shifts, each shift is
scheduled to overlap the shift that preceded it and the shift that follows it by one hour 79
For Space Shuttle missions, one of the shifts is scheduled to coincide with the crew sleep
period whenever possible 80 . This shift is given the responsibility for re-planning the
crew's activities for the next day.
Chain of Command
In the hierarchical structure of Mission Control, the Flight Director acts as the flight
control team integrator and assumes full responsibility for the actions of the flight control
team. Ultimately, the Flight Director must approve all actions recommended or directly
implemented by the flight control team. Even though Flight Directors are relatively low-
level managers within NASA as a whole, they have the authority, along with the crew
79 Consequently, each flight control shift works for nine hours per day during spacecraft operations.
80 On some Shuttle flights the entire crew sleeps at the same time while on others, the crew is divided into
two groups with different sleep cycles in order to support continuous crew operations.
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commander, to overrule high-level NASA management during operations in order to take
any action that they feel is necessary to ensure the safety of the crew and spacecraft
(Kraft 2001). MPSR controllers report to the FCR controller that they support and the
FCR controllers in turn report directly to the Flight Director.
In Mission Control, information can flow vertically, horizontally, or instantaneously to all
positions. Sometimes the MPSR controllers, because of their low-level attention to
subsystem issues identify an issue first and discuss it with other MPSR controllers and
their associated FCR controller who in turn suggests possible actions to other FCR
controllers and the Flight Director who then approves a course of action. CAPCOM,
traditionally the only position allowed to speak to the crew, then relays that decision to
the crew. Other times, the Flight Director may recognize a system issue and ask FCR
controllers for advice, which they will derive from a discussion with other FCR
controllers or their MPSR personnel. Finally, at other times, the details of an issue will
be broadcast to everyone in the FCR and MPSR from the crew, spacecraft automation, or
other elements of NASA.
Flight Rules
Flight Rules can be thought of as the operational requirements for Mission Control and
serve as the basis for all decisions made by the flight control team in one way or another.
They are developed and approved by the Flight Director Office and higher-level NASA
management before the mission and their purpose is to decrease the amount of time it
takes to make decisions whenever off-nominal events occur. They include, among other
things, a prioritized list of mission objectives, definitions of the minimum acceptable
performance level of many components, operational policies, and anomaly response
strategies. Additionally the rationale for each flight rule is explicitly stated in the
documentation of the rule. Because it is understood that creating a set of Flight Rules
that is internally consistent in addressing all of these issues for all situations is nearly
impossible given the complexity of spaceflight operations, there is also a Flight Rule that
addresses conflicting requirements. Essentially, this Flight Rule allows the flight control
team to use its engineering judgment to resolve any conflicts that arise among two or
more Flight Rules.
Digital Voice Loops
Because flight controller teams and the astronauts that they support are physically
distributed, communication in Mission Control is primarily facilitated by digital voice
loops. A digital voice loop can be thought of as the aural equivalent of an online chat
room. Users in Mission Control can anonymously monitor or participate in conversations
occurring on a voice loop through an earpiece-microphone headset that they plug into the
voice loop network. Additionally, like online chat rooms, each voice loop is reserved as
a forum for discussion of a specific topic or among a specific group of users. As a result,
each flight control position has specific loops that it monitors at all times and others that
it monitors at its discretion. To facilitate discretionary monitoring of conversations of
interest to the flight control position, there are few restrictions on the position's access to
the various loops in Mission Control. While some loops can only be monitored from
certain workstations and others grant talking privileges only to certain flight control
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positions (e.g., only CAPCOM can talk on the loops used to converse with the
astronauts), flight controllers are generally afforded the appropriate level of access to the
loops that would be useful to them.
Ultimately, there are hundreds of voice loops available for flight controller
communication in Mission Control. Each flight controller's interface to the voice loop
network allows talking on only one loop at a time. It also makes it possible to monitor up
to 24 loops simultaneously, though no flight controllers can actually monitor this many
loops at the same time unless many of them are silent. Typically flight controllers only
monitor between four and ten loops concurrently. They succeed at this task by learning
to focus their attention only on parts of the conversations that are relevant to their
position. Additionally, all flight controllers are expected to use a formal protocol of
concise dialogue when conversing on the loops in order to avoid unnecessarily cluttering
them. For example, even though all flight controllers have access to the Flight Director
Loop and are strongly encouraged to monitor it at all times, only controllers in the FCR
are allowed to talk on it under normal circumstances.
Flight Controller Consoles
While the astronauts orbit the Earth or walk on the Moon, the flight controllers monitor
and advise them from a windowless building in Houston, Texas. Telemetry, voice
messages from the crew, and occasional video downlinks from the spacecraft provide the
only windows that flight controllers have into what is actually happening on the vehicle.
Therefore, the workstation for a flight controller-referred to as a console-that provides
this information, is vital to the flight control process. Figure 41 contains a picture of a
typical Space Shuttle FCR console with numbered flags to identify its key features.
These features are described further in Table 6.
Figure 41. A typical flight controller console in the Space Shuttle FCR (image from
http//:spaceflight.nasa.gov/).
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FLAGGED DESCRIPTION OF FLAGGED ITEM
ITEM
NUMBER
1 This display at the front of the FCR contains event logging information.
2 This display at the front of the FCR contains information that allows the flight controller to
locate the spacecraft's position over the Earth.
3 These wall clock light displays provide count-downs and count-ups to and from mission
critical events.
4 This display at the front of the FCR is used for high-level situation awareness. It is
reconfigured multiple times in any given day of a mission. Normally it contains video
footage downlinked from the spacecraft, weather maps, spacecraft attitude, maneuver
displays, landing displays, etc.
5 This flat panel monitor is connected to a PC that flight controllers use for email, word
processing, timeline software, Flight Note 8' editing, and internet access.
6 This digital interface is used by the flight controller to select the voice loops that they will
monitor and talk on.
7 These three computer monitors are connected to two Unix machines and are used for the
display of data. Data can be viewed digitally or in time history plots through custom
displays designed for the various FCR positions. Furthermore, the flight controller can set
limits on the data, called "Console Limits," in order to receive an aural alert when the data
exceeds a limit.
8 This extra chair is used by FCR flight controllers on the incoming shift during a shift
handover and flight controller trainees for observation of certified FCR flight controllers.
9 This headset plugs into the console and allows the flight controller to both listen to and talk
on the voice loops.
10 This label points towards a bookshelf (not in the image) for reference manuals containing:
nominal procedures, malfunction procedures, Flight Rules, vehicle schematics, etc.
Table 6. Description of Space Shuttle FCR console features.
MPSR consoles differ only slightly from FCR consoles. Most MPSR consoles have
additional closed circuit televisions screens that allow them to view what is happening in
the FCR. Additionally, because MPSR flight controllers cannot directly view the FCR
wall displays-features 1 through 4 in Table 6-they usually access the information on
these displays either through the Unix-driven screens of their console, feature 7 in Table
6, or their closed circuit television screens.
5.3 The Scholars of Flight Control
When given a description of the responsibilities of flight controllers-such as the one
provided in the previous section-the question arises as to what kind of knowledge is
required to satisfy those responsibilities. Rasmussen's (1990, 1987) framework of Skill-
Based Behaviors (SBBs), Rule-Based Behaviors (RBBs), and Knowledge-Based
Behaviors (KBBs) and their relation to human "error"-as discussed in Chapter 2-
provides an intriguing construct for addressing this question. Information in the form of
vehicle health and status data is transmitted from the spacecraft automation directly to
two layers of human supervisory control: the astronaut crew and Mission Control.
Mission Control and the astronaut crew coordinate their efforts through radio frequency
transmission of digital voice, video, and text files. While the crew has almost full
81 Flight notes are memos that the flight control team uses to write or rewrite procedures and Flight Rules
or draw attention to other issues during operations.
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capability to command the automation directly, Mission Control has a more limited
capability and must often initiate their desired control actions through instructions to the
crew. Astronauts go through years of generic and mission specific training to understand
the wide spectrum of RBBs that will be required in their flights into space, to practice the
SBBs that will not be automated, and form a high-level mental model for mastery of
some of the necessary KBBs. Flight controllers, on the other hand, primarily focus on the
KBBs and RBBs needed for development and revision of procedures, operational
requirements, flight plans, and other reference material (i.e., flight controller
"publications") and the management of vehicle consumables. Figure 42 depicts the
distribution of authority and focus of Mission Control, the astronaut crew, and the
spacecraft automation in regards to SBBs, RBBs, and KBBs.
Verbal & Print Instructions & Messages
Knowledge
Based Behavior
Verbal Messages & Video Downlink
Mission
Control
Processed Astronaut
Telemetry Data Crew
Rule Based
Behavior
Spacecraft
Uplinked Automation Commands
Commands
Skill Based
Behavior
Figure 42. The distribution of authority for SBBs, RBBs, and KBBs in U.S. human
spaceflight operations.
Flight controllers must not only master the knowledge in their field, but they must
advance it through original thought and they must do so in a very public setting. In other
words, flight controllers must become "Scholars of Flight Control" over the course of
their training. Accordingly, flight controllers receive years of highly focused training in
almost every known aspect of their subsystem and have to pass a series of written and
oral exams before being certified to take responsibility for the execution of the KBBs and
supervision of the RBBs relating to their subsystem.
While the training of a flight controller develops the trainee's capacity for original
thought and problem solving, it can be said that the focus on fostering original thought
rather than preventing human "error" is understated. The concept of human reliability as
the central problem to safety in the field of human factors is unfortunately so prevalent
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that even operators may be led to believe it. The current chair of the AIAA Space
Operations and Support Technical Committee recently wrote, "The ultimate goal of a
training program is to reduce operator error" (Fuller 2003). To the contrary, the author
believes that the ultimate goal of operator training is to build the operators' mental
models to the point where they understand how to apply the control authority for task
execution, disturbance rejection, and adaptation allocated to them (explicitly and
implicitly) in order to successfully or at least safely perform the mission. In the
remaining paragraphs of this section, the elements of a typical flight controller's training
are discussed.
United Space Alliance Flight Operations Training Academy
Most flight controllers are entry-level engineers, and while all are required to have an
engineering, science, or mathematics degree from a university, few have graduate school
or significant prior work experience. Typically the first major training milestone that
flight controller trainees achieve in their flight control career is graduation from a four-to-
six week training program provided by NASA's prime contractor for spaceflight
operations, the United Space Alliance. This program, commonly referred to as "Training
Academy," is offered several times a year and flight controller trainees are usually
expected to attend it during its first offering after their hire date. While the structure and
content of the program evolves from year-to-year, the format consists mostly of lectures,
facility tours, and reading assignments relating to the high-level details of the U.S. human
spaceflight program in general and each of its operational vehicles. The program is
broken up into several sections, each of which is followed by comprehensive exams
consisting of multiple sections that are graded individually. If a flight controller trainee
fails one or more sections of an exam-which happens to almost every flight controller
trainee as they go through the program-the trainee is required to retake the failed
section(s) in order to achieve a passing score.
Computer Based Trainers (CBTs)
Flight controller trainees are required to individually complete dozens of short (i.e. one to
three hours in duration), online training courses referred to as Computer Based Trainers
(CBTs) throughout their flight certification process. Normally these courses involve the
review of a series of narrated slides and the completion of multiple choice tests. The
topics of these CBTs range from universal engineering workplace issues such as
intellectual property rights of workers to highly specific topics relating to the subsystems
for which the flight controller trainee will be responsible.
Hardware Familiarization in Spacecraft Mockup Facilities
The majority of U.S. spaceflight hardware assembly and maintenance occurs at KSC in
Florida. Consequently, there are few opportunities for flight controllers to examine flight
hardware in person-especially early on in their careers when they are training for their
flight control responsibilities. This situation presents an enormous challenge to flight
controller trainees in the development of their mental model of the systems for which
they will be responsible, and it is partially remedied by the existence of semi-functional,
full scale mockups of the major crew compartments of each type of human spacecraft
operated by NASA. A number of short courses are offered in these mockups for
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hardware familiarization and each flight controller trainee is required or encouraged to
complete a subset of them. Flight controller trainees are also given the option to reserve
time in these mockups for individual and group study of the hardware. In all, these
mockup facilities are frequently used to reduce trainees' reliance on hardware/software
documentation, images, and video footage for the development of a viable mental model
of the hardware/software relevant to their flight control responsibilities.
Single System Trainers (SSTs)
Because flight controllers are often required to write and update crew procedures and
supervise the crew while they complete them, a portion of their training is devoted to
understanding procedure execution from the perspective of an astronaut. This type of
training is mostly conducted in Single System Trainers (SSTs), which are mockups of the
crew's interfaces to spacecraft software and subsystem electro-mechanical interfaces (e.g.
valve switches, power switches, etc.). Flight controller trainees are required to complete
a number of short courses in SSTs where they act out the role of astronaut crewmembers
in the execution of both nominal and contingency procedures.
Flight Controller Trainers (FCTs)
Actual simulation of the flight control process is a crucial part of the training of each
flight controller. Early on in the flight control career of trainees, it is usually not practical
for the trainees to participate in simulations with a full flight control team because they
will usually not be able to keep pace with more experienced flight controllers.
Furthermore, there will be a number of training scenarios that are of immense value to the
trainee, but not the flight control team as whole. Therefore, flight controllers have access
to facilities known as Flight Controller Trainers (FCTs) where they can run through
simulations alone with an instructor or with just a handful of flight controllers-typically
those who work on their FCR/MPSR team.
Each FCT contains a small number of flight controller consoles-minus a few features-
that can be loaded with simulation data to respond much like a real console would in
flight. Because everyone involved in the simulation is typically in the same room, voice
loops normally are not used-though there is limited capability to conduct a simulation in
more than one FCT and link trainees in each FCT through voice loops. Because certain
flight control and astronaut positions are not represented directly in the simulation, the
instructor in charge of the simulation normally acts out the roles of these positions.
FCT simulation sessions are typically three hours in length and are orchestrated by senior
members in the flight control groups involved or personnel from the flight controller
training division. Each flight control group that uses the FCTs for training has a required
curriculum of scenarios that trainees must successfully pass. The trainees are exposed to
these scenarios in a non-predictable order and if they successfully complete one scenario
early in the session, they may be exposed to another. Conversely, if trainees struggle in a
scenario, they may have to spend the whole session on it and be exposed to it again in
later sessions until they perform satisfactorily in it. Once trainees successfully work
through a number of scenarios and demonstrate an acceptable level of competence in
flight control relating to their position, they begin participation in simulations with full
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flight control teams. However, this transition usually does not signal the end of the
trainees' participation in FCT simulations as it is often necessary for trainees to continue
to use the FCTs to sharpen their skills in between simulations with full flight control
teams.
Integrated Simulations
Integrated simulations or "sims" are conducted in a FCR and its associated MPSRs and
involve a full flight control team and usually a crew of astronauts. They range in
duration from a few hours to a few days and are organized by a team of certified flight
controller training personnel. While the shorter sims can be completed by a single shift
of flight controllers, the longer ones cannot and thus require shift changes 82. Ultimately
sims are among the most crucial elements of a flight controller's training because they
most closely resemble the actual flight control process during contingency situations. In
fact, they are considered to be so useful that even certified flight controllers participate in
them regularly to maintain generic proficiency or prepare for specific events to be
conducted during actual flight operations.
Normally, the flight control team is exposed to a handful of system and subsystem level
malfunctions and difficulties throughout the course of a sim and the performance of each
flight controller is evaluated closely 83. The trainees in particular are evaluated for their
overall progress in developing a viable mental model for flight control in their assigned
position. Once trainees become comfortable in participating in integrated sims at their
position, they are put through an evaluation process known as an "interim certification
sim" in which their position is a point of intense focus for malfunctions and difficulties in
the course of a sim. If trainees perform well in their interim certification sim, they will
shortly thereafter get to participate in a similar, yet more intense evaluation sim referred
to as a "final certification sim," which is usually the final task that they must successfully
complete before certification. Conversely, if trainees perform poorly in their interim
certification sim they will have to participate in sims and FCT sessions until they can
demonstrate a level of progress that would address the concerns that their flight control
group might have in putting them through a final certification sim.
In-Flight Training
Flight controller trainees are also strongly encouraged to observe and participate in the
actual flight control process at various stages throughout their training. As illustrated
above in Figure 41 there is one extra seat and voice loop interface at every console in
Mission Control. In the seven hours of each shift between the shift handovers this seat
and interface is usually available for flight controller trainees to sit next to the certified
flight controllers in order to observe and assist them. This type of experience is meant to
give the trainee-who in this role is referred to as an On-the-Job-Trainee (OJT)-
exposure to the aspects of the flight control process that cannot be simulated. As a result,
each flight control group has a set number of hours that it would like its trainees to serve
82 Because shift changes are considered an important part of the flight control process, it is sometimes the
case that shift changes are scheduled even during the shorter duration sims.
83 At the conclusion of every sim both the Flight Director and the simulation supervisor debrief the
simulation with the entire flight control team.
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as OJTs before they become certified. However, this number of hours is usually
considered a guideline rather than a requirement because the flight schedule does not
always provide enough opportunities for OJT experience.
Generic Certification Process
As mentioned above, the final certification sim typically serves as the final barrier to
certification for a flight controller trainee. It is essentially a way to subjectively evaluate
the trainees' readiness to serve at the flight control position that they will occupy. As is
the case in the interim sim, the trainee is forced to deal with a spate of malfunctions and
other difficulties. The scenarios are designed to expose the trainee's level of knowledge
and capacity for original thought and problem solving to the fullest extent possible.
Flight controllers in some groups also take a written exam shortly before their final
certification sim. Each flight control group has different requirements for their final
certification sims and thus, the sim pass/failure rate and the maximum number of
opportunities that a trainee is given to retake the sim varies from position to position.
Once flight controller trainees receive certification, they are qualified to work at the flight
control position that they have been training at in FCTs and sims. Usually this position
will be only one of several positions that they will eventually work at in their career.
Figure 43 provides an example of the progression of a flight controller from position to
84position in the Space Shuttle environmental systems flight control group 8 . Whenever
flight controllers move from one position to another, they must go through another
certification process for the new position. Ultimately, this new certification process will
not call for a repeat of some training elements such as Training Academy, but it will call
for the flight controller to participate in a new curriculum of CBT, FCT, and sim training,
culminating in another final certification sim.
Orbit Life Ascent/Entry Orbit Thermal
Support Life Support
Ascent/Entry I Orbit EECOM Ascent/Entry
Thermal I EECOM
MPSR I FCR
Figure 43. Example certification flow for a flight controller in the Space Shuttle
environmental systems group.
84 The Space Shuttle environmental systems flight control group has two MPSR positions (Life Support and
Thermal) and one FCR position (EECOM). Each position has two levels of certification: Orbit and
Ascent/Entry. The Orbit certification allows the flight controller to work only during the phase of the
mission where the Space Shuttle is in orbit and it is always achieved before the Ascent/Entry certification.
The Ascent/Entry phases of a Space Shuttle flight are much more dynamic than the Orbit phase and
therefore require deeper knowledge and capacity for original thought and problem solving relating to the
flight control position.
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There is no pre-determined amount of time for completing a flight controller training
program. It typically takes over a year for flight controller trainees to achieve their first
level of certification and may take anywhere from five to fifteen years before they
complete every level of certification in their group. Ultimately, the amount of time it
takes to complete the progression is dependent on several factors, including: the number
of positions and certification levels in their group, the number of people vying for
certification or who have certification, the availability of the training facilities, the flight
schedule, the time the flight controllers dedicate to training versus working on other
assignments, and the flight controllers' individual performance during FCTs and sims.
Whenever flight controllers receive a new certification, they may immediately begin
training for their next certification or spend some time focusing solely on the
responsibilities of their flight control position. Either way, they will be expected to serve
a number of shifts at the position that they have become certified for before moving to the
next level of certification. Caldwell (2005) estimates that as many as 70% of all flight
controllers fail to eventually achieve certification for a FCR position.
Flight Specific Certification Process
In addition to the generic certification process, flight controllers are typically required to
go through some kind of separate process to become certified to work on specific
missions. This process varies widely among the flight control groups, but can always be
completed much faster than the generic certification process. Some groups-especially
those that deal directly with mission payloads-have unique responsibilities for each
mission and thus require a highly formal process that usually involves flight specific
hardware familiarization training. Other groups that have very similar flight
responsibilities from mission to mission tend to have a less formal process that consists
mainly of participation in the flight specific sims.
Traditions and Foundations of Mission Control
Training programs in Mission Control are fundamentally socialization processes. One
aspect of socialization is the adoption of traditions and cultural foundations of a specific
group. In professional communities, such traditions and foundations provide indications
of how a community views its professional identity. The stated foundations of MOD are
as follows (Webb and Smith 2008, Liebergot and Harland 2006, Kranz 2000):
"To instill within ourselves these qualities essential to professional excellence:
Discipline...Being able to follow as well as to lead, knowing that we must
master ourselves before we can master our task.
Competence...There being no substitute for total preparation and
complete dedication, for space will not tolerate the careless or indifferent.
Confidence.. .Believing in ourselves as well as others, knowing that we
must master fear and hesitation before we can succeed.
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Responsibility.. .Realizing that it cannot be shifted to others, for it belongs
to each of us; we must answer for what we do, or fail to do.
Toughness... Taking a stand when we must; to try again, and again, even
if it means following a more difficult path.
Teamwork...Respecting and utilizing the abilities of others, realizing that
we work toward a common goal, for success depends upon the efforts of
all.
Vigilance...Always attentive to the dangers of spaceflight; Never
accepting success as a substitute for rigor in everything we do.
To always be aware that suddenly and unexpectedly we may find ourselves in a
role where our performance has ultimate consequences.
To recognize that the greatest error is not to have tried and failed, but that in the
trying, we do not give it our best effort."
These foundations indicate a standard of performance exceeding the mere avoidance of
errors. In fact, the only references made to "error" downplay its significance relative to
the added value of a sufficiently qualified, accountable, and engaged flight controller.
Further reinforcing this view are the "hanging of the plaque" ceremony 8 and frequent
flight controller usage of the following Roosevelt (1910) quote:
"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man
stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit
belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and
sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and
again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does
actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions;
who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the
triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while
daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls
who neither know victory nor defeat."
This quote is often referenced in internal flight controller presentations and reference
documents, and in the environmental systems group, a flight controller that completes the
Ascent/Entry EECOM certification (or otherwise contributes substantially to flight
control in the EECOM group over his or her career) receives the "Man in the Arena"
award.
85 After every mission, the leader of the flight control console team (e.g., ACO, EVA, EECOM, etc.) that is
perceived by the Flight Directors and crew to have made contributions to mission success and safety that
are most deserving of recognition is invited to physically hang a plaque based on the mission patch in the
FCR during a post-flight ceremony.
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5.4 Procedure Rework in Space Shuttle Mission Control
Mindell's (2008) description-provided at the beginning of this chapter-of Hugh Blair
Smith's reaction to the Apollo 11 program alarms highlights the importance of
procedures (and their embedded assumptions) in complex system operation. Procedures
are formal descriptions of task execution and disturbance rejection as planned. That
being said, it is possible for procedures to be used as a means for control of uncertainty.
Procedures can be constructed with an "if-then-else" structure to account for a multitude
of possible outcomes that could result from a planned task. Additionally, procedures can
be written to detail responses to system disturbances that the system may or may not
encounter. Finally, processes can be put in place to remove detrimental inconsistencies
in procedures due to design or operational issues that were initially unrecognized or that
emerge from system adaptation and the evolution of its operating environment.
Inconsistencies in procedures constitute a dynamic hazard in systems with interactive
complexity and tight coupling and thus, the rework of procedures is a dynamic, safety
risk management process 6. In accordance with Leveson's (1995) definition of a hazard,
the mere existence of inconsistencies in a procedure will not necessarily lead to an
accident unless certain contextual conditions are also present (e.g., the procedure
executor wishes to execute the procedure as written, etc.). Moreover, the number of
inconsistencies in the procedures relevant to a system can change over time as changes
occur in the system and its environment and as the procedures themselves are changed.
Therefore, it is possible to define system safety constraints that restrict the execution of
procedures with inconsistencies, and to design the control authority into the system to
allow enforcement of these constraints.
Procedures have traditionally been viewed as rules that must be followed and thus the
failure to execute a procedure as written has been viewed as an indication of poor or
"unsafe" operator performance (Bourrier 2005, Carroll et al. 2002). Indeed, many
accident investigation reports in numerous industries habitually draw attention to the
failures of operators to perform the prescribed procedures, and offer recommendations
stressing increased training of the procedures and more surveillance of the workers to
ensure that the procedures will be followed (Carroll et al. 2002). However, procedures
can be ambiguous or outright wrong in many operational situations encountered in
complex systems and in such instances it might even be best for the system stakeholders
if the procedures are not followed by the operators (Dekker 2005, Bourrier 2005,
Leveson 1995)87. Such situations require a less commonly held (or at least less
commonly discussed) view of procedures: the view of procedures as resources rather
than rules.
When viewed as a resource, a procedure is just a medium for communication between the
person or group that writes the procedure and the person or group that executes the
86 More precisely, inconsistencies in procedures are control flaws-see Figure 33 in Chapter 4-that could
instantiate inadequate control actions leading to hazard states (they represent flaws in the controller's
model of the process being controlled).
87 As noted by Leveson (1995) and others, "working-to-rule" or working in accordance to a procedure as
written, regardless of whatever flaws exist in the procedure, is a practice often used as an alternative to
formal strikes by workers belonging to labor unions in many industries.
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procedure. The writer and the executor of the procedure can either be different people
(ideally in such cases the procedure writer will actually be able to provide useful
information to the procedure executor) or the same person who, when subjected to time
pressure, would benefit from having the procedural information readily available. Every
procedure is written for an assumed operational context and when that context applies,
the executor of the procedure can use it to free up cognitive resources for thinking more
critically about the process they are undertaking (i.e., to think about what's happening
rather than trying to remember each step). On the other hand, when the assumed
operational context does not apply or the procedure is not internally consistent-due to a
mistake in the writing of the procedure or asynchronous system evolution (Leplat
1987)-the executor of the procedure should be given the discretion to delay the
procedure in order to discuss it with the procedure writer or deviate from it when delay of
the procedure cannot be tolerated. With this view of procedures, there is a burden on the
procedure executor(s) to use discretion in executing the procedure and there is a burden
on the procedure writer(s) to provide procedures to the executor(s) that are internally
consistent and applicable to the actual operational context.
In Mission Control, the burdens of the procedure writer and procedure executor are
addressed through a process that is henceforth referred to as procedure rework.
Procedures are written by the flight controllers in Mission Control and mostly executed
by the astronauts on board the spacecraft 88 . The space environment harbors a number of
potential disturbances to spacecraft and the spacecraft themselves-being complex and
highly coupled-potentially harbor destructive internal inconsistencies in their
configuration and thus, uncertainty is recognized in the usage of procedures. While in the
months leading up to the mission, the astronauts and flight controllers train extensively
on the proper execution of procedures, the foregone assumption throughout training is
that the procedures will not be perfect and will need to be continuously updated both
before and during the mission. This explicit recognition of uncertainty is perhaps best
exemplified by a Mission Control flight rule that states that the Flight Director and the
commanding astronaut for the mission have the discretion to resolve any inconsistencies
in the flight rules that may be discovered during the mission.
Flight controllers carefully monitor the spacecraft throughout the mission, searching for
conditions that may invalidate the assumptions behind the procedures that relate to their
domain area. Whenever such conditions are recognized, the flight controllers initiate an
update of the procedure through communication over the voice loops and if time permits,
a document referred to as a Flight Note. When the procedure change is approved,
documents or voice instructions are transmitted to the spacecraft to instruct the crew on
how to update their procedure documentation. The astronauts are free to ask questions
about procedures and procedure updates and to challenge the rationale for conducting
them as written. These challenges present another opportunity to initiate or reiterate
rework of a procedure. However, it should be noted that it is a point of pride for most
88 As mentioned above, there is limited capability for flight controllers to uplink commands to the
spacecraft, thereby executing procedures on their own. The extent to which this commanding capability is
possible depends on the spacecraft; the International Space Station, for example, can accept a far greater
number of uplinked commands than the Space Shuttle.
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flight controllers to discover potential problems with procedures before the astronauts do
and thus, procedure rework is usually initiated by flight controllers.
The goal of procedure rework in Mission Control is to induce adaptation of flight
controller and astronaut behavior in response to the emergence of inconsistencies in task
execution and disturbance rejection as planned. Specifically procedure rework is meant
to enforce a safety constraint on the number of potentially harmful inconsistencies and
omissions in the procedures. The sources and enablers of this control authority for
system adaptation are the knowledge of the flight controllers, MER engineers, and
astronauts; the formal processes for procedure rework; and the information systems used
for data interpretation and communication.
In the next chapter, this process will be formally analyzed as part of Space Shuttle real-
time 89 operations safety control structure shown in Figure 44. In this safety control
structure, the White House and Congress have the responsibility to enable safe operations
during emergencies on a national level, while NASA Administration must provide final
approval for real-time operations to begin. Of course, both of these components are, by
necessity, mostly inactive in real-time operations. The MMT is responsible for most high
level real-time operations issues (e.g., redefining mission objectives in flight), while most
implementation issues occur on the levels below the MMT. For example, Mission
Control (assisted by the MER) is responsible for, among other things, providing safe
procedures to the crew to execute in flight.
89 The term "real-time" is used in this case study to describe operations occurring from the start of the
launch countdown to the safing of the Space Shuttle once it has landed. Maintenance and pre-flight
training operations are excluded in the use of this term.
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Figure 44. A portion of the Space Shuttle real-time operations safety control
structure.
5.5 Mission Control Literature Review
As stated in Chapter 1, the hypothesis of this dissertation is:
"Modeling the output of system safety control structures as phase space
attractors with nonlinear, continuous dynamics subject to uncertain initial (or
disturbance) conditions will provide useful insights in the design and operation of
system safety control structures."
The discussion in Chapter 4 explains the relationship between phase space attraction and
safety control structure evaluation. However, to provide support for the hypothesis's
claim on the usefulness of this relationship it is necessary to briefly summarize what
researchers of a specific context have and have not learned without the concepts of this
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relationship at their disposal. As stated earlier, the specific context used in this
dissertation to demonstrate this usefulness is the Mission Control function. Thus, a brief
summary of the Mission Control literature is provided in this section in order to highlight
the gaps in knowledge that can be potentially be filled through the application of these
safety control structure evaluation concepts. In the next two chapters these concepts are
used to begin filling a portion of these gaps.
The amount of data on work in Mission Control that is available to researchers is
staggering: the control rooms are continuously videotaped, conversations on the voice
loops are recorded and can be monitored with little restriction by anyone with access to
any of the hundreds of nodes in the voice loop network, commands uplinked to the
spacecraft from flight controller consoles are logged, and official correspondence
between flight controllers is saved for future reference. However, even though work in
Mission Control is highly visible, unique, and thoroughly documented, relatively few
researchers have attempted to study it (Caldwell 2007a) and those who have, did not
attempt to perform an integrative, quantitative assessment of the control authority it
provides in human spaceflight operations. While Mindell (2008), for example, provides
an in-depth historical account of control authority allocation to astronauts and spacecraft
automation during the Apollo lunar landings, he only devotes secondary attention to the
control authority allocated to Mission Control.
Patterson et al. (1999) provide a detailed qualitative description of voice loop structure
and usage in Mission Control that is being followed up by a quantitative network analysis
(Caldwell 2007a). Shalin (2005) describes how information displays at two Mission
Control consoles (FDO and INCO) are used for planning purposes in order to identify
general requirements for developing effective planning representations. Patterson and
Woods (2001) observed and describe both nominal and ad hoc shift handovers between
flight controllers during a Space Shuttle mission as a means of maintaining flight
controller preparedness. Kearney (1987) details the evolution-from the Gemini Era to
the Early Space Shuttle Era-of the display and communications systems used in Mission
Control. Watts et al. (1996) discuss real-time anomaly response coordination between
the flight controllers and the MER. Chow et al. (2000) develop, after reviewing the data
collected in previous Mission Control studies (i.e., Watts et al. 1996, Patterson et al.
1999, Patterson and Woods 2001), a descriptive model of the contents of communication
among distributed practitioners engaged in anomaly response and re-planning. Garrett
and Caldwell (2002) provide a quantitative description of Mission Control Flight Rule
Change Request processing between Space Shuttle missions: a key element of flight
controller knowledge capture and synchronization. A research group at Purdue
University describes the concepts of information flow and synchronization as it relates to
Mission Control and the challenges of generically linking these concepts to engineering
design contexts in order to improve system reliability and human performance (Caldwell
et al. 2007b, Caldwell 2003, Caldwell and Ghosh 2003, Caldwell and Wang 2003).
Finally, the memoirs of pre-Shuttle Era flight controllers (Liebergot and Harland 2006,
Kraft 2001, Kranz 2000) and "oral histories" recorded by NASA provide personal
accounts of work in pre-Shuttle Mission Control. Though these accounts normally
describe the technical details of work in Mission Control in a limited manner, they
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prominently feature the "war stories" that flight controllers learn during their
socialization 9 .
Engineers and flight controllers recently or currently involved in the evolution of Mission
Control present additional accounts of tools and processes used for the Mission Control
function and potential options for addressing future challenges of space exploration.
Webb and Smith (2008) detail MOD's role in the development of systems for the
Constellation Program91. Sierhuis et al. (2007) describe an agent-based process for
simulating tasks performed by flight controllers and propose its use in the design of
mission operations work processes. Mishkin et al. (2007) and Korsmeyer et al. (2005)
briefly discuss Mission Control as a "locus of control" and mention issues that may
necessitate a shift of control authority to the crew and spacecraft automation for
Constellation. Esper and Olsen (2007), Leslie (2006), and Jaap et al. (2006) discuss
procedure planning for ISS operations and suggest potential improvements for procedure
planning in Constellation operations. Rose and Miller (2006) summarize spaceflight
training objectives and processes and propose new directions for Constellation operations
training. Challis et al. (2007) discuss preflight validation of crew procedures relating to
the ISS Columbus Laboratory and the role of these procedures as hazard controls. Brown
et al. (2002) describe an automation tool used to simulate astronaut actions during
simulations and how it is being used to automate ISS procedures. Finally, Crocker
(2005) briefly reviews the role of spacecraft automation vis-a-vis the Mission Control
function in current and previous NASA programs and lists considerations and
recommendations for the future development of spacecraft autonomy.
All of these publications provide rich descriptions (usually qualitative) of some of the
organizational and technical tools in place in Mission Control to enable flight controllers
to positively impact human spaceflight. However, researchers have yet to explore, in a
rigorous mathematical fashion, how these tools-when used together-allow the
alteration of select system states for the purpose of task execution, disturbance rejection,
and adaptation. In the remainder of the case study of this dissertation, the concepts for
safety control structure evaluation presented in Chapter 4 are applied-for the purpose of
demonstrating their potential usefulness in actual socio-technical systems-to an analysis
of procedure rework in Mission Control that addresses a portion of this gap in our
knowledge of the control authority of Mission Control.
90 In the HRO literature, researchers identify vivid stories as a means of enhancing requisite variety (Weick
1987) and preserving heedful interrelation (Weick and Roberts 1993) in a social system.
91 The Constellation Program is involved in the development of space exploration systems to replace the
Space Shuttle, utilize ISS after shuttle retirement, and explore the Moon and beyond.
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Chapter 6: Case Study Purpose, Scope, and
Methodology
"...an anthropology of space operations would examine skill, training,
professional identity, automation, risk, organizations, divisions of power, and
other aspects of human-machine relationships. Sources exist for Skylab, the
space shuttle, and the International Space Station, as well as for similar
endeavors in other countries. What, exactly, are engineers, pilots, and scientists
doing in orbit? When are they using judgment, skill, experience, and expertise,
and when are they following scripts? What kinds of contingency operations do
they perform? How are skills and judgment divided between those in orbit and
those on the ground? What kinds of 'repair' do humans do (including rework and
workarounds) when operating complex systems? Numerous spaceflights have
been recorded and transcribed in detail (all of the Apollo flights and at least some
of the shuttle flights), allowing such real-time ethnography. Mission transcripts,
combined with deep analyses of operations, provide an empirical basis for
exploring such questions...Such studies, if rigorously done by disinterested
scholars would have implications for engineering design, training, mission
planning, and safety in spaceflight... This work will also likely generate insights
into other complex technical systems whose operations are rarely as well
documented or as accessible as human spaceflight. "-David A. Mindell (2008).
"Principally the discussion of new technologies and tools [for real-time human
spaceflight operations] needs to be framed in a manner that identifies and
emphasizes the value to the MOD operational flight controller. It is not about
replacing 'man with a machine', but about augmenting the flight controller or
operator to do a better job. "-David J. Korsmeyer and Ernest Smith (2008).
"Every decision is based on an approximation of reality, not reality itself The
question is not, 'Should models be used?' but, rather, 'which is the best model
available for the task at hand?'"-Donella "Dana" Meadows et al. (1982).
"A model should always be created for a purpose. The adequacy of the model
can only be judged in terms of that purpose. There is no possibility of absolute
proof that a model is appropriate for its objective. But the model can be
evaluated in several stages. The basic assumptions can be checked against
available experience and data. The dynamic behavior of a model can be
compared with the real systems it should represent." -Jay W. Forrester (1969).
6.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose, scope, and methodology of the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study are presented in this chapter. First, the case study purpose and scope
are described. Next, the initial actions taken to develop dynamic models of the Procedure
Rework Process are discussed along with the actions taken for data collection and
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processing. Then, a description is provided of the dynamic models and how they were
calibrated.
6.2 Case Study Purpose and Scope
Mindell's (2008) quote at the beginning of this chapter highlights the potential lessons
that can be learned about complex system operations in general by studying human
spaceflight operations. Of course, not all of what is suggested can be covered in a single
dissertation and thus an area of focus is needed. Throughout this dissertation, the author
has drawn attention to the management of uncertainty (particularly its downside) and the
role of nonlinearity in system accidents. The author has argued-much like Leveson
(2004)-that safety is a system property and that the attainment and maintenance of it are
best treated as a control problem in complex, socio-technical systems. Specifically, the
author has advocated that control authority be designed into systems to enhance and
synthesize their adaptability, resilience, flexibility, and robustness to safely counter the
effects of uncertainty, and that phase space attractors will emerge from the application of
that control authority. Thus, the purpose of this case study is to evaluate how control
authority is applied in human spaceflight operations to produce properties of attraction to
safe system states and to determine how one would perform such an evaluation.
Mission Control has a number of sources of control authority for task execution,
disturbance rejection, and adaptation to affect a number of spaceflight system states.
However as alluded to in the Mission Control literature review in the previous chapter,
little has been done to quantitatively evaluate this control authority. What has been said
recently is that we need to consider augmenting flight controller control authority or
transferring it to automated technologies and astronaut crews to confront the
challenges-particularly light delay (Korsmeyer and Smith 2008, Landis et al. 2008,
Mishkin et al. 2007, Esper and Olsen 2007, Jaap et al. 2006, Korsmeyer et al. 2005,
Crocker 2005)92-of future exploration missions. The quote by Korsmeyer and Smith
(2008) rightly stresses the importance of identifying the value that such automation
technology would provide to the flight controller, but perhaps it is necessary to take a
step back and better understand the value of Mission Control's current control authority.
After all, Mishkin et al. (2007) pose the following as important issues to pursue:
"What it is to have control authority... What it is to transfer control authority"
Thus, this case study is scoped to evaluate a specific aspect of flight controller control
authority in the context of Space Shuttle real-time operations and, to a lesser extent, in
the context of a future exploration mission to land on a distant celestial body.
The specific aspect of flight controller control authority analyzed in this study is the
control authority that drives the Procedure Rework Process described in the previous
chapter. This aspect of flight controller control authority is particularly interesting for
two reasons. First, as demonstrated throughout the study, this aspect of flight controller
control authority is a key reason for past successes in human spaceflight. Second,
92 In fact, some have said that the issue of light delay will necessitate a shift in control authority so dramatic
that Mission Control will effectively become "Mission Support."
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procedural issues relate to both the organizational and technical aspects of complex
system operations. In other words, they are a subset of the many socio-technical issues
that are problematic to address through approaches from the science and engineering
science paradigms of research. By contrast, the engineering systems approach taken in
this research is intended to provide new insights on exactly these kinds of issues.
6.3 Development of the Dynamic Models for Procedure Rework
in Space Shuttle Mission Control
In order to quantitatively identify and evaluate the Space Shuttle Mission Control
Procedure Rework Attractor across a range of conditions and human spaceflight mission
modes, it was necessary to develop a realistic dynamic model of procedure rework. In
this section, the initial steps taken to develop such a model are discussed. These steps
initiated an iterative cycle of model-building/refinement, data collection and analysis
(described in the next two sections), and model analysis (in other words, deductive-
inductive logic cycles). Towards the end of the next chapter, the content of this and the
following sections are integrated into a process for safety control structure evaluation and
redesign.
Identification of modeling archetypes applicable to procedure rework
As is often the case in modeling efforts, it was possible in this case study to build the core
of the model around a set of modeling archetypes in the literature. In this effort, three
useful archetypes-described in the following paragraphs-were identified from the
System Dynamics literature: the rework cycle (Lyneis and Ford 2007, Lyneis et al. 2001,
Sterman 2000), disaster dynamics (Rudolph and Repenning 2002), and first-order and
pipeline delays (Sterman 2000, pp. 415-417).
The Rework Cycle
The rework cycle is a dynamic structure used in project management modeling. It was
developed by Pugh-Roberts Associates (which is now part of PA Consulting Group) in
the 1970s and is believed to have appeared with varying degrees of complexity in every
project management model created by the System Dynamics community since then
(Lyneis and Ford 2007). It has been used in post-project analysis to resolve dozens of
contract disputes related to cost and schedule overruns (the total value of these disputes is
said to exceed $4 billion) and in pre-project planning (Lyneis et al. 2001).
The basic structure of the rework cycle is shown in Figure 45 below. Each project that is
to be modeled-a project is defined here as a series of tasks that have a specific
objective, start and end dates, and funding limits (Lyneis and Ford 2007)-is assumed to
be comprised of a certain number of tasks or "Work to Do". The tasks can either be
completed fully and correctly (i.e., they can become "Work Done") or they can be
mistakenly classified as completed fully and correctly (i.e., they can become
"Undiscovered Rework"), until it is discovered that they were flawed and need to be
redone (i.e., they can go from being "Undiscovered Rework" to "Work to Do"). Thus,
the state variables of the system, as shown in Figure 45, are: Work to Do, Undiscovered
Rework, and Work Done. The rates at which work is being completed correctly and
incorrectly, are affected by the value of Work to Do and the Staff Size, Productivity, and
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Work Quality. Similarly, the rate at which rework is discovered and reclassified as work
to do is affected by the Undiscovered Rework and the Time to Discover Rework. In
Figure 45, Staff Size, Productivity, Work Quality, and Time to Discover Rework are
treated as constants (or parameters), which are essentially state variables that remain
fixed under the conditions and timescale of the model. However in reality, the
parameters in Figure 45 are state variables that are controllable by organizations and thus,
they represent the control authority of the organization over the states of Work to Do,
Undiscovered Rework, and Work Done. Moreover, there are feedback effects observed
and modeled by some that can potentially erode or weaken this control authority (Lyneis
and Ford 2007): workforce experience dilution through the addition of workers to a
project (i.e., the so-called "Brooks' Law93"), communication inefficiencies associated
with an increase in workforce size, worker burnout associated with prolonged periods of
overtime, and higher error rates associated with increased work intensity (i.e., "rushing to
get things done").
No Work Done
Work
+ Completion Rate
7+
Work to Do Staff Size Productivity Work Quality
Rework Undiscovered
+ Generation Rework
Rework Discovery
Time to Discover, ---
Rework
Figure 45. The Rework Cycle dynamic structure (adapted from Lyneis et al. 2001).
The relevance of the rework cycle to safety risk management is that it represents the
processes by which "human errors" in system design both occur and are discovered
throughout a system development process. The Work Quality parameter in Figure 45
implicitly encompasses the inadequate skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based
behaviors occurring during system design while the Time to Discover Rework parameter
represents the effectiveness of system reviews and testing in the identification of
problems in the design. With several modifications to the basic rework cycle structure in
Figure 45, such as those introduced by Dulac (2007) for example, it is possible to
demonstrate the effect of organizational decisions on the generation and discovery of
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93 See Brooks (1995).
rework during system development and the passage of unresolved rework issues to the
operational system.
With that said, the basic rework cycle structure can also be modified to demonstrate how
inconsistencies in the planned task executions and disturbance rejections to occur in
system operations emerge and are then resolved. Specifically, the behavior associated
with the Procedure Rework Process in Mission Control can be captured through
modifications to the basic rework cycle structure. Work tasks can be substituted for
procedures and the timescale to be modeled can be reduced from the timeframes typical
in system development to those of spacecraft flight control. Additionally, detrimental
feedback effects relevant to project management such as workforce experience dilution,
communication inefficiencies due to increases in workforce size, and workforce burnout
would perhaps not need to be modeled due to the short duration of a Space Shuttle flight
and the limitations that the flight controller certification process presents to quickly
adding flight controllers to the team.
Disaster Dynamics
Rudolph and Repenning (2002) provide a very simple modeling archetype to highlight
the potential role of non-novel (i.e., normal and seemingly mundane) disruptions to
organizational operations in accidents and organizational collapse. They argue that the
link between non-novel disruptions and accidents/organizational collapse are perhaps
overlooked due to the attention given to novel disruptions and the naive assumption that
the dynamics associated with non-novel disruptions are intuitive (i.e., "the more there are,
the worse things get"). The "central construct" of their model archetype is the concept of
an interruption that necessitates a response. Essentially, as the interruptions initially
accumulate in a stock of interruptions to be addressed, the outflow of the stock (i.e., the
response to the interruptions) is affected. At first, the outflow increases as the level of the
stock increases (i.e., the operators increase their performance accordingly), however after
a delay, the operators' ability to perform at the heightened level decreases and thus, the
outflow of the stock decreases. Eventually, interruptions accumulate further, leading to a
"disaster".
The obvious analogs for interruptions in the Procedure Rework Process are undiscovered
procedures needing rework. As procedures needing rework initially accumulate, the
discovery rate of these procedures is likely to increase as well. However, once
procedures needing rework have been discovered, the focus of the flight control team
must shift (partially at least) to the actual reworking of procedures. As that happens, the
ability to discover rework should decrease, leading to the potential accumulation of more
undiscovered procedures needing rework, any one of which could potentially be
executed, leading to an accident or otherwise adverse incident.
First-Order and Pipeline Delays
First-order delays (Sterman 2000, pp. 415-417) are dynamic structures that regulate the
outflow of a stock. Essentially, these structures increase the outflow in proportion to the
level of the stock divided by an average outflow or "delay" time (i.e., the stock value will
decay exponentially). The fundamental assumption of this structure is that all items in
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the stock at any given time will be equally likely to exit the stock, but ultimately some
will exit much earlier than the delay time, most will have exited by the delay time, and
others will exit much later than the delay time.
In a procedure rework process, the discovery and completion of procedure rework should
approximate first-order delayed outflows in operating regimes in which the flight control
team's ability to discover and complete rework is not saturated. In such a structure,
procedures would flow into stocks of procedures needing rework and procedures being
reworked and ultimately remain in those stocks for a certain time on average. Some
procedures would exit the stock faster than average while others would exit slower on
average, and the overall rates of rework discovery and completion would increase with
the overall number of procedures in those stocks.
Pipeline delays (Sterman 2000, pp. 415-416), on the other hand, are structures that
regulate the outflow of the stock based on its inflow and a given delay time. Items that
enter the stock will remain in it for the given delay time and leave the stock in the same
order in which they flowed into it (as if they were moving through a pipe).
For procedure rework processes during missions to Mars or Near-Earth Objects (NEOs)
(Landis et al. 2008) with light delays on the order of 10 seconds and higher, the light
delay would essentially introduce pipeline delays into the flow of procedures. Changes in
spacecraft state that would invalidate certain procedures would not be observable on the
ground for the duration of the light delay, and they would become observable in the order
that they occur. Additionally, updates transmitted from the ground to the crew would not
be observable by the crew for the duration of the light delay and they too would become
observable in the order in which they are sent. Thus, for mission types with significant
light delays, two pipeline delays would have to be introduced (one for the spacecraft-to-
ground flow of information and one for the ground-to-spacecraft flow of information).
Integrating the modeling archetypes applicable to procedure rework
Through integration of the three modeling archetypes described above, the author was
able to identify the key state variables and constraints relevant in evaluating the attractor
produced by the procedure rework process and to develop a preliminary model of
procedure rework. The Procedures Needing Rework and Procedures Being Reworked
stocks were defined as the state variables to be constrained (procedures in these stocks
are control flaws that could lead to inadequate control actions during their execution). In
a flow structure reminiscent of the standard rework cycle, procedures would flow into the
Procedures Needing Rework stock from a stock of Valid Procedures due to a Procedure
Invalidation Rate. The procedures in the Procedures Needing Rework stock would then
flow out of that stock into the Procedures Being Reworked stock due to a Procedure
Rework Discovery Rate. This rate, as stated above, would approximate a first-order
delay, however because of the Disaster Dynamics phenomenon, the average outflow or
delay time would increase as attention shifts from discovering rework to completing
rework (a pair of state variables were thus introduced to track the fraction of resources
devoted to each task). Accordingly, the rate of procedures being moved from the
Procedures Being Reworked to the Valid Procedures stock (i.e., the Procedure Rework
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Completion Rate) would increase as attention shifted from rework discovery to rework
completion.
Because of the unpredictable flow of procedures into the Procedures Needing Rework
stock and the first-order delayed outflow of this stock subject to the Disaster Dynamics
phenomenon, it was immediately recognized that the system could not be constrained to
the point of zero procedures needing or being reworked at all time. The least hazardous
level of constraint that could be hoped for was an equilibrium attractor near values of
zero Procedures Needing Rework and Procedures Being Reworked in the system's phase
space.
After preliminary model-building and analysis, the author collected and processed
procedure rework data from Space Shuttle missions for model parameter and structure
validation. Several key updates to the model structure were made due to discoveries
during data processing, and therefore, a full description of the model is provided after the
data collection and processing summary in the next two sections of this chapter.
6.4 Data Collection
As previously mentioned, there are a number of sources of data to quantitatively
characterize procedure rework in Mission Control. Procedure changes occurring during
missions and immersive simulations are documented as attachments to flight notes,
except in situations in which the procedure changes must be made rapidly and explained
to the crew through voice transmission. Once the changes are approved by the Flight
Director, the flight note attachment containing the update is taken as written by the FAO
and uplinked to the crew as part of an electronic message sent individually or as part of
the daily execute package 94 (Delapp 2008).
With the assistance of a Mission Control FAO (Delapp 2008), the author obtained and
processed electronic messages from five Space Shuttle Missions (i.e., STS-97, STS-115,
STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120) for procedure update information. Listings of the
messages sent to the crew during each mission, along with a record of how (and whether)
the author obtained them, are provided in Table 25 to Table 28, Table 48 to Table 53,
Table 69 to Table 75, Table 94 to Table 99, and Table 114 to Table 122 of the Appendix
2, respectively. In the remainder of this section, these missions are described.
Brief Overview of the Flights Analyzed
The five Space Shuttle missions analyzed in this case study are described in the
paragraphs that follow. Each of these flights involved the deployment or retraction of
ISS Solar Array Wings (SAWs). As mentioned in Chapter 5, these deployment and
retraction events provide examples of Mission Control's ability to safely 95 cope with
94 Execute packages are sent to the crew at the beginning of each flight day and contain messages produced
while the crew was asleep. All execute packages from STS-115 and later missions are available on
NASA's website.
95 Due to the "unforgiving" environment of low-Earth orbit, the actions taken by Mission Control
throughout these missions potentially prevented a number of loss events (e.g., loss of one or more SAWs,
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unexpected spaceflight contingencies and they previously had not been mentioned in the
literature. Furthermore, due to their relative similarity (when compared to any other
group of five missions), these missions, when comparatively analyzed, provide an
opportunity to distinguish the effects of high-impact, rare events from the effects of
smaller-impact, higher frequency events.
STS-97
The first two of eight ISS SAWs were delivered to the station and deployed on STS-97 in
December, 2000. At the time the SAWs were delivered to the space station, the main
truss that will ultimately serve as the mounting location of all eight SAWs had yet to be
installed-see Figure 46 for a computer rendering of the final ISS configuration and
Figure 47 for the ISS configuration as STS-97 first approached the station. Therefore, it
was necessary to deploy the first pair of SAWs-referred to as the "P6"96 array-at a
temporary location.
Figure 46. A computer-generated rendering of the anticipated final configuration of
the ISS (source: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
loss of the starboard ISS Solar Alpha Rotary Joint, loss the ISS, loss of a Space Shuttle Orbiter, loss of
crew, loss of technical credibility of the human spaceflight program, etc.).
96 P6 is an alphanumeric designation of the SAWs' permanent deployment location. The "P" in P6
represents the port side of the space station (with respect to the nominal velocity vector) while the 6
represents six units of measurement from the centerline of the space station.
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Figure 47. The configuration of the ISS as STS-97 first approached it (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Deployment of the two SAWs required the unfolding of four 112 foot photovoltaic
blanket spans tensioned by wires running the length of each blanket. As the SAWs were
deployed, blanket folds stuck together, causing the SAWs to shake dramatically as they
unfolded and the tensioning wires jumped off of their guides leaving slack in the tension
lines (NASA JSC 2000). Ultimately, the SAWs were successfully deployed after the
crew executed modifications to the deployment procedure and manual array tensioning
tasks added to the third spacewalk of the mission by flight controllers and MER
engineers. The configuration of the ISS once STS-97 left it is shown in Figure 48.
Figure 48. The configuration of the ISS when STS-97 undocked from it (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
STS-115
The second pair of SAWs (i.e., the "P4" array) was delivered to the ISS and deployed on
the third post-Columbia mission, (i.e., STS-115 in September, 2006). Though STS-97
and STS-115 occurred before and after the Columbia Accident, respectively, they shared
more similarities than perhaps any pre- and post-Columbia mission pair. The primary
objective of both missions was delivery and deployment of a pair of SAWs and the same
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commander and lead spacewalker participated on the crews of both missions. However,
unlike STS-97, STS-115 occurred at a time in the ISS assembly sequence where it could
attach a pair of SAWs to their permanent location on the ISS main truss-see Figure 49
for an image of the ISS as STS-115 first approached it. Additionally, STS-115 delivered
and activated a Solar Alpha Rotary Joint (SARJ) 97 on the port side of the truss.
Figure 49. The configuration of the ISS as STS-115 first approached it (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Though the P4 SAW blanket folds stuck together during deployment as they did on STS-
97, modifications to the deployment procedures made during and after the P6 deployment
allowed the P4 array deployment to occur much more smoothly. In fact, the
spacewalking crew was even able to accomplish a number of "get ahead" tasks (NASA
JSC 2006b). The configuration of the ISS when STS-115 undocked from it is shown in
Figure 50.
Figure 50. The configuration of the ISS as STS-115 undocked from it (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
97 The ISS has a SARJ on each side of the truss. These rotary joints are used to rotate the arrays towards
the sun in order to increase the energy output of the arrays.
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STS-116
The primary objectives of STS-116-flown in December, 2006-were to reconfigure the
ISS power system so that it would accept power from the P4 array instead of P6 array,
reconfigure the thermal control system, retract the port side of the P6 array so that the
SARJ could rotate the P4 array without obstruction, swap an ISS crewmember with a
Shuttle crewmember, and install the P5 truss segment that would ultimately connect the
P6 array to the P4 array. When STS-116 arrived at the ISS, the space station's
configuration had not changed significantly since STS-115-see Figure 50.
While the crew swap, installation of the P5 segment, and the reconfiguration of the power
and thermal systems went relatively smoothly, the retraction of the port side SAW of the
P6 array was problematic. As shown in Figure 51, substantial kinks developed in the
photovoltaic blankets as they were retracted. Upon recognizing the kinks, Mission
Control halted the retraction process and initiated the following actions in an attempt to
work the kinks out of the blankets: deploy-retract cycles, Beta Gimbal Assembly (BGA)
"wiggles" 98, and vigorous crew exercise 99 (NASA JSC 2006d). Because these actions
resulted in little progress, Mission Control then instructed the crew of the third spacewalk
to physically shake the arrays from one end after they completed their nominally
scheduled tasks. A significant portion of the array was retracted through this action;
however, full retraction could not be completed before the spacewalk had to be ended.
Thus, the MMT extended the mission by one day and added an unscheduled spacewalk to
retract the array. During this spacewalk, the crew used makeshift tools that Mission
Control instructed them to build to physically manipulate the blanket folds and guide
wires until the array was fully retracted-see Figure 52. The configuration of the ISS
when STS-116 undocked is shown in Figure 53.
Figure 51. A kink in the port side of the P6 array during retraction (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
98 The BGA provides a second axis of SAW rotation-along with the SARJ-for facing the arrays towards
the sun. The "wiggles" were small BGA rotations commanded by Mission Control in an attempt to free the
kinks.
99 It had been noted that the SAWs oscillated slightly whenever the crew exercised on the ISS treadmill.
Thus, Mission Control had the crew exercise vigorously in an attempt to remove the kinks.
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Figure 52. STS-116 astronauts retracting the port side of the P6 SAW during an
unscheduled spacewalk (source: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Figure 53. The configuration of the ISS at the conclusion of STS-116 (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
STS-117
The primary objectives of STS-117-flown in June, 2007-were to deliver and activate
the starboard SARJ, deliver and deploy the S4 array, swap an ISS crewmember with a
Shuttle crewmember, and retract the starboard side of the P6 array. The configuration of
the ISS at the beginning of STS-117 was roughly the same as it was at the end of STS-
116-see Figure 53. Because Mission Control and the MER had incorporated lessons
learned from P6 array problems on STS-97 and STS-116 into the nominal flight plan, all
of these objectives were achieved with relatively few problems. However, the mission
was not without challenges for flight controllers and MER engineers. A thermal blanket
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on the rear of the Orbiter came loose and had to be repaired during a spacewalk, the
MMT added an extra spacewalk for ISS "get ahead" tasks, and the ISS developed attitude
control problems that led flight controllers to conserve Orbiter consumables so that it
could be used for both shuttle and station attitude control for as long as possible (NASA
JSC 2007b). The configuration of the ISS at the conclusion of STS-117 is shown in
Figure 54.
Figure 54. The configuration of the ISS at the conclusion of STS-117 (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
STS-120
The primary objectives of STS-120-flown in October and November of 2007-were to
install a new pressurized module on the ISS, move the retracted P6 array to its permanent
location on the port side of the main truss and re-deploy it, and swap an ISS crewmember
with a Shuttle crewmember. Though STS-118 flew in the interim between STS-117 and
STS-120, it did not significantly alter the external configuration of the ISS from the
configuration shown in Figure 54100 . In the early stages of the mission, Mission Control
decided to have an astronaut inspect the starboard SARJ-which had been vibrating
unusually for several weeks-as part of the mission's second spacewalk. During the
inspection, the spacewalker discovered metal shavings in the joint, indicating that the
joint was grinding itself. Upon this discovery, Mission Control halted starboard SARJ
rotation, added a precautionary inspection of the port SARJ during the third spacewalk,
and made plans to do further troubleshooting of the starboard SARJ on the fourth
spacewalk (NASA JSC 2007d). While the inspection of the port SARJ uncovered no
issues with that joint, additional inspection of the starboard SARJ was canceled after the
re-deployment of the P6 SAWs resulted in a tear in one of the photovoltaic blankets 10-
see Figure 55. After deliberation, Mission Control and the MER re-planned the fourth
spacewalk to include a repair of the SAW. For this repair, Mission Control and the MER
instructed the crew on how to construct makeshift tools. Additionally, they developed a
'00 STS-118 installed the S5 truss segment that will ultimately connect the S4 and S6 arrays and brought
supplies to the ISS. STS-119, which is slated to occur in 2009, is to deliver and deploy the S6 SAWs.
101 Incidentally, the tear occurred in the SAW that was retracted during STS-1 16.
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set of procedures to have a spacewalking astronaut ride on the end of the OBSS attached
to the end of the SSRMS in order to reach the tear. Ultimately, the spacewalking
astronaut fixed the tear-see Figure 56 and Figure 57-and further troubleshooting of the
starboard SARJ was deferred to later missions. The external configuration of the ISS at
the conclusion of STS-120 is shown in Figure 58.
Figure 55. The tear that developed in photovoltaic blanket of the P6 SAW (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Figure 56. An astronaut "rides" on the end of the OBSS to repair a tear in the P6
SAW (source: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
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Figure 57. The P6 SAW after the repair of the tear (source:
http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
Figure 58. The external configuration of the ISS at the conclusion of STS-120
(source: http://spaceflight.nasa.gov).
6.5 Data Processing
In this section, the steps that the author took to investigate the electronic messages from
STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120 are described.
Update Designation
Instances of procedure updating during these missions were identified through several
reviews of the electronic messages by the author. The following considerations were
relevant in determining what would or would not be classified as an instance of procedure
updating:
* Updates that were deemed to have been performed mostly by ISS Mission Control
were disregarded in order to keep the focus of the study on the performance of
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Space Shuttle Mission Control. However, with that said, updates that were
deemed to involve significant contributions from both ISS and Space Shuttle
Mission Control were included in the study.
* Updates to the list of items to be transferred between the Space Shuttle and ISS
were not considered unless circumstances warranted an "unusual" change to the
transfer list. The transfer list is nominally changed dozens, if not hundreds of
times over the course of a mission and thus an analysis of these changes, though
interesting in its own right, would detract from the analysis of the far less frequent
and unexpected changes that occur during a mission.
* Updates to supply water and waste water dumps were not considered unless
unexpected events necessitated fundamental changes to the procedure. As is the
case with the transfer list, the water dump procedures are executed and updated
over a dozen times in a given mission with many "fill-in-the-blank" aspects of the
procedure changing as expected from execution to execution.
* Multiple updates of the same procedure at the same time (i.e., in the same
electronic message) were counted as a single update unless there were
fundamentally different rationales for the various updates in the procedure.
Each instance of procedure updating identified by the author was first designated with an
update number and the following information was cataloged: the flight day that the
update was issued, the title of the altered procedure, the number of the electronic message
in which the update was announced, the rationale for the update, and the console position
responsible for the update, all as judged by the author. These designations are provided
in Appendix 2 for each respective mission in the following tables: Table 29 to Table 34,
Table 54 to Table 58, Table 76 to Table 81, Table 100 to Table 104, and Table 123 to
Table 133. A summary of the number of updates identified for these missions is provided
below in Table 7.
MISSION NUMBER OF MISSION DURATION UPDATES PER DAY
UPDATES (DAYS)
STS-97 93 10.832 8.59
STS-115 63 11.796 5.34
STS-116 86 12.865 6.68
STS-117 66 13.841 4.77
STS-120 135 15.099 8.95
Total 443 64.435 (total) 6.88 (average)
12.887 (average)
Table 7. Procedure update statistics for the Space Shuttle missions analyzed.
Later, the author made and recorded judgments-based on information in the electronic
messages and other information available on NASA's website (e.g., mission status
reports, pre-mission flight plans, anomaly briefings, etc.)-of the flight days on which
each update was identifiable, issued, and was to be executed. The following
considerations were relevant in judging which flight day the procedures were deemed
identifiable, issued, and to be executed:
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* Updates were deemed to have been issued on the flight day that the electronic
message announcing them was sent to the crew.
* Updates that were deemed to have been identifiable at launch were classified as
being identifiable on Flight Day 0.
* Refinements and rework of previously sent updates were deemed to have been
identifiable on the flight day that the original update was sent.
* The flight day designated for when each update was to be executed is the flight
day that the procedure update was expected to be executed when it was issued.
These designations usually depended on the flight day the procedures were
scheduled in the pre-flight version of the flight plan (NASA JSC 2006a, NASA
JSC 2006c, NASA JSC 2007a, NASA JSC 2007c) and did not depend on whether
a procedure update's execution time was ultimately delayed or cancelled after the
update was issued.
* Whenever there was an update to a contingency procedure that was not planned to
be executed, but immediately available for execution if needed, the designation
for the execution flight day was the same as the update issue flight day.
These designations are provided in Appendix 2 in Table 35 to Table 37, Table 59 to
Table 60, Table 82 to Table 84, Table 105 to Table 106, and Table 134 to Table 137.
Additionally these tables include the number of days between when an update was
identifiable and when it was updated as well as the number of flight days between when it
was updated and when it was to be executed.
This information for the sum of all missions studied is also depicted in Figure 59. The
distributions shown in this figure suggest a zero-to-two flight day time horizon on the
procedure rework process (i.e., the procedures that are primarily updated are the ones that
must be executed within zero-to-two flight days of the current flight day). If the flight
control team was attempting to update every procedure that needed updating at all times,
then one would expect the distributions to be reversed. The procedural problem would
"wait" a short time after becoming identifiable to be discovered, be updated, and then
"wait" up to fifteen flight days before being executed. Instead, the procedural problems
"wait" for up to fifteen flight days to be updated and then "wait" for only an additionally
zero-to-five (but often less than two) flight days to be executed. As hinted at above, this
discovery led to a fundamental update in the procedure flow of the model. This model
update will be described in the next section.
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Figure 59. Histogram of time gaps between when updates were identifiable and
issued and when updates were issued and expected to be executed.
Rationale Categorization
The author, in addition to providing the specific rationales for each procedure update as
mentioned above, developed a set of general update rationale categories for qualitative
analysis of the causes of procedure rework. The specific categories chosen by the author
are meant to exhaustively capture the updates identified in the case study without: 1)
being so general that they "abstract away" useful information on the cause of the update
(and its potential remedy) and 2) being so specific that they are too numerous and thus
too cumbersome to track. As a result, the categories-though probably not mutually
exclusive-should link each update to a particular cause that provides clues on how such
an update can be mitigated or avoided in future missions.
The general categories can be broken down into two types of rationale: update rationales
due to the downside of uncertainty and update rationales due to the upside of uncertainty
(i.e., update rationales due to opportunity exploitation). Recall from Chapter 1 that
uncertainty has the potential to lead to undesirable, unexpected events (i.e., risks) as well
as the potential to lead to desirable, unexpected events (i.e., opportunities).
The update rationales due to the downside of uncertainty are categorized as follows:
* Task Deferral or Reprioritization: Procedures were changed due to the deferral or
reprioritization of scheduled tasks.
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* Equipment List Revision: The equipment list for a procedure was changed or
procedures were changed to alter to configuration of equipment to be used for a
procedure. For example, the SRMS was required for steps added to a procedure
and therefore, procedural steps were added to get the SRMS into the right
configuration.
* Consumable Management Replanning: A procedure was changed to provide the
necessary consumables (e.g., oxygen, water, battery power, etc.) for it. For
example, tasks were added to an EVA increasing its duration, necessitating the
usage of a different set of batteries or an oxygen recharge from shuttle airlock
umbilicals.
* Unaccounted for Inhibits: A procedure is changed to add a previously
unaccounted for safety inhibit. For example, a step is added to an EVA procedure
to ensure that the power to a power connector that a spacewalking astronaut will
work with is disabled.
* Internal Inconsistencies in the Procedure: The procedure was changed because if
it were to be completed from beginning to end as written under the assumed
conditions, contradictory steps in the procedure would have prevented the
procedural goals from being accomplished or caused other problems.
* Sensor "Failure" or Bias: A sensor used to observe Space Shuttle processes
"failed" or degraded in a manner that necessitated the procedure update. Failures
or degradations of ISS sensors were not covered by this category.
* Actuator "Failure" or Degradation: A hardware component used to complete
Space Shuttle processes "failed" or degraded in a manner that necessitated
procedure updates. Failures or degradations of ISS hardware components (e.g.,
SARJ) were not covered by this category.
* Unexpected Software Behavior: Procedures were changed to cope with
unexpected behavior of Space Shuttle software systems. For example, the
Payload General Support Computers (PGSCs), which are laptops used for shuttle
operations, unexpectedly and repeatedly "crashed," necessitating the procedure
updates.
* Launch Damage (actual or suspected): Procedures were updated to inspect or fix
damage to the Orbiter or its payloads during launch.
* Crew Procedural Slips: An update was due to the astronaut crew's improper
execution of a correct procedure.
* Typos and Omissions: An update was needed to correct spelling or grammar
errors or to insert small procedural items that were mistakenly excluded.
* Inadvertent Deletion of Steps: An update was needed to insert procedural steps
that were mistakenly deleted in a previous update before or during the mission.
* Inconsistency between Item's Expected Post-Launch Configuration and Actual
Post-Launch Configuration (e.g., packaging error, manufacturing error, etc.):
Procedures had to be updated because an item was in an unexpected stowage
location or configuration.
* Inconsistency between Items Expected to be Launched and Items Actually
Launched: Procedures had to be changed because an item was launched other than
what was assumed to be launched in the procedures or an expected item was not
launched.
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Unanticipated Environmental/ISS Conditions (e.g., temperatures): Unanticipated
environmental or ISS conditions led to changes to the procedures that the Space
Shuttle crew must accomplish in order to complete their mission objectives
Similarly, the update rationales due to the upside of uncertainty (i.e., opportunity
exploitations) are categorized as follows:
* "Get-Ahead" Tasks Scheduled: Procedures were changed to allow the crew to
perform tasks beyond what was originally scheduled for them (i.e., tasks to
perform when they are "ahead of schedule"). In many instances, "Get-Ahead"
tasks are tasks assigned to future crews, however, by having the current crew
complete them, the Space Shuttle/ISS programs can "get ahead" of schedule.
* Consumable Management Optimizations: Procedures were changed to
decrease/increase consumable usage in an advantageous manner.
* Use of Shuttle Resources to Counteract ISS Problems: Procedures were changed
to allow Space Shuttle resources to be used to address an unexpected problem on
the ISS. For example, a procedure was created or changed to allow the Space
Shuttle to control the attitude of the docked Space Shuttle/ISS system during ISS
attitude control system malfunctions.
* Proactive Contingency Preparation and/or Hazard Investigation: Procedures
were updated to provide the crew with contingency instructions before they would
be needed or procedures were updated to allow the crew to investigate a
potentially hazardous condition that does not necessarily interfere with mission
priorities (e.g., the port SARJ inspection).
* Procedure Nominally Updated in Real-time: Certain procedures were nominally
updated during a mission because it is understood that the flight controllers will
know the best manner to conduct the procedure at the appropriate time. As an
example, a landing procedure required the crew to use one of two or more
redundant systems and the flight controllers were only able to determine the best
one to use shortly before landing.
* Crew Comfort Optimizations: Procedures were changed to make the crew more
comfortable.
* Procedure Efficiency Optimization: Procedures were changed to increase the
efficiency with which they could be completed given the circumstances of the
mission.
* Procedure Updated or Re-evaluated after the Print Deadline for the Procedure
Books and before Launch: Procedural changes were made before launch, but after
the procedures had been printed in the procedure books that were loaded onto the
Space Shuttle.
Tallies of the number of updates attributed to each categorization are provided in Table 8
and Table 9 for categorization due to the downside and upside of uncertainty,
respectively. Furthermore, categorizations of all updates using the above categories are
provided in Table 38 to Table 44, Table 61 to Table 65, Table 85 to Table 90, Table 107
to Table 110, and Table 138 to Table 147. These tables also include the author's
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interpretation of the detailed rationale for the
rationale categorizations (if applicable).
update as well as the discrete event
RATIONALE CATEGORIZATION TOTAL OVERALL
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
UPDATES OF UPDATES
Task Deferral or Reprioritization 11 2.5%
Equipment List Revision 55 12.4%
Consumable Management Replanning 15 3.4%
Unaccounted for Inhibits 19 4.3%
Internal Inconsistencies in the Procedure 14 3.2%
Sensor "Failure" or Bias 13 2.9%
Actuator "Failure" or Degradation 49 11.1%
Unexpected Software Behavior 18 4.1%
Launch Damage (actual or suspected) 19 4.3%
Crew Procedural Slips 2 0.5%
Typos and Omissions 29 6.5%
Inadvertent Deletion of Steps 1 0.2%
Inconsistency between Item's Expected Post- 14 3.2%
Launch Configuration and Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g., packaging error, manufacturing
error, etc.)
Inconsistency between Items Expected to be 5 1.1%
Launch and Items Actually Launched
Unanticipated Environmental/ISS Conditions (e.g., 49 11.1%
temperatures)
Total updates due to the downside of uncertainty 313 70.7%
Table 8. Number of updates associated with each update rationale categorization
relating to the downside of uncertainty.
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RATIONALE CATEGORIZATION TOTAL OVERALL
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
UPDATES OF UPDATES
"Get-Ahead" Tasks Scheduled 25 5.6%
Consumable Management Optimizations 5 1.1%
Use of Shuttle Resources to Counteract ISS 6 1.4%
Problems
Proactive Contingency Preparation and/or Hazard 20 4.5%
Investigation
Procedure Nominally Updated in Real-time 20 4.5%
Crew Comfort Optimizations 6 1.4%
Procedure Efficiency Optimization 9 2.0%
Procedure Updated or Re-evaluated after the Print 39 8.8%
Deadline for the Procedure Books and before
Launch
Total updates due to the upside of uncertainty 130 29.3%
Table 9. Number of updates associated with each update rationale categorization
relating to the upside of uncertainty.
The discrete event rationale categorizations identify the updates due to the "novel" or rare
(i.e., occurring less than two or three times per mission) events that create the need for a
large number of procedure updates at a time. As mentioned earlier, the similarities
between the missions studied allow one to distinguish the effects of these discrete events
relative to the more frequent events that require fewer updates. As will be shown in the
next section, such a distinction is important in characterizing the underlying dynamics of
procedure rework. Referring back to Table 7, it is clear that STS-115 and STS-117 have
far fewer total updates and updates per day than the other missions even though STS-115
was very similar to (and probably more complex than) STS-97 and despite the fact that
STS-117 could be thought of as a hybrid re-enactment of STS-97, STS-115, and STS-
116. These differences in update rates are due to the discrete events on STS-97, STS-
116, and STS-120. While the ISS SAW deployment, retraction, and redeployment
problems were inherent to the design, manufacturing, or pre-flight storage of the SAWs
and had to be dealt with during each mission, they respectively were first encountered
operationally during STS-97, STS-116, and STS-120, thus leading to the higher updates
rates on those missions. As a result of the analysis, the following discrete events were
identified:
* P6 SAW Deploy Problems: This discrete event designation relates to the SAW
deploy problems that began on Flight Day 4 of the STS-97 mission.
* "Get Aheads": Much to the author's surprise, discrete events related to the ISS
SAWs did occur on STS-115 and STS-117. However, these discrete events were
not due to problems related to SAW deployment/retraction, but to the
opportunities that arose to complete extra tasks after the smoother-than-expected
deployment/retraction operations on these flights. On Flight Day 5 of STS-115 a
spate of "Get-Ahead" tasks were added to the third spacewalk after the highly
successful completion of the first two spacewalks. On Flight Day 4 of STS-117
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the MMT instructed Mission Control to perform an additional spacewalk full of
"Get-Ahead" tasks after the first spacewalk.
* P6 SAW Retract Problems: This discrete event designation relates to the P6 port
SAW retraction problems that began on Flight Day 5 of the STS-116 mission.
* OMS Pod Blanket Tear: This discrete event designation relates to the tear that
developed in an OMS Pod thermal blanket during the launch of STS-117. It
includes updates to enable the Orbiter thermal shielding inspection tasks added
after the discovery of the tear and updates associated with an EVA task to repair
the blanket.
* ISS Attitude Problems: This discrete event designation relates to the attitude
control problems that the ISS developed during the STS-117 mission. Space
Shuttle Mission Control's response to these problems was to use the Space Shuttle
to control attitude of the docked Space Shuttle/ISS system and to conserve
consumables so that the Space Shuttle could stay at the ISS and help it maintain
attitude control for as long as possible.
* SARJ Grinding Problems: This discrete event designation relates to the starboard
SARJ grinding problems that the MMT first chose to address on Flight Day 4 of
the STS-120 mission (i.e., when the MMT decided that the starboard SARJ would
be inspected). Included in this category of updates are updates related to the
precautionary inspection of the port SARJ and the troubleshooting tasks that were
ultimately cancelled when it was determined that the P6 SAW should be fixed
instead.
* P6 SAW Redeploy Problems: This discrete event designation relates to the P6
SAW redeployment problems that began on Flight Day 8 of the STS-120 mission.
Table 10 below contains a summary of the number of updates caused by the discrete
events.
Flight Discrete Events Resulting Updates Resulting Updates
(without (including
Refinements) Refinements)
STS-97 P6 SAW Deploy Anomaly 15 17
STS-115 "Get Aheads" 8 8
STS-116 P6 SAW Retract Anomaly 20 26
STS-117 OMS Pod Blanket Tear 10 10
"Get Aheads" 17 17
ISS Attitude Anomaly 7 7
STS-120 SARJ Grinding Anomaly 21 23
SAW Redeploy Anomaly 37 50
Total 135 158
Percent of Total Updates 30.47% 35.67%
Table 10. Summary of the number of procedure updates due to discrete events.
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6.6 Model Description
The final versions of the procedure rework models that were developed in this case study
are described in this section. Additionally, the model testing and calibration philosophy
and approach adopted by the author for this study are detailed.
Model Structure
As alluded to in section 6.3, the core stock and flow structure of the non-light delayed
procedure rework model was initially derived from the rework cycle, disaster dynamics,
and first-order delay dynamic structure archetypes. However, as mentioned in section
6.5, the discovery of a zero-to-two day time horizon on the Procedure Rework Process
led to a significant alteration of the flow structure. The final form of the basic flow
structure is shown in Figure 60 and each of the numbered flows is described in Table 11.
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Figure 60. The core stock and flow structure of the procedure rework models.
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FLOW DESCRIPTION
NUMBER
1 Before the mission starts, all valid procedures are in the Inactive Valid
Procedures stock, which resides beyond the time horizon. As the mission
begins and progresses, procedures roll into the time horizon of the procedure
rework process (i.e., they flow into the Active Valid Procedures stock due to
what the author refers to as an Activation Rate for Valid Procedures). All
invalid active procedures (including contingency procedures that are not
expected to be used) should become active by the time the end of the
mission rolls into the time horizon of the Procedure Rework Process.
2 As the mission progresses, procedures that are to be completed (contingency
procedures typically do not fall into this category) move from the Active
Valid Procedures stock to the Completed Procedures stock as they are
completed.
3 Just as there inactive valid procedures that are activated throughout the
flight, so too are there inactive procedures needing rework. These
procedures initially reside in the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock
and flow into the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock as their
anticipated execution date rolls into the time horizon.
4 As the mission progresses, a portion of the active valid procedures are
invalidated, flowing from the Active Valid Procedures stock to the Active
Procedures Needing Rework.
5 Upon recognizing procedures in the Active Procedures Needing Rework
stock, the flight controllers move these procedures into the Procedures
Being Reworked stock before ultimately reinserting them into the Active
Valid Procedures stock. Reworked procedures that ultimately will need to
be refined or iterated, effectively work their way into Flow 4 immediately
after exiting this flow.
6 Due to the highly coupled nature of the procedures, it is often the case that
an incident or even a particular procedure update solution will invalidate
multiple procedures. Some of these additional procedures invalidated reside
beyond the time horizon at the moment that they are invalidated (e.g., a
procedure to be executed on Flight Day 10 is invalidated on Flight Day 3),
and thus, they flow from the Inactive Valid Procedures stock to the Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework stock.
Table 11. A description of the procedural flows in the core stock and flow structure
of the procedure rework models.
Acceptance of this structure requires the following noteworthy assumptions:
Procedures needing or being reworked are not executed until they are fully
reworked: While it is reasonable to suggest that procedures needing or being
reworked do get executed in reality (and perhaps create problems that lead to
more procedure invalidations), it is not clear how one could determine when
an invalid procedure is executed and its ultimate impact from the data
analyzed by the author (if a procedure is known to be invalid at the time of its
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execution, it most likely would not be executed as written). The type of
retroactive or experimental study necessary to estimate the number of invalid
procedures executed and their tendency to create subsequent procedural
invalidations is left to future work. As it is, the effects of the execution of
invalid procedures are implicitly addressed by the Baseline Procedure
Invalidation Rate parameter in the models used for this case study.
" All procedures created during the procedure rework process exist at the start
of the simulation and all other procedures are conserved throughout the
simulation: Though procedures are created 102 and cancelled over the course of
the mission, the presence of sources and sinks in the structure (for procedure
creation and cancellation, respectively) would have complicated the relevant
phase portraits of the system, making it more difficult to interpret the behavior
of the procedure rework attractor. Additionally, the alternative to eliminate
the sources and sinks by creating extra stocks for procedures to be created and
cancelled would have unnecessarily complicated the flow structure. As it is,
cancelled procedures, which are not necessarily invalidated, effectively
accumulate in the Active Valid Procedures stock of the model, and procedures
to be created effectively reside beyond the time horizon as inactive procedures
before they are created. In both cases, flight controller behavior is not
appreciably altered by the presence of procedures yet to be created and
cancelled procedures in the structure.
* Each procedure is equally "important": The allocation of resources to
rework completion vis-a-vis rework discovery is based purely on the number
of procedures in the Procedures Being Reworked stock. In reality, some
procedures will require more resources than others to rework and therefore
lead to a greater attention shift away from rework discovery. This effect could
be addressed in future work through numerical weighting of procedures being
reworked. As it is, the necessary allocation of resources per procedure being
reworked is assumed to average out over the simulation time.
* Each procedure in a given stock is as likely as any of the other procedures in
the same stock to exit the stock at each time step, regardless of its order of
entry into the stock (i.e., there are no pipeline delays in this structure): In
reality, there are some aspects of flight control that may affect the order in
which procedures are activated, invalidated, identified as needing rework, and
corrected (e.g., the order in which the spacecraft automation logs spacecraft
faults). However, the priority and complexity of procedures relative to each
other will on the whole lead to instances of procedures being activated and
reworked much faster or slower than others and instances of certain
procedures being reworked in orders other than which they were invalidated
(i.e., behavior approximating a first-order delay).
In addition to this core stock and flow structure, each version of the procedure rework
model contains a separate flow structure to create the disaster dynamics or "attention
shifting" effect that occurs as flight controllers focus more and more heavily on
102 Refer to Table 46, Table 67, Table 92, Table 112, and Table 149 of Appendix 2 for listings of
procedures created during the procedure rework process.
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completing rework as more procedures needing rework are discovered. This flow
structure contains two stocks with a sum total value of unity: Fraction of Flight
Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery and Fraction of Flight Controller
Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework. The values of these two stocks affect the Time
to Discover Procedure Rework and Time to Complete Procedure Rework, respectively.
Finally, each version of the model contains a stock of Total Procedures Reworked to
track the number of procedure updates issued.
Basic Procedure Rework Model
The Basic Procedure Rework Model was used in this case study to examine the
fundamental characteristics of the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework
Attractor. The complete stock and flow structure of this model is depicted in Figure 61.
The parameters used to regulate the flows in this model are described in Table 13. The
baseline values for these parameters were derived from the model testing and calibration
process. These approaches for parameter baseline value determination are described in
the next section. The information necessary to replicate this model fully is documented
in Appendix 3.
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
Active Procedure This parameter defines the number of procedures in the Active
Invalidation Rate Valid Procedures stock that would flow in the Active Procedures
During Discrete Needing Rework stock during a discrete event. This parameter was
Event only used for special simulation runs in this case study and thus its
baseline value is 0 procedures per minute.
Baseline Flight This parameter defines the average rate at which procedures in the
Controller Rework Active Procedures Needing Rework stock would be discovered if all
Recognition Delay available flight controller resources were devoted to rework
discovery. The baseline value of this parameter is 30 minutes.
Baseline Procedure This parameter defines the steady state rate (i.e., the rate without
Invalidation Rate discrete events) at which procedures flow from the Active Valid
Procedures stock to the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock.
Its baseline value is 0.00069 procedures per minute.
Baseline Time to This parameter defines the average rate at which procedures in the
Complete Procedures Being Reworked stock would be completed if all
Procedure Rework available flight controller resources were devoted to rework
completion. The baseline value for this parameter is 200 minutes.
Inactive Procedure This parameter defines the number of procedures in the Inactive
Invalidation Rate Valid Procedures stock that would flow in the Inactive Procedures
During Discrete Needing Rework stock during a discrete event. This parameter was
Event only used for special simulation runs in this case study and thus its
baseline value is 0 procedures per minute.
Mission Duration This parameter defines the length of this mission in days. The
(in days) baseline value for this parameter is 12.9 days, which was the
average mission duration for the flights studied.
Procedure Due to the fact that not all valid procedures are completed in a
Completion given mission (e.g., contingency procedures, cancelled procedures,
Fraction for etc.), this parameter is needed to determine what fraction or
Mission percentage of procedures will be completed during the mission.
The baseline value for this dimensionless parameter is 0.
Procedure This parameter defines the average time it takes to complete
Completion Time procedures. The baseline value for this parameter is 10 minutes.
Procedure Rework This parameter defines the rate was which inactive procedures (both
Time Horizon valid and invalid) are activated. Nearly all inactive procedures
should be activated by the time that the simulation time plus this
parameter equals the mission duration time. The baseline value for
this parameter is 2000 minutes.
Resource Fraction This parameter defines the desired fraction or percentage of flight
per Procedure controller resources that should be devoted to procedure rework for
Reworked each procedure in the Procedures Being Reworked stock. The
baseline value for this parameter is 20% per procedure.
Table 12. Description of the parameters in the Basic Procedure Rework Model
(Part 1 of 2).
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTIONRework
Completion Time
Attention Shifting
Factor
Rework
Propagation Factor
Rework
Recognition Delay
Attention Shifting
Factor
This parameter defines the factor of increase in average procedure
rework completion time that would result from the shifting of all
available flight controller resources away from procedure rework.
The baseline value for this dimensionless parameter is 1, and thus
with this value, procedure rework time would increase by a value
equivalent to the Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework
(i.e., it would double relative to the baseline completion time).
This parameter regulates the flow of procedures from the Inactive
Valid Procedures stock to the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework
stock. It defines the relative proportion of this flow to the flow of
procedures from the Procedures Being Reworked stock to the
Active Valid Procedures stock (i.e., it defines the proportion of
rework propagated beyond the time horizon). The baseline value
for this dimensionless parameter is 0.605 or 60.5%.
This parameter defines the factor of increase in average procedure
rework discovery time that would result from the shifting of all
available flight controller resources away from rework discovery.
The baseline value for this dimensionless parameter is 1, and thus
with this value, procedure rework time would increase by a value
equivalent to the Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition
Delay (i.e., it would double relative to the baseline rework
discovery time).
Startup Delay This parameter defines the time that the procedure rework process
effectively starts after launch. It accounts for key differences
between launch/post-launch operations and orbit operations, as well
as the time it takes to configure the equipment the crew needs to
receive electronic messages from the ground (e.g., printer). The
baseline value for this parameter is 520 minutes.
Time of Discrete This parameter defines the time at which a discrete event occurs.
Event This parameter was only used for special simulation runs in this
case study and thus its baseline value is 100 minutes.
Time to Shift This parameter defines the average time that it takes to shift
Focus resources to or away from rework discovery. The baseline value
for this parameter is 1 minute.
Table 13. Description of the parameters in the Basic Procedure Rework Model
(Part 2 of 2).
Flight Specific Procedure Rework Models
The flight specific procedure rework models were used in this case study to calibrate the
general procedure rework model with flight specific data. Each of these models is
essentially identical to the Basic Procedure Rework Model. The differences between
these models and that model mainly relate to the parameter values and simulation
timescales used. Additionally, because as many as three discrete events were identified
on the Space Shuttle missions, each flight specific procedure rework model included
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
variables for exogenously initiating up to three discrete invalidation events-generating
invalidations both within and beyond the procedure rework time horizon (i.e., flows 4 and
6 in Figure 60)-at the times of the discrete events.
The information necessary to replicate these models fully (including the parameter values
used for each model) is documented in Appendix 3.
Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model
The Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model is essentially the Basic Procedure
Rework Model with several structural elements added to implement flow control as
described in Chapter 4. The full stock and flow structure of this model is shown in
Figure 63; the variables added to implement flow control are labeled with italicized text.
Two different flow control schemes are implemented in this model and can be used
individually or in unison.
The first flow control scheme mimics the effect of having a fourth shift of flight
controllers working on procedure rework beyond the procedure rework time horizon-
this work is done in parallel to the rework done within the time horizon by the first three
shifts-or of having one of the first three shifts working primarily on procedure rework
beyond the time horizon. This scheme was implemented through the variables added to
the left side of the stock and flow structure in Figure 63. These added variables include:
* A flow from Inactive Procedures Needing Rework to Inactive Valid
Procedures to account for the completion of rework beyond the time horizon,
* A small stock and flow structure to account for the resource limitations for
procedure rework beyond the time horizon, and
* A stock to record the resource-minutes devoted to rework beyond the time
horizon.
The second flow control scheme mimics the effect of suddenly increasing the procedure
rework time horizon towards the end of the mission. This scheme was implemented
through the variables added to the top of the stock and flow structure in Figure 63. These
added variables are:
* An initial value for the procedure rework time horizon,
* A factor of increase to the procedure rework time horizon (relative to the
initial value), and
* The time at which the procedure rework time horizon is increased.
The additional parameters needed for this model are described in Table 14. Because
there is no data available on these types of flow control and the purpose of this model is
to simply demonstrate the types of benefit that can be derived from flow control (precise
evaluation of the benefits of flow control is beyond the scope of this study and a potential
area for future work), the author's judgment was used to determine notional baseline
values for these parameters. The information necessary to replicate this model fully is
documented in Appendix 3.
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Figure 62. The stock and flow structure of the Flow Controlled Procedure Rew
ork
M
odel.
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PARAMETER DESCRIPTION
Baseline Time to This parameter defines the average inactive procedure rework
Complete Inactive completion time if minimal resources are devoted to rework
Procedure Rework beyond the time horizon. The baseline value of this parameter
is 30,000 minutes.
Initial Procedure This parameter defines the procedure rework time horizon at the
Rework Horizon start of the mission. The baseline value of this parameter is
2,000 minutes.
Procedure Rework This parameter defines the factor of increase to the procedure
Horizon Change rework time horizon (relative to the initial time horizon) at the
Factor time of time horizon increase. The baseline value of this
dimensionless parameter is 0, which means that the rework time
horizon would not increase towards the end of the mission in
the baseline scenario.
Procedure Rework This parameter defines the time at which the procedure time
Horizon Change Time horizon is to be increased. The baseline value of this parameter
is 14,000 minutes.
Resource Fraction per This parameter defines the desired fraction of resources to be
Inactive Procedure applied to inactive procedure rework for every procedure in the
Needing Rework Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock. The baseline value
of this parameter is 0.5 or 50%.
Rework Time This parameter defines the factor of improvement of inactive
Improvement Factor procedure rework time (relative to the Baseline Time to
Complete Inactive Procedure Rework) that would be realized if
all available resources for inactive procedure rework were
devoted to inactive procedure rework. The baseline value of
this parameter is 0.02, which means that the inactive procedure
rework completion time can be improved to 600 minutes on
average. This value makes the shift dedicated to rework beyond
the time horizon one-third as effective as the three shifts
nominally dedicated to rework within the time horizon.
Time to Activate This parameter defines the average amount of time that it takes
Resources for Rework to activate resources for rework beyond the time horizon. The
of Inactive Procedures baseline value of this parameter is 30 minutes.
Needing Rework
Table 14. Description of the parameters needed to implement flow control in the
Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model.
Light Delay Model
The light delay model is used in this case study to simulate the light delay as a function of
time on a mission to Mars. The full stock and flow structure of the Light Delay Model is
shown in Figure 63. In this model, a minimum energy transfer or Hohmann Transfer
(Bate et al. 1971, pp. 163-166) is assumed from a circular Earth Solar Orbit to Mars
Perihelion (i.e., the closest point to the Sun in Mars' orbit). The Sun is assumed to be
fixed in inertial space and both the planet and spacecraft trajectories are assumed to be
two-dimensional. Once the spacecraft arrives at Mars Perihelion a maneuver is performed
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to insert the spacecraft into Mars' elliptical orbit about the Sun. The information
necessary to replicate this model fully is documented in Appendix 3.
Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model
The Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model was used in this case study to evaluate the
effect that the light delay associated with a Mars mission would have on the Procedure
Rework Process. This model was created through alteration of the Basic Procedure
Rework Model and the combination of it with the Light Delay Model. The stock and
flow structure of this model minus the elements from the Light Delay Model is shown in
Figure 64. The alteration of the Basic Procedure Rework Model consisted of the addition
of two pipeline delays to account for the effects of the light delay on the spacecraft-to-
ground and ground-to-spacecraft procedure flows. State variable names had to be
changed to include these pipeline delays, but no new parameters had to be introduced
other than the Speed of Light and a control switch to allow the model user to select a
Spacecraft Distance from Earth parameter to cancel out the light delay on special
simulation runs. The time unit of integration for the Light Delay Model was converted
from days to minutes and its Distance between Earth and Spacecraft variable was used to
calculate the light delay. The information necessary to replicate this model fully is
documented in Appendix 3.
Light Delayed, Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model
The Light Delayed, Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model was used in this case
study to identify the effects on flow control on the procedure rework process subject to a
significant light delay. It was essentially created through the addition of the flow control
elements in the Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model to the Light Delayed
Procedure Rework Model. The information necessary to replicate this model fully is
documented in Appendix 3.
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Model Testing and Calibration
The author subjected the models to the following tests and used the following model
building principles in order to establish internal validity (i.e., internal consistency) of the
models:
* After each model update, the author verified dimensional consistency of the
model using the "Units Check" tool in Vensim®.
* To avoid unrealistic model sensitivity to integration time step size, a minimum
delay of 1 minute was used for all first-order delays in accordance with
Forrester's (1968) suggestion that all first order delays should be at least twice as
large as the integration time step. This minimum delay time dictated the value
of the Time to Shift Focus parameter which is more likely to be nearly
instantaneous in reality. Furthermore, simulation results were tested for low
sensitivity to time step values up to 0.5 minutes.
* Simulations were conducted using various numerical integration techniques (i.e.,
Euler, Second-order Runge-Kutta with fixed and automatically adjusted time
steps, and Fourth-Order Runge-Kutta with fixed and automatically adjusted time
steps) to ensure that the results were not sensitive to the method of numerical
integration.
* Multiple simulation runs were conducted with extreme parameter values and
initial conditions to ensure that the simulation results were consistent with the
physical reality that they were trying to represent. Over time, these "extreme
conditions tests" enhanced model robustness to the point where only the most
absurd parameter values or initial conditions would lead to simulated system
states that would suggest a physical impossibility (e.g., negative procedure
values in the stocks in the procedure flow).
The data collected in the analysis of the five Space Shuttle missions were used to
establish external validity of the models (i.e., to validate them relative to "reality"). As
mentioned before, it was the initial analysis of the data that led to the discovery of the
procedure rework time horizon and the resulting structural changes to the models.
Additionally, the data were used to identify other structural changes to the models and
reasonable values for the remaining model parameters.
First, each update had to be classified based on how it would flow through the core
procedural flow structure. The categories used for this classification are as follows:
* Latent updates at launch: The latent updates at launch (i.e., updates that were
judged to be identifiable on Flight Day 0) start at two places in the core
procedural flow: the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock or the
Procedures Being Reworked stock. These updates thus determine the initial
values of these stocks. Most latent updates at launch began in the former
stock while a few-judged to most likely have been completed by launch-
began in the former stock.
* Updates within time horizon and due to a discrete event: While the starting
points of these updates are not necessarily relevant, what is relevant is that
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they move from the Active Valid Procedures stock to the Active Procedures
Needing Rework stock at the time of the discrete event. Thus, these updates
determine the value of the Active Procedure Invalidation Rate during Discrete
Event parameter in simulations in which a discrete event occurs.
* Updates propagated beyond time horizon and due to a discrete event: These
updates move from the Inactive Valid Procedures stock to the Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework stock at the time of the discrete event, and
because there are no inflows to the Inactive Valid Procedures stock, they
begin the simulation in the Inactive Valid Procedures stock. These updates
determine the value of the Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate during
Discrete Event parameter in simulations in which a discrete event occurs.
* Updates due to refinement of an update related to a discrete event: While the
starting points of these updates are not necessarily relevant, what is relevant is
that they work their way over time from the Active Valid Procedures stock to
the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock. Thus, if they are to be included
in a simulation run, these updates contribute to the value of the Baseline
Procedure Invalidation Rate parameter. However, because they are due to
discrete events, they should not be included in simulation runs without
discrete events.
* Updates propagated beyond time horizon and not due to a discrete event:
These updates flow over time from the Inactive Valid Procedures stock to the
Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock and therefore determine the value
of the Rework Propagation Factor parameter.
* Updates within the time horizon that were not related to a discrete event:
While the starting points of these updates are not necessarily relevant, what is
relevant is that they flow over time from the Active Valid Procedures stock to
the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock and they do so without the
influence of a discrete event. Thus, these updates determine the value of the
Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate parameter in simulation runs in which
there are no discrete events and account for most of the value of the parameter
in simulation runs in which there are discrete events.
A summary of the update classifications for the five Space Shuttle missions studied is
provided in Table 15. The data from which this table is derived is provided in Table 35
to Table 37, Table 46, Table 59 to Table 60, Table 67, Table 82 to Table 84, Table 92,
Table 105 to Table 106, Table 112, Table 134 to Table 137, and Table 149 of Appendix
2.
From these classifications, reasonable values for several parameters were determined.
For example, because the baseline runs of the Basic Procedure Rework Model exclude
discrete events, the baseline values of its Rework Propagation Factor and Baseline
Procedure Invalidation Rate parameters were tuned to contribute 13.2 and 12.6 updates
(i.e., the average values in Table 15 for non-discrete event related updates propagated
beyond and originating within the time horizon, respectively) to the update total over the
average mission duration of 12.9 days. Similarly, the values in Table 15 were used to
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determine these parameter values for each of the Flight Specific Procedures Rework
Models as well as parameter values associated with discrete events in those models.
STS-
97
STS-
115
STS-
116
STS-
117
STS-
120
Total
(Average)
Number of latent updates at 49 30 35 16 26 156
launch (31.2)
Number of updates within time 3 1 0 3 7 14
horizon and due to a discrete (2.8)
event
Number of updates propagated 12 7 20 31 51 121
beyond time horizon and due to a (24.2)
discrete event
Number of updates due to 2 0 6 0 15 23
refinement of an update related to (4.6)
a discrete event
Number of updates propagated 19 13 16 8 10 66
beyond time horizon and not due (13.2)
to a discrete event
Number of updates within the 8 12 9 8 26 63
time horizon that were not related (12.6)
to a discrete event
Total Number of Updates 93 63 86 66 135 443
(88.6)
Table 15. Summary of update classifications
studied.
for all five Space Shuttle missions
Other structural changes to the models and reasonable values for the remaining
parameters were determined through an iterative calibration technique involving the
Flight Specific Procedure Rework Models. From the data provided throughout Appendix
2, time histories were developed for all flights studied of the combined values of the
Inactive Procedures Needing Rework, Active Procedures Needing Rework, and
Procedures Being Reworked stocks. These time histories are provided in Table 45, Table
66, Table 91, Table 111, and Table 148 of Appendix 2, respectively. These time histories
were then imported into the Vensim® software package for comparison against the
simulation results (i.e., the Procedures Needing and Being Reworked variable) using the
modified Powell Search Algorithm in Vensim®. This search algorithm uses a one-
parameter-at-a-time (OPAT) routine to identify parameter values that would minimize the
difference between the data values and the simulation results. The parameter value
constraints placed on the algorithm are listed in Table 16 and were based on the author's
judgment of the realistic bounds of these parameters, which was informed by his
experience as a member of flight control teams during several Space Shuttle missions
between STS-97 and STS-115. Because the algorithm is not guaranteed to find the
global minimum if multiple local minima exist, the starting point of the algorithm, which
coincides with the baseline parameter values, can affect the result. Therefore, dozens of
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experimental baseline values were attempted until the author settled on the values in
Table 17, which are shown along with the final calibration run results.
PARAMETER MINIMUM MAXIMUM
VALUE VALUE
Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay 1 minute 120 minutes
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework 30 minutes 360 minutes
Procedure Rework Time Horizon 800 minutes 3,000 minutes
Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked 0.01 0.5
Rework Completion Time Attention Shifting Factor 0.01 2
Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor 0.01 2
Startup Delay 0 minutes 720 minutes
Table 16. Parameter constraints used for calibration runs using the modified
Powell Search Algorithm in Vensim®.
The final baseline values represent the author's best attempt to define a uniform set of
parameter values for all of the flights. These parameter values produce simulation results
that match the data time histories as closely as possible without disregarding the physical
reality that the parameters represent. As stated by Sterman (1984), parameter estimates
should be derived from data 'below the level of aggregation' of the model, such as
engineering data, surveys, or other disaggregate data sources that 'draw on descriptive
knowledge of the system's structure rather than its aggregate behavior'. The reason for
relying on data below the aggregate level of system behavior is that these models, like
almost every other model, neglect select behavior modes in the data that are not relevant
with regard to the model purpose (otherwise the models would have to be as complex as
the system they represent and resources would be wasted on understanding
inconsequential behavior modes). By neglecting these behavior modes, two sources of
unwanted variability are injected into the results of the calibration runs:
* The results returned by the search algorithm may deviate from physical reality
because the algorithm is trying to compensate for the absence of the select
behavior modes.
* The results returned by the search algorithm may deviate from flight to flight
because an event occurring on a certain flight may excite or amplify a neglected
behavior mode on that flight, but not the others.
Thus, the parameter estimates are primarily derived from the author's judgment of the
physical realities represented by the parameters. The calibration run results for the
Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay parameter, for example, were
largely neglected because they unrealistically suggested values that coincided with either
the upper or lower constraints placed on the search algorithm in all but one case. The
results from the calibration runs only factored into the estimates when they suggested an
alternative parameter value to the author's estimate that was physically reasonable and
capable of significantly improving the fit of the baseline simulation results to the data.
For instance, the calibration run results for the Procedure Rework Time Horizon
parameter suggested that a value of 2,000 minutes would, on average, produce a better fit
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than the author's initial estimate of 1,440 minutes (this suggestion represented a realistic
and important change to make to the estimate).
More importantly, the calibration runs were used to determine when certain structural
changes in the model were justifiable by allowing the author to isolate the effects of
parameter values on the simulation results from the effects of model structure. Because
the parameter values from each calibration run were optimized for each flight data set,
the runs made it clear that any important behavior modes absent from the simulation
results during these runs were missing due to the model structure.
PARAMETER STS-97 STS- STS- STS- STS- EXPERIMENTAL
115 116 117 120 BASELINE
(AVERAGE)
Baseline Flight 1 60.99 120 120 1 30
Controller Rework (60.6)
Recognition Delay
(minutes)
Baseline Time to 360 78.51 30 360 360 200
Complete Procedure (237.7)
Rework
(minutes)
Procedure Rework 1264.86 2016 800 2985 3000 2000
Time Horizon (2013.3)
(minutes)
Resource Fraction per 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 0.2
Procedure Reworked (0.304)
(dimensionless)
Rework Completion 0.01 0.01 2 2 0.29 1
Time Attention (0.862)
Shifting Factor
(dimensionless)
Rework Recognition 0.01 2 2 2 0.01 1
Delay Attention (1.204)
Shifting Factor
(dimensionless)
Startup Delay 254.8 459.7 360.0 720 720 520
(minutes) I I I 1 1 (502.9)
Table 17. Summary of the results from the final calibration run using the modified
Powell Search Algorithm in Vensim®.
Plots of the time histories using the baseline parameter values, final search algorithm
results, and flight data for each flight are provided in Figure 65 to Figure 69, respectively.
In future work, the baseline parameter estimates can be improved upon by seeking out
more data below the aggregation level of in-flight update statistics (e.g., flight controller
interviews and survey, experiments conducted with flight controllers, etc.).
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Figure 65. Results of model calibration against STS-97 data.
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Figure 66. Results of model calibration against STS-115 data.
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Figure 67. Results of model calibration against STS-116 data.
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Figure 68. Results of model calibration against STS-117 data.
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Figure 69. Results of model calibration against STS-120 data.
While visual indications of how well the models replicate the system behavior are
provided in Figure 65 through Figure 69, quantitative statistics characterizing the fit are
provided in Table 18. The first three columns contain the Mean Absolute Error (MAE),
the MAE divided by the mean of the data series, and Root Mean Square (RMS) error-
which is derived from the Mean Square Error (MSE)-as defined in the following
equations (Sterman 2000):
1n[Eq. 23] MAE = - I S, - A, I
n t=
where n = number of
Actual value at time t
observations, St = Simulated value at time t, and At =
[Eq. 24] MSE 
- (S, -A)
n 1=1
[Eq. 25] RMS = M-SE
The Theil Inequality Statistics (Sterman 2000 pp. 874-880, Sterman 1984)-shown in the
final three columns of Table 18--decompose the mean square error into three
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dimensionless components: the bias (UM), unequal variation (US), and unequal
covariation (UC). These terms are mathematically defined in the following equations:
[Eq. 26] MSE = (S- A) 2 +(S s -SA) 2 + 2(1- r)SsSA
where S = mean of the simulated data set, A = the mean of the Actual data
set, Ss =Standard deviation of the simulated data set, SA =Standard deviation of
the actual data set, and r is the correlation coefficient
(S - A)2[Eq. 27] UM
MSE
(SS - SA)2[Eq. 28] U (S -SMSE
[Eq. 29] UC 2(1-r)SsSA[Eq. 29] U MSE
From [Eq. 26] through [Eq. 29] it follows that the sum of the Theil Inequality Statistics
(U , Us, and UC) is unity. In other words, these statistics represent a relative distribution
of the types of error produced by the model. The following considerations are important
in interpreting the distribution of error among these components (Sterman 2000 pp. 874-
880, Sterman 1984):
* If the error is largely concentrated in bias (UM), most of the error is due to the
difference in the means of the model results and the data series. This type of
error is systematic in that it could undermine what the modeler is trying to
accomplish with the model.
* If the error is largely concentrated in unequal variation (US), most of the error
is due to the difference in the variances of the model results and the data
series. This type of error can be due to the different trends in model results
and data series, a difference in the amplitude of cycles present in the model
results and data series, or the absence of cycles in simulation results that exist
in the data series. While each of the causes of this type of error can
undermine what the modeler is trying to accomplish, the third cause is only
important when the purpose of the model is to study the cycle(s) that has been
neglected from the simulation results.
* If the error is largely concentrated in unequal covariation (UC), the model has
a mean and trends that closely match those of the data series. This type of
error can be due to an unaccounted for difference in phasing of the results and
data series, but is usually due to noise and cycles in the data series that have
been neglected. If proper phasing of the model results and data series is vital,
then this type of error could undermine what the modeler is trying to
accomplish. However, it is more often the case that the phasing, noise, and
183
cycles are not relevant with regard to the modeler's goal and thus the model
should not be faulted for this type of error.
Because U s could be affected by unimportant cycles in the data, it is possible
that a large concentration of error in Us and Uc does not necessarily
undermine the model's ability to replicate the important system behaviors
present in the data series.
As indicated in Table 18 most of the error is concentrated in U s and Uc for all of the
calibration runs and all but one of the baseline runs (which is an accepted consequence of
the author's attempt to develop a uniform set of parameters for all missions). This result
indicates that the models have means and trends that are very similar to those of the data
and most of the difference between the data and the model results are due to cycles and
random noise not explicitly represented by the models. In other words, most of the error
is due to factors that have little to do with what the modeler was trying to accomplish in
this modeling effort.
SIMULATION RMS MAE MAE/A UM  Us UC
RUN (UPDATES) (UPDATES) (%)
STS-97 4.246 3.270 10.98 0.1880 0.2236 0.5884
Baseline
STS-97 2.446 1.929 6.477 0.0866 0.0256 0.8878
Calibration
STS-115 3.218 2.247 10.80 0.2672 0.1981 0.5347
Baseline
STS-115 2.263 1.549 7.447 0.0006 0.0137 0.9856
Calibration
STS-116 7.579 5.761 17.17 0.5626 0.0006 0.4368
Baseline
STS-116 4.514 3.613 10.77 0.0197 0.0051 0.9753
Calibration
STS-117 5.924 4.577 16.78 0.2909 0.4741 0.2349
Baseline
STS-117 5.239 3.985 14.62 0.2022 0.4858 0.3120
Calibration
STS-120 3.994 3.166 11.03 0.0806 0.0178 0.9016
Baseline
STS-120 3.5798 2.820 9.826 1.45e -  0.0640 0.9360
Calibration
Table 18. Summary statistics for the fit of flight specific model simulation results to
the flight data.
Interpretation of the Model Testing and Calibration Process
While the plots in Figure 65 through Figure 69 provide a visual reference of how closely
the simulation results "match" the flight data and the summary statistics in Table 18
indicate that the difference is small and primarily due to cycles and noise that are not
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relevant to the model purpose, the question of whether the models are "valid" or not
requires more contextual grounding than a simple fitting of results to the data. Forrester
(1968) provides the following thoughts on model validity:
"Model validity is a relative matter. The usefulness of a mathematical simulation
model should be judged in comparison with the mental image or other abstract
model which would be used instead...By constructing a formal model, our mental
image of the system is clearly exposed...A controversy often develops over
whether or not reality is exactly as presented in the model. But such questions
miss the first purpose of a model which is to be clear and to provide concrete
statements that can be easily communicated. There is nothing in either the
physical or social sciences about which we have perfect information. We can
never prove that any model is an exact representation of 'reality.' Conversely,
among those things of which we are aware, there is nothing of which we know
absolutely nothing. So we always deal with information which is of intermediate
quality-it is better than nothing and short of perfection. Models are then to be
judged, not on an absolute scale that condemns them for failure to be perfect, but
on a relative scale that approves them if they succeed in clarifying our knowledge
and our insights into systems... The value in computer models derives from the
differences between them and mental models. When the conflicting results of a
mental and a computer model are analyzed, when the underlying causes of the
differences are identified, both of the models can be improved."
Sterman (1991) adds the following:
"By creating a representation of the system in the laboratory [i.e., a simulation
model], a modeler can perform experiments that are impossible, unethical, or
prohibitively expensive in the real world...In other words, simulation models are
'what if' tools."
Forrester's argument-which is echoed in the Meadows et al. (1982) and Forrester
(1969) quotes provided at the beginning of this chapter-is that we make all of our
decisions with models, be they mental or formal. Furthermore, because the process of
formalizing a mental model through computer simulation reveals weaknesses in the
mental model, it is worth doing even when data is scarce and our knowledge of the
mathematical nature of the system severely constrained. Sterman's comment expands on
this argument by identifying the kind of experimentation that is made possible by
simulation.
With this argument in mind, questions on the validity of the Procedure Rework Models
hinge on the purpose of the models and their usefulness relative to whatever mental or
formal models exist on the Procedure Rework Process. As stated above, the purpose of
the models are to characterize (and perhaps improve upon) how the Procedure Rework
Process attracts human spaceflight systems to safe states under uncertain conditions (i.e.,
to identify the Procedure Rework Attractor, its bifurcations, and its responses to flow
control schemes). The fact that the models produce results that seem to match flight data
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is a promising indication towards this end. However, the vast experience of Space
Shuttle Mission Control with this process would suggest that its "mental model" of the
process should already be rather sophisticated, at least in regards to the standard Space
Shuttle mission profile. Thus, most value of the models is likely to come from what they
suggest about the attraction properties of the system under conditions that have never
been encountered (e.g., long duration flights to land on moons, NEOs, or planets; flights
without "novel" or discrete events; flights subject to significant light delays; etc.). What
the models have to say about the system under these conditions is discussed in the next
chapter. As alluded to in the Mission Control literature review in Chapter 5, this purpose
of the models has not been addressed in the scholarly literature and therefore, it is up to
the reader to gauge the usefulness and plausibility of the results presented in the next
chapter against what would result from his or her mental model of the Procedure Rework
Process.
186
Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis Results and
a Process to Use Phase Space Attractors to
Evaluate Safety Constraint Enforcement
"The NASA Vision for Space Exploration calls for the return of humans to the
Moon, and the eventual human exploration of Mars; the complexity of this range
of missions will require an unprecedented use of automation and robotics in
support of human crews. The challenges of human Mars missions, including
roundtrip communications time delays of 6 to 40 minutes, interplanetary transit
times of many months, and the need to manage lifecycle costs, will require the
evolution of a new mission operations paradigm far less dependent on real-time
monitoring and response by an Earthbound operations team." -Andrew Mishkin
et al. (2007).
"The communications delays [i.e., light delays on missions to distant celestial
bodies] will change the way human missions are operated. The crew will be the
first responders to emergencies and mundane anomalies; they will attend
autonomously to all alarms, switching the troublesome system to a safe mode
and/or making quick repairs and reconfigurations. What we now think of as
ground control teams will become ground support teams." -John Jaap et al.
(2006).
"Today's basic paradigm of how to conduct mission operations must change. At
their closest approach to Earth, NEOs (particularly PHAs-potentially hazardous
asteroids) are 7 to 10 light seconds away. The crew must be very knowledgeable
and systems savvy with the vehicle, as the locus of operational decision-making
will be upon the crew. " -Rob R. Landis et al. (2008).
"Human missions to the moon and Mars will demand a higher level of spacecraft
autonomy than can be demonstrated today. Communications delays induced by
long distances render the ground unable to provide the amount or type of support
that Mission Control has always provided to crewed spacecraft." -Alan R.
Crocker (2005).
7.1 Chapter Overview
The analysis and results of the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework Case
Study are presented in this chapter. First, the analyses performed in this case study along
with their results and limitations are detailed. These analyses explore a range of flight
conditions that, as indicated in the quotes above, NASA is expected to encounter as it
executes its vision for space exploration and highlight potential ways in which the
Procedure Rework Process can be improved. Then, a general process for using phase
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space attractors to evaluate and improve safety control structures is presented with the
case study serving as an example application.
7.2 Analysis
Results from the author's analysis of the Procedure Rework Models and the flight data
are presented throughout this section. The Procedure Rework Attractor is characterized
across a range of flight conditions (including those that NASA will likely encounter on
future human spaceflight missions) and evaluations of bifurcation and flow control
schemes to improve it are described. Additionally, limitations of this analysis are
discussed.
Rework Propagation Bifurcation
As shown in Figure 70-which was derived from the data in Table 47, Table 68, Table
93, Table 113, and Table 150 of Appendix 2-the "novel" or discrete events during the
missions and the latent updates at launch introduce a good deal of noise into the time
history of procedure updates, making it difficult to infer trends in procedure update rates
over the course of a mission and their causal mechanisms.
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Figure 70. Update times for all missions studied normalized to their time of landing
preparation.
The models developed in this case study allow one to remove the latent updates at launch
and the discrete events in order to examine the underlying trends of procedure rework and
the aspects of the dynamic structure that lead to such behavior. One such dynamic
behavior that the author refers to as the rework propagation end-of-mission effect is
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depicted in Figure 71. When procedure rework is allowed to propagate beyond the time
horizon (i.e., when Flow 6 in Table 11 is positive), the procedure rework completion rate
increases exponentially throughout the mission until it peaks at the landing preparation
time and drops off considerably. Alternatively, when rework propagation is not allowed,
the procedure rework rate increases to a steady-state rate that is small (relative to the peak
rate when rework propagation occurs) and constant throughout the remainder of the
mission.
Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)
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(PBR)" :Without Rework Propagation 2 2-
Figure 71. The rate of procedure rework over the course of missions with rework
propagation and without rework propagation.
Once this behavior was identified in the model, the author retrospectively examined the
data disregarding latent updates at launch and discrete events in order to verify the
existence of the rework propagation end-of-mission effect. Figure 72 contains averaged
update rates for all procedure rework from all of the missions studied at fourteen update
times'0 3, each normalized to the landing preparation time of the average (or reference)
mission. This figure contains three spikes in the rework completion rate: one towards the
beginning of the mission, one in the middle of the mission, and one at the end of the
mission (consistent with the notion of the rework propagation end-of-mission effect).
When all updates related to discrete events are disregarded-as shown in Figure 73-the
second peak disappears and the other two are slightly reduced. This result is consistent
with a simulation run-also shown in Figure 73-in which the average number of
updates deemed likely to have been finished by launch (i.e., 6.6 updates) was the initial
103 See Table 151 in Appendix 2 for these update times and the update rates at these times
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value of the Procedures Being Reworked stock and the average number of otherwise
latent issues at launch (i.e., 24.6 updates) was the initial value of the Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework stock 104 . Finally when the latent updates at launch are also
disregarded-as shown in Figure 74-the first peak disappears, leaving only the third
peak that would be produced by the rework propagation end-of-mission effect. In fact,
the simulation results from using the baseline parameter values for the Basic Procedure
Rework Model-also shown in Figure 74-closely match the flight data when latent
updates at launch and discrete events updates are disregarded. The closeness of the
results in Figure 74-which is quantitatively summarized in Table 19105 -is particularly
impressive when one considers the following sources of error in such a comparison:
* The variable considered in this plot (i.e., the procedure update rate) is a rate
variable. Rate variables are not measurable unless they are averaged over a
period of time (Forrester 1968). The time period used for averaging is thus a
potential source of error in the plot (i.e., different time periods used for averaging
could lead to better or worse "fits" to the data).
* The effects of the discrete events and latent updates at launch cannot be removed
from the data unless they were purely additive or linear. For example, the data
shows fewer updates in the third quarter of the mission duration than the model
suggests, however, as shown in Figure 72 that was the time period in which most
of the discrete event updates were issued. The flight controllers may have been
too distracted with discrete event related updates to perform non-discrete event
related updates at the rate suggested by the model.
* The model was built on an assumption that the procedure activation and active
procedure invalidation rates would be consistent throughout the mission. In
reality, the level of procedural activity on a mission varies from day to day. For
example, there is typically an "off-duty" day in which the crew performs very few
procedures.
Furthermore, it should be noted that Garrett and Caldwell (2002) observed a similar
effect in the processing of flight rule change requests between missions (i.e., change
requests spiked in the month before a launch). Overall, the analysis provides strong
empirical support for the existence of a rework propagation end-of-mission effect.
104 The value of the Rework Propagation Factor parameter was also tuned from the baseline value of 0.605
to 0.185 in order to prevent the model from producing more than 13.2 propagated updates due to the
addition of the latent updates at launch.
105 Note that the error is mostly concentrated in Uc and Us, indicating that it is likely due to data noise and
cycles that are not relevant to the model purpose.
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Figure 72. The actual average rate of procedure rework
with normalized update times.
over the missions studied
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Figure 73. The actual and simulated average rates of procedure rework (excluding
discrete event updates) over the missions studied with normalized update times.
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Figure 74. The actual and simulated average rates of procedure rework (excluding
latent updates at launch and discrete event updates) over the missions studied with
normalized update times.
SIMULATION RMS MAE MAE/ A U U U
RUN (UPDATES) (UPDATES) (%)
No Discrete 2.8428 1.9652 48.2691 0.0081 0.3422 0.6497
Events
(see Figure 73)
No Discrete 1.0176 0.8154 44.2454 0.0026 0.0009 0.9965
Events or
Latent Updates
at Launch
(see Figure 74)
Table 19. Summary statistics for the fit of model simulation results and flight data
in Figure 73 and Figure 74.
Given the existence of the rework propagation end-of-mission effect, questions arise
regarding its causal mechanism and its potential impact on safety. As shown in Figure
75, propagated rework (i.e., rework stemming from issues that affected procedures
beyond the procedure rework time horizon when they occurred) accumulates throughout
the mission until the time comes to "tie up all the loose ends" and prepare for landing.
Prior to this time, some of the propagated rework gets activated and resolved. However,
because the amount of inactive procedures needing rework is small relative to amount of
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valid inactive procedures, they comprise a relatively small proportion of the procedures
being activated. Therefore it is not until the point near the end of the mission when all
inactive procedures must be activated that the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock
empties faster than it is filled. In describing a similar effect related to flight rule change
requests before launch, Garrett and Caldwell (2002) concluded that launch served as a
"forcing function" in Mission Control knowledge synchronization (e.g., flight rule
change request processing) between missions. Thus, landing can be considered as a
forcing function for another type of Mission Control knowledge synchronization (i.e.,
procedure rework).
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Figure 75. The time history of the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock for
scenarios with and without rework propagation.
As previously mentioned, invalid procedures are control flaws with the potential to lead
to inadequate control actions in potentially any safety control process that involves the
execution of procedures by astronauts. The Procedure Rework Process is a safety control
process to reduce such control flaws, but as shown above, it has its own control flaws.
The existence of a procedure rework time horizon that is significantly shorter than
mission duration and the tendency of procedures beyond the time horizon to be
invalidated almost as frequently as those within time horizon (i.e., rework propagation)
are control flaws that lead to the rework propagation end-of-mission effect. Unlike the
rework spikes created by the "novel" or discrete events and latent updates at launch,
which are typically due to factors outside of the real-time procedure rework process (e.g.,
SAW design), the rework propagation end-of-mission effect is due to the design of the
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Procedure Rework Process and thus, it may be possible to mitigate it through re-design of
the process. Furthermore, because discrete events and latent updates at launch also affect
procedures beyond the time horizon, such mitigation efforts could improve the system's
response to discrete events and latent updates at launch as well.
As suggested throughout this dissertation, one way to characterize such control flaws (so
that they may be improved upon) is through evaluation of their effect on system attraction
properties in phase space. When viewed in the Valid Procedures 106-Procedures Being
Reworked phase space, the Procedure Rework Attractor is an equilibrium point attractor
as shown in Figure 76. The two phase portraits in the figure depict simulations with
rework propagation and without rework propagation, respectively. In the phase portrait
without rework propagation, the system starts on horizontal axis and takes a nearly direct
path to the equilibrium point, temporarily overshooting it slightly while the startup delay
is in effect. The phase portrait with rework propagation starts in the same spot in phase
space, but carries the system away from the equilibrium along both axes of the phase
space (i.e., it takes it deeper into the hazardous regions of the phase space) in a path that
eventually ends at the equilibrium. Thus, rework propagation changes the path to the
equilibrium from a nearly direct path to a pseudo spiral-in trajectory. In other words,
rework propagation bifurcates the Procedure Rework Attractor in a hazardous manner.
This bifurcation-the Rework Propagation Bifurcation-depends on the value of the
Rework Propagation Factor parameter in the model. When the value of this parameter is
zero, no rework propagation occurs. When its value is greater than zero, rework
propagation occurs. Finally, when its value is less than zero (a condition that would
effectively mean that Inactive Procedures Needing Rework are being cancelled or
reworked outside of the standard Procedure Rework Process) negative propagation
occurs. A phase portrait and time history for a negative propagation scenario, along with
the phase portrait of a propagation scenario under identical initial conditions 0 7 are
provided in Figure 77 and Figure 78. It is worth noting that negative propagation
eliminates the rework propagation end-of-mission effect in scenarios without discrete
events and latent updates at launch and reduces it for scenarios with discrete events and
latent updates at launch.
106 Valid Procedures is a state variable derived from summing the values of the Inactive Valid Procedures,
Active Valid Procedures, and Completed Procedures stocks.
107 The dynamics of negative propagation only differ from the dynamics of zero propagation when there are
latent updates at launch or when a discrete event invalidates some procedures beyond the time horizon
(otherwise the value of the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock would always be 0 procedures).
Thus, the initial value of the Inactive Procedures Needing Rework stock is 30 procedures in both simulation
runs. The values of the Rework Propagation Factor parameter are -0.135 and 0.135 for the negative
propagation and positive propagation simulations, respectively.
194
VP-PBR Phase Space
2.5
Increasing
Hazard
1.875 Levels1.875
.-
0 1.250
0.625
0
2595.60 2596.80 2598 2599.20
Valid Procedures (VP)
With Rework Propagation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Without Rework Propagation 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 76. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with and without rework propagation.
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Figure 77. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with negative and positive rework propagation.
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Bifurcation Control of the Rework Propagation Bifurcation
The data seem to indicate that positive propagation occurred on all flights (propagated
rework had to be dealt with on each flight through the Procedure Rework Process). Thus,
with positive propagation likely to be the norm in the Procedure Rework Process rather
than negative propagation, it may be desirable to pursue some bifurcation control
techniques in order to reverse this hazardous bifurcation. One set of approaches to such
bifurcation control is to identify and alter the factors that affect the Rework Propagation
Factor.
Table 20 and Table 21 summarize the rationales for all propagated rework. The results in
these tables, along with the results in Table 8 and Table 9 suggest that rework (especially
propagated rework) is not usually due to human and component reliability issues (i.e.,
procedure rework is not a reliability problem). The rationale categorizations associated
with human/component reliability issues (i.e., Internal Inconsistencies in the Procedure,
Sensor "Failure" or Bias, Actuator "Failure" or Degradation, Crew Procedural Slips,
Typos and Omissions, Inadvertent Deletion of Steps) only account for 24.4% of the total
rework and 20.9% of propagated rework. Rework due to opportunity exploitations (i.e.,
the upside of certainty) account for more total and propagated rework (29.3% and 21.9%,
respectively) than human/component reliability issues. Thus, there appears to be a
number of opportunities for rework reduction without necessarily improving
human/component reliability:
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Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate
* Better inventory management: Equipment list revisions accounted for the largest
number of updates due to a single rationale categorization. Furthermore, there
were updates due to inconsistencies between the expected and actual
configurations of items launched and between items expected to be launched and
items actually launched. While some of these updates were due to the changing
equipment requirements for tasks, a portion of these updates were due to an out-
of-date listing in the procedure of the item's stowage location and configuration.
Thus, it may be possible to reduce such rework by removing procedural
references to equipment locations and configurations and instead referring the
crew to an electronic database for equipment locations and configurations-such
as the Inventory Management System used on ISS (McCallum 2000).
* Discretion in the pursuit of opportunity exploitations such as "get ahead" tasks
and optimizations: While opportunity exploitations allowed the crews and
Mission Control to accomplish more than they expected on these missions, it is
important to note that these opportunities exploitations led to significant rework.
Ultimately any change to the state of a highly coupled system-be it a change due
to bad events that were unexpected or to opportunities that emerged-will have to
be accompanied with changes to other parts of the system to prevent hazardous
asynchronous system evolution. Thus there is an important lesson for opportunity
management to derive from this data: discretion is necessary in the acceptance of
opportunity exploitations unless the system is prepared to make the necessary
changes to avoid asynchronous system evolution.
* Task cancellations: While resisting the temptation to exploit opportunities will
lead to a reduction in new rework, the cancellation of tasks can reduce rework that
is "waiting" to be resolved (e.g., it can lead to negative rework propagation).
However, because the cancellation of a task that other tasks depend on will create
procedure rework for those tasks, tasks that are decoupled from other tasks would
have to be targeted for cancellation in order to get the desired reduction in rework.
* Assumptions tracking for improved replanning: Nearly 11% of propagated
rework was due to task deferral, task reprioritization, and consumable
management replanning due to the downside of uncertainty. Because the order in
which procedures are executed may affect the state of the system when any given
procedure is initiated, it is possible for the assumed initial conditions for
procedures to be invalidated when procedures are reordered. Thus, if the
assumptions are more clearly tracked in the procedures or an electronic database
of assumptions, it may be possible to decouple certain procedures from ones that
could be reprioritized (i.e., the crew might be able to effectively execute the
procedures across a wider range of initial conditions).
* Reduction of mechanical switch interfaces for the crew: When one looks more
closely at the rework due to actuator/sensor "failure" or degradation/bias, it is
often the case that rework is necessary to inform the crew that they should expect
a switch to be in another position or that another switch must be used for a
procedure. Replacing switch interfaces with software interfaces, for example,
could reduce the need for such rework, not because it would alter the change in
system state caused by the actuator/sensor problems, but because it would permit
the offloading of "switch management" tasks from the crew to the flight
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controllers. As mentioned in Chapter 5, ISS flight controllers make use of much
more control authority than Space Shuttle flight controllers for commanding
subsystem functions due to the relative lack of mechanical switches on ISS.
Furthermore, it should be noted that a number of typos were due to mistakes in
the descriptions of switch positions, and thus, offloading "switch management"
tasks to flight controllers could also reduce the need to initiate updates due to
these particular typos.
* Reduction of planned rework at the end of the mission: Though technically not a
part of rework propagation, procedures that are nominally planned to be updated
often occur at the end of the mission, thus weakening the system's ability to deal
with the rework propagation end-of-mission effect.
* Use of an electronic procedure database: If the procedures are primarily
documented in an electronic database rather than paper books, it would be
possible to perform updates without the intervention of the crew. However, such
an approach to updating procedures would potentially create three problems: 1)
the interaction of the procedure database with other spacecraft databases and
software could lead to safety-of-flight issues, 2) the reliability of the procedure
database could lead to safety-of-flight issues, and 3) the crew may reject the
notion of not being kept aware of all of the updates being made (see Mindell 2008
for an account of astronaut objections to reductions in their control authority in
the early U.S. human spaceflight programs).
RATIONALE CATEGORIZATION TOTAL OVERALL
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
UPDATES OF UPDATES
"Get-Ahead" Tasks Scheduled 21 11.2%
Consumable Management Optimizations 1 0.5%
Use of Shuttle Resources to Counteract ISS 3 1.6%
Problems
Proactive Contingency Preparation and/or Hazard 10 5.3%
Investigation
Procedure Nominally Updated in Real-time 0 0.0%
Crew Comfort Optimizations 0 0.0%
Procedure Efficiency Optimization 6 3.2%
Procedure Updated or Re-evaluated after the Print 0 0.0%
Deadline for the Procedure Books and before
Launch
Total propagated updates due to the upside of 41 21.9%
uncertainty
Table 20. Number of propagated updates associated with each update rationale
categorization relating to the upside of uncertainty.
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RATIONALE CATEGORIZATION TOTAL OVERALL
NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
UPDATES OF UPDATES
Task Deferral or Reprioritization 5 2.7%
Equipment List Revision 37 19.8%
Consumable Management Replanning 15 8.0%
Unaccounted for Inhibits 10 5.3%
Internal Inconsistencies in the Procedure 2 1.1%
Sensor "Failure" or Bias 7 3.7%
Actuator "Failure" or Degradation 28 15.0%
Unexpected Software Behavior 12 6.4%
Launch Damage (actual or suspected) 15 8.0%
Crew Procedural Slips 1 0.5%
Typos and Omissions 1 0.5%
Inadvertent Deletion of Steps 0 0.0%
Inconsistency between Item's Expected Post- 2 1.1%
Launch Configuration and Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g., packaging error, manufacturing
error, etc.)
Inconsistency between Items Expected to be 0 0.0%
Launch and Items Actually Launched
Unanticipated Environmental/ISS Conditions (e.g., 11 5.9%
temperatures)
Total propagated updates due to the downside of 146 78.1%
uncertainty
Table 21. Number of propagated updates associated with each update rationale
categorization relating to the downside of uncertainty.
Currently, the only mechanism in the Basic Procedure Rework Model for evaluating the
effects of such changes is proportional variation of the Rework Propagation Factor
parameter. Each change can be assumed to reduce the value of that parameter by an
amount proportional to the percentage of propagated rework it eliminates. However,
because such assumptions would be dubious without further analysis of the causal
mechanisms of rework and the specific implementation approaches for these changes, no
attempt is made to quantitatively evaluate these solutions in this study. In future work,
the Rework Propagation Factor variable could be modeled as a state variable rather than
a parameter, allowing the modeler to delve deeper into the dynamics of the processes
affecting rework propagation. Additionally, researchers can investigate the effectiveness
of the ISS Inventory Management System and the predominantly non-mechanical
approach to interface design on the ISS in reducing overall procedure rework and rework
propagation.
The Effects of Flow Control
Flow control can be used to augment bifurcation control or as an alternative to it in order
to cope with the rework propagation end-of-mission effect. The first flow control scheme
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examined simply involves the sudden (i.e., step) increase of the procedure rework time
horizon towards the end of the mission. As shown in Figure 79, the effect of this scheme
is to slightly increase the peak of the rework completion rate and move it to an earlier
time in the mission. The advantage of such a scheme is not to reduce the hazard caused
by the magnitude of effect, but to improve the timing of the effect (i.e., to make it occur
at a more desirable time). Indeed as shown in Figure 80, the effect of this scheme on the
Procedure Rework Attractor is to put the system on a path that while taking the system
somewhat deeper into the hazardous regions of the phase space, returns the system to the
equilibrium more quickly.
The other flow control scheme examined in this case study involves the assignment of a
shift of flight controllers and MER engineers to address rework that has propagated
beyond the time horizon. This shift could either be an on-call shift that works in parallel
to the three primary shifts or it could be one of the three primary shifts. As shown in
Figure 79, this scheme creates a sizable reduction in the rework propagation end-of-
mission effect. When the performance of this scheme is viewed in phase space-see
Figure 81-it is clear that the Procedure Rework Attractor is much stronger with this
scheme than without it (i.e., the pseudo spiral-in path to the equilibrium is substantially
"shrunk"). However, it is worth noting that fundamental system behavior is the same
because the attractor has not been bifurcated. The shift dedicated to rework beyond the
time horizon-just like their colleagues in the shifts focused on rework in the time
horizon-react to propagated rework accumulation (rather than proactively preventing it
as would be done in the bifurcation control approaches) and the changes that they make
to the system also introduce propagated rework that they do not immediately realize.
When these two flow control schemes are used together, the rework propagation end-of-
mission effect is reduced and occurs at an earlier time in the mission as shown in Figure
79. Additionally, the combined usage of these schemes presents several engineering
tradeoffs. Consider the following notional cost function for flow control combining these
two schemes:
N
[Eq. 30] CResources = 0.0012x Total Resource Minutes for Inactive Procedure Reworki
i=0
Where CResources is the dimensionless cost of resources applied to inactive
procedure rework, i is an index variable denoting the value of the variable at a
given time step, and N is the total number of integration steps.
N
[Eq. 31] CTmeHorizon = 0.0001x Procedure Rework Time Horizoni
i=0
Where CTimeHorizon is the dimensionless cost associated with the value of the
procedure rework time horizon, i is an index variable denoting the value of the
variable at a given time step, and N is the total number of integration steps.
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N Time 2[Eq. 32] CPNR = 4x (1 + m ) X Inactive Procedures Needing Rework,
i=O Mission Duration
Where CpNR is the dimensionless cost associated with the accumulation of
inactive procedures needing rework, i is an index variable denoting the value of
the variable at a given time step, and N is the total number of integration steps.
[Eq. 33] Overall Cost = C = CResources + CTimeHorizon + CIPNR
This cost function penalizes the system for using resources to address inactive rework
with a dedicated shift, increasing the procedure rework time horizon, and allowing
inactive procedures needing rework to accumulate. The first two costs are directly
proportional to variables in the model while the third has a nonlinear relationship to a
variable in the model to account for a desire to address propagated rework early in the
mission. These penalties do not complement each other: to reduce one, increases in the
other two would most likely have to be accepted. Therefore, it is possible to search for
an "optimal" solution as the author has done with the modified Powell Search Algorithm
in Vensim®. The results of this "optimization" run are shown in Figure 79 and
summarized in Table 22.
Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate
12
9
S6
3
0
0 4650 9300 13950 18600
Time (Minutes)
No Flow Control 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Flow Control 1 (Time Horizon Change) 2 2 2 2 2 2
Flow Control 2 (Propagated Rework Completion Shift) a a a
Integrative Flow Control I4 4 4 4 4 4
"Optimized" Integrative Flow Control 6 6 - 5 5 -
Figure 79. Time history of the Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate for four
simulation runs with flow control and one without flow control.
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Figure 80. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with and without a sudden increase in the
procedure rework time horizon.
The reader is advised to consider these results as an example of the type of tradespace
involved in developing an integrative flow control scheme rather a statement of the
"optimal" parameter values to use for the flow control scheme presented here. If an
effort was to be made to identify optimal values for these parameters, the stakeholders
involved would have to be more engaged in the definition of the cost function.
Furthermore, because the model used for this "optimization" run was built for simulation
to understand the system dynamics rather than identification of "optimal" parameter
values, it may require some alteration for effective exploration of the tradespace. As
stated by Sterman (1991):
"Models can be static or dynamic, mathematical or physical, stochastic or
deterministic. One of the most useful classifications, however, divides models into
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those that optimize versus those that simulate. The distinction between
optimization and simulation models is particularly important since these types of
models are suited for fundamentally different purposes...Often such 'what if'
information [that can be gained from simulation models] is more important than
knowledge of the optimal decision."
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Figure 81. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with and without a shift dedicated to rework
beyond the time horizon.
PARAMETER MINIMUM MAXIMUM "OPTIMAL"
ALLOWABLE ALLOWABLE VALUE
VALUE VALUE
Procedure Rework Horizon 0 2.5 0.250
Change Factor
Procedure Rework Change 14,000 minutes 15,000 minutes 14,000 minutes
Time
Resource Fraction per Inactive 0.00001 2 1.671
Procedure Needing Rework
Table 22. Results of the combined flow control scheme "optimization" run.
The Effect of Light Delay
Up until this point, the rework propagation end-of-mission effect has only been discussed
in the context of a Space Shuttle mission. Fortunately, because Space Shuttle missions
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last for only a few weeks, there is relatively little time for propagated rework to
accumulate to the point where it cripples the Procedure Rework Process at the end of the
mission. In fact, as shown in Figure 72, the largest peaks in the rate of rework were due
to the "novel" or discrete events that occurred on the flights studied. However, the
question arises as to how severe the rework propagation end-of-mission effect would be
on longer duration missions in which propagated rework will have more time to
accumulate.
Because the rework propagation end-of-mission effect requires a mission event in which
all of the procedures must be activated by a certain time, one could argue this effect has
never been fully encountered on a long duration mission. While there have been many
long duration missions on LEO space stations such as the ISS, these space stations are
tended by multiple crews and do not land with a crew on board: propagated rework can
accumulate, but its activation can always be delayed or ultimately disregarded when the
space station is set to be disposed. Furthermore, because crews rotate on these space
stations, there is no need to develop the majority of the procedures to be executed over
the lifetime of the space station: the procedures that each crew will execute can be
developed shortly before that crew launches. On future missions to NEOs, distant
moons, and other planets however, there will be points in the mission-such as insertion
into the orbit of these celestial bodies-that will require almost all of the outstanding
issues to have been addressed. The crew for such events will be the same crew that
launched at the start of the mission and therefore, a majority of the necessary procedures
will have to have been developed and practiced by this crew before the start of the
mission. Furthermore, due to the orbital mechanics of these missions, it will not be
possible to significantly delay these events. Additionally, the rework process will be
subject to light delay, which-as stressed by the quotes provided at the beginning of this
chapter-is expected to change the fundamental nature of human spaceflight operations.
Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the rework propagation end-of-mission effect in the
context of a long duration mission subject to light delay, such as the one shown in Figure
82.
The results of simulation runs with and without light delay are shown in the time histories
provided in Figure 83 and the phase portraits provided in Figure 84. The results from
both simulations are nearly identical suggesting that light delay does not significantly
alter the rework propagation end-of-mission effect nor weaken the Procedure Rework
Attractor. However, the increased mission duration leads to a more pronounced rework
propagation end-of-mission effect and severely weakens the Procedure Rework Attractor:
the procedure rework completion rate peaks nearly seven times higher than it did for the
Space Shuttle mission duration simulations and the system travels deeper into the
hazardous regions of the phase space.
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Figure 82. The time history of the light delay affecting a spacecraft
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Figure 83. Time history of the Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate for
simulation runs of Mars transit duration missions with and without light delay.
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Figure 84. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with and without light delay on a Mars transit
duration mission.
These simulation runs ended at roughly the time that a Mars-bound crew would be
landing on the surface of Mars. Though technically not the end of the mission, such an
event would require a substantial fraction of the total mission procedures to be activated.
Inserting a spacecraft into the orbit of a distant celestial body and then landing on that
body are critical tasks. Indeed, they are so critical that one could perhaps not imagine a
worse time for the Procedure Rework Process to be subject to a dramatic rework
propagation end-of-mission effect. As noted by Mindell (2008):
"...the landings represented critical moments of each [Apollo lunar landing]
mission. Neil Armstrong described them as 'the hardest for the system and
hardest for the crews.' On a scale of one to ten, Armstrong rated walking around
on the moon a one, whereas 'the lunar descent on a ten scale was probably a
thirteen'...An Apollo flight encompassed hundreds of complex operations, but
none were as demanding, time-critical, and plagued with uncertainties as the
landing, executed in extreme conditions of darkness and cold, far from home... The
lunar landings played a microcosm of the entire Apollo program in dramatic ten-
minute phases. Here the tensions between human and machine, between manual
and automated, between pilots as controllers and pilots as system managers
manifested themselves in a string of life- and mission-critical operations, some
smooth and some surprising...Like the software itself the design of the landings
embodied the dreams and uncertainties instilled in each mission."
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While the inherent difficulties of orbit insertion and landing are enough to make the
timing the rework propagation end-of-mission effect worrisome, it is also worth noting
that the effect would occur when the system is subject to a substantial light delay.
Though the results suggest that light delay would be a minor factor, the model only treats
light delay as a pure information delay. Inefficiencies in astronaut-flight controller
communication due to the light delay are not included in the model and would be a major
source of uncertainty if they were. If such inefficiencies were to exist, they would
probably increase the difficulty of coping with the rework propagation end-of-mission
effect. Thus, it would appear from the analysis that the rework propagation end-of-
mission effect is more severe for missions to land on celestial bodies than Space Shuttle
missions and possibly far more significant in terms of the Procedure Rework Process than
the effect of light delay.
Flow control on a mission to land on a distant celestial body
Given the potential severity of the rework propagation end-of-mission effect on missions
to land on distant celestial bodies, it is worthwhile to examine some options to mitigate
this effect. Of course, many of the bifurcation control techniques mentioned above could
potentially be applied to make the effect manageable or to even reverse it. Additionally,
at least one of the flow control techniques mentioned above could provide an effective
solution to this problem. While the strategy of merely increasing the procedure rework
time horizon towards the end of the mission is risky (there is a possibility of not
increasing the time horizon soon enough), the use of a shift dedicated to rework beyond
the time horizon is likely to substantially decrease the effect. As shown in the time
histories in Figure 85 and the phase portraits in Figure 86, a shift dedicated to rework
beyond the time horizon substantially reduces the effect. In comparing these plots and
phase portraits to those from a Space Shuttle mission duration simulation (i.e., Figure 79
and Figure 81) it is apparent that the relative payoff of flow control increases as mission
duration increases.
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Figure 85. Time history of the Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate for
simulation runs of Mars transit duration missions with and without a dedicated
shift for flow control.
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Figure 86. Phase portraits in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked
Phase Space for simulations runs with and without a dedicated shift for flow control
on a Mars transit duration mission.
The Disaster Dynamics Bifurcation
The Disaster Dynamics Bifurcation is another bifurcation to which the Procedure Rework
Attractor is susceptible. This bifurcation occurs when the shift in flight controller
attention from rework discovery to rework completion leads to a situation in which the
baseline procedure invalidation rate (i.e., the rate of invalidations due to neither rework
propagation nor discrete events) outpaces the procedure rework process. As shown in
Figure 87, the rework discovery rate stabilizes at the bifurcation point of the system at a
value equivalent to the baseline procedure invalidation rate and thus, procedures needing
rework accumulate in the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock until all procedures
are activated. Beyond the bifurcation point, procedures continue accumulating in the
Active Procedures Needing Rework stock. In the phase space-see Figure 88 and Figure
89-the pseudo spiral trajectory to an equilibrium point in a relatively safe part of the
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phase space is replaced by nearly direct path trajectory to an equilibrium point in a more
hazardous part of the phase space.
The parameter that must be varied to create this bifurcation is the Rework Recognition
Delay Attention Shifting Factor. Fortunately, this bifurcation does not appear to be a
threat for Space Shuttle Mission Control as it requires the parameter value to be increased
to 7,100 times its baseline value in the baseline scenario. However, the following
considerations are noteworthy, as they highlight issues that could make this bifurcation a
threat to Space Shuttle Mission Control or in other applications of a procedure rework
process:
* As shown in Figure 90, the bifurcation value of the Rework Recognition Delay
Attention Shifting Factor parameter decays exponentially as the Baseline
Procedure Invalidation Rate parameter increases.
* The bifurcation is not sudden; the procedure rework process gradually slows
as the parameter is varied up to the bifurcation value. Overall the
performance of the process can be considered unacceptable for parameter
values well below the bifurcation value.
* The rework discovery time is assumed to increase linearly as resources are
shifted away from rework discovery. If the increase were nonlinear in reality
(e.g., a "square law"), the bifurcation value would be much lower.
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Figure 87. Time history of the value of the Active Procedures Needing Rework stock
at the Disaster Dynamics bifurcation point of the system.
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Figure 88. Phase portrait in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Needing Rework Phase
Space for a simulation at the Disaster Dynamics bifurcation point of the system.
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Figure 89. Phase portrait in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked Phase
Space for a simulation at the Disaster Dynamics bifurcation point of the system.
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Figure 90. The Disaster Dynamics Bifurcation value of the Rework Recognition
Delay Attention Shifting Factor parameter as a function of the Baseline Procedure
Invalidation Rate parameter.
Comments of the usefulness of phase portraits during model development and
analysis
As alluded to in the hypothesis of this dissertation, one of the objectives of this case study
was to demonstrate the usefulness of evaluating safety control structure performance with
phase portraits. Though it can be argued that viewing information in time histories and
phase portraits is redundant (the data/simulation results used in each are the same),
certain characteristics of the data emerge more readily in phase portraits than they do in
time histories and vice versa. For example, consider the time histories in Figure 91 and
the phase portrait in Figure 92 for a simulation run in which the dynamics of the system
were unintentionally constrained. The constraint-due to a low initial value for the
Inactive Valid Procedures stock in the Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model l08
flattens the peak of the rework propagation end-of-mission effect and the top of the path
that the system takes through phase space as it is returning to the equilibrium point
attractor. The flattening is more pronounced in the phase portrait than the time history
and thus, it was-not surprisingly-the phase portrait that drew the author's attention to
the unintended constraint on system. Ultimately, it was determined that the initial values
used for this simulation allowed the Inactive Valid Procedures stock to empty before the
rework propagation end-of-mission effect has run its course. Such constraints are
particularly important to identify because they could indicate unrealistic behavior or in
108 The initial value was 3,500 procedures instead of the baseline initial value of 25,000 procedures.
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this particular case, they can provide clues on how certain system behaviors can be
constrained (i.e., it may be possible to mitigate the rework propagation end-of-mission
effect by reducing the overall number of procedures to execute).
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Figure 91. Time histories for a simulation in which the system dynamics were
unintentionally constrained.
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Figure 92. Phase portrait in the Valid Procedures-Procedures Being Reworked Phase
Space for a simulation in which the system dynamics were unintentionally
constrained.
Overall, the author gained insights-in addition to those mentioned in the example
above-from both the phase portraits and time histories throughout the model-building
and analysis processes. Both types of graphical representations for the simulation results
were critical for the identification of logical errors in the model and nuances of the
system dynamics.
Summary of analysis results
The key findings of the case study analysis are summarized as follows:
The Procedure Rework Attractor has a bifurcation (i.e., the Rework Propagation
Bifurcation) that leads to a temporary, exponential increase in the rate of
procedure rework towards the end of the mission or before any mission event
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(e.g., landing on a celestial body) that would require a substantial portion of the
unresolved rework to be addressed. This effect-referred to as the rework
propagation end-of-mission effect-is due to the slow accumulation of rework
beyond the time horizon of the Procedure Rework Process.
* Data from all five of the Space Shuttle missions studied suggests that the rework
propagation end-of-mission effect is normal for Space Shuttle missions. In other
words, the system typically operates beyond the Rework Propagation bifurcation
point. All things being equal, operating on this side of the bifurcation is more
hazardous than operating on the other side of it.
* The rationales for procedure rework observed in the five Space Shuttle missions
studied indicate that rework is not only necessary to mitigate the effects of
negative, unexpected events, but to also prevent asynchronous system evolution
when opportunities are exploited. Nearly 30% of all observed procedure rework
was due to opportunity exploitations.
* Rework due to human and component reliability issues accounted for less than
30% of all observed procedure rework. The majority of rework was due to
opportunity exploitations, logistics issues, and process issues.
* Based on the observed rationales for procedure rework, the following bifurcation
control measures might be capable of reducing overall rework and the rework
propagation end-of-mission effect: better inventory management, discretion in
the pursuit of opportunity exploitations, task cancellations, assumptions tracking
for improved replanning, reduction of mechanical switch interfaces for the crew,
reduction of planned rework at the end of the mission, and use of an electronic
procedure database.
* Increasing the procedure rework time horizon towards the end of the mission will
slightly increase the rework propagation end-of-mission effect and move it to an
earlier time. It thus, may be possible to use such an approach in certain situations
to intentionally make the effect occur at a more desirable time.
* Assigning a dedicated shift of flight controllers and MER engineers-whether
they would be an on-call, fourth shift or one of the three primary shifts-to
address procedure rework beyond the time horizon will not eliminate the rework
propagation end-of-mission effect. However, it will substantially reduce the
effect; particularly on long duration missions in which propagated rework has
more time to accumulate.
* An integrated flow control scheme in which the procedure rework time horizon is
increased towards the end of the mission and a dedicated shift is assigned to
address propagated rework is subject to at least three types of penalties:
difficulties associated with increasing the time horizon, staffing costs, and risks
associated with allowing propagated rework to accumulate. These penalties are
not complementary and therefore must be traded against each other.
* If the Procedure Rework Process is applied as it is now on long duration missions
to land on celestial bodies, propagated rework accumulation will lead to a larger
rework propagation end-of-mission effect than what would be experienced on an
average Space Shuttle mission. Moreover, this effect would likely occur shortly
before the spacecraft is inserted into the orbit of the celestial body and landed on
it (such timing for the effect is probably undesirable given the uncertainties
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associated with these mission events). For a mission to Mars, for example, the
effect could perhaps be seven (or more) times greater than what has been
observed on Space Shuttle missions.
* Light delays on the order of ten minutes, when modeled as pure information
delays, will not significantly affect the Procedure Rework Process.
* The Procedure Rework Attractor has a bifurcation (i.e., the Disaster Dynamics
Bifurcation) that leads to an inability to discover rework faster than it is being
created. This bifurcation is not likely to be a threat to the Space Shuttle Procedure
Rework Process, as it occurs well beyond the system's observed operating point.
However, if the system's operating point were to migrate towards the bifurcation
value, its performance could deteriorate to unacceptable levels well before the
bifurcation occurs.
In the next chapter, the implications of these findings relative to the stated hypothesis of
the dissertation will be described.
Case Study Limitations
It is impossible to exhaustively address the issues involved in procedure rework in
complex, socio-technical systems in a single research study. The research described in
this dissertation is not intended to provide universal conclusions on the matter; instead it
is intended to draw attention to it and provide a process for further, customizable
analysis. The first limitation of the study is that it only looks into procedure rework in
one type of organization (i.e., a technical government organization). Procedure rework,
which exists in a number of organizations, is sure to vary across organizations in aspects
of timescale, formality, and so forth. For example, Mission Control is a component of an
organization that primarily exists for safety and technical mission success 109 and thus, the
specific insights derived from modeling procedure rework in Mission Control will not
necessarily be applicable to organizations where safety conflicts more severely with
priorities such cost, schedule, etc. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Leveson et al.
(2009) have criticized HRO researchers for too broadly generalizing their conclusions
following the study of organizations that only or primarily exist for safety (e.g., air traffic
control, fire fighting teams, aircraft carrier operations teams during peacetime, etc.).
With that said, it is important to reiterate that the aim of the research described in this
dissertation was to develop a process for designing and evaluating safety control
structures in complex, socio-technical systems while taking into account the unique
contextual factors of those systems. The achievement of this goal should make it
possible in future studies to apply the methods and modeling archetypes for evaluating
procedure rework to organizations that primarily exist for profit, for example, for the
purpose of comparing and contrasting the effectiveness and appropriateness of procedure
rework in organizations that have different priorities in regards to safety.
109 Note that Mission Control only takes responsibility for the mission after the spacecraft is launched.
Other elements of NASA make spacecraft launch, maintenance, and upgrade decisions and are therefore
subject to different pressures (e.g., cost-related pressures, schedule-related pressures, etc.) than Mission
Control.
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In terms of the application-specific limitations of this case study, there were a few
simplifications that should be considered in evaluating the results:
* As mentioned above, flight controller burnout, attrition, and hiring are not
considered in the model. While these issues are not likely to be a major problem
on short duration Space Shuttle missions, they could potentially have important
effects on long duration missions and require corrective action. In fact, ISS
Mission Control has developed two "super" console positions (i.e., ATLAS and
GEMINI) to perform the Mission Control function at a reduced staffing level
during night and weekend shifts so that the flight control team at large will not
become burnt out.
* Light delay is modeled as a pure information delay in this case study. In other
words, inefficiencies in flight controller/astronaut communications (e.g., the
inability to ask clarification questions without delay) are not included in the
model.
* The Procedure Rework Process was only evaluated over the timescale of a single
mission (though the mission duration was not the same for every simulation).
The decision to model certain process factors as parameters rather than state
variables hinged on the question, "Do these factors appreciably change over the
timescale of a single mission?" Thus, certain parameters in the model may be
better treated as state variables if multi-mission timescales are to be considered.
These considerations are mentioned to caution the reader in interpreting the case study
results and to highlight potential areas to investigate in future work. As stated by
Sterman (1991):
"No one can (or should) make decisions on the basis of computer model results
that are simply presented, 'take 'em or leave 'em.' In fact, the primary function of
model building should be educational rather than predictive."
Accordingly Table 24, which contains the author's responses to a list of questions from
Sterman (1991) for evaluating the validity of a model and its usefulness for solving a
specific problem, has been provided to help the reader determine what can be learned
from the simulations.
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STERMAN'S QUESTION AUTHOR'S RESPONSE
What is the problem at hand? The purposes of the models produced in the case study
What is the problem are to identify the Procedure Rework Attractor, its
addressed by the model? bifurcations, the factors influencing its bifurcations, and
its response to flow control schemes under wide range of
uncertain conditions in human spaceflight.
What is the boundary of the The models contain the process variables for procedure
model? What factors are rework. The causes of rework are mostly modeled as
endogenous? Exogenous? exogenous factors (the exception being a portion of the
Excluded? Are soft variables propagated rework). As mentioned above, the models
included? Are feedback effects can be expanded in future work to capture endogenous
properly taken into account? side effects of the process that would be relevant on
Does the model capture multi-mission timescales. As it is, the models currently
possible side effects, both capture the endogenous rework propagation end-of-
harmful and beneficial? mission effect in a way that closely matches the data.
What is the time horizon The author feels that there is much to be learned by
relevant to the problem? Does examining the system over both the single-mission and
the model include as multiple-mission time horizons. The focus of this case
endogenous components those study is on the single-mission time horizon, but future
factors that may change work exploring multiple-mission time horizons could be
significantly over the time useful.
horizon?
Are people assumed to act "Non-economic behaviors" are implicitly accounted for
rationally and to optimize in the first order delays in rework discovery/completion
their performance? Does the and in the Rework Propagation Factor. For example,
model take non-economic controllers can create propagated rework by providing
behavior (organizational rework solutions that will cause rework to propagate to
realities, non-economic another position or a later time in the mission. The
motives, political factors, author feels that the explicit modeling of these issues is
cognitive limitations) into best left to future work in which the Mission Control
account? stakeholders are further engaged in the modeling
process.
Does the model assume The flight controllers as represented in the models only
people have perfect react to procedures that are observable to them and
information about the future within their time horizon for action. Furthermore, they
and about the way the system divide their attention between two facets of their job
works, or does it take into (rework discovery and rework completion) and their
account the limitations, performance is affected accordingly.
delays, and errors in
acquiring information that
plague decision makers in the
real world?
Table 23. The author's responses to Sterman's (1991) checklist of questions to ask
to evaluate the validity of a model and its appropriateness as a tool for a specific
problem (Part 1 of 2).
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STERMAN'S QUESTION AUTHOR'S RESPONSE
Are appropriate time delays, Flight controllers have limited resources for rework
constraints, and possible discovery/completion and their communications with
bottlenecks taken into the spacecraft are subject to light delay.
account?
Is the model robust in the face The author subjected the models to a series of extreme
of extreme variations in input conditions tests because of this question. The results of
assumptions? these tests led to numerous model updates to improve
model robustness.
Are the policy The rework propagation end-of-mission effect is very
recommendations derived robust to parameter and initial condition variation in the
from the model sensitive to model. Furthermore, it is observable in the data.
plausible variations in its
assumptions?
Are the results of the model The author has attempted to provide all the information
reproducible? Or are they necessary in this chapter, the previous chapter,
adjusted (add factored) by the Appendix 2, and Appendix 3 to replicate the simulation
model builder? results.
Is the model currently This question is meant to help the reader determine if
operated by the team that the people who built the model are available to help the
built it? How long does it take reader use it for some application. The answer to this
for the model team to evaluate question depends on the interests of the reader(s) and
a new situation, modify the when this document is being read. For posterity, the
model, and incorporate new author has attempted to describe the models and process
data? used to build and modify them as best as possible so that
others can independently use them.
Is the model documented? Is The models are documented in Appendix 3.
the documentation publicly
available? Can third parties
use the model and run their
own analyses with it?"
Table 24. The author's responses to Sterman's (1991) checklist of questions to ask
to evaluate the validity of a model and its appropriateness as a tool for a specific
problem (Part 2 of 2).
7.3 A Proposed Process for Using Phase Space Attractors to
Evaluate System Safety Constraint Enforcement
As mentioned in the dissertation hypothesis and Chapter 4, phase space attractors provide
a conceptual construct for the evaluation of safety control structures. In this section, the
author proposes a process for using phase space attractors to evaluate system safety
constraint enforcement. This process details how he evaluated an actual safety control
structure using the concepts of phase space attraction and what others can do to perform a
similar evaluation of other control structures. The actions of the process are described
both in general (for as broad applicability as possible) and in the specific context of the
case study (as a clarifying example).
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Process Structure
The process proposed in this dissertation is organized by stages, each representing a
maturation level of the evaluation effort to which the process is applied. What it means
to be in a stage of the process during an evaluation effort is that the effort involves
thought processes and actions of the current stage and potentially any or all of those of
the previous stages. This structure was chosen instead of a step-by-step (i.e.,
"cookbook") structure due to the highly nonlinear nature of an analysis effort occurring
within the context of an overall safety-driven design effort. If the overall effort is truly a
safety-driven design effort (as opposed to an effort in which safety is added on to the
system after it has been designed), then the safety control structure and its presumed
operating environment will evolve throughout the process, making linear step-by-step
progression through the process difficult, if not impossible.
Over the course of an analysis effort, the effort can progress forward and backward
through the stages depending on the evolution of the safety control structure and its
presumed operating environment. A successful effort will end on the final stage, leaving
the analysis team to focus on other efforts and, when appropriate, to revive the effort in
order to make use of new information and resources available for the effort or account for
critical changes in the system.
Process Stage 1: Identification of the key state variables relevant to the safety
constraints and the hazardous portion of their phase space
In this stage of the process, the key state variables relating to the relevant safety
constraints are defined. Additionally, the regions of phase space that the system is
allowed (or in more restricted cases, desired) to reside in or visit are determined from the
set of relevant constraints. Because system safety constraints are derived from hazards
that are defined in STPA in terms of system state, this stage of the process should be
straightforward if the constraints are written to provide an unambiguous description of
the constrained system state. However, it may be necessary to rework the safety
constraints when the allowable phase space implied by the constraints is not viable (e.g.,
the allowable or desirable phase space is null, physically impractical, etc.). Also, care
must be taken to ensure that changes in the key state variables and allowable regions of
the phase space due to updates of the safety constraints throughout the safety-driven
design effort are incorporated into the process.
The Application of Process Stage 1 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
In the case study presented in this and the previous two chapters, invalidations of
procedures were considered to be control flaws that could lead to inadequate control
actions in practically any Space Shuttle process that involved the execution of procedures
by the astronaut crew. Thus, the number of procedures needing rework (both inactive
and active) and number of procedures being reworked were used to define the hazard
states associated with these types of control flaws. The model variables Procedures
Needing Rework (which would eventually become a summation of the Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework and Active Procedures Needing Rework stocks), Procedures
Being Reworked, and Valid Procedures (which would eventually become a summation of
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the Inactive Valid Procedures, Active Valid Procedures, and Completed Procedures
stocks) were defined for the phase space analysis.
The least hazardous point in the phase space defined above corresponds to a system state
in which the value of the Valid Procedures variable equals the total number of procedures
in the system. The system thus drifts into increasingly hazardous states as the value of
the Valid Procedures variable decreases and the values of the Procedures Needing
Rework and Procedures Being Reworked variables increase. Ideally one would want to
constrain the system so that it would remain at the least hazardous point in the phase
space at all times (i.e., the safety constraint would effectively be, "All procedures to be
executed by the crew must be valid at all times"). However, this level of constraint is not
possible due to the "novel" (i.e., discrete) and "normal" (i.e., effectively continuous)
procedure invalidations that occur during Space Shuttle missions and the time delays in
rework discovery and completion. Therefore, the safety constraint was initially refined to
the following, "All procedures to be executed by the crew must be valid by the time that
they are executed." This constraint immediately implied two things about the Space
Shuttle Procedure Rework Attractor: 1) the attractor must attract the system to an
equilibrium point near the values of zero procedures needing rework and procedures
being reworked and 2) that equilibrium point should be at a spot in which the value of
procedures needing rework is no greater than the value of procedures being reworked
(procedures needing rework are not known to be invalid and thus they are more likely to
be executed). Later-when the rework propagation end-of-mission effect was
discovered-it was recognized that this constraint also implied that the attractor must
reduce the depth of the end-of-mission excursions into the hazardous regions of phase
space or at the very least return the system to the equilibrium point before the affected
procedures are executed.
Process Stage 2: Evaluation of the viability of using continuous dynamics to model
safety control structure performance
As stated above, the process proposed in this dissertation is meant to increase the depth of
the STPA involved in safety-driven design efforts through numerical simulation of the
safety control structure's continuous dynamics. However, this intended purpose raises
questions on the usefulness of the process whenever the safety control structure's
behavior is dominated by discontinuous dynamics. Thus, it is necessary in Stage 2 of the
process (and later stages) to evaluate whether new and useful information about the
safety control structure's behavior can be derived from simulating its dynamics as being
primarily continuous. If it is clear that useful information can potentially be obtained,
then the analysis effort can proceed to (or continue in) the later stages of the process. If,
on the other hand, the prospect of finding useful information eventually becomes
unequivocally doubtful, then the specific process proposed in this dissertation should not
be continued further, at least in regards to the specific aspect of the control structure
being evaluated. The analysis team should instead focus on other aspects of the control
structure or attempt to analyze the aspect of the control structure in question through
discontinuous dynamic analysis methods (e.g., State Machine Hazard Analysis).
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Unfortunately, there is no simple rule or test for one to invoke in order to determine
whether or not useful information will be derivable from a primarily continuous-time
dynamic simulation of safety control structure behavior. The following questions were of
use in this regard during the dissertation case study and are offered for the reader's
discretion:
1. "Is there a progression or flow of people, material, or information through
physical or abstract stages (e.g., experience levels, stations along an assembly
line, etc.) that can be modeled with simple conservation laws?"
2. "Is the controlled process (or a major part of it) continuous?
3. "Will the control structure's response be more effective if it is (fully or
partially) continuous?
However, with that said, the reader is cautioned to think beyond these general questions
and to perform the evaluation implied in this stage early and often in the analysis effort.
The Application of Process Stage 2 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
The concept of procedures flowing in an approximately continuous manner from states of
being valid to being invalidated and ultimately re-validated was identified by the author
as soon as the case study was envisioned. However, it was also recognized early on in
the case study that many procedure invalidations would be due to events so novel that the
accuracy of the model would be affected if they were considered to be continuous in
nature. This recognition of discrete or novel events in the data partially led to the
selection of the P6 ISS SAW flights as the set of missions to examine. STS-97 and STS-
115 in particular, were very similar missions by design, but the former was known
beforehand to have encountered a novel event (i.e., the P6 ISS SAW deploy anomaly)
while the latter was known to have not encountered this same problem. Thus, by
comparing these two missions to each other and ultimately the other three missions, it
was possible to qualitatively distinguish novel invalidations from the relatively "normal"
deviations and treat them accordingly in the modeling effort. Later on, initial efforts to
calibrate the flight data proved encouraging and eventually, useful information was
derived from the modeling effort when the rework propagation end-of-mission effect was
discovered in the model and then confirmed in the flight data.
Process Stage 3: Identification of state variables, state variable time derivatives,
and parameters affecting the key state variables
Stage 3 of the process begins with the qualitative identification of causal (as opposed to
simple correlative) relationships between the key state variables, their time derivatives,
other state variables and their time derivatives, and parameters. Early work in this stage
can involve causal loop diagramming (see Sterman 2000, Ch. 5) or jump straight into the
development of the stock and flow structure of the control structure and its operating
environment. Later on in the stage (or perhaps in later stages) consideration is given to
the division of certain state variables into multiple cohorts (i.e., groups sharing a common
trait, such as age) in order to increase the fidelity of the analysis (See Sterman 2000, Ch.
12).
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The Application of Process Stage 3 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
As described earlier in this chapter, the initial causal structure of the model was largely
derived from three archetypes in the system dynamics literature: the rework cycle
(Lyneis and Ford 2007, Lyneis et al. 2001, Sterman 2000), disaster dynamics (Rudolph
and Repenning 2002), and first-order and pipeline delays (Sterman 2000, pp. 415-417).
Additionally, variables were added to introduce one-minute-long pulses in the procedure
invalidation flows in order to simulate the discrete events during the missions.
Later on when the procedure rework startup delay and procedure rework time horizon
were discovered in the flight data, it became necessary to add the Startup Delay
parameter and divide what were initially the Valid Procedures and Procedures Needing
Rework stocks into two cohorts each to distinguish between the procedures beyond the
time horizon and the procedures in the time horizon. With the addition of these two new
stocks came the addition of three new flows (two procedure activation flows and an
inactive procedure invalidation flow) and the parameters to regulate these flows (e.g.,
Rework Propagation Factor, Procedure Rework Time Horizon, etc.). Finally, the causal
structure of the basic model was altered to introduce light delay and to implement the
flow control schemes in the later model analysis stages of the proposed process.
Process Stage 4: Model construction, iteration, and confidence building
In Stage 4, the analysis team begins to devise and refine the numerical relationships
between the state variables, state variable time derivatives, and parameters. The
relationships derived are primarily based on conservation laws, decision rules (see
Sterman 2000, Ch. 13), control laws, state estimation algorithms, and expert judgment.
Parameter values are derived from control set points, resource availability, scientific
knowledge (e.g., speed of light), or expert judgment. The dynamics necessary for
calculating light delay in the dissertation case study, for example, were based on simple
and well established orbital mechanics principles. Once the variable relationships and
parameter values are defined, numerical simulation is initiated.
Because the model must be constructed with some degree of subjectivity in quantitative
variable relationships, the classification of variables as parameters rather than state
variables, and the decisions on which variables to include in the model, it is necessary to
build confidence in the model's results before drawing any conclusions from them. First,
the model should be checked for dimensional consistency (e.g., that "apples are not added
to oranges") and the model's results should be evaluated for sensitivity to the time step of
the numerical integration i o and the numerical integration technique. Once dimensional
incompatibilities and sensitivity to the numerical integration approach are ruled out,
confidence should be increased further by subjecting the model to extreme inputs and
initial conditions to ensure that the model's behavior is consistent with the physical
reality that it is trying to represent. Only the most absurd inputs or initial conditions
should lead to simulated system states that would suggest a physical impossibility (e.g.,
the dead rising from the grave). Another approach to build confidence in the model is to
110 Forrester (1968) suggests that the time step should be no more than one-half the shortest first-order
delay in the system.
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perform sensitivity analyses on the model parameters to verify that the model behavior is
physically reasonable across a reasonable variation of parameter values. Additionally,
confidence in the model can be improved through peer/expert review of the model
structure and results. Finally, confidence in the model can be further built through the
comparison of simulation results to time history data-preferably through use of metrics
such as the Theil Inequality Statistics as described in Sterman (2000, 1984)-provided
that an adequate physical incarnation of the model structure, be it heritage or
experimental, exists
Throughout the process of iterating the model and building confidence in it, the analysis
team should question the realism of the boundaries and scope of their model. Because
the system state modeling in the proposed process is performed on a system level of
abstraction, the model is in some sense incomplete until all system states are taken into
account. However, such completeness is impossible and thus the modeler(s) is left to
decide what level of scope is good enough. This question should be guided by the issue
of system coupling. As emphasized throughout this dissertation, complex, socio-
technical systems are often nonlinear and thus, a change in one part of the system can
lead to disproportionate changes in another part of the system. When developing a safety
control structure to produce a specific attractor, the possibility exists that an unaccounted
for change in the system could lead to a condition that destroys the attractor over time.
Such situations are, in mathematical terms, the coupling that Perrow (1999) and others
(Leveson et al. 2006, Woods 2006, Dekker 2005, Leveson 2004, Rasmussen 1997) have
identified as a factor in accidents. Thus, the stakes are high to ensure that the model is
sufficiently scoped to identify the potential for coupling.
One set of possible starting points in the outward expansion of the model to identify
potential sources of coupling are the sources and sinks (i.e., the "clouds" in a stock and
flow structure diagram). By "challenging our clouds" (Sterman 2002) or converting a
source or sink into a state variable, it is sometimes possible to identify areas in which the
safety control structure's ability to respond to uncertainty could be saturated or eroded.
For example, if one were to model the flow of a key resource to the safety control
structure (e.g., money, people, etc.) as a source rather than a state variable, he or she
would neither recognize the finite limitations of that resource nor the possibility of other
parts of the system making that resource unavailable to the safety control structure at an
inopportune time. Model parameters are another potential starting point for outward
expansion of the model. One way to perform such an expansion would be to convert
parameters to state variables with exogenous forcing functions (i.e., inputs that are
functions of time rather than system state variables). Alternatively, parameters could be
converted into state variables altered by archetypal or unique endogenous dynamic
structures (i.e., structures in which all mathematical relationships are functions of system
state variables). For example, Marais et al. (2006) described an archetypal dynamic
structure-shown in Figure 93-in which safety goals that are widely perceived to be
parameters actually erode over time.
"1 It is also helpful if the attractor produced by the system is not chaotic. Recall from Chapter 4 that time
history data of the behavior of the Lorenz Attractor would be quite dubious for inferring system behavior.
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Figure 93. The eroding safety goals archetype (recreated from Marais et al. 2006).
Because outward expansion of the model may uncover system couplings capable of
destroying a phase space attractor, it is valuable to monitor the emergence and evolution
of phase space attractors appearing in model iterations during Process Stage 4 (and later
stages). To perform this monitoring one would create phase portraits of all of the state
variables believed to have a feedback relationship and qualitatively evaluate them after
every model iteration. Once it appears as though the attractors have stabilized from
model iteration to iteration, it may be okay to proceed to the next stage of the process.
Such stabilization of the relevant attractors may provide an indication that the attractors
are sufficiently decoupled from the rest of the system to proceed or that the modeling
effort has begun to focus on aspects of the system that have little effect on the safety
control structure dynamics.
The Application of Process Stage 4 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
The descriptions in the literature of the dynamic archetypes from which the qualitative
system structure was derived also detail the quantitative structure of these archetypes.
Thus, the process of defining the mathematical relations necessary for the initial
simulations was relatively straightforward after the initial qualitative structure had been
defined. However, early testing of extreme conditions, dimensional consistency, time
step sensitivity, and integration technique sensitivity revealed a number of areas in which
the mathematical relationships had to be improved to enhance model robustness and
realism. These improvements-along with additional rounds of testing and improvement
after the introduction of the procedure rework time horizon to model-were made before
the model calibration. Then during the model calibration process, further changes were
made to the structure of the model to improve the fit of its results to the flight data, and of
course, reasonable baseline parameter values were identified.
The phase portraits depicting the Procedure Rework Attractor evolved considerably
throughout early model iteration, particularly when the procedure rework time horizon
and thus the rework propagation end-of-mission effect were introduced into the model.
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However in the later stages of model iteration, the attractor remained relatively
unchanged as slight changes were made to the model in order to improve the fit of the
simulation results to the flight data. The last noteworthy change in the phase portraits of
the attractor occurred when the procedure rework startup delay was introduced into the
model, and that change only produced a small kink in the trajectory that the system would
take during simulations with rework propagation as it ventured into the more hazardous
regions of phase space-see Figure 76, Figure 81, Figure 89, and Figure 92
Ultimately, the Basic Procedure Rework Model and its variants provide a robust and
realistic representation of the Procedure Rework Attractor and its rework propagation
end-of-mission effect. With that said, there are areas to potentially improve upon in
future work. The first area is the treatment of parameters in the model. All of the
parameters in the model are state variables in reality and thus, one could explore the
possibility of treating some or all of them as such. The key issue in such an effort would
be to determine whether they would appreciably change over the relevant operational
time period of the system. For example, while the Baseline Flight Controller Rework
Recognition Delay is probably best treated as a parameter over the time scale of a single
Space Shuttle mission, the same may not be true over the time scale of the Space Shuttle
Program where flight controller training philosophies could change and operational
experience with the Space Shuttle would accumulate. Another area for potential
improvement is the treatment of the state variables in the model. While there are no
sources or sinks in the core procedure flow structure and thus no "clouds" to challenge,
the separation of the procedure stocks into further cohorts may be worth considering in
future work.
Process Stage 5: Identification of the phase space attractors produced by the safety
control structure and their bifurcations
Process Stage 5 begins with detailed analysis of the phase space attractors produced by
the safety control structure. As mentioned above, the phase space attractors can change
from one model iteration to the next and thus, it is important (for the sake of reducing
wasted effort) to ensure that the model is relatively mature before initiating this stage of
the process. Additionally, because discontinuous dynamics tend to make phase portraits
more difficult to interpret, it is important to include mechanisms in the model for
deactivating discontinuities that have been modeled. For example, suppose that data is
available for model calibration and that it contains significant discontinuities. In such an
instance, it would be necessary to include the discontinuities while calibrating the model
and then deactivate them during the early analysis of the attractors. In doing so, a clearer
picture of the underlying continuous dynamics of the safety control structure can be
developed before an attempt is made to understand the system dynamics with the
discontinuities.
Analysis of the phase space attractors involves two types of model sensitivity analysis:
variation of initial/disturbance conditions and variation of model parameters.
Initial/disturbance conditions are varied in order to estimate the strength of the attractor
while parameters are varied to determine the attractor bifurcation points. Exploration of
the parameter space and range of possible initial conditions can be carried out in one-
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parameter-at-a-time (OPAT) searches' 12, adaptive OPAT searches, or through the use of
automated search algorithms, if available. However, the reader is advised to perform
these kinds of analyses only on relatively mature models because as a model of any given
size matures, its potential parameter space and potential range of initial/disturbance
conditions is likely to become better defined and thus more manageable.
The Application of Process Stage 5 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
As mentioned above, two bifurcations were discovered in the analysis of the Procedure
Rework Attractor: the Rework Propagation Bifurcation and Disaster Dynamics
Bifurcation. These bifurcations-caused by variation of the Rework Propagation Factor
and Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor parameters, respectively-were
found through simple OPAT searches. Furthermore, because the Disaster Dynamics
bifurcation point occurred incredibly far (i.e., 7100 times) beyond the baseline operating
point of the system, the author analyzed the sensitivity of this bifurcation point to the
variation of other model parameters. The plot in Figure 90 is an output of one of these
analyses. These sensitivity analyses were conducted by varying a single parameter that
might affect the bifurcation point by a fixed amount and then varying the Rework
Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor until the bifurcation occurred.
Ultimately, neither of the two bifurcations occurs suddenly. Increasing the Rework
Propagation Factor parameter gradually weakens the attractor, leading to further and
further excursions into the hazardous regions of the phase space during the rework
propagation end-of-mission effect. Increasing the Rework Recognition Delay Attention
Shifting Factor gradually slides the equilibrium deeper into the hazardous regions of
phase space (i.e., to higher equilibrium values of the Procedures Needing Rework
variable and Procedures Being Reworked stock).
Process Stage 6: Evaluation of bifurcation control and flow control options to
improve the phase space attractors produced by the safety control structure
Following the analysis in Stage 5, the analysis team may deem the attractor properties of
the safety control structure unsatisfactory for effective safety constraint enforcement.
Possible reasons for deeming the attractor properties unsatisfactory include:
1. Inability of the attractor to prevent movement of the system into the hazardous
regions of the phase space,
2. Inability of the attractor to persist across a wide enough range of
initial/disturbance conditions,
3. Slow reaction to undesirable initial/disturbance conditions,
4. Potential for an undesired bifurcation during system operations, or
5. Inefficiency of the attractor.
112 Frey et al. (2003) discuss the advantages of one-parameter-at-a-time experimentation. Though their
primary focus is on physical experimentation rather than numerical experimentation, the general concepts
apply in both forms of experimentation.
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Thus, in Stage 6 of the process, the analysis team can explore possibilities for using
bifurcation and flow control to improve the attractor's ability to prevent the system from
entering (or lingering too long in) the hazardous regions of the phase space. Options for
bifurcation and flow control are identified through a review of the bifurcation analysis
results obtained in Stage 5 of the process and an evaluation of the dynamics of the
"flows" in the system. The candidate solutions are then implemented in the model
through the model-building techniques of the preceding stages of this process.
The Application of Process Stage 6 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
The bifurcation control schemes pursued in the case study were identified from the
results of the bifurcation analyses in Process Stage 5. Because the Disaster Dynamics
Bifurcation did not appear to be a threat to the Procedure Rework Process in Space
Shuttle Mission Control, no action was deemed necessary other than to recommend that
the current level of flight controller rework recognition performance be maintained.
Additionally, because the Rework Propagation Bifurcation occurs well below the
operating point of the system, the author decided to investigate ways in which the
operating point could be brought closer to the bifurcation point (i.e., to lower the value of
the Rework Propagation Factor parameter). After identifying the rationales for
procedure rework (particularly propagated rework) the author proposed several technical
and process improvements-described earlier in this chapter-to investigate in future
work for their effect on the value of the Rework Propagation Factor parameter.
Process Stage 7: Reflection, dialogue, and wrap-up
Perhaps, one of the most difficult questions to answer in an analysis effort, particularly
when a complex system is being analyzed, is when the analysis is "good enough." In
Stage 7 of the process, the analysis team must evaluate whether or not the model
developed in the process has served its purpose. Typically, the purpose will center on the
identification of control flaws, the recommendation of additional safety constraints on the
system, redesign of elements of the control structure, or the addition of new elements to
the control structure. The "clients" in these situations will most likely be the managers,
engineers, and other stakeholders driving the overall safety-driven design effort.
In Stage 7, a dialogue must be initiated between the analysis team and its "clients" to
determine whether or not the model produced has served its initial purpose or is
potentially useful towards another purpose. If the model has not quite served its purpose,
the analysis team should evaluate what must be done to the model in order to make the
model serve its purpose. If the model has been deemed to have served its purpose, the
analysis team must determine whether or not an additional purpose can be served by
further elaborating the model. Furthermore, they must solicit critiques and advice from
individuals outside of the modeling effort and key stakeholders in the effort. If it is found
that no further purpose can be served by continuing the modeling effort with the
individuals currently involved, the individuals must move on to their next effort while
facilitating the transfer of its insights or further effort to the stakeholders.
113 Facilitation of this transfer, in some instances, could involve the development of a version of the model
adequate for use by the stakeholders in an operational or developmental setting (e.g., an archetype
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Such transfers may be awkward and otherwise difficult, but it is paramount to maintain a
clear purpose throughout any modeling effort and to walk away from the effort when no
further purpose can be served. In discussing the importance of the purpose that drives a
modeling effort, Meadows et al. (1982) pointed out that every member of the Limits to
Growth global modeling efforts-briefly described in the Chapter 3-had moved on to
other modeling efforts by that time because they felt that the purpose for the models had
been served. In subsequent years, the Limits to Growth team briefly revisited these
modeling efforts on occasion, but only when enough new data became available or
attitudes towards ecology evolved enough to provide purpose for further effort. As
pointed out by Forrester (1985):
"Ifeel that the emphasis on 'The' model is not only unrealistic, but probably also
alarming to the reader...I believe we are proposing the 'Process' of modeling
rather than particular frozen and final models...we are suggesting that models
will help to clarify our processes of thought; they will help to make explicit the
assumptions we are already making; and they will show the consequences of the
assumptions. But as our understanding, our assumptions, and our goals change,
so can the models."
The Application of Process Stage 7 in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure
Rework Case Study
The purpose for the case study in this chapter was to develop a process for using the
notion of phase space attraction to evaluate safety control structures and to provide the
reader with an example application of the process to a "real-world" complex, socio-
technical system. An additional purpose was to identify key aspects of the dynamics of
procedure rework (i.e., the type of attractor produced, its bifurcations, factors affecting its
bifurcations, and its response to flow control schemes). While the solutions provided for
bifurcation and flow control of the attractor are not necessarily "optimal", further
development of the case study would not be likely to contribute to the reader's
understanding of the concepts involved in applying this process. Furthermore, the results
obtained are worthy of discussion in the appropriate stakeholder community to evaluate
their merit and to formulate meaningful goals and strategies for the continuation of this
work. In short, the purposes of the case study have been fulfilled and thus the author's
focus in the next chapter is shifted towards reflection on the contributions of this
dissertation and proposed possibilities for future research.
contribution to the repository of dynamic structures available to practitioners of Dulac's methodology,
etc.). In other instances, it may be the case that the incumbent modeling team lacks the skill set, financial
resources, domain knowledge, access to data, or interest to expand upon the model to serve another purpose
while others do possess these attributes. In such instances, the incumbent analysis team would provide the
new analysis team the support that they would need to begin pursuing these new purposes.
231
Chapter 8: Summary of Contributions,
Future Work, and Concluding Remarks
8.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the author closes his argument. First, the author's hypothesis is revisited
and his contributions to the management of uncertainty in engineering systems are
summarized. Next, the author's contributions to procedure rework processes in human
spaceflight and in general are reviewed. Then, the author describes possible directions
for further research. Finally, the author summarizes the entire dissertation and provides a
closing statement.
8.2 The Dissertation Hypothesis Revisited
The hypothesis of this dissertation is as follows:
"Modeling the output of system safety control structures as phase space
attractors with nonlinear, continuous dynamics subject to uncertain initial (or
disturbance) conditions will provide useful insights in the design and operation of
system safety control structures."
This idea is derived from a desire to improve our understanding of how robustness,
adaptability, flexibility, and resilience in complex socio-technical systems can be
evaluated and improved for the purpose of opposing unsafe decisions and component
behaviors in these systems. If a safety control structure does not have a sufficient blend
of robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience to oppose unsafe decisions and
component behaviors, it may not successfully attract the system to safe states throughout
its lifecycle. What the safety control structure lacks in robustness could allow the system
to drift deep into the hazardous regions of its phase space after a disturbance. What it
lacks in beneficial adaptability (i.e., adaptability that resists asynchronous or otherwise
detrimental system evolution) can allow the attractor to bifurcate over time and draw the
system to unsafe states. What it lacks in flexibility can allow its attractive force to be
overpowered by changes in the system's environment over time. Finally, what it lacks in
resilience can prevent the safety control structure from maintaining (or, in times of crisis,
recovering) its desirable attractive properties. In other words, evaluating and improving
the attractor produced by a safety control structure can be one approach to ensuring that
the structure has suitable robustness, adaptability, flexibility, and resilience to oppose
unsafe decisions and component behaviors in its uncertain future.
The support provided for this hypothesis throughout the dissertation is summarized in the
next three sections. The first of these sections includes a summary of a widely applicable
process that emerged from thinking of safety control structure evaluation and design as a
phase space attractor engineering problem. Additionally, it describes lessons learned in
the application of this process for opportunity management and the treatment of non-
novel events in uncertainty management. The second of these sections mentions how an
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example application of the process filled gaps in a specific literature. Finally, the third of
these sections lists several directions for further research identified while acting on this
hypothesis.
8.3 Contributions to the Management of Uncertainty in
Engineering Systems
The first class of contributions from this dissertation relates to the management of
uncertainty in general. The safety control structure evaluation process proposed and
demonstrated in this dissertation holds promise for helping engineers develop better
safety control structures to manage the downside of uncertainty. Additionally, in
applying this process to an actual system, two interesting nuances of the management of
uncertainty were identified. All three contributions are reviewed more fully in the
remaining paragraphs of this section.
Development of a process for the quantitative evaluation and improvement of
control structures for safety risk (and opportunity) management
By thinking of safety control structure evaluation and design as a phase space attractor
engineering problem, the author was able to develop, demonstrate, and describe a process
that-though restricted to systems that can be behaviorally represented with continuous
dynamics-should be applicable for safety risk (and opportunity 14) management in a
wide range of situations. The process consists of seven model-building, analysis, and
refinement stages that outline an approach for identifying phase space attractors produced
by safety control structures. These attractors should attract the system to safe system
states despite an onslaught of uncertain events. If such an attraction is not the case or if
the attraction is not as good as it should be, the process includes bifurcation and flow
control analysis techniques for control structure improvement.
The advantage of such a process over processes involving a linear accident model, for
example, is that it does not constrain itself to a linear conception of nonlinear phenomena.
Linear accident models rely on a chain of events, which are manifestations of symptoms
of the states of the system and its environment. Events depend on confluences of these
states that are so complex that they can only be represented by chance. Correctly
characterizing these chances becomes an infinitely impossible task in complex systems
and thus the task is linearized to the extent possible. In other words, safety risk
management is reduced to a linearized "gamble" when the linear accident models are
used.
By shifting the focus to system states-as done in the proposed process-our goal
changes from the infinitely impossible task of correctly characterizing event chances to
the regulation of one or more of the many states that must coincide to allow the undesired
events to occur (i.e., to actively control risk rather than gambling on it). Contrary to what
one may intuitively think, this shift simplifies the problem to the extent that nonlinearities
in system state can be considered. Of course-as demonstrated by even simple chaotic
114 While opportunity management was not the focus of this dissertation, the analysis surprisingly
uncovered ways in which safety risk and opportunity are linked. Thus, it is reasonable to speculate that the
proposed process can also be used to impact opportunity management directly or indirectly.
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systems like the Lorenz Attractor-we will always lack the necessary understanding to
determine what specific states the system of concern will be in at all times. This
uncertainty is the reason why the concept of phase space attraction is so important. By
understanding phase space attraction and how to improve it, we can constrain the system
to the safe regions of its phase space without having full certainty of present and future
system states and without having to linearize our approach to safety risk management.
Identification of an example of a potential hazard in opportunity exploitation
Though the focus of this dissertation was on safety risk, a contribution to our
understanding of opportunity exploitation was nonetheless inferred from the data. Nearly
30% of all instances of procedure rework were due to the upside of uncertainty (i.e.,
unexpected opportunities that emerged and were exploited). This information has two
implications for opportunity exploitation.
The first is that control authority for adaptation can be used to respond to both the upside
and downside of uncertainty even if it is predominately in place to manage one side. In
other words, having the ability to make changes to the system in response to dangerous,
unexpected events may also allow the system to take advantage of unexpected
opportunities. This potential for "dual use" of adaptation control authority should be
considered when tradeoffs are made as to whether or not to include such capability into
the system.
The second implication of these results is that opportunity exploitation can introduce
hazards into the system if the exploitations are not accompanied by efforts to coordinate
these exploitations with other actions planned for the system. Any unexpected change to
the state of the system-even if it is made with the intention of improving system
performance-can potentially turn a valid procedure or plan into a hazardous procedure
or plan. In implicitly recognizing this potential, Mission Control and the MER routinely
"resynchronize" procedures and plans that are desynchronized by opportunity
exploitations through the Procedure Rework Process (i.e., they prevent asynchronous
system evolution). Such efforts to keep the system synchronized regardless of the
positive or negative nature of the desynchronizing "force," are a reason why Mission
Control and the MER are not only very successful in safely guiding the astronaut crew
through undesired contingencies, but also in helping the crew safely accomplish more
than what is expected of them. Thus, the general lesson for opportunity management is
that all opportunity exploitations must be accompanied by efforts to coordinate these
exploitations with other actions planned for the system.
Identification of an example of the role of non-novel events in operational hazard
emergence
Rudolph and Repenning (2002) used a simple, generic dynamic structure to show that
while novel events tend to garner much attention as operational hazards, the effects of
non-novel events can accumulate to effectively break down an operational process. By
identifying the rework propagation end-of-mission effect, the author has identified a real-
world example of such phenomena. This effect is not due to novel events, it is due to the
accumulation and sudden activation of procedures invalidated by numerous non-novel
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events (i.e., baseline and propagated procedure invalidations) dictated by the system's
dynamic structure. Fortunately, this effect has not yet led to a breakdown of the
Procedure Rework Process in Space Shuttle Mission Control. However, its presence and
the possibility that it could be far more damaging on long duration missions to land on
distant celestial bodies serves as a reminder that the way in which non-novel events are
handled by the system's dynamic structure is an important aspect of uncertainty
management. In fact, one could say that the "normal" nature of system accidents that
Perrow (1999) referred to is due to a widespread lack of understanding of how to safely
handle non-novel or "normal" events in complex systems (after all, rework propagation is
due to system coupling).
8.4 Contributions to Procedure Rework Processes for Human
Spaceflight and Other Applications
The second class of contributions from this dissertation relates to procedure rework
processes for human spaceflight and other applications. Despite little mention of
procedure rework in the literature, the author believes that procedure rework is a primary
reason for the success of Mission Control and the MER in guiding astronaut crews safely
through spaceflight operations. The qualitative and quantitative aspects of its dynamics
that were identified in this dissertation may thus be useful in improving the operational
success of Mission Control, the MER, and other operational entities that heed the lessons
of this study. In the remaining paragraphs of this section, these contributions are more
fully discussed.
Identification of the severity of rework propagation
Rework propagation occurs for two reasons. The first reason is that the procedures are
based on assumptions of system states that are in part affected by other procedures (i.e.,
procedures are coupled and can be invalidated simultaneously). The second reason is that
there is a time horizon for the procedure rework process (i.e., procedures are typically
reworked less than two flight days before they are to be executed). The result of rework
propagation is an exponential increase in the amount of rework before the end of the
mission or any other event that would require "all loose ends to be tied up" (i.e., the
rework propagation end-of-mission effect)' 15.  The data indicate that this effect
commonly occurs on Space Shuttle missions and may not be as much of a problem as the
"novel" events that occur on many Space Shuttle missions (in fact, it may not even be
noticeable relative to the novel events).
However, the analysis in this dissertation has revealed that the procedure rework process
could significantly increase in severity on a long duration mission to land on a distant
celestial body. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the effect of rework propagation
on the Procedure Rework Process will be much more severe than the effect of light
delay-an unavoidable issue often cited in the literature as a primary challenge to
overcome on such missions. On a Mars mission, for example, the Procedure Rework
Process would be most stressed when the spacecraft is about to enter Mars orbit and land.
115 A prior study by Garrett and Caldwell (2002) noted a similar effect in the processing of flight rule
change requests in the month before each Space Shuttle launch. However, no attempt was made in that
study to simulate that effect.
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However, this stress would not necessarily be due to the intuitive and unavoidable
problem of light delay; it would be due to the less intuitive and preventable problem of
procedure rework propagation. The identification of this problem thus highlights a key
gap in the literature on (and perhaps stakeholder mental models of) the future of crewed
spaceflight mission flight control.
Identification of rationales for procedure rework
In order to anticipate, fix, and prevent instances of procedure rework, an understanding or
model of procedure rework causality is necessary. Procedure rework is necessary in
human spaceflight (and other domains) for a number of reasons and barring a clear record
of these reasons, flight controllers and MER engineers are left to develop their mental
models of procedure rework through experience. Such a reliance on experience takes
time, subjecting the system to additional levels of hazard while the flight controller or
MER engineer learns, and subjects the eventual mental model to biases that people often
make in informal inference of past experience.
By explicitly identifying the rationales of procedure rework observed in this study, the
author has provided information to aid flight controllers and MER engineers in the
anticipation, completion, and prevention of procedure rework (indeed the author provides
several recommendations based on this analysis to prevent instances of rework). One
could look at the data and identify rationales that they previously overlooked or rationales
that were falsely attributed to be the cause of most rework. For example, one who
attributes most rework to unpreventable component or human reliability issues may
instead realize from the data that most rework is due to more manageable logistics and
process issues.
Characterization of strategies for using flow control to mitigate the effect of rework
propagation
Two distinct and one integrative flow control schemes to mitigate rework propagation
were demonstrated in this dissertation. The first involved either the use of a fourth shift
of flight controllers and MER engineers to work on propagated rework in parallel to the
three primary shifts or the use of one of the primary shifts to work on propagated rework
as needed throughout the flight. The second scheme involved the sudden increase in the
time horizon of the procedure rework process as the mission neared its end. The first
scheme significantly reduced the rework propagation end-of-mission effect (particularly
on the long duration missions) falling somewhat short of eliminating it while the second
scheme merely moved the effect to an earlier (and perhaps more desirable) time in the
mission. Each of these schemes has their costs and benefits and thus, an integrative
scheme and notional cost function were defined to synthesize these two schemes.
Though these schemes cannot be said to be "optimal," they provide a set of options for
Mission Control and the MER to consider as they prepare for future human spaceflight
missions.
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Qualitative and quantitative description of the Procedure Rework Process in Space
Shuttle Mission Control
The ways in which procedures are created, updated, and ultimately executed are key
issues in the interface of humans and technology. The Procedure Rework Process relies
on a view of procedures as resources rather than rigid rules and a dual responsibility in
procedure development and execution (i.e., the procedure developer has a responsibility
to provide the procedure executor with a useful procedure and the procedure executor
must use discretion in executing the procedure). The qualitative and quantitative
description of the process provided in this dissertation should promote the concepts and
merit of such a view to operational environments in which procedures are viewed as rigid
rules and the operator's responsibility is merely to follow them. In particular, the explicit
identification of the capacity for original thought and problem solving as a flight
controller training objective and the results that follow from that objective should speak
to the usefulness of harnessing the potential of human operators in complex system
operation vis-a-vis treating them as components that must be regulated by inflexible
procedures for "reliable" performance. Furthermore, the overall description of the
process should provide indications of tangible human contributions to complex system
operation for those seeking to understand how control authority should be split between
humans and automation (many instances of rework are examples of contingencies or
opportunity exploitations that require a human's ability for original thought).
As far as Mission Control is concerned, the description of the Procedure Rework Process
provided in this dissertation should be useful for flight controller training. Because
procedure rework is an important part of a flight controller's job, the qualitative
description of the process, documented procedure rationales, and simulation model could
be used in flight controller training-perhaps in a CBT or Training Academy lecture-to
help trainees understand their role in the process and the strengths and weaknesses of its
dynamic structure.
Finally, the generic dynamic structure of procedure rework developed in this study can be
added to the repository of generic dynamic models available to practitioners of Dulac's
(2007) method, discussed in Chapter 4.
8.5 Future Work
Further research can proceed along three directions: 1) additional development of the
proposed process for using phase space attractors to evaluate safety constraint
enforcement, 2) additional investigation of procedure rework, and 3) application of the
process to other systems. These directions are discussed in the paragraphs below.
Additional development of the proposed process for using phase space attractors to
evaluate system safety constraint enforcement
The process proposed in this dissertation takes some of the abstract mathematical notions
of phase space attraction and applies them to the practical system safety problem of
safety control structure evaluation and design. However, the author has admittedly only
"scratched the surface" of the established knowledge of phase space attraction and much
work could be done to determine uses for it in the process. Mathematicians have studied
237
bifurcations and attractors for decades and as mentioned in Chapter 4, bifurcation control
is an emerging subfield of nonlinear control theory. Review of this work and perhaps
collaboration with researchers in these areas of study are likely to yield augmentations to
the process that will help process users better understand how bifurcations form and can
be controlled. Such an understanding would not only lead to better schemes for
bifurcation control, but also provide more clarity as to what dynamic structures should be
created in the model-building process to reveal the relevant bifurcations of the system.
Similarly, the approaches taken to flow control in this dissertation are derived from some
of the simplest control schemes known today (e.g., proportional control). Further
research could be applied towards identifying far more sophisticated and useful schemes
for flow control in the nonlinear control literatures.
Moreover, work can be done to better enable the use of phase space attractors for the
evaluation of safety constraint enforcement in systems dominated by discrete or hybrid
dynamics. Such efforts would likely be aimed at augmenting the current process with
analysis techniques from discrete mathematics or developing a complementary process
focused on discrete or hybrid systems.
Additional investigation of procedure rework
In this dissertation, procedure rework was identified as a key process to the success of
Space Shuttle operations and several important aspects of its dynamics were described.
Given its importance, it is possible that stakeholders in Mission Control, the MER, the
Astronaut Office, or even completely different industries will want to know more about
it. Thus, there are several opportunities for further investigation of procedure rework.
The first potential area of investigation could involve refinement and expansion of the
model to further validate the long duration mission rework propagation concerns raised in
the initial analysis or to identify other issues. The following considerations could apply
to such analysis:
* The analysis in this dissertation was baselined from Space Shuttle data. When
long duration missions to land on distant celestial bodies do occur, they will be
performed with other spacecraft architectures and potentially a new Mission
Control architecture. Thus, the model might have to be altered to account for the
architectural difference between these systems and the current one.
* Only a portion of the safety control structure was analyzed in this dissertation. By
expanding the model to include other components of the safety control structure,
it may be possible to show that while procedure rework is sufficiently decoupled
from other system processes over the duration of a single Space Shuttle mission,
there are safety control and cost minimization processes in other parts of the
control structure that could weaken or destroy the Procedure Rework Attractor
over a multi-mission timescale.
* During the analysis, light delay was not shown to be a major issue for the
Procedure Rework Process. However, the models used represent the effect of
light delay in an optimistic manner (i.e., light delay is only treated as a pure
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information delay). Investigation of potential nonlinear effects of light delay on
flight controller performance could potentially reveal problems that would have to
be addressed.
* Flight controller and MER engineer burnout, attrition, and hiring were not
accounted for in the model. While these issues are probably irrelevant over the
duration of a Space Shuttle mission, they may have a significant effect on long
duration missions. Thus, it may be worthwhile to model these effects in future
work.
* Rework propagation is caused by a number of issues. While the model currently
treats the Rework Propagation Factor as a parameter, further modeling efforts can
expand upon the processes affecting rework propagation and perhaps allow for
better analysis of bifurcation control options.
The next potential area of investigation could involve refinement of the flow control
tradespace exploration. As stated in Chapters 6 and 7, the purpose of the model
developed in this dissertation was to simulate procedure rework rather than optimize it.
However, there are bound to be optimization considerations in the development of a
flight control strategy for future human spaceflight missions. According to Webb and
Smith (2008) and Korsmeyer and Smith (2008), MOD has a goal of staffing flight
support for the proposed Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle with approximately 50% of the
staff currently required for Shuttle. Future work could be geared towards making the
necessary refinements to the model and notional cost functions presented in Chapter 7 to
evaluate the impact of such a strategy. Furthermore, multiple flow control schemes could
be identified and traded against each other.
Additionally, procedure rework can be evaluated in the operation of other spacecraft to
identify potential ways in which its practice may differ in future human spaceflight
missions from how it is done during Space Shuttle missions. As mentioned in Chapter 7,
studying procedure rework for the ISS may reveal the advantages and disadvantages of
some of the bifurcation control techniques proposed in this dissertation (e.g., reduction of
mechanical interfaces for the crew, use of an electronic inventory management database,
etc.). However, care would have to be taken to ensure that some of the fundamental
differences between ISS-style missions and Space Shuttle-style missions are properly
accounted for in the evaluation of these techniques. For example, in studying rework
propagation on ISS, one may be led to believe that rework propagates more slowly
because there are no mission events to force the completion of all unaddressed rework
(i.e., propagated rework could be delayed beyond the time period studied). Similarly,
when evaluating procedure rework for uncrewed spacecraft missions, one would have to
account for the fact that procedures written for humans differ from procedures written for
automation (in fact, this study only considered procedures written for humans), and that
the humans executing procedures in such missions are executing them from a control
room on Earth. In other words, comparisons of procedure rework data for crewed and
uncrewed spacecraft missions could easily be as invalid as the comparisons between
"apples and orangutans" (double pun intended) if such differences are not taken into
account.
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Finally, procedure rework in the operation of other complex systems can be evaluated to
develop a better understanding of how it can (or perhaps cannot) be more universally
applied.
Application of the proposed process to other engineering systems
The process is meant to be applicable to any engineering system in which useful
information can be derived by treating some aspect of the system's dynamics as
continuous. Thus, there are sure to be countless opportunities to apply the process to
other systems in order to evaluate and improve the performance of their safety control
structures whether they are already in existence or being engineered.
8.6 Concluding Remarks
This dissertation began with what the author intended to be a provocative discussion on
the role of nonlinearity in two complex system accidents and one near accident. The
interactions of components in such systems can cause some components to compensate
for the "failings" of others or to degrade: the behavior of the system as a whole differs
from the sum of the behaviors of its parts. The reason for bringing this role to the
attention of the reader is a not-so-subtle emphasis in traditional science and engineering
research to fit linear reasoning to even the most complex phenomena as mentioned in
Chapter 1. As discussed in Chapter 2, this emphasis has left us with linear, event-based
accident models that are problematic to use for safety risk management in complex,
socio-technical systems.
However, the situation was not said to be entirely grim as several works were highlighted
that have begun to draw attention to the nonlinearity of system accidents and to stress the
importance of system-level properties like resilience, robustness, flexibility, adaptability,
and safety in managing the positive and negative aspects of uncertainty. Among these
works, an idea has arisen-promoted mostly by Leveson and her research group-to
explicitly treat safety as a control problem. Thus, some fundamentals of control theory
were presented in Chapter 3 to help the reader understand what treating safety as a
control problem would mean. Then in Chapter 4, the author introduced the mathematical
concept of phase space attractors and laid the conceptual groundwork for a process to use
them to evaluate how well safety is being controlled in a system and how this control can
be improved. Finally, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the author used a case study of a real-
world safety control application-the Space Shuttle Mission Control Procedure Rework
Process-to describe and demonstrate the proposed process while drawing attention to
the aspects that make this application successful in a complex, uncertain environment.
Accordingly, the contributions of this work have implications for the management of
uncertainty in general and in reworking procedures in Mission Control and elsewhere.
In treating safety control structure evaluation and design as a phase space attractor
engineering problem, the author has taken steps to better foster the resilience,
adaptability, flexibility, and robustness of safety constraint enforcement in one particular
engineering system. Moreover, this work identifies a path for future steps to be taken
with regards to safety constraint enforcement in this and other engineering systems.
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Appendix 1: List of Acronyms
Abbreviations
AA Associate Administrator
AAE Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering
ACM Association for Computing Machinery
ACO Assembly and Checkout Officer
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
B.S. Bachelor of Science
BGA Beta Gimbal Assembly
BOOSTER Booster Systems Engineer
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board
CAPCOM Spacecraft Communicator
CSA Canadian Space Agency
CSM Command and Service Module
CSRL Complex Systems Research Laboratory
DfC Design for Changeability
DoD Department of Defense
DPS Data Processing Systems Engineer
EECOM Emergency, Environmental, Consumables Manager
EGIL Electrical Generation and Illumination Engineer
ESD Engineering Systems Division
ESMD Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
ET External Tank
EVA Extravehicular Activities Officer
FAO Flight Activities Officer
FCR Flight Control Room
FCT Flight Controller Trainer
FD Flight Day
FDO Flight Dynamics Officer
FLIGHT Flight Director
GC Ground Controller
GDO- Rendezvous Guidance and Procedures Officer
Rendezvous
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control Systems Engineer
GP-B Gravity Probe B
HRO High Reliability Organization
IAASS International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IL Instrumentation Laboratory
INCO Integrated and Communications Officer
ISS International Space Station
ITA Independent Technical Authority
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and
JSC Johnson Space Center
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KBB Knowledge Based Behavior
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LCC Launch Control Center
LEO Low-Earth Orbit
LiOH Lithium Hydroxide
M.S. Master of Science
MAE Mean Absolute Error
MBE Multiple Bit Error
MBU Multiple Bit Upset
MCC Mission Control Center
MER Mission Evaluation Room
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MMACS Maintenance, Mechanical, Arm, and Crew Systems Officer
MMT Mission Management Team
MOCR Mission Operations Control Room
MOD Mission Operations Directorate
MPSR Multi-Purpose Support Room
MSE Mean Square Error
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MSG Message
N/A Not Applicable
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NAT Normal Accident Theory
NEO Near-Earth Object
OJT On-the-Job-Trainee
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
OPAT One-Parameter-At-a-Time
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PAYLOADS Payloads Officer
PC Personal Computer
PDRS Payload Deployment and Retrieval Systems
PGSC Payload General Support Computer
PGT Pistol Grip Tool
PI Principle Investigator
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PROP Propulsion
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
Ph.D. Doctor of Philosophy
RBB Rule Based Behavior
RCC Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
RF Radio-Frequency
RMS Root Mean Square
S.M. Master of Science (Latin Abbreviation)
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SARJ Solar Alpha Rotary Joint
SAW Solar Array Wing
SBB Skill Based Behavior
SBE Single Bit Error
SBU Single Bit Upsets
SE Spiral-in Equilibrium
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRMS Shuttle Remote Manipulator System
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator System
STAMP Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
STPA STAMP-based Analysis
STS Space Transportation System
SURGEON Flight Surgeon
WHO World Health Organization
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Appendix 2: Detailed Space Shuttle Flight
Data Tables
This appendix contains the necessary documentation for an independent evaluation of the
author's data analysis for each Space Shuttle mission studied. The first set of tables
shown for each mission include a listing of the electronic messages sent to the crews
during those flights and how (or whether) the author obtained them for the case study.
The second set of tables provided for each mission includes a numerical code for each
update (e.g., Procedure Update 1, Procedure Update 2, etc.), the flight days on which the
updates occurred, the title of the altered procedure, the number of the electronic message
in which the update was announced, the rationale for the update, and console position
responsible for the update as judged by the author. The third set of tables include the
author's judgment of the flight days on which each update was identifiable, issued, and
was to be executed. Additionally the third set of tables include the number of days
between when an update was identifiable and when it was updated as well as the number
of flight days between when it was updated and when it was to be executed. The fourth
set of tables for each mission include the author's interpretation of the detailed rationale
for the update as well as the more general rationale categorization and discrete event
rationale categorization (if applicable). The fifth set of tables for each mission include
the data time history of the Procedures Needing and Being Reworked variable used in the
calibration of the procedure rework model. The information in the fifth set of tables was
derived from an integration of the values in the third set of tables and an evaluation of the
mission timelines that yielded the mission elapsed time when each flight day ended and
when the discrete events effectively occurred. The next to last table provided for each
mission identifies which updates the author judged as originating within/beyond the time
horizon, attributable to specific discrete events (within/beyond the time horizon or due to
refinements of prior updates), and being created as a result of the procedure rework
process. These evaluations largely dictated the parameter values used in the model
calibration. The last table for each mission lists the update times and totals normalized to
the landing preparation time. Finally, the last table of this appendix list the update times
and totals for all missions normalized to a standard landing preparation time.
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STS-97 Data Tables
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
157C EDW Entry Summary 12 Disregarded
156B KSC Entry Summary 12 Disregarded
155 FD11 - FD13 Summary Pages 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
154B Entry C/L Deltas 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
153C D/O Prep Deltas 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
152 Entry Day Fluid Loading and Anti-G Suit 11 Disregarded
Operations
151 FD11 Internet Questions 11 Disregarded
150A SWIS Network RF Comm Sensitivity Check 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
149 FD11 PAO Event Summary 11 Disregarded
148 FD11 Earth Obs Image 11 Disregarded
147 FD11 Earth Obs Text 11 Disregarded
146 FD11 Mission Summary 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
145B FD11 Flight Plan Revision 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
144 FD11 Summary Timeline 10 Disregarded
143 Middeck Stowage Configuration 10 Disregarded
142 FD10 Internet Questions 10 Disregarded
141A FD10 Transfer Message (ACFN585A) 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
140 Joint Ops Update Summary 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
139A FD10 PAO Event Summary 10 Disregarded
138 Conjunction Viewing (FAIN338) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
137A (OCA_0510B) Joint PMA3 Egress Procedure 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Deltas
136 FD10 Mission Summary 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
135D FD10 Flight Plan Revision 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
134 FD10 Earth Obs Image 10 Disregarded
133 FD10 Earth Obs Text 10 Disregarded
132 Cancelled 10 Disregarded
131 FD10 Summary Timeline 09 Disregarded
130 Transfer Message (ACFN562A) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
129 Undocking Plan (GPFN558) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
128 OCA Jumper build with Shuttle Resources 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(ISS Get A
127 FD09 Internet Questions 09 Disregarded
126 Assembly Ops Update Summary 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
125A DT0261 Alt Test Ops Updates (ACFN550) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
124 (OCA_0490) IWIS Abbreviated Setup 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
123A (OCA_0496A)FDO9 PAO Event 09 Disregarded
122A SAFER Equipment Stow For ISS Transfer 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EVFN524)
121A EVA Crew Hook Lock Attachment 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Procedure (EVFN516)
120A EVA Equipment Hook Changeout Procedure 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EVFN515)
119 FD09 Transfer Message 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
118 (OCA_0493) CBCS Install Mods - Missing 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Video Cable
117 FD09 Earth Obs Image 09 Disregarded
Table 25. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-97 crew (Part 1 of 4).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
116 FD09 Earth Obs Text 09 Disregarded
115A FD09 Mission Summary 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
114D FD09 Flight Plan Revision 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
113 FD09 Summary Timeline 08 Disregarded
112 ISS Flyaround Procedures 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
111 REBA/EMU TV Power Cable Check 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EVFN483)
110 EVA Tool Config Deltas (EVFN490) 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
109 Cable Slack Wrench Photo (EVFN495) 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
108 FD08 Internet Questions 08 Disregarded
107A Manual SABB Latch Cycle (EVFN487B) 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
106B PDRS PMA2 Connector Survey (PDFN457) 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
105 Solar Array Mast Retraction Update 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(PHFN434A)
104B Final EVA Timeline 08 Disregarded
103B SA Tension Cable Slack Take-up (Wrench 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
B/U Procedure)
102B EVA3 Big Picture 08 Disregarded
101 FDO8 Earth Obs Image 08 Disregarded
100 FD08 Earth Obs Text 08 Disregarded
099A (OCA_0468) CMG Procedure Deltas 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
098B FDO8 Mission Summary 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
097C FD08 Flight Plan Revision 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
096 FDO8 Summary Timeline 07 Disregarded
095 EVA 3 Procedure Deltas (EVFN459) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
094 EVA Picture #2 07 Disregarded
093A EVA Picture #1 07 Disregarded
092B EVA 3 Tool Config (EVFN431) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
091 Solar Array Mast Retraction (PHFN434) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
090C 2B Maintenance Summary (FDFN433) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
089 FD07 Internet Questions 07 Disregarded
088A WVS Troubleshoot Procedure 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
087A Preliminary EVA3 Procedures 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
086 Tension Solar Array (PHFN436) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
085 Latch Cycle Procedure (PHFN435) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
084 Assembly Ops Update Summary 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
083 (OCA_0453) DTO-261 Test Ops (VRCS) & 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
IWIS ACT
082 (OCA_0452) IWIS Software File Update 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
081 FD07 Earth Obs Image 07 Disregarded
080 FD07 Earth Obs Text 07 Disregarded
079 FD07 PAO Event 07 Disregarded
078 FD07 Mission Summary 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
077C FD07 Flight Plan Revision 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
076 FD07 Summary Timeline 06 Disregard
075 FD06 PMA 3 Ingress Procedure 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EEFN406A)
074 Assembly Ops Update Summary 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Table 26. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-97 crew (Part 2 of 4).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
073 (OCA_0444)Node 1 Ingress for Node 1 Patch 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Panel Re
072 ZI Patch Panel Reconfig Procedure Updates 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(OPFN394
071 FD06 Internet Questions 06 Disregarded
070 EVA Picture #5 06 Disregarded
069 EVA Picture #4 06 Disregarded
068 EVA Picture #3 06 Disregarded
067 EVA Picture #2 06 Disregarded
066 EVA Picture #1 06 Disregarded
065 FD06 Earth Obs Image 06 Disregarded
064 FD06 Earth Obs Text 06 Disregarded
063B Updated LiOH Cue Card for FD06 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
062A FD06 Mission Summary 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
061C FD06 Flight Plan Revision 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
060 FD06 Summary Timeline 05 Disregarded
059 EVA WVS Survey of Stbd Wing(2B) Right 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
SABB
058 Updates to EVA 2 H-Jumper Inhibits 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(ACFN339A)
057A 4B SAW Deploy Ops Update (PHFN354A) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
056 RMS SAW Survey (PDFN342) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
055 FD05 Earth Obs Image 05 Disregarded
054 FD05 Earth Obs Text 05 Disregarded
053 FD05 Internet Questions 05 Disregarded
052B FD05 PAO Event Summary 05 Disregarded
051B FD05 Mission Summary 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
050C FD05 Flight Plan Revision 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
049D FDO5 Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
048 Assembly Ops Update Summary 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
047 Z1 Keel Target Blockage 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
046 FD04 Internet Questions 04 Disregarded
045 IMAX/ICBC3D Troubleshooting 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(ACFN276)
044 Mast Canister Thermal Blanket Re-Install 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EVFN270)
043 FD04 Earth Obs Image 04 Disregarded
042 FD04 Earth Obs Text 04 Disregarded
041A FD04 Mission Summary 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
040B FD04 Flight Plan Revision 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
039 FD04 Summary Timeline 03 Disregarded
038A EVA Workarounds Cribsheet Updates 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EVFN266)
037 IEA Keel Pin Nut Plate Removal (EVFN274) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
036 Cancelled 03 Disregarded
035A FD03 Transfer Message (ACFN250) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
034 Final IMAX Scene List (ACFN205A) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
033 Audio Config Cue Card Input (INFN247) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
032A (OCA_386) BGA Position Plan 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Table 27. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-97 crew (Part 3 of 4).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
031 Preliminary Orbital Maneuver Pad for Ti 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
030 Progress Relmo Plot 03 Disregarded
029 Relmo Plot 03 Disregarded
028 Preliminary Orbital Maneuver Pad for NC4 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
027 Joint Ops Update Summary 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
026 (OCA_0384) Failure to Unlatch SABB 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Remotely
025 (OCA_0383) Failure to Tension SABB 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Remotely
024 (OCA_0382) Failure to Extend Mast 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Remotely
023A Assembly Ops Update Summary 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
022C (OCA_0381C) EPS Deltas to Assembly Ops 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
021B (OCA_0380B) P6 PVR Retract 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
020 Cancelled 03 Disregarded
019 ISS Radiogram 204 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
018 Updated Proc For ODS Vestibule Depress 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
(EEFN218)
017 FD03 Mission Summary 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
016B FD03 Flight Plan Revision 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
015 DTO 257 Changes (GNFN202) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
014 FD03 Earth Obs Image 03 Disregarded
013A FD03 Earth Obs Text 03 Disregarded
012A FD03 Summary Timeline 02 Disregarded
011 Rendezvous Updates 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
010 ODS C/L Camera Misalignment Workaround 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
009 FD02 News From Home 02 Disregarded
008A EVA C/L Updates (FN181) 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
007 EVA Warm Restart Procedure (FN176) 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
006 SWIS SETUP Procedure Updates (FN165) 01 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
005 FD02 Earth Obs Image 02 Disregarded
004 FD02 Earth Obs Text 02 Disregarded
003 Z1 RSU Networking Procedure (FN161) 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
002 FD02 Mission Summary 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
001A FD02 Flight Plan Revision 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Table 28. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-97 crew (Part 4 of 4).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
1 2 OIU ACTIVATION 1 Change of OIU 2 to primary ACO/EGIL
unit (OIU 1 was primary unit
for the previous flight, but was
tripped due to an under-rated
circuit breaker)
2 2 EMU SWAP 1 Battery Swap due to improper EVA
charging of battery
3 2 EMU C/O 1 Removal of step to close EVA
external airlock heaters due to
warm attitudes of STS-97
4 2 Zi RSU Networking 3 Procedural Flaws Discovered ACO
Procedure on FD 1
5 1 SWIS SETUP 6 Procedural Flaws Discovered ACO
on FD 1
6 2 DISPLAY LOSS 7 EMU display anomaly during EVA
DURING POWER testing corrected
TRANSFER
7 2 UNSTOW PORT SAW 8 Change to ensure that there EVA
BLANKET BOXES, will be no interference
RELEASE MAST TIP between STBD SSU and
FITTINGS APFR
8 2 EVA 2 TOOL CONFIG 8 Change to ensure that there EVA
will be no interference
between STBD SSU and
APFR
9 2 EVA 2 TOOL CONFIG 8 Last minute addition of EVA
protective covers
10 2 EVA 2 SORTIE 8 Last minute addition of EVA
SETUP protective covers
11 2 ATTACH ZI TO P6 8 Last minute addition of a EVA
QD release ring snap back test to
avoid leaking and/or hose
whipping hazard to EVA crew
12 2 UNSTOW 8 Change to bolt torque settings EVA
STARBOARD SAW due to Boeing analysis
BLANKET BOXES
13 2 UNSTOW PORT SAW 8 Change to bolt torque settings EVA
BLANKET BOXES due to Boeing analysis
14 2 ATTACH P6 TO Zi 8 Change to bolt torque settings EVA
USING due to Boeing analysis
CONTINGENCY
FASTENERS
15 2 MANUAL OVERRIDE 8 Change to bolt torque settings EVA
TO EXTEND due to Boeing analysis
RADIATOR
16 2 WORKAROUNDS 8 Change to bolt torque settings EVA
CRIBSHEET due to Boeing analysis
17 2 ODS C/L CAMERA 10 Contingency procedure (there MMACS/
MISALIGNMENT was a misalignment on the RNDZ
WORKAROUND previous flight: STS-92)
Table 29. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 1 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
18 2 RNDZ Timeline 11 Time of callouts changed due RNDZ
to potential packet conflict
19 3 DTO 257 PRCS TEST 15 Changes possibly due to RCS PROP
problems on FD 1
20 3 ACBM TO PCBM 16 Logistical Changes ACO
GROUND STRAP
INSTALLATION
21 3 ODS VEST/PMA3 16 Minor Omissions ACO
PRESSURIZATION
22 3 SWIS SETUP 16 Missing step ACO
23 3 ZI RSU Networking 16 Typo ACO
Procedure
24 3 UPDATED PROC 18 Changes to procedure after ACO/
FOR ODS print deadline EECOM
VESTIBULE
DEPRESS
25 3 P6/Z1 UTILITY 22 Previously unaccounted for ACO
CONNECTION PVCU Switchover inhibit
POWERDOWN AND
RECOVERY
26 3 P6 CH 4B/2B BGA 22 Inadvertent deletion of a step ACO
ACTIVATION AND call out to ensure that attitude
SAW DEPLOY control is handed over
27 3 P6 PVR DEPLOY 22 Previously unaccounted for ACO
PVR Turnoff inhibit
28 3 EETCS RADIATOR 22 Auto Off function must be re- ACO
DEPLOY enabled in order for the power
off command to successfully
execute
29 3 IEA KEEL PIN NUT 37 Contingency procedure to be EVA
PLATE REMOVAL performed if the crew cannot
break torque on the IEA Keel
Pin Bolt
30 4 DEPRESS/REPRESS 40 Typo EVA
CC
31 4 POST EVA 40 Step Incompatible with EMU EVA
PREBREATHE procedures
for EVA 2 and EVA 3
32 4 POST EVA 40 Incompatible steps deleted EVA
33 4 POST DEPRESS CC 40 Airlock External Heater Steps EVA
Removed due to warm
attitudes of STS-97
34 4 POST EVA 40 Airlock External Heater Steps EVA
Removed due to warm
attitudes of STS-97
Table 30. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 2 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
35 4 RMS IMAX OPS 40 New RMS position to view ACO/
IMAX camera shutter PDRS
(probably to ensure that
IMAX camera is functioning
properly after ICBC3D camera
failure)
36 3 MAST CANISTER 44 Procedure added to re-install EVA
THERMAL thermal blankets that became
BLANKET RE- partially detached (possibly
INSTALLATION during launch)
37 3 IMAX/ICBC3D 45 Problems with ICBC3D ACO/
Troubleshooting camera INCO
38 4 P6 INSTALL SCRIPT 47 A PAD tethered to the Zi PDRS
Keel was floating into and out
of the line of sight to a target
39 5 HEATER RECONFIG- 50 Steps deleted (possibly due to EGIL/
CONFIG B warm attitude of STS-97) MMACS
40 5 RELEASE EETCS 50 Steps deleted to meet EVA
STATION requirement for STS-98
STARBOARD
CINCHES AND
WINCH
41 5 SAW VIEWING 56 Steps added due to SAW PDRS
Deploy Anomaly
42 5 4B SAW DEPLOY 57A Added due to SAW Deploy ACO
OPS Anomaly
43 5 H-JUMPER 58 Previously unaccounted for EVA
INSTALLATION inhibits
44 5 EVA WVS SURVEY 59 Added due to SAW Deploy EVA
OF STBD WING (2B) Anomaly
RIGHT SABB
45 5 LDRI Troubleshooting 61 LDRI problems on FD 3 INCO
46 6 LiOH Cue Card 63 Update made to save a LiOH EECOM
canister (i.e., optimize usage)
47 6 ZI PATCH PANEL 72 Temperature checks added, ACO
RECONFIGURATION typos fixed, and procedure
updated to reflect ISS config.
48 6 NODE 1 PATCH 73 Procedure updated to reflect EVA/ACO
PANEL ISS configuration
RECONFIGURATION
49 6 EARLY PMA3 75 Steps changed to prevent ACO/
INGRESS excess pressure during transfer EECOM
ops in PMA3 (i.e., the crew
would break EVA prebreathe
protocol if the pressure
exceeded 10.6 psi)
Table 31. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 3 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
50 6 EARLY PMA3 75 Steps changed to prevent ACO/
EGRESS excess pressure during transfer EECOM
ops in PMA3 (i.e., the crew
would break EVA prebreathe
protocol if the pressure
exceeded 10.6 psi)
51 7 FPP ASSEMBLY 77 Step added due to SAW ACO
Deploy anomaly
52 7 IWIS SOFTWARE 82 Procedure added to command ACO
FILE UPDATE IWIS to take data properly
53 7 IWIS ACTIVATION 83 Unaccounted for delay ACO
54 7 DTO-261 TEST OPS 83 Procedure changed due to ACO
(VRCS) rescheduling of Test 1 and
Test 2
55 7 LATCH CYCLE 85 Procedure added due to SAW EVA/ACO
PROCEDURE Deploy anomaly
56 7 TENSION SOLAR 86 Procedure added due to SAW EVA/ACO
ARRAY Deploy anomaly
57 7 STBD SAW SABB 87 Procedure added due to SAW EVA/ACO
Tensioning Deploy anomaly
58 7 WVS 88A Added to recover EV l's EMU EVA
TROUBLESHOOTIN Camera (which failed on FD6)
G PROCEDURE
59 7 SOLAR ARRAY 91 Procedure added due to SAW EVA/ACO
MAST RETRACTION Deploy anomaly
60 7 EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG 92B Logistical changes due to EVA
SAW Deploy anomaly
61 7 INSTALL FPP 95 Changes due to SAW Deploy EVA
ANTENNA anomaly
62 7 EVA 3 SORTIE 95 Changes due to SAW Deploy EVA
SETUP anomaly
63 7 EVA 3 SORTIE 95 Changes due to SAW Deploy EVA
CLEANUP anomaly
64 8 CMG Procedure Deltas 99A Changes to activate CMG ACO
heaters
65 8 SA REEL TENSION 103B Contingency procedure added EVA
CABLE SLACK due to SAW Deploy Anomaly
TAKEUP
66 8 SOLAR ARRAY 105 Procedure refined EVA/ACO
MAST RETRACTION
67 8 PDRS PMA2 106B Procedure added to gather PDRS
CONNECTOR more information on a
SURVEY problem that occurred during
STS-92
68 8 MANUAL SABB 107A Contingency procedure added EVA/ACO
LATCH CYCLE due to SAW Deploy Anomaly
69 8 EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG 110 Procedure refined EVA
70 9 NODE 1 FWD CBCS 118 Potentially missing Video ACO
INSTALL In/Out Cable
Table 32. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 4 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
71 9 EVA EQUIPMENT 120A The appropriate hooks EVA
HOOK CHANGEOUT apparently were not stowed
PROCEDURE for launch
72 9 SAFER EQUIPMENT 122A This transfer function was ACO
STOW FOR ISS done in order to accommodate
TRANSFER change in STS-98 manifest
following the deferral of 3P
73 9 NODE 1 IWIS SETUP 124 Contingency update due to ACO
possible addition of crew to
procedure in order to get it
done on time
74 9 DTO-261 TEST OPS 125A Procedure updated to save ACO/
(ALT) propellant after the separation PROP
of Tests 1 and 2
75 9 OCA JUMPER BUILD 128 Task added as an ISS get MMACS
WITH SHUTTLE ahead
RESOURCES
76 9 Undocking Plan 129 Changed due to ICBC3D RNDZ
camera failure on FD 3
77 10 UNDOCK AND 135 Changes due to SAW Deploy INCO
FLYAROUND Anomaly
78 10 UNDOCK AND 135 Changes due to LDRI INCO
FLYAROUND problems on FD 3
79 10 DOCKING 135 Changes due to changes made MMACS
MECHANISM in ODS vestibule depress
POWERUP procedure on FD 3 (ref. MSG
018)
80 10 JOINT PMA3 EGRESS 137A Logistical Changes ACO
81 11 SWIS NETWORK RF 150A Procedure added to test ACO
COMM SENSITIVITY sensitivity of SWIS network to
CHECK RF communication
82 11 PAYLOAD ENTRY 153C PRI MNC switch position ACO
SWITCH LIST typo
CONFIGURATION
83 11 DEORBIT PREP 153C Changes due to LDRI INCO
problems on FD 3
84 11 DEORBIT PREP 153C Change in PL BAY Flood EGIL
light configuration due to
DTO-261
85 11 ENTRY SWITCH 153C Change in Cabin Temperature EECOM
LIST/ VERIFICATION Controller Configuration due
to stuck pip pin on FD 5
86 11 ENTRY SWITCH 153C Different configuration of EECOM
LIST/ VERIFICATION external airlock heaters due to
warm attitudes of STS-97
Table 33. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 5 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name Msg Rationale Console
Update # Position
87 11 ENTRY SWITCH 153C Reverses change in RMS PDRS
LIST/ VERIFICATION Wireless Video Config made
after the FD 5 discovery that
the LDRI will respond to an
array of camera commands
issued by ground
88 11 DEORBIT PREP 153C Change in Cabin Temperature EECOM
BACKOUT Controller Configuration due
to stuck pip pin on FD 5
89 11 DEORBIT PREP 153C Change in PL BAY Flood EGIL
BACKOUT light configuration due to
DTO-261
90 11 DEORBIT PREP 153C Reverses change in RMS PDRS
BACKOUT Wireless Video Config made
after the FD 5 discovery that
the LDRI will respond to an
array of camera commands
issued by ground
91 11 DEORBIT BURN 154 Typo PROP
(2ENG)
92 11 NH3 ACT 154 NH3 boiler configuration EECOM
93 11 NH3 RECONFIG 154 NH3 boiler configuration EECOM
Table 34. Procedure update designations for STS-97 (Part 6 of 6).
Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable
Executed anticipated and When it was
execution updated
1 2 0* 2 0 2
2 2 0* 2 0 2
3 2 0 2 0 2
4 2 0 3 1 2
5 1 0 2 1 1
6 2 0* 2 0 2
7 2 0* 4 2 2
8 2 0 5 3 2
9 2 0* 5 3 2
10 2 0* 6 4 2
11 2 0* 6 4 2
12 2 0* 4 2 2
13 2 0* 4 2 2
14 2 0* 4 2 2
15 2 0* 4 2 2
16 2 0* 4 2 2
17 2 0* 3 1 2
18 2 0* 3 1 2
19 3 1 3 0 2
Table 35. Key flight days for each STS-97 procedure update (Part 1 of 3).
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Procedure FD FD when issue FD when Number of FD Number of FD
Update identifiable update was between issue of between when issue
to be update and was identifiable and
executed anticipated when it was updated
execution
20 3 0 3 0 3
21 3 0 3 0 3
22 3 1 3 0 2
23 3 2 3 0 1
24 3 0* 3 0 3
25 3 0 4 1 3
26 3 0 4 1 3
27 3 0 4 1 3
28 3 0 7 4 3
29 3 0 4 1 3
30 4 0 4 0 4
31 4 0 4 0 4
32 4 0 4 0 4
33 4 0 4 0 4
34 4 0 4 0 4
35 4 3 4 0 1
36 3 1 4 1 2
37 3 3 3 0 0
38 4 0 4 0 4
39 5 0 5 0 5
40 5 0 6 1 5
41 5 4 5 0 1
42 5 4 5 0 1
43 5 0 6 1 5
44 5 4 6 1 1
45 5 3 5 0 2
46 6 6 6 0 0
47 6 0 6 0 6
48 6 0 6 0 6
49 6 3 6 0 3
50 6 3 6 0 3
51 7 4 7 0 3
52 7 4 7 0 3
53 7 0 7 0 7
54 7 7 7 0 0
55 7 4 8 1 3
56 7 4 8 1 3
57 7 4 8 1 3
58 7 6 7 0 1
59 7 4 8 1 3
60 7 4 7 0 3
61 7 4 8 1 3
62 7 4 8 1 3
63 7 4 8 1 3
64 8 0 9 1 8
Table 36. Key flight days for each STS-97 procedure update (Part 2 of 3).
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Procedure FD FD when issue FD when Number of FD Number of FD
Update identifiable update was between issue of between when issue
to be update and was identifiable and
executed anticipated when it was updated
execution
65 8 4 8 0 4
66 8 7 8 0 1
67 8 0 8 0 8
68 8 4 8 0 4
69 8 7 8 0 1
70 9 0 9 0 9
71 9 0 9 0 9
72 9 0 9 0 9
73 9 7 9 0 2
74 9 7 9 0 2
75 9 8 9 0 1
76 9 3 10 1 6
77 10 4 10 0 6
78 10 3 10 0 7
79 10 0 10 0 10
80 10 9 10 0 1
81 11 9 11 0 2
82 11 0 12 1 11
83 11 3 12 1 8
84 11 7 12 1 4
85 11 5 12 1 6
86 11 0 12 1 11
87 11 5 12 1 6
88 11 5 12 1 6
89 11 7 12 1 4
90 11 5 12 1 6
91 11 0 12 1 11
92 11 0 12 1 11
93 11 0 12 1 11
*Likely being reworked or already finished at launch
Table 37. Key flight days for each STS-97 procedure update (Part 3 of 3).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
1 Change of OIU 2 to primary unit N/A Actuator "Failure" or
(OIU 1 was primary unit for the Degradation
previous flight, but was tripped
due to an under-rated circuit
breaker)
2 Battery Swap due to improper N/A Actuator "Failure" or
charging of battery Degradation
3 Removal of step to close N/A Unanticipated
external airlock heaters due to Environmental/ISS
warm attitudes of STS-97 Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
4 Procedural Flaws Discovered on N/A Internal Inconsistencies
FD 1 in the Procedure
5 Procedural Flaws Discovered on N/A Internal Inconsistencies
FD 1 in the Procedure
6 EMU display anomaly during N/A Procedure Updated or
testing corrected Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
7 Change to ensure that there will N/A Internal Inconsistencies
be no interference between in the Procedure
STBD SSU and APFR
8 Change to ensure that there will N/A Internal Inconsistencies
be no interference between in the Procedure
STBD SSU and APFR
9 Last minute addition of N/A Inconsistency between
protective covers Items Expected to be
Launched and Items
Actually Launched
10 Last minute addition of N/A Inconsistency between
protective covers Items Expected to be
Launched and Items
Actually Launched
11 Last minute addition of a release N/A Proactive Contingency
ring snap back test to avoid Preparation and/or
leaking and/or hose whipping Hazard Investigation
hazard to EVA crew
12 Change to bolt torque settings N/A Procedure Updated or
due to Boeing analysis Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
13 Change to bolt torque settings N/A Procedure Updated or
due to Boeing analysis Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
Table 38. STS-97 update rationales (Part 1 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
14 Change to bolt torque settings N/A Procedure Updated or
due to Boeing analysis Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
15 Change to bolt torque settings N/A Procedure Updated or
due to Boeing analysis Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
16 Change to bolt torque settings N/A Procedure Updated or
due to Boeing analysis Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
17 Contingency procedure (there N/A Proactive Contingency
was a misalignment on the Preparation and/or
previous flight: STS-92) Hazard Investigation
18 Time of callouts changed due to N/A Internal Inconsistencies
potential packet conflict in the Procedure
19 Changes possibly due to RCS N/A Actuator "Failure" or
problems on FD 1 Degradation
20 Logistical Changes N/A Equipment List
Revision
21 Minor Omissions N/A Typos and Omissions
22 Missing step N/A Typos and Omissions
23 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
24 Changes to procedure after print N/A Procedure Updated or
deadline Re-evaluated after the
Print Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
before Launch
25 Previously unaccounted for N/A Unaccounted for
PVCU Switchover inhibit Inhibits
26 Inadvertent deletion of a step N/A Inadvertent Deletion of
call out to ensure that attitude Steps
control is handed over
27 Previously unaccounted for PVR N/A Unaccounted for
Turnoff inhibit Inhibits
28 Auto Off function must be re- N/A Internal Inconsistencies
enabled in order for the power in the Procedure
off command to successfully
execute
29 Contingency procedure to be N/A Proactive Contingency
performed if the crew cannot Preparation and/or
break torque on the IEA Keel Hazard Investigation
Pin Bolt
30 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Table 39. STS-97 update rationales (Part 2 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
31 Step Incompatible with EMU N/A Internal Inconsistencies
PREBREATHE procedures for in the Procedure
EVA 2 and EVA 3
32 Incompatible steps deleted N/A Internal Inconsistencies
in the Procedure
33 Airlock External Heater Steps N/A Unanticipated
Removed due to warm attitudes Environmental/ISS
of STS-97 Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
34 Airlock External Heater Steps N/A Unanticipated
Removed due to warm attitudes Environmental/ISS
of STS-97 Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
35 New RMS position to view N/A Actuator "Failure" or
IMAX camera shutter (probably Degradation
to ensure that IMAX camera is
functioning properly after
ICBC3D camera failure)
36 Procedure added to re-install N/A Launch Damage (actual
thermal blankets that became or suspected)
partially detached (possibly
during launch)
37 Problems with ICBC3D camera N/A Actuator "Failure" or
Degradation
38 A PAD tethered to the Z1 Keel N/A Unanticipated
was floating into and out of the Environmental/ISS
line of sight to a target Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
39 Steps deleted (possibly due to N/A Unanticipated
warm attitude of STS-97) Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
40 Steps deleted to meet N/A Internal Inconsistencies
requirement for STS-98 in the Procedure
41 Steps added due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
42 Added due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
43 Previously unaccounted for N/A Unaccounted for
inhibits Inhibits
44 Added due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
Table 40. STS-97 update rationales (Part 3 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
45 LDRI problems on FD 3 N/A Unexpected Software
Behavior
46 Update made to save a LiOH N/A Consumable
canister (i.e., optimize usage) Management
Optimizations
47 Temperature checks added, N/A Typos and Omissions
typos fixed, and procedure
updated to reflect ISS
configuration.
48 Procedure updated to reflect ISS N/A Unanticipated
configuration Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
49 Steps changed to prevent excess N/A Internal Inconsistencies
pressure during transfer ops in in the Procedure
PMA3 (i.e., the crew would
break EVA prebreathe protocol
if the pressure exceeded 10.6
psi)
50 Steps changed to prevent excess N/A Internal Inconsistencies
pressure during transfer ops in in the Procedure
PMA3 (i.e., the crew would
break EVA prebreathe protocol
if the pressure exceeded 10.6
psi)
51 Step added due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Task Deferral or
anomaly Problems Reprioritization
52 Procedure added to command N/A Unexpected Software
IWIS to take data properly Behavior
53 Unaccounted for delay N/A Unexpected Software
Behavior
54 Procedure changed due to N/A Task Deferral or
rescheduling of Test 1 and Test Reprioritization
2
55 Procedure added due to SAW P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Deploy anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
56 Procedure added due to SAW P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Deploy anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
57 Procedure added due to SAW P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Deploy anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
58 Added to recover EV l's EMU N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Camera (which failed on FD6)
Table 41. STS-97 update rationales (Part 4 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
59 Procedure added due to SAW P6 SAW Deploy Unanticipated
Deploy anomaly Problems Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
60 Logistical changes due to SAW P6 SAW Deploy Equipment List
Deploy anomaly Problems Revision
61 Changes due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Task Deferral or
anomaly Problems Reprioritization
62 Changes due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Equipment List
anomaly Problems Revision
63 Changes due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Equipment List
anomaly Problems Revision
64 Changes to activate CMG N/A Internal Inconsistencies
heaters in the Procedure
65 Contingency procedure added P6 SAW Deploy Proactive Contingency
due to SAW Deploy Anomaly Problems Preparation and/or
Hazard Investigation
66 Procedure refined P6 SAW Deploy Internal Inconsistencies
Problems in the Procedure
67 Procedure added to gather more N/A Proactive Contingency
information on a problem that Preparation and/or
occurred during STS-92 Hazard Investigation
68 Contingency procedure added P6 SAW Deploy Proactive Contingency
due to SAW Deploy Anomaly Problems Preparation and/or
Hazard Investigation
69 Procedure refined P6 SAW Deploy Equipment List
Problems Revision
70 Potentially missing Video In/Out N/A Inconsistency between
Cable Items Expected to be
Launched and Items
Actually Launched
71 The appropriate hooks N/A Inconsistency between
apparently were not stowed for Items Expected to be
launch Launched and Items
Actually Launched
72 This transfer function was done N/A "Get-Ahead" Tasks
in order to accommodate change Scheduled
in STS-98 manifest following
the deferral of 3P
73 Contingency update due to N/A Procedure Efficiency
possible addition of crew to Optimization
procedure in order to get it done
on time
74 Procedure updated to save N/A Consumable
propellant after the separation of Management
Tests 1 and 2 Optimizations
75 Task added as an ISS get ahead N/A "Get-Ahead" Tasks
Scheduled
Table 42. STS-97 update rationales (Part 5 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
76 Changed due to ICBC3D camera N/A Actuator "Failure" or
failure on FD 3 Degradation
77 Changes due to SAW Deploy P6 SAW Deploy Proactive Contingency
Anomaly Problems Preparation and/or
Hazard Investigation
78 Changes due to LDRI problems N/A Unexpected Software
on FD 3 Behavior
79 Changes due to changes made in N/A Procedure Updated or
ODS vestibule depress Re-evaluated after the
procedure on FD 3 (ref. MSG Print Deadline for the
018) Procedure Books and
before Launch
80 Logistical Changes N/A Equipment List
Revision
81 Procedure added to test N/A "Get-Ahead" Tasks
sensitivity of SWIS network to Scheduled
RF communication
82 PRI MNC switch position typo N/A Typos and Omissions
83 Changes due to LDRI problems N/A Unexpected Software
on FD 3 Behavior
84 Change in PL BAY Flood light N/A Procedure Efficiency
configuration due to DTO-261 Optimization
85 Change in Cabin Temperature N/A Actuator "Failure" or
Controller Configuration due to Degradation
stuck pip pin on FD 5
86 Different configuration of N/A Unanticipated
external airlock heaters due to Environmental/ISS
warm attitudes of STS-97 Conditions (e.g.,
temperatures)
87 Reverses change in RMS N/A Procedure Efficiency
Wireless Video Config made Optimization
after the FD 5 discovery that the
LDRI will respond to an array of
camera commands issued by
ground
88 Change in Cabin Temperature N/A Actuator "Failure" or
Controller Configuration due to Degradation
stuck pip pin on FD 5
89 Change in PL BAY Flood light N/A Procedure Efficiency
configuration due to DTO-261 Optimization
90 Reverses change in RMS N/A Procedure Efficiency
Wireless Video Config made Optimization
after the FD 5 discovery that the
LDRI will respond to an array of
camera commands issued by
ground
Table 43. STS-97 update rationales (Part 6 of 7).
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Procedure Rationale Discrete Event Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization
Categorization
91 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
92 NH3 boiler configuration N/A Procedure Nominally
Updated in Real-time
93 NH3 boiler configuration N/A Procedure Nominally
Updated in Real-time
Table 44. STS-97 update rationales (Part 7 of 7).
DATA POINT MISSION ELAPSED NUMBER OF PROCEDURES
TIME (MINUTES) NEEDING AND BEING
REWORKED
Launch 0 49
End of FD 1 300 51
End of FD 2 1620 35
End of FD 3 3030 30
Instant before SAW Deploy Anomaly 4200 25
Instant after SAW Deploy Anomaly 4201 40
End of FD 4 4470 39
End of FD 5 5880 36
End of FD 6 7290 33
End of FD 7 8700 27
End of FD 8 10140 22
End of FD 9 11580 17
End of FD 10 13020 13
End of FD 11 14460 0
Table 45. The STS-97 data time history for the variable Number of Procedures
Needing and Being Reworked.
TYPES OF PROCEDURE UPDATES PROCEDURE UPDATE NUMBERS
Due to SAW Deploy Anomaly and in Time Horizon 41, 42, and 44
Due to SAW Deploy Anomaly and Beyond Time 51, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 68, and 77
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to the SAW
Deploy Anomaly)
Outside Time Horizon and Not Latent at Launch 19, 22, 36, 45, 49, 50, 52, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81, 83, 84,
(i.e., propagated reworks not due to a discrete event) 85, 87, 88, 89, and 90
Due to refinements of previously submitted SAW 66 and 69
Deploy Anomaly related updates
Procedures developed as a result of the rework 29, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 65, 67, 68,
process 71, 72, 74, 75, and 81
Table 46. List of specially designated STS-97 procedure updates.
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FLIGHT MISSION ELAPSED NORMALIZED TIME TO UPDATES SINCE
DAY TIME AT END OF LANDING PREVIOUS FLIGHT
FLIGHT DAY PREPARATION AT THE DAY
(MINUTES) END OF FD 11
0 0 0 0
1 300 0.02075 1
2 1620 0.11203 17
3 3030 0.2095 13
4 4470 0.3091 7
5 5880 0.4066 7
6 7290 0.5041 5
7 8700 0.6017 13
8 10140 0.7012 6
9 11580 0.8008 7
10 13020 0.9004 4
11 14460 1 13
12 15598 1.0787 0
Table 47. STS-97 update times normalized to landing preparation time.
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STS-115 Data Tables
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
139 Attitudes for OBSS Inspections 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012928
138 EOM+1 Entry Summary Message 12 Disregarded
sources: NO 15286
137 FD13 EOM+1 - EOM+3 Summary Timeline 12 Disregarded
136 FD13 EOM+1 Detail Timeline 12 Disregarded
135 FD12 OBSS INSPECTIONS 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: FO12925
134A RMS EE ORBITER SURVEY 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F012918
133 FD12 Water Summary Message 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F012909
132A FD12 Summary Timeline 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
131A FD12 Mission Summary 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: NO15267, F012907, N015280
130A FD12 Flight Plan Revision 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F012904
129A Entry Summary Template 11 Disregarded
128A Entry Summary 11 Disregarded
sources: NO 15231
127C Entry FIW Summary 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: FDO2-l Ex Pkg, F012884
126 Entry Day Fluid Loading 11 Disregarded
sources: N015160
125 Entry Checklist Deltas 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012872, F012864A
124A Deorbit Prep Updates 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012864A, F012865
123 Sunday Funnies 11 Disregarded
122 FD10 MMT Summary 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F012878
121 FD11 Water Summary Message 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F012863
120 FD11 PAO Events - Inflight Interviews with 11 Disregarded
KYW-TV, KARE-TV and WGN-TV
sources: F012866
119 Deltas to FCS Checkout Procedure 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F012843
118A FD11 Summary Timeline 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
117 FD11 Mission Summary 11 Retrieved from FD 11 Execute Package
sources: N015170, F012870, N015218,
N015224
116A FD11 Flight Plan Revision 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F012862, N015211, N015209,
N015212, N015222
115 FD11 Preliminary Summary Timeline 11 Disregarded
Table 48. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 1 of 6).
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114 FDO9 MMT Summary 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F012822
113 PLBD Troubleshooting for Loss of Port 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
FWD CL A Indication
sources: F012711
112 MICROBE/Yeast - GAP Updates 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: FO12812
111A FD10 Water Summary Message 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F012808
110 FD10O Summary Timeline 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
109 FD10 Mission Summary 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: N015145, N015154
108 FD10 Preliminary Summary Timeline 09 Disregarded
107A FD10 Flight Plan Revision 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F012821, F012804, F012805,
N015110, N015151
106 FDO8 MMT Summary (13-1260) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012800
105 Docked Audio Troubleshooting (13-1259) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012775
104 Undocking Camera Change 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012719
103A FDO9 LiOH Transfer 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012791
102 LiOH Cue Card 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012790
101 FDO9 Water Summary Message 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: FO 12793
100 FDO9 Transfer Message (13-1254) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: FO12797
099 FDO9 Summary Timeline 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
098A FD09 Mission Summary (13-1253A) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: NO 15075, N015092
097A FDO9 Flight Plan Revision 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F012792, F012798, N015067,
F012794, NO 15084
096 Undocking Pad and Event Summary (13- 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
1252)
sources: F012769
095 FD09 Preliminary Summary Timeline 08 Disregarded
094 FDO7 MMT Summary (13-1247) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012749
093 12A SODF Transfer List 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012743
092 External Airlock Return Bag Change 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012742
Table 49. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 2 of 6).
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091 Updates to Pre-Undock EVA Reconfig and 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
Xfer
sources: F012741
090 Atlantis/ISS Joint Crew News 08 Disregarded
Conference (13-1239)
sources: F012723
089 Atlantis PAO Event w/CBS, NBC, and ABC 08 Disregarded
sources: F012723
088 FDO8 Water Summary Message 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012740
087 FDO8 Transfer Message (13-1237) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012739
086A FDO8 Summary Timeline 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
085 FD08 Mission Summary (13-1236) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: NO 15011, N015014
084A FDO8 Flight Plan Revision 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012737, F012735, F012738,
F012743, F012746, F012748, F012747,
F012751
083A FDO8 Preliminary Summary Timeline 07 Disregarded
082 FDO6 MMT Summary (13-1233) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F012700
081 EVA 3 Changeout Pages (13-1232) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F012698
080 Updated Middeck Bag A Layout and Entry 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
Locker Layout
sources: F012692, N014941
079 EVA 3 Detailed Timeline Pen and Inks (13- 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
1231)
sources: FO 12690
078 PRLA Close With OBSS Safing 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F012684
077 FDO7 Water Summary Message 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: FO12693
076 FDO7 Summary Timeline 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
075 FD07 Mission Summary (13-1228) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: N014952, N014944
074A FDO7 Flight Plan Revision 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F012697, F012696, NO 14943,
N014947
073 FDO7 Preliminary Summary Timeline 06 Disregarded
072 12A PRE EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG Pen&Ink 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Udates (13-1227)
071 12A EVA Tool Restow (13-1226) 08 FD8 Execute Package
sources: F012758A
070 EVA3 Replanned Summary Timeline (13- 06 Disregarded
1225)
Table 50. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 3 of 6).
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069 FD 6 Activities to Move Earlier - Part 1 (13- 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
1224)
sources: F012633
068 ERCA Troubleshooting Procedure (13-1223) 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012662B
067 STS-115 Middeck Bag Layouts 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F012639
066 Atlantis / ISS PAO Event with National 06 Disregarded
Public Radio and CNN (13-1222)
sources: F012636
065 Atlantis Canadian Space Agency PAO 06 Disregarded
Event (13-1221)
sources: F012636
064 SASA, BSP and XPDR Tie Down Plan (13- 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
1217)
063A FD05 MMT Summary (13-1216A) 06 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012656
062 FDO6 Water Summary Message 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F012651
061 FDO6 Transfer Message (13-1214) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F012646
060A FD06 Summary Timeline 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
059 FDO6 Mission Summary (13-1213) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F012648, N014867
058A FD06 Flight Plan Revision 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F012569, F012628, NO 14865,
F012653
057 FDO6 Preliminary Summary Timeline 05 Disregarded
056 Bag C Layout 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012620
055 ORCA Outlet Hose Checkout (13-1211) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
054 FD04 MMT Summary (13-1208) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F012606
053 EVA 2 Summary Timeline Updates (13- 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
1207)
sources: F012593
052 FD05 Monitor Ops 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: N014785
051 EVA 2 Big Picture (13-1206) 05 Disregarded
sources: F012593
050 FDO5 Water Summary Message 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F012601
049 FD05 Transfer Message (13-1203) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F012597
048 FDO5 Summary Timeline 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
047 FDO5 Mission Summary (13-1202) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: N014787, N014798
046 FDO5 Flight Plan Revision 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F012594
Table 51. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 4 of 6).
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045 Preliminary FD05 Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
044 FDO3 MMT Summary (13-1201) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012568
043 BPSMU Audio Config 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012566
042 Robotics Procedure Update Rationale for 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
FD04
sources: F012503
041 FD4 Lighting Predicts for AVU 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
Operations (13-1199)
040 FD04 Monitor Ops 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012535
039 P3 Activation Procedure Updates 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012532
038 FD04 Water Activity Summary 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012549
037 Loose SARJ Thermal Blanket 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
Troubleshooting (13-1196)
sources: F012563
036 FDO4 Summary Timeline 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
035 FD04 Mission Summary (13-1195) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012541, N014723, F012556,
N014739
034 FD04 Flight Plan Revision 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F012564, NO014728, W010290,
F012567, NO14737
033 FDO4 Preliminary Summary Timeline 03 Disregarded
032 1.301 AVU SPEE CAM P3 Truss Install (13- 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
1194)
031 Unberth Hand CNTRL Test Results 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F012528A
030 RelMo Plots and Burn Pads 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: N014671
029 FD03 MMT Summary (13-1189) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012517B
028 Contingency RTL Loss After WR 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
Limping (13-1187)
027 Contingency P3/4 Installation with Failed 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
SSAS RTL (13-1186)
sources: F012479
026 OPCL and EPCL P&I Deltas 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012486
025A EVA Changeout Pages (13-1185A) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012493A
024A EVA Procedure P&I Deltas (13-1184A) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012493A
023 EVA SAFER Latch Taping (13-1183) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012494
Table 52. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 5 of 6).
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022 FDO3 Water Activity Summary 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012512
021 FDO3 Transfer Message (13-1182) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012511
020A FD03 Summary Timeline 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
019 FDO3 Mission Summary (13-1181) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012514, N014670, N014673
018A FD03 Flight Plan Revision 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F012513, F012515
017A FD03 Preliminary Summary Timeline 02 Disregarded
016 Rendezvous Event and Lighting Info 02 Disregarded
sources: F012942
015A 6.113 CUP(LAB) Artificial Vision Unit 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
(AVU) Hard Disk Drive (HDD)
Changeout (13-0907A)
014A 6.210 MT Generic Auto Translation Using 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
String A(B) IMCAS (13-0555A)
013 7.001 MSS Failure Response and 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
Recovery (13-1104)
012 7.201 MSS COMM Failure (13-1103) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
011A Ref Data Flight Supplement Updates 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F012451
01OA FD02 Water Activity Summary 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F012472
009 FDO2 OBSS LDRI RCC SURVEY - STBD 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
UNDOCKED Procedure Update
sources: F012470
008 FD02 Flat Fields Procedure 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F012468
007 RCS Jet Reprioritization 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F012466
006 5.501 Attitude Control Constraints for P3P4 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
Install (13-1176)
005B 12A Photo/TV Stowage Matrix (13-1060B) 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
004A FDO2 Summary Timeline 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
003A FDO2 Mission Summary (13-1175A) 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F012461, F012462, F012475,
N014608
002A FD02 Flight Plan Revision 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: N014604, F012469, F012476
001 Star Pairs Pad Update 01 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: Pointing
Table 53. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-115 crew (Part 6 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
1 2 OBSS UNBERTH 002A Typo PDRS
2 2 OBSS ITVC/LDRI FLAT 8 Procedure updates PDRS
FIELDS after the print
deadline
3 2 OBSS LDRI RCC SURVEY- 9 Procedure updates PDRS
STBD UNDOCKED after the print
deadline
4 3 LiOH Cue Card 018A Change made in EECOM
order to save a LiOH
can
5 3 EMU PREBREATHE 23 Steps added for IV EVA
crew member to tape
a SAFER latch that
has had a tendency to
jam
6 3 AIRLOCK CONFIG 024A Missing steps EVA
7 3 PRE EVA 1 TOOL CONFIG 024A Logistical Changes EVA
8 3 12A WORKAROUND 024A New PGT settings EVA
CRIBSHEET
9 3 12A EMU/AIRLOCK 024A Logistical Changes EVA
CONSUMABLES CUE and Typos
CARD
10 3 EVA 2 Inhibit Pad 25 Previously EVA
unaccounted for
inhibit and typos
11 3 12A WORKAROUND 25 Added QD EVA
CRIBSHEET workarounds for vent
tool on Z1-M5
12 3 P1-P3 CAPTURE LATCH 25 New PGT settings EVA
OVERRIDE
13 3 P1-P3 MBA BOLT 25 New PGT settings EVA
OVERRIDE
14 3 OPCL 26 Changes due to loss EGIL
of AC 1 Phase A for
Fuel Cell 1
15 3 EPCL 26 Changes due to loss EGIL
of AC 1 Phase A for
Fuel Cell 1
16 3 CUP(LAB) ARTIFICIAL 15A Procedure to replace ROBO
VISION UNIT (AVU) HARD "failed" hard drive
DISK DRIVE (HDD) disk
CHANGEOUT
17 4 AVU SPEE CAM P3 TRUSS 32 Logistical changes PDRS/
INSTALL and other changes ROBO
due to obstructed
view of P1 targets
discovered on FD3
18 4 LOOSE SARJ THERMAL 37 Blanket came loose EVA
BLANKET during launch
TROUBLESHOOTING
Table 54. Procedure update designations for STS-115 (Part 1 of 5).
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Update # Position
19 4 P3 ACTIVATION AND SO, 39 Missing RPC ACO
S1, AND P1 position checks
POWERDOWN/POWERUP
20 4 PRE-SLEEP 40 Steps added to INCO
configure ISS
Loopback capability
from CVIU 6 to
VTR2 using the
shuttle's Monitor 2
and VPU capability
21 4 BPSMU AUDIO CONFIG 43 Alternative to INCO
BPSMU Audio Only
string referenced in
P/TVO5 INTERNAL
OPS scene (BPSMU
cable was
accidentally returned
on STS-121)
22 6 ORCA OUTLET HOSE with 55 This procedure was ACO/EGIL
CHECK VALVE TRANSFER added to check for
AND CHECKOUT trapped air in the
ORCA hose
(discovered in ground
testing)
23 6 SASA, BSP and XPDR Tie 64 Contingency EVA
Down Plan Procedure
24 6 ERCA 68 Procedure to recover EVA
TROUBLESHOOTING an ERCA that failed
PROCEDURE during EVA 2
25 6 PRE EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG 72 Equipment added for EVA
get ahead tasks and
typos fixed
26 7 POST-SLEEP 74A New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
27 7 PRLA CLOSE 78 Updated to safe ACO/PDRS
OBSS in response to
a STBD Manipulator
Retention Latch
microswitch failure
28 7 RELEASE P4 PV 79 Changes due to the EVA
RADIATOR addition of get ahead
CINCHES/WINCHES tasks
29 7 MISSE 5 RETRIEVAL 79 Logistical changes EVA
due to the addition of
get ahead tasks
30 7 DTO 861 IR CAMERA - 79 Logistical changes EVA
WLE IMAGERY due to the addition of
get ahead tasks
31 7 EVA 3 INHIBIT PAD 81 Addition of callout EVA
Table 55. Procedure update designations for STS-115 (Part 2 of 5).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
32 7 EVA 3 EGRESS/SETUP 81 Logistical changes EVA
due to the addition of
get ahead tasks
33 7 P3 CLEANUP 81 Logistical changes EVA
due to the addition of
get ahead tasks
34 7 INSTALL SGANT AGIT 81 Steps added to EVA
HEAD SHIELD indicate desired
photograph areas
35 7 EWIS ANTENNA 81 Changed steps due to EVA
INSTALLATION DAIU failure
36 8 POST-SLEEP 84 New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
(refinement of update
in msg 74A)
37 8 LiOH Cue Card 84 Changes made to EECOM
save a canister
38 8 EVA PREP FOR TRANSFER 91 Logistical Changes EVA
TO SHUTTLE
39 8 UNDOCKING PAD AND 96 Changes due to RNDZ
EVENT SUMMARY newly planned ISS
maneuver during
flyaround (the
maneuver was added
because of high beta
magnitudes)
40 9 POST-SLEEP 97 New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
(refinement of update
in msg 84)
41 9 HEATER RECONFIG- 97 Potentially due to EECOM
CONFIG B(CONFIG A) unexpected heating at
the given attitude
42 9 P/TV03 UNDOCK 104 Undocking Camera INCO
Change
43 9 DOCKED AUDIO 105 Changed steps due to INCO
TROUBLESHOOTING DAIU failure
44 10 POST-SLEEP 107A New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
(refinement of update
in msg 97)
45 10 EMU INSTALLATION 107A Changed made to EVA
ensure that proper
loads are transferred
to Airlock Adapter
Plate
Table 56. Procedure update designations for STS-115 (Part 3 of 5).
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Update # Position
46 10 OBSS UNBERTH 107A Typo (same as the PDRS
one noted in msg
002A)
47 10 OBSS LDRI RCC SURVEY- 107A Same as msg 9 PDRS
STBD UNDOCKED
48 10 SSV Troubleshooting 107A SSV stopped PDRS
generating video
49 10 PLBD 113 Contingency MMACS
TROUBLESHOOTING FOR Procedure added due
LOSS OF PORT FWD CL A to microswitch
INDICATION problems on FDI1
50 10 MICROBE ACTIVATION 112 Leak mitigation steps ACO
added
51 11 POST-SLEEP 116A New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
(refinement of update
in msg 107A)
52 11 DEACTIVATION AND 116A New stowage ACO
TEARDOWN location for WLES
53 11 FCS CHECKOUT 119 Changes due to GNC
Speedbrake Channel
3 degradation on FDI
54 11 NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP 124 Step added due to EGIL
FD1 failure of AC
Phase A failure of
Fuel Cell Pump
55 11 ENTRY SWITCH LIST 124 Step changed due to EGIL
VERIFICATION FD1 failure of AC
Phase A failure of
Fuel Cell Pump
56 11 ENTRY SWITCH LIST 124 Step changed due to EECOM
VERIFICATION Supply H20 Dump
Valve leakage
observed on FD 10
57 11 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 124 PCS configuration EECOM
58 11 NH3 ACT 125 NH3 boiler config EECOM
59 11 NH3 RECONFIG 125 NH3 boiler config EECOM
60 12 POST-SLEEP 130A New Cryo Config EGIL
due to unexpected
heating conditions
(refinement of update
in msg 116A)
61 12 SUPPLY/WASTE WATER 133 Step changed due to EECOM
DUMP Supply H20 Dump
Valve leakage
observed on FD 10
Table 57. Procedure update designations for STS-115 (Part 4 of 5).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
62 12 RMS EE ORBITER SURVEY 134 Contingency survey PDRS
of Orbiter to verify
that OD object seen
on FD 11 did not
come off of the
Orbiter
63 12 FD 12 OBSS INSPECTIONS 135 Refinement of MSG PDRS
134
Table 58. Procedure update designations for STS-115 (Part 5 of 5).
Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable
Executed anticipated and When it was
execution updated
1 2 0 2 0 2
2 2 0* 2 0 2
3 2 0* 2 0 2
4 3 0* 3 0 3
5 3 0* 4 1 3
6 3 0 4 1 3
7 3 0* 3 0 3
8 3 0* 4 1 3
9 3 0 4 1 3
10 3 0 5 2 3
11 3 0 5 2 3
12 3 0* 5 2 3
13 3 0* 5 2 3
14 3 1 3 0 2
15 3 1 3 0 2
16 3 0 4 1 3
17 4 3 4 0 1
18 4 1 5 1 3
19 4 0 4 0 4
20 4 0 4 0 4
21 4 0 4 0 4
22 6 0* 6 0 6
23 6 0 7 1 6
24 6 5 6 0 1
25 6 5 6 0 1
26 7 0 7 0 7
27 7 2 7 0 5
28 7 5 7 0 2
29 7 5 7 0 2
30 7 5 7 0 2
31 7 5 7 0 2
32 7 5 7 0 2
Table 59. Key flight days for each STS-115 procedure update (Part 1 of 2).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable
Executed anticipated and When it was
execution updated
33 7 5 7 0 2
34 7 0 7 0 7
35 7 3 7 0 4
36 8 7 8 0 1
37 8 7 8 0 1
38 8 5 8 0 3
39 8 7 9 1 1
40 9 8 9 0 1
41 9 0 9 0 9
42 9 0 9 0 9
43 9 3 9 0 6
44 10 9 10 0 1
45 10 0 10 0 10
46 10 0 10 0 10
47 10 0 10 0 10
48 10 9 10 0 1
49 10 1 12 2 9
50 10 0 10 0 10
51 11 10 11 0 1
52 11 9 12 1 2
53 11 1 11 0 10
54 11 1 12 1 10
55 11 1 12 1 10
56 11 10 12 1 1
57 11 0 12 1 11
58 11 0 12 1 11
59 11 0 12 1 11
60 12 11 12 0 1
61 12 10 12 0 2
62 12 10 12 0 2
63 12 12 12 0 0
*Likely being reworked or already finished at launch
Table 60. Key flight days for each STS-115 procedure update (Part 2 of 2).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
1 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure updates after the Procedure Books and
2 print deadline N/A before Launch
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure updates after the Procedure Books and
3 print deadline N/A before Launch
Change made in order to save Consumable Management
4 a LiOH can N/A Optimizations
Procedure Updated or Re-
Steps added for IV crew evaluated after the Print
member to tape a SAFER Deadline for the
latch that has had a tendency Procedure Books and
5 to jam N/A before Launch
6 Missing steps N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
7 Logistical Changes N/A before Launch
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
8 New PGT settings N/A before Launch
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g.,
packaging error,
9 Logistical Changes and Typos N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
Previously unaccounted for
10 inhibit and typos N/A Unaccounted for Inhibits
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Added QD workarounds for Conditions (e.g.,
11 vent tool on Zl-M5 N/A temperatures)
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
12 New PGT settings N/A before Launch
Table 61. STS-115 update rationales (Part 1 of 5).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
13 New PGT settings N/A before Launch
Changes due to loss of AC 1 Actuator "Failure" or
14 Phase A for Fuel Cell 1 N/A Degradation
Changes due to loss of AC 1 Actuator "Failure" or
15 Phase A for Fuel Cell 1 N/A Degradation
Procedure to replace "failed" Actuator "Failure" or
16 hard drive disk N/A Degradation
Logistical changes and other Unanticipated
changes due to obstructed Environmental/ISS
view of P1 targets discovered Conditions (e.g.,
17 on FD3 N/A temperatures)
Blanket came loose during Launch Damage (actual
18 launch N/A or suspected)
19 Missing RPC position checks N/A Typos and Omissions
Steps added to configure ISS
Loopback capability from
CVIU 6 to VTR2 using the Use of Shuttle Resources
shuttle's Monitor 2 and VPU to Counteract ISS
20 capability N/A Problems
Inconsistency between
Alternative to BPSMU Audio Item's Expected Post-
Only string referenced in Launch Configuration and
P/TVO5 INTERNAL OPS Actual Post-Launch
scene (BPSMU cable was Configuration (e.g.,
accidentally returned on STS- packaging error,
21 121) N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
Procedure Updated or Re-
This procedure was added to evaluated after the Print
check for trapped air in the Deadline for the
ORCA hose (discovered in Procedure Books and
22 ground testing) N/A before Launch
Proactive Contingency
Preparation and/or Hazard
23 Contingency Procedure N/A Investigation
Procedure to recover an
ERCA that failed during EVA
24 2 N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Equipment added for get "Get-Ahead" Tasks
25 ahead tasks and typos fixed "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
New Cryo Config due to Conditions (e.g.,
26 unexpected heating conditions N/A temperatures)
Table 62. STS-115 update rationales (Part 2 of 5).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Updated to safe OBSS in
response to a STBD
Manipulator Retention Latch
27 microswitch failure N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Changes due to the addition of "Get-Ahead" Tasks
28 get ahead tasks "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Logistical changes due to the "Get-Ahead" Tasks
29 addition of get ahead tasks "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Logistical changes due to the "Get-Ahead" Tasks
30 addition of get ahead tasks "Get Aheads" Scheduled
"Get-Ahead" Tasks
31 Addition of callout "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Logistical changes due to the "Get-Ahead" Tasks
32 addition of get ahead tasks "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Logistical changes due to the "Get-Ahead" Tasks
33 addition of get ahead tasks "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Steps added to indicate desired "Get-Ahead" Tasks
34 photograph areas N/A Scheduled
Changed steps due to DAIU Actuator "Failure" or
35 failure N/A Degradation
New Cryo Config due to Unanticipated
unexpected heating conditions Environmental/ISS
(refinement of update in msg Conditions (e.g.,
36 74A) N/A temperatures)
Changes made to save a Consumable Management
37 canister N/A Optimizations
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g.,
packaging error,
38 Logistical Changes "Get Aheads" manufacturing error, etc.)
Changes due to newly planned
ISS maneuver during Unanticipated
flyaround (the maneuver was Environmental/ISS
added because of high beta Conditions (e.g.,
39 magnitudes) N/A temperatures)
New Cryo Config due to Unanticipated
unexpected heating conditions Environmental/ISS
(refinement of update in msg Conditions (e.g.,
40 84) N/A temperatures)
Unanticipated
Potentially due to unexpected Environmental/ISS
heating at the the given Conditions (e.g.,
41 attitude N/A temperatures)
Table 63. STS-115 update rationales (Part 3 of 5).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
42 Undocking Camera Change N/A before Launch
Changed steps due to DAIU Actuator "Failure" or
43 failure N/A Degradation
New Cryo Config due to Unanticipated
unexpected heating conditions Environmental/ISS
(refinement of update in msg Conditions (e.g.,
44 97) N/A temperatures)
Changed made to ensure that
proper loads are transferred to Internal Inconsistencies in
45 Airlock Adapter Plate N/A the Procedure
Typo (same as the one noted
46 in msg 002A) N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
47 Same as msg 9 N/A before Launch
Unexpected Software
48 SSV stopped generating video N/A Behavior
Contingency Procedure added
due to microswitch problems
49 on FDI N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Proactive Contingency
Preparation and/or Hazard
50 Leak mitigation steps added N/A Investigation
New Cryo Config due to Unanticipated
unexpected heating conditions Environmental/ISS
(refinement of update in msg Conditions (e.g.,
51 107A) N/A temperatures)
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g.,
New stowage location for packaging error,
52 WLES N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
Changes due to Speedbrake
53 Channel 3 degradation on FD 1 N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Step added due to FD1 failure
of AC Phase A failure of Fuel Actuator "Failure" or
54 Cell Pump N/A Degradation
Step changed due to FD 1
failure of AC Phase A failure Actuator "Failure" or
55 of Fuel Cell Pump N/A Degradation
Table 64. STS-115 update rationales (Part 4 of 5).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Step changed due to Supply
H20 Dump Valve leakage Actuator "Failure" or
56 observed on FD 10 N/A Degradation
Procedure Nominally
57 PCS configuration N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
58 NH3 boiler config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
59 NH3 boiler config N/A Updated in Real-time
New Cryo Config due to Unanticipated
unexpected heating conditions Environmental/ISS
(refinement of update in msg Conditions (e.g.,
60 116A) N/A temperatures)
Step changed due to Supply
H20 Dump Valve leakage Actuator "Failure" or
61 observed on FD 10 N/A Degradation
Contingency survey of Orbiter
to verify that OD object seen
on FD 11 did not come off of Launch Damage (actual
62 the Orbiter N/A or suspected)
Launch Damage (actual
63 Refinement of MSG 134 N/A or suspected)
Table 65. STS-115 update rationales (Part 5 of 5).
DATA POINT MISSION ELAPSED NUMBER OF PROCEDURES
TIME (MINUTES) NEEDING AND BEING
REWORKED
Launch 0 30
End of FD 1 360 37
End of FD 2 1740 35
End of FD 3 3180 25
End of FD 4 4620 20
Instant before "Get Aheads" 5640 21
Instant after "Get Aheads" 5641 29
End of FD 5 6060 29
End of FD 6 7500 25
End of FD 7 8940 18
End ofFD 8 10380 15
End of FD 9 11760 14
End of FD 10 13140 11
End of FD 11 14550 3
End of FD 12 15990 0
Table 66. The STS-115 data time history for the variable Number of Procedures
Needing and Being Reworked.
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TYPES OF PROCEDURE UPDATES PROCEDURE UPDATE NUMBERS
Due to "Get Aheads" and in Time Horizon 25
Due to "Get Aheads" and Beyond Time Horizon 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 38
(i.e., propagated reworks due to the "Get Aheads")
Outside Time Horizon and Not Latent at Launch 14, 15, 18, 27, 35, 43, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, and 62
(i.e., propagated reworks not due to a discrete event)
Due to refinements of previously submitted "Get None
Ahead" related updates
Procedures developed as a result of the rework 16, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 43, 48, 49, and 62
process
Table 67. List of specially designated STS-115 procedure updates.
FLIGHT MISSION ELAPSED NORMALIZED TIME TO UPDATES SINCE
DAY TIME AT END OF LANDING PREVIOUS FLIGHT
FLIGHT DAY PREPARATION AT THE DAY
(MINUTES) END OF FD 11
0 0 0 0
1 360 0.02474 0
2 1740 0.1196 3
3 3180 0.2186 13
4 4620 0.3175 5
5 6060 0.4165 0
6 7500 0.5155 4
7 8940 0.6144 10
8 10380 0.7134 4
9 11760 0.8082 4
10 13140 0.9031 7
11 14550 1 9
12 15990 1.0990 4
Table 68. STS-115 update times normalized to landing preparation time.
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STS-116 Data Tables
MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
152 FD13 MMT Summary 13 Disregarded
sources: Flight Director
151A Northrup Updates to Entry Checklist 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014485
150A DPS Entry Message for BFS --> PASS DK 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Assignment
sources: F014464C
149 SHAB Entry Prep 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014475A
148A Entry Summary Template 13 Disregarded
sources: MATS
147A Entry Summary 13 Disregarded
sources: NO17342
146B Entry Checklist Deltas 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014462,F014478,N017335
145 Payload Deact Procedure Deltas 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: NO 17283D
144B Deorbit Prep Updates 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014458, F014470,FO14478, F014481
143 Entry FIW Summary 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
142 Entry Day Fluid Loading 13 Disregarded
sources: F014434B
141 Sunday Funnies 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
140 FD 13 SpaceHab Viewport Violations 13 Retrieved from FD 13 Execute Package
sources: F014472
139 FD 13 PAO Event Summary 13 Disregarded
sources: F014463
138B FD13 EECOM Updates 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F014450, F014451, F014452,
F014466A
137 FD13 Water Summary Message 13 Retrieved from FD 13 Execute Package
sources: F014469
136 FD12 MMT Summary 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
135A FD13 Mission Summary 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: N017316A, N017307
134A FD13 - EOM+1 Flight Plan Revision 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F014472, F014468, F014465
133A FD13 Preliminary Summary Timeline 12 Disregarded
132 FD12 SpaceHab Viewport Violations 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F014432
131 Updates to LCS Cue Card 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: MSG028
130 FD12 Water Summary Message 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F014425
129 FD11 MMT Summary 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
Table 69. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 1 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
128 FD12 Mission Summary 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: NO 17263, N017273
127A FD12 Flight Plan Revision 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F014432, F014431, F014428, F014419
126 FD12 Preliminary Summary Timeline 12 Disregarded
125 Undock With Fly around Updates 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014400
124 Docked Audio Hardline Voice Test (14-0643) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F014389
123 Middeck Stowage Updates 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F014371
122 Spacehab Inlet Duct Screen Check 11 Retrieved from FD 11 Execute Package
sources: F014370
121 FD1O MMT Summary (14-0637) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
120 PMA 2 X3 Connector Photography Procedure 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F014360A
119A FD 11 Water Summary Message 11 Retrieved from FD 11 Execute Package
sources: F014831
118 FD11 Transfer Message (14-0636) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: FO14394
117 FD11 Mission Summary (14-0635) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: N017165, N017189
116A FD11 Flight Plan Revision 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F014362C, F014379, F014391
115 FD11 Preliminary Summary Timeline 10 Disregarded
114 EMU Reconfig & Transfer Update (14-0634) 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014365
113 Undock Message and Sep Burn Revision 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014358A
112 Middeck Stowage Bag Drawings 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F014340A
111A FD10 Water Summary Message 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F014342
1lOA FD10 Transfer Message (14-0628A) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F014348, N017123
109 FDO9 MMT Summary (14-0627) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
108 FD1O Mission Summary (14-0626) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: NO17106, N017124
107C FD10 Flight Plan Revision 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F014335, F014345, F014350
105 Deltas to EVA PREP to checkout EMU 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
3015 (14-0624)
sources: F014329
104 FD10 Preliminary Summary Timeline 09 Disregarded
103 Additional SAW Inspections for EVA 4 (14- 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
0623)
sources: F014327
Table 70. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 2 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
102 EVA 4 Procedures (14-0622) 09 Available online
sources: F014326
101 EVA 4 Tool Stowage Locations and EMU 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Wrist Disconnect Taping (14-0620)
sources: F014317, F014318
100 FD10-EOM Overview Timeline (14-0618) 09 Disregarded
099 EVA 4 Briefing Package (14-0617) 09 Disregarded
sources: F014312
098 Preliminary EVA 4 Procedures (14-0615) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014300A
097 EMU SWAP for EVA 4 (14-0614) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014297
096 FD9 and FD10 Big Picture words for Robotics 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
Ops (14-0613)
sources: F014299
095 Updated LiOH CC 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014296
094 FD09 PAO Event Summary Message 09 Disregarded
sources: F014291
093 ISS HAM KENWOOD MANUAL 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
FREQUENCY INPUT
sources: ISS MSG 14-0193
092 Logistics Cue Card (14-0611) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014297
091A P6 4B Solar Array Retract EVA Support (14- 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
0610A)
sources: F014282
090A EVA 12A. 1: SSRMS DOUG Setup Notes for 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
12A. 1 EVA 4 (14-0609A)
089 EVA4 Support Setup (14-0608) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014276
088A FD08 MMT Summary (14-0607A) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
087A FD09 Water Summary Message 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014292
086 FD09 Transfer Message (14-0606) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014302
085 FDO9 Mission Summary (14-0605) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: N017034, N017051
084A FD09 Flight Plan Revision 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F014279, F014293, N017052
083 FD09 Preliminary Summary Timeline 08 Disregarded
082 Maneuver to MT Translate Config WS3 to Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
WS5 from P6 Retract Viewing (14-0604)
sources: F014271
081 EVA 4 SAW SRMS Viewing 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F014267A
080 Big Picture Words for Channel (1/4) for Power 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
Reconfiguration (14-0600)
Table 71. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 3 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
079 Updated LiOH CC 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F014254
078 FD08 Water Summary Message 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F014252
077 FD08 Transfer Message (14-0599) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F014260
076A FDO7 MMT Summary (14-0598A) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
075 FDO8 Mission Summary (14-0597) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: NO16982, N016999
074 FD08 Flight Plan Revision 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F014257
073 STS-116 EVA#3 Agreements for SAW 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Retraction (14-0595)
sources: F014237
072 EVA 3 SAW Troubleshooting (14-0596) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014235
071A FD08 Preliminary Summary Timeline 07 Disregarded
070 Channel 1/4 Ground/Crew Interaction 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
Table (14-0594)
sources: F014238
069 Channel 1/4 Power Reconfiguration Definitions 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
Table (14-0593)
sources: F014071
068 Channel 1/4 Flow Chart Update (14-0592) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F014071
067 HAM Pass for GMT 351 - Thunmanskolan, 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
Knivsta, Sweden (14-0589)
066 Crew News Conference Event (14-0583) 07 Disregarded
sources: F014207
065 FDO7 ESA PAO EVENT (14-0582) 07 Disregarded
sources: F014205A
064 2.3.402 N14B Y-Jumper Installation/Removal 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: ODF
063A EVA Questions and Deltas to FD7 EMU 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
Resize
sources: F014200A, F014201A, N016921A
062 FD07 Water Summary Message 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F014212
061 FDO6 MMT Summary (14-0580) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
060 FDO7 Transfer Message (14-0579) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F014219
059 FD07 Mission Summary (14-0578) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: N016894, F014125, N016916
058A FD07 Flight Plan Revision 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F014208, F014216, F014218
Table 72. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 3 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
057 2.600 Unknown EPS 12A. 1 EVA 2 through 06 Disregarded
EVA 3 (14-0577)
sources: F014190
056 FDO7 Preliminary Summary Timeline 06 Disregarded
055 EVA #4 Discussion with Crew 06 Disregarded
sources: F014186A
054 Excerpts from FD06 Daily Summary 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014154
053 FDO6 Water Summary Message 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014166
052 FDO6 Transfer Message (14-0572) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014171
051 FD05 MMT Summary (14-0571) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
050 FD06 Ceta Cart Relocation Viewing 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014148
049 FD06 Mission Summary (14-0570) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: N016834, N016849
048A FD06 Flight Plan Revision 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014149, F014165, F014168
047 Preliminary FD06 Summary Timeline 05 Disregarded
046 Channel 2-3 Ground/Crew Interaction 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
Table (14-0569)
sources: F014152
045 Channel 2/3 Power Reconfiguration Definitions 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
Table Update (14-0568)
sources: FO14072
044 Channel 2-3 Power Reconfiguration Flowchart 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
Update (14-0567)
sources: F014072
043 ROBO Procedure Updates for EVA2 (14-0566) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F014150
042 Zi Tray QD U-Jumper Nutplate Caps 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
Imagery (14-0561)
041A FDO5 PAO Event Summary Message (14- 05 Disregarded
0560A)
sources: F014121B
040 FDO5 Water Summary Message 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F014122
039 FD05 Transfer Message (14-0558) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F014130
038 FDO4 MMT Summary (14-0557) 05 Disregarded
sources: Flight Director
037 FDO5 Mission Summary (14-0556) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: N016769, N016785
036B FD05 Flight Plan Revision 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: N016746, F014128, N016779C,
F014131
035 FDO5 Preliminary Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
Table 73. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 4 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
034A Panel 19 Viewing with SRMS EE 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014109
033C FDO5 Mnvr to 4B SAW Retract Viewing 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
Position
sources: F014113
032 FN03 DAT Review (14-0551) 04 Disregarded
sources: F014092A. ET DOORS IMPACT.ppt
(e-mail)
031 FDO4 Water Summary Message 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014076
030 FDO3 MMT Summary (14-0549) 04 Disregarded
sources: Flight Director
029 FD04 Transfer Message (14-0548) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014093A
028 Updates to LCS Cue Card 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014066
027 Desktop Video Downlink Test 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014064
026 FDO4 Mission Summary (14-0547) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014077, NO 16706, NO 16722
025B FDO4 Flight Plan Revision 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F014058, N016719
024 FDO4 Preliminary Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
023 Orbiter Port RCC Panel Inspection (14-0546) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014055
022 SODF Book Transfer (14-0534) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
021 FD03 RELMO AND MNVR PADS 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: NO 16650
020 9.101 JOINT EXPEDITED UNDOCKING 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
AND SEPARATION Procedure Update (14-
0542)
sources: FO1403 I A
019 FD03 Transfer Message (14-0541) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F014039
018A FD02 MMT Summary (14-0537A) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: Flight Director
017B FDO3 EVA Updates (14-0538B) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F013994, F014022, F014023
016 FD03 Mission Summary (14-0539) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: N016646A, F014036, F014020
015B FD03 Flight Plan Revision 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F014006, F014015
014 FD03 Preliminary Summary Timeline 02 Disregarded
013 DOUG Setup Notes for 12A.1 (14-0535) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F014006
012 FD03 Events and Lighting Summary 02 Disregarded
sources: F013993
011 FDO3 Water Summary Message 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F014035
Table 74. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 5 of 6).
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MSG Message Title FD Status for Case Study
010 FD02 SpaceHab Viewport Violations 02 FD2 Execute Package
sources: N016591
009 FD02 Summary Timeline 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
008A FD02 Transfer Message (14-0528A) 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F013983, F013984
007A FD02 Water Summary Message 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F013976
006 Port Upper Carrier Tile ITVC Survey 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F013971
005A PL PWRDWN UPDATES 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F014012
004A FD02 Mission Summary (14-0529A) 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F013977, F013967, N016590,
N016596
003B FD02 Flight Plan Revision 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F013964, F013963, F013974,
F013980A
002 FLIGHT NIGHT 01 ATTITUDES 01 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F013957
001 OCA PRINTER TEST MESSAGE 01 Disregarded
sources: MATS
Table 75. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-116 crew (Part 6 of 6).
Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
RCS JET Tin Whisker mitigations
1 2 REPRIORITIZATION 3 determined pre-flight GNC/PROP
Changes due to RHC 10V
2 2 P5 Ungrapple 3 Failure PDRS
Changes due to RHC 10V
3 2 OBSS Berth 3 Failure PDRS
OBSS Handoff From Changes due to RHC 10V
4 2 SRMS to SSRMS 3 Failure PDRS
Step added for FES PRI B
5 2 POST SLEEP 3 troubleshooting EECOM
PORT UPPER TILE Changes due to RHC 10V
6 2 ITVC SURVEY 6 Failure PDRS
7 3 DOUG Setup for FD4 13 Typo PDRS
Checkmark added and
8 3 LCH DEACT 15B callout deleted PDRS
9 3 PL PWRDWN 005A Modified SpaceHab steps ACO
10 3 PL SAFING 005A Modified SpaceHab steps ACO
SO/N1 PWR CABLE
11 3 INSTALL 017B Logistical Changes EVA
12 3 UIA HANDRAILS 017B Typo EVA
EVA 3 TOOLS AND Missing PGT SETTINGS
13 3 STOWAGE 017B TABLE EVA
Table 76. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 1 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
EVA 3 UNSCH/CONT
14 3 EVA TASK 017B Logistical Changes EVA
STS-116 Logistics Cue Changed Serial Numbers
15 3 Card 017B for LiOH canisters EVA
EMU AND EVA TOOL
TRANSFER AND Changed Serial Numbers
16 3 RECONFIGURATION 017B for LiOH canisters EVA
17 3 EMU PREBREATHE 017B Typo EVA
SAFER LATCH GUARD
Steps Added (they did a
variant of these steps on
18 3 EMU PREBREATHE 017B STS-115 also) EVA
JOINT EXPEDITED
UNDOCKING AND
SEPARATION
19 3 PROCEDURE 20 Typos and extra instructions ACO
Added due to port wing
ORBITER PORT RCC leading edge sensor PDRS/
20 3 PANEL INSPECTION 23 indications during launch ROBO
DESKTOP VIDEO Added due to FD2 LCC
21 4 DOWNLINK TEST 27 Desktop malfunction INCO
Changes due to FD2 LCC
22 4 LCS Cue Card 28 Desktop malfunction INCO
Added due to port wing
PORT PANEL 19 leading edge sensor
23 4 VIEWING 34A indications during launch PDRS
Added to put the SRMS in
the desired config for SAW
4B SAW RETRACT viewing after the extra
24 5 VIEWING 33C inspection on FD3 PDRS
Steps added to inspect Zl
CHANNEL 2/3 POWER U-jumper nutplates for
25 5 RECONFIGURATION 42 sharp edge hazard EVA
Improper config of OBSS
26 6 PRLA CLOSE 048A MRL Logic ACO/PDRS
STBD CETA CART 2 PDRS/
27 6 RELOCATION 43 Typos ROBO
STBD CETA CART 1 PDRS/
28 6 RELOCATION 43 Extra Instructions Added ROBO
CETA CART
RELOCATION Procedure intended to be PDRS/
29 6 VIEWING 50 updated in real-time ROBO
Steps added to make the
PRE EVA 3 EMU procedure outcome more
30 7 RESIZE 063A efficient EVA
Maneuver added in
anticipation of viewing
SSRMS STOW TO P6 SAW retraction after BGA
31 7 RETRACT VIEWING 59 wiggle test PDRS
Table 77. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 2 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
Updated to account for
32 8 LiOH Cue Card 79 recovery of ISS CDRA EECOM
EVA 3 SAW Procedure added due to
33 8 Troubleshooting 72 SAW Retract Anomaly EVA
MANEUVER TO MT
TRANSLATE CONFIG Maneuver added in
WS3 TO WS5 FROM anticipation of viewing
P6 RETRACT SAW retraction during
34 8 VIEWING 82 EVA 3 ROBO
Maneuver added in
anticipation of viewing
EVA4 SUPPORT SAW retraction during
35 9 SETUP 89 EVA 4 ROBO
Added for support of EVA PDRS/
36 9 DOUG Setup for EVA 4 90 4 ROBO
P6 4B SOLAR ARRAY
RETRACT EVA Added for support of EVA
37 9 SUPPORT 91 4 ROBO
STS-116 Logistics Cue Updated for newly added
38 9 Card 92 EVA 4 EVA
Added to swap an EMU for
39 9 EMU SWAP for EVA 4 97 EVA 4 EVA
EVA 4 NOTES,
CAUTIONS, &
40 9 WARNINGS 98 Added for EVA 4 EVA
41 9 EVA 4 INHIBIT PAD 98 Added for EVA 4 EVA
42 9 EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 98 Added for EVA 4 EVA
43 9 EGRESS 98 Added for EVA 4 EVA
44 9 INGRESS 98 Added for EVA 4 EVA
EMU WRIST Added to reduce
DISCONNECT electrocution hazard on
45 9 TAPING 98 EVA 4 EVA
EVA 4 NOTES,
CAUTIONS, & Refinement of EVA 4
46 9 WARNINGS 102 Procedure EVA
Refinement of EVA 4
47 9 EVA 4 INHIBIT PAD 102 Procedure EVA
Refinement of EVA 4
48 9 EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 102 Procedure EVA
Refinement of EVA 4
49 9 EGRESS 102 Procedure EVA
P6 4B SOLAR ARRAY
WING RETRACT
50 9 TROUBLESHOOTING 102 Added for EVA 4 EVA
Refinement of EVA 4
51 9 INGRESS 102 Procedure EVA
P6 4B SOLAR ARRAY
WING RETRACT Addition of steps to inspect
52 9 TROUBLESHOOTING 103 SABB EVA
Table 78. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 3 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
Addition of steps to inspect
EV 2's EMU (which had
10.2 PSIA CAMPOUT not been through a
53 9 EVA PREP 105 complete checkout) EVA
EVA 4 SAW SRMS
54 10 VIEWING 81 Added for EVA 4 PDRS
Changes due to possibility
55 10 SEP BURN 113 of SAW not retracting RNDZ
EMU
RECONFIGURATION
56 10 FOR TRANSFER 114 Added for EVA 4 EVA/ACO
Switch position changed
APU HEATER due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
57 11 RECONFIG 116A according to preflight plan MMACS
HEATER RECONFIG- Possibly due to warm
58 11 CONFIG B(CONFIG A) 116A attitude EECOM
PMA 2 X3
CONNECTOR
PHOTOGRAPHY Added to inspect PMA
59 11 PROCEDURE 120 audio interface for damage INCO
DOCKED AUDIO
HARDLINE VOICE Audio problem
60 11 TEST 124 troubleshooting INCO
Updated to re-insert
61 11 SEP BURN 125 flyaround RNDZ
Additional changes
resulting from the LCC
62 12 LCS Cue Card 131 problem on FD2 INCO
Steps changed to perform a
WASTE H20 DUMP purge of the Waste H20
63 13 TERMINATION 137 Dump Line EECOM
Steps added to return Ext
Ext Airlock Heater Airlock Heaters to nominal
64 13 Reconfig 138B config for D/O Prep EECOM
Steps changed due to the
discovery of a bias in 02
Sys 2 flow sensor during
65 13 PRE-SLEEP 138B PCS configuration on FD11 EECOM
Steps changed due to the
discovery of a bias in 02
Sys 2 flow sensor during
66 13 POST SLEEP 138B PCS configuration on FD11 EECOM
Switch positions changed
due to FES PRI B
67 13 RAD BYPASS/FES C/O 144B Controller on FD 1 EECOM
Switch positions changed
NOMINAL DEORBIT due to FES PRI B
68 13 PREP C/L 144B Controller on FD 1 EECOM
Table 79. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 4 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
Switch positions changed
due to failure of a Mid Port
NOMINAL DEORBIT Payload Bay Floodlight on
69 13 PREP C/L 144B FD3 EGIL
Switch positions changed
ENTRY SWITCH LIST due to FES PRI B
70 13 VERIFICATION 144B Controller on FD 1 EECOM
Switch positions changed
ENTRY SWITCH LIST due to waste water line
71 13 VERIFICATION 144B purge EECOM
Switch position changed
ENTRY SWITCH LIST due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
72 13 VERIFICATION 144B according to preflight plan MMACS
Switch positions changed
DEORBIT PREP due to FES PRI B
73 13 BACKOUT 144B Controller on FD 1 EECOM
Switch positions changed
due to failure of a Mid Port
DEORBIT PREP Payload Bay Floodlight on
74 13 BACKOUT 144B FD3 EGIL
Switch position changed
DEORBIT PREP due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
75 13 BACKOUT 144B according to preflight plan MMACS
PAYLOAD
76 13 DEACTIVATION 145 Additional steps required ACO
Switch position changed EGIL/
77 13 MNVR to D/O BURN 146B due to APU heater reconfig MMACS
78 13 NH3 ACT 146B NH3 Boiler Config EECOM
MS SYS DEACT F/ Step not required for this
79 13 EXTENDED PWR UP 146B flight ACO
Switch position changed
due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
80 13 APU HTR DEACT 146B according to preflight plan MMACS
81 13 NH3 RECONFIG 146B NH3 Boiler Config EECOM
Switch position changed
1-Orbit Late D/O due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
82 13 Procedure 146B according to preflight plan MMACS
Switch position changed
MNVR to 1-ORB LATE due to APU heater reconfig EGIL/
83 13 D/O ATT 146B according to preflight plan MMACS
Improper installation of
caps on air circulation
ducts during SHAB prep for
84 13 TUNNEL CONFIG 149 docking ACO
Table 80. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 5 of 6).
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Procedure FD Procedure Name MSG Rationale Console
Update # Position
New procedure due to
BFS --> PASS DK single-hit I/O error on IDP4
85 13 ASSIGNMENT 150A during Post Insertion DPS
New steps added due to the
possibility of landing at
White Sands (this
possibility was considered
due to the extra docked day
OMS/RCS VALVE at ISS to accommodate
86 13 TEST 151A EVA 4) PROP
Table 81. Procedure update designations for STS-116 (Part 6 of 6).
Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When
to be update and issue Was
Executed anticipated Identifiable and
execution When it was
updated
1 2 0* 2 0 2
2 2 1 3 1 1
3 2 1 2 0 1
4 2 1 3 1 1
5 2 1 2 0 1
6 2 1 2 0 1
7 3 0 4 1 3
8 3 0 3 0 3
9 3 0* 3 0 3
10 3 0* 3 0 3
11 3 0 6 3 3
12 3 0 8 5 3
13 3 0 8 5 3
14 3 0 8 5 3
15 3 0 3 0 3
16 3 0 3 0 3
17 3 0 4 1 3
18 3 0* 4 1 3
19 3 0 3 0 3
20 3 1 3 0 2
21 4 2 4 0 2
22 4 2 4 0 2
23 4 1 4 0 3
24 5 1 5 0 4
25 5 0 6 1 5
26 6 0 6 0 6
27 6 0 6 0 6
28 6 0 6 0 6
Table 82. Key flight days for each STS-116 procedure update (Part 1 of 3).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When
to be update and issue Was
Executed anticipated Identifiable and
execution When it was
updated
29 6 0 6 0 6
30 7 0 7 0 7
31 7 5 7 0 2
32 8 8 8 0 0
33 8 5 8 0 3
34 8 5 8 0 3
35 9 5 10 1 4
36 9 5 10 1 4
37 9 5 10 1 4
38 9 5 10 1 4
39 9 5 9 0 4
40 9 5 10 1 4
41 9 5 10 1 4
42 9 5 9 0 4
43 9 5 10 1 4
44 9 5 10 1 4
45 9 5 10 1 4
46 9 9 10 1 0
47 9 9 10 1 0
48 9 9 9 0 0
49 9 9 10 1 0
50 9 5 10 1 4
51 9 9 10 1 0
52 9 9 10 1 0
53 9 9 9 0 0
54 10 10 10 0 0
55 10 5 11 1 5
56 10 5 11 1 5
57 11 0 11 0 11
58 11 0 11 0 11
59 11 0 11 0 11
60 11 0 11 0 11
61 11 10 11 0 1
62 12 2 12 0 10
63 13 12 13 0 1
64 13 0 13 0 13
65 13 11 13 0 2
66 13 11 13 0 2
67 13 1 13 0 12
68 13 1 13 0 12
69 13 3 13 0 10
70 13 1 13 0 12
71 13 12 13 0 1
72 13 0 13 0 13
Table 83. Key flight days for each STS-116 procedure update (Part 2 of 3).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When
to be update and issue Was
Executed anticipated Identifiable and
execution When it was
updated
73 13 1 13 0 12
74 13 3 13 0 10
75 13 0 13 0 13
76 13 0 13 0 13
77 13 0 13 0 13
78 13 0 13 0 13
79 13 0 13 0 13
80 13 0 13 0 13
81 13 0 13 0 13
82 13 0 13 0 13
83 13 0 13 0 13
84 13 3 13 0 10
85 13 1 13 0 12
86 13 5 13 0 8
*Likely being reworked or already finished at launch
Table 84. Key flight days for each STS-116 procedure update (Part 3 of 3).
Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Tin Whisker mitigations Procedure Books and
1 determined pre-flight N/A before Launch
Changes due to RHC 10V Actuator "Failure" or
2 Failure N/A Degradation
Changes due to RHC 10V Actuator "Failure" or
3 Failure N/A Degradation
Changes due to RHC 10V Actuator "Failure" or
4 Failure N/A Degradation
Step added for FES PRI B Actuator "Failure" or
5 troubleshooting N/A Degradation
Changes due to RHC 10V Actuator "Failure" or
6 Failure N/A Degradation
7 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Checkmark added and callout
8 deleted N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
9 Modified SpaceHab steps N/A before Launch
Table 85. STS-116 update rationales (Part 1 of 6).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
10 Modified SpaceHab steps N/A before Launch
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g.,
packaging error,
11 Logistical Changes N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
12 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Missing PGT SETTINGS
13 TABLE N/A Typos and Omissions
14 Logistical Changes N/A Equipment List Revision
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Actual Post-Launch
Configuration (e.g.,
Changed Serial Numbers for packaging error,
15 LiOH canisters N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
Inconsistency between
Items Expected to be
Changed Serial Numbers for Launched and Items
16 LiOH canisters N/A Actually Launched
17 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
SAFER LATCH GUARD evaluated after the Print
Steps Added (they did a Deadline for the
variant of these steps on STS- Procedure Books and
18 115 also) N/A before Launch
19 Typos and extra instructions N/A Typos and Omissions
Added due to port wing
leading edge sensor Launch Damage (actual
20 indications during launch N/A or suspected)
Added due to FD2 LCC Unexpected Software
21 Desktop malfunction N/A Behavior
Changes due to FD2 LCC Unexpected Software
22 Desktop malfunction N/A Behavior
Added due to port wing
leading edge sensor Launch Damage (actual
23 indications during launch N/A or suspected)
Added to put the SRMS in the
desired config for SAW
viewing after the extra Launch Damage (actual
24 inspection on FD3 N/A or suspected)
Table 86. STS-116 update rationales (Part 2 of 6).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Steps added to inspect ZI U- Proactive Contingency
jumper nutplates for sharp Preparation and/or Hazard
25 edge hazard N/A Investigation
Improper config of OBSS Unexpected Software
26 MRL Logic N/A Behavior
27 Typos N/A Typos and Omissions
28 Extra Instructions Added N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure intended to be Procedure Nominally
29 updated in real-time N/A Updated in Real-time
Steps added to make the
procedure outcome more Procedure Efficiency
30 efficient N/A Optimization
Maneuver added in
anticipation of viewing SAW
retraction after BGA wiggle P6 SAW Retract
31 test Problems Equipment List Revision
Updated to account for Consumable Management
32 recovery of ISS CDRA N/A Optimizations
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Procedure added due to SAW P6 SAW Retract Conditions (e.g.,
33 Retract Anomaly Problems temperatures)
Maneuver added in
anticipation of viewing SAW P6 SAW Retract
34 retraction during EVA 3 Problems Equipment List Revision
Maneuver added in
anticipation of viewing SAW P6 SAW Retract
35 retraction during EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
P6 SAW Retract
36 Added for support of EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
P6 SAW Retract
37 Added for support of EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
Updated for newly added P6 SAW Retract Consumable Management
38 EVA 4 Problems Replanning
Added to swap an EMU for P6 SAW Retract
39 EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
P6 SAW Retract
40 Added for EVA 4 Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
P6 SAW Retract
41 Added for EVA 4 Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
P6 SAW Retract
42 Added for EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
P6 SAW Retract Task Deferral or
43 Added for EVA 4 Problems Reprioritization
P6 SAW Retract Task Deferral or
44 Added for EVA 4 Problems Reprioritization
Added to reduce electrocution P6 SAW Retract
45 hazard on EVA 4 Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
Table 87. STS-116 update rationales (Part 3 of 6).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Refinement of EVA 4 P6 SAW Retract
46 Procedure Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
Refinement of EVA 4 P6 SAW Retract
47 Procedure Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
Refinement of EVA 4 P6 SAW Retract
48 Procedure Problems Equipment List Revision
Refinement of EVA 4 P6 SAW Retract Task Deferral or
49 Procedure Problems Reprioritization
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
P6 SAW Retract Conditions (e.g.,
50 Added for EVA 4 Problems temperatures)
Refinement of EVA 4 P6 SAW Retract Task Deferral or
51 Procedure Problems Reprioritization
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Addition of steps to inspect P6 SAW Retract Conditions (e.g.,
52 SABB Problems temperatures)
Addition of steps to inspect
EV 2's EMU (which had not
been through a complete P6 SAW Retract
53 checkout) Problems Unaccounted for Inhibits
P6 SAW Retract
54 Added for EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Changes due to possibility of P6 SAW Retract Conditions (e.g.,
55 SAW not retracting Problems temperatures)
P6 SAW Retract
56 Added for EVA 4 Problems Equipment List Revision
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
57 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
58 Possibly due to warm attitude N/A temperatures)
Proactive Contingency
Added to inspect PMA audio Preparation and/or Hazard
59 interface for damage N/A Investigation
Audio problem Actuator "Failure" or
60 troubleshooting N/A Degradation
Procedure Efficiency
61 Updated to re-insert flyaround N/A Optimization
Table 88. STS-116 update rationales (Part 4 of 6).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Additional changes resulting
from the LCC problem on Unexpected Software
62 FD2 N/A Behavior
Steps changed to perform a
purge of the Waste H20 Actuator "Failure" or
63 Dump Line N/A Degradation
Unanticipated
Steps added to return Ext Environmental/ISS
Airlock Heaters to nominal Conditions (e.g.,
64 config for D/O Prep N/A temperatures)
Steps changed due to the
discovery of a bias in 02 Sys
2 flow sensor during PCS
65 configuration on FD11 N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Steps changed due to the
discovery of a bias in 02 Sys
2 flow sensor during PCS
66 configuration on FD 11 N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Switch positions changed due
to FES PRI B Controller on Actuator "Failure" or
67 FD 1 N/A Degradation
Switch positions changed due
to FES PRI B Controller on Actuator "Failure" or
68 FD 1 N/A Degradation
Switch positions changed due
to failure of a Mid Port
Payload Bay Floodlight on Actuator "Failure" or
69 FD3 N/A Degradation
Switch positions changed due
to FES PRI B Controller on Actuator "Failure" or
70 FD 1 N/A Degradation
Switch positions changed due Actuator "Failure" or
71 to waste water line purge N/A Degradation
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
72 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
Switch positions changed due
to FES PRI B Controller on Actuator "Failure" or
73 FD 1 N/A Degradation
Switch positions changed due
to failure of a Mid Port
Payload Bay Floodlight on Actuator "Failure" or
74 FD3 N/A Degradation
Table 89. STS-116 update rationales (Part 5 of 6).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
75 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
76 Additional steps required N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Switch position changed due Procedure Books and
77 to APU heater reconfig N/A before Launch
Procedure Nominally
78 NH3 Boiler Config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
79 Step not required for this flight N/A before Launch
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
80 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
Procedure Nominally
81 NH3 Boiler Config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
82 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Switch position changed due Deadline for the
to APU heater reconfig Procedure Books and
83 according to preflight plan N/A before Launch
Improper installation of caps
on air circulation ducts during
84 SHAB prep for docking N/A Crew Procedural Slips
New procedure due to single-
hit I/O error on IDP4 during Unexpected Software
85 Post Insertion N/A Behavior
New steps added due to the
possibility of landing at White
Sands (this possibility was
considered due to the extra
docked day at ISS to P6 SAW Retract Consumable Management
86 accommodate EVA 4) Problems Replanning
Table 90. STS-116 update rationales (Part 6 of 6).
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DATA POINT MISSION ELAPSED NUMBER OF PROCEDURES
TIME (MINUTES) NEEDING AND BEING
REWORKED
Launch 0 35
End of FD 1 360 48
End of FD 2 1770 45
End of FD 3 3240 34
End of FD 4 4650 31
Instant before SAW Retract Anomaly 5325 27
Instant after SAW Retract Anomaly 5326 47
End of FD 5 6090 47
End of FD 6 7500 43
End of FD 7 8940 41
End of FD 8 10350 39
End of FD 9 11790 27
End of FD 10 13200 26
End of FD 11 14580 23
End of FD 12 15990 24
End of FD 13 17430 0
Table 91. The STS-116 data time history for the variable Number of Procedures
Needing and Being Reworked.
TYPES OF PROCEDURE UPDATES PROCEDURE UPDATE NUMBERS
Due to SAW Retract Anomaly and in Time Horizon None
Due to SAW Retract Anomaly and Beyond Time 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to the SAW 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, and 86
Retract Anomaly)
Due to refinements of previously submitted SAW 46, 47, 48, 49, 51 and 52
Retract Anomaly related updates
Outside Time Horizon and Not Latent at Launch 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74,
(i.e., propagated reworks not due to a discrete event) 84, and 85
Procedures developed as a result of the rework 1, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41,
process 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 54, 59, 60, and 85
Table 92. List of specially designated STS-116 procedure updates.
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FLIGHT MISSION ELAPSED NORMALIZED TIME TO UPDATES SINCE
DAY TIME AT END OF LANDING PREVIOUS FLIGHT
FLIGHT DAY PREPARATION AT THE DAY
(MINUTES) END OF FD 13
0 0 0 0
1 360 0.02065 0
2 1770 0.1016 6
3 3240 0.1859 14
4 4650 0.2668 3
5 6090 0.3494 2
6 7500 0.4303 4
7 8940 0.5129 2
8 10350 0.5938 3
9 11790 0.6764 19
10 13200 0.7573 3
11 14580 0.8365 5
12 15990 0.9174 1
13 17430 1 24
Table 93. STS-116 update times normalized to the landing preparation time.
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STS-117 Data Tables
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
120 Blank Star Pairs Pad 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
119B Waveoff Summary Timeline 13 Disregarded
118A Entry Notes 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: FN020557
117A Entry Summary Template 13 Disregarded
116A Entry Summary 13 Disregarded
sources: N020550A
115A Entry Checklist Deltas 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: N020545, N020559
114A Deorbit Prep Updates 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F017102, F017113, N020545
113A Entry FIW Summary 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F017059, F017106, F016565
112 Entry Day Fluid Loading and Anti-G Suit 13 Disregarded
Operations
sources: F017097
111 Sunday Funnies 13 Disregarded
110 FD13 PAO Event Summary 13 Disregarded
sources: F17095
109A FD12 MMT Summary 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F017094A
108 FD13 Mission Summary 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: N020539, N020540
107A FD13 and FD14 Flight Plan Revision 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F017104A, F017107A, N020535
106 MDM OA2 Card 5 Impacts for FCS C/O and 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Entry
105 Late Inspection Playback Times 12 Disregarded
sources: F017096
104A FD13 Preliminary Summary Timeline 12 Disregarded
103 Modified Group C Powerup 12 Retrieved from FD 12 Execute Package
sources: F017042
102C FD11 MMT Summary (15-0494C) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F17043
101 FD12 Mission Summary (15-0493) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: N020476, N020477, F017059
100B FD 12 Flight Plan Revision 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F017058, F017067, F017068A,
N020464
099B FD12 Preliminary Summary Timeline 11 Disregarded
098B Undocking PAD and Event Summary 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: N20461, N20466
097 Handover Attitude Control Orbiter to CMG- 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
Only Without RS SMTC (15-0487)
sources: F016955
096A FD10 MMT Summary (15-0482A) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F017006
Table 94. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 1 of 6).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
095 FD11 Transfer Message (15-0481) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F017033
094 FD11 Mission Summary (15-0480) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F017017, N020428, N020420
093A FD11 Flight Plan Revision 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F016946, F017001A, F017013,
F017018, FO17019, F017029, N020438
092C FD11 Preliminary Summary Timeline 10 Disregarded
091 Updated H20 Activities Cue Card 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F016976
090 13A EVA-4: MMOD Shield 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Instructions (15-0475)
sources: F016962
089 FD09 MMT Summary (15-0473) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F016958
088 FD10 Transfer Message (15-0472) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F016985
087 FD10 Mission Summary (15-0471) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: N020359, N020366
086B FD10 Flight Plan Revision 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F016946, F016972A, F016986,
F016987
085D FD10 Preliminary Summary Timeline 09 Disregarded
084 13A EVA-4: ESP-2 Instructions (15-0468) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016956
083 Detailed EVA 4 Procedures (15-0467) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
082 EVA 4 Summary Timeline (15-0463) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F016930
081 EVA Transfer and Reconfig Update (15- 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
0462)
sources: FO 16926
080 PAO Event Summary Message Joint Crew 09 Disregarded
News Conference (15-0460)
sources: F016919
079 Question for Crew Regarding EVA 3 (15- 08 Disregarded
0458)
078 FD08 MMT Summary (15-0457) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F016916A
077 FD09 Transfer Message (15-0456) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F016936
076 FD09 Mission Summary (15-0455) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: N020308, N020311
075B FD09 Flight Plan Revision 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: FO16925, F016928, F016930,
F016932, F016935, N020300
074A FD08 Pre-Sleep Powerdowns 08 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016905A
073A Words from Lindsey (15-0459A) 09 Retrieved from FD9 Execute Package
sources: F016904
Table 95. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 2 of 6).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
072 EVA 3 Procedure Pen and Inks (15-0453) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F016879
071 Updated LiOH Cue Card 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F016881
070A FD07 MMT Summary (15-0451 A) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F016867
069B FDO8 Flight Plan Revision 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: F016819, F016869, F016871,
F016880, F016882A, F016884, F016887,
N020213
068B FD08 Preliminary Summary Timeline 07 Disregarded
066 EVA 3 Detailed Procedures (15-0447) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016858
065 EVA 3 Cuff Checklist Pages (15-0445) 07 Disregarded
sources: F016855
064 FD08 Mission Summary (15-0443) 08 Retrieved from FD8 Execute Package
sources: N020233, N020232
063 Broken Stapler 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016838
062 OMS Pod Repair Stowage Matrix (15-0440) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016832B
061A Modified Group C Powerdown Procedure 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016825A
060 SRMS OMS Pod Blanket Repair Procedure 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016801, F016813
059 Detailed EVA Repair Procedure (15-0438) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016830
058A Updated EVA 3 Tool Config (15-0437A) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016834A
057 Updated EVA 3 Inhibit Pad (15-0435) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016821A
056 Space to Ground EVA 3 Tagup Outline (15- 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
0434)
sources: F016822
055 OMS Pod Blanket Repair Practice Session 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
Procedure (15-0433)
sources: F016799A
054 OMS Pod Blanket Repair Tool Prep 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
Procedure (15-0432)
sources: F016823A
053 EVA Tool Gather Procedure (15-0431) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: FO16831
052 Blanket Repair Briefing Package (15-0430) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: FO16826
051 EVA 3 Summary Timeline (15-0429) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016816
050B FD07 EVA Summary (15-0436B) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016820
Table 96. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 3 of 6).
306
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
049A MEDS Power Savings Cue Card 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016804A
048 Updated H20 Activities Cue Card 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016806
047 2B SAW Retract Lighting Information (15- 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
0428)
sources: F016794
046 PAO Event Summary Message Fox News 07 Disregarded
Radio, KMGH-TV, KUSA-TV (15-0427)
sources: F016798
045 Parameters Affected By OA2 Card 5 MDM 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
Failure
sources: INCO, N020143
044 FD06 MMT Summary (15-0425) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016788A
043 FD07 Transfer Message (15-0424) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016824
042 FD07 Mission Summary (15-0423) 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016810, N020165, N020168
041A FD07 Flight Plan Revision 07 Retrieved from FD7 Execute Package
sources: F016800, F016811
040B FD07 Preliminary Summary Timeline 06 Disregarded
039 2B SAW Retract Lighting Information (15- 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
0419)
sources: F016763B
038 EVA Assessment of OMS Pod Blanket 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
Repair (15-0417)
sources: F016726B
037 EMU Water Recharge Troubleshooting for 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
Post EVA 2 (15-0416)
sources: F016758
036 FD05 MMT Summary (15-0415) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F016744
035 FD06 Transfer Message (15-0414) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F016769A
034 FD06 Mission Summary (15-0413) 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: N020099, N020092
033A FD06 Flight Plan Revision 06 Retrieved from FD6 Execute Package
sources: F016742, F016760, F016767,
F016768, N020094A
032B FD06 Preliminary Summary Timeline 05 Disregarded
031 EVA 2 Tool Updates (15-0410) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
030A FD5 EVA Status Items (15-0406A) 05
sources: F016713
029 PAO Event Summary Message CBS News, 05 Disregarded
KFOX-TV, KTSM-TV (15-0405)
sources: F016703
028A FD04 MMT Summary (15-0404A) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F016693
Table 97. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 4 of 6).
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027 FDO5 Transfer Message (15-0403) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F016717
026 FDO5 Mission Summary (15-0402) 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: FO16709, FO16710, N020018,
N020017
025A FDO5 Flight Plan Revision 05 Retrieved from FD5 Execute Package
sources: F016708, F016712
024 FDO5 Preliminary Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
023 Status of Regions of Interest (15-0398) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F016670A
022 FD03 MMT Summary (15-0396) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: FO16649
021 FD4 SVS S3S4 VIEWING LIGHTING 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
PREDICTIONS (15-0395)
sources: F016660
020B FDO4 Flight Plan Revision 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: F016673, F016665, F016668,
F016671, NO 19926A
019A FDO4 Preliminary Summary Timeline 03 Disregarded
018 FDO4 Mission Summary (15-0392) 04 Retrieved from FD4 Execute Package
sources: N019955, N019956
017A Port OMS Pod Survey 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F016629
016 FD03 RELMO and MNVR PADS 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: N019907
015 FDO2 MMT Summary (15-0390) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F016613
014B FDO3 Preliminary Summary Timeline 02 Disregarded
013 FDO3 Transfer Message (15-0387) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F016626
012A FDO3 Mission Summary (15-0386A) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: NO 19905, NO 19902A
011C FD03 Flight Plan Revision 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F016597, F016607, F016620,
F016627
010 FDO2 Inspection Playback Times 02 Disregarded
sources: N19887
009 OMS Pod Blanket Survey 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: F016598
008 WLES Recovery on STS7 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 7/2/08
sources: FN16594
007 Rendezvous Events and Lighting Info 02 Disregarded
sources: F016593
006 IWIS Big Picture Words for 13A (15-0361) 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
sources: F016584
005 IWIS INSTALLATION IN SHUTTLE 03 Retrieved from FD3 Execute Package
AIRLOCK (15-0374)
sources: F016552B
Table 98. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 5 of 6).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
004 H20 Activities Cue Card 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F016566
003 FD02 Mission Summary (15-0371) 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F016565, F016560B, N019847B,
N019849
002 FD02 Flight Plan Revision 02 Retrieved from FD2 Execute Package
sources: F016527, F0165662, NO 19839,
F016574
001 FD1 Test Message 01 Disregarded
Table 99. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-117 crew (Part 6 of 6).
Procedure MSG Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Changes to prevent
the Sun from coming
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC into the field of view
1 2 SURVEY - STBD 2 of the IDC PDRS
WLES RECOVERY ON
2 2 STS7 8 Problems with STS7 FAO
Procedure changed to
allow more detailed
inspection of the
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC thermal blanket tear
3 2 SURVEY - PORT 9 on the port OMS Pod PDRS
Reconfiguration of
the OMS POD
heaters (perhaps due
to the tear in the
4 3 POST SLEEP 11C thermal blanket) PROP
N2 REPRESS USING Non-functional N2
5 3 PAYLOAD N2 VALVES 11C Flow Sensor EECOM
Switch guard placed
over switch for a
failed PL Bay Flood
6 3 Switch Guard 11C light EGIL
IWIS INSTALLATION IN Procedure not ready
7 3 SHUTTLE AIRLOCK 5 by print deadline ACO
Procedure changed to
allow more detailed
inspection of the
P/TV08 EXTERNAL thermal blanket tear
8 3 SURVEY S/U 17A on the port OMS Pod PDRS
Update sent to correct
a step that had been
N2 REPRESS USING done incorrectly on
9 4 PAYLOAD N2 VALVES 20 FD3 EECOM
Table 100. Procedure update designations for STS-117 (Part 1 of 5).
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Procedure MSG Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Update to configure
cameras for
monitoring SAW
deploy (per request
10 4 PRE-SLEEP 20 from ROBO) INCO
Refinement of the
Update from
11 5 PRE-SLEEP 25 Message 20 INCO
PGT battery logistics
changed due to PGT
STS-117 Consumables power off anomaly
12 5 Tracking Cue Card 30A during EVA 1 EVA
PGT battery logistics
changed due to PGT
STS-1 17 Battery Recharge power off anomaly
13 5 Plan 30A during EVA 1 EVA
Addition of a tool to
cut the 2B leader (the
fact that it still had a
spring attached was
14 5 EVA 2 Tool Config 31 reported on EVA 1) EVA
FUEL CELL PURGE - Change due to MDM
15 6 MANUAL 33A OA2 Card 5 failure EGIL
Changes due to poor
EMU water
EMU WATER RECHARGE recharging after EVA
16 6 POST UIA CAP and PLUG 37 1 EVA
Provides the
necessary camera
2B SAW Retract Lighting pan/tilt angles for PDRS/
17 6 Information 39 viewing SAW retract ROBO
Refinement of update
from Msg. 25.
Changes made to
support transfer of
Shuttle camera
images to ISS
18 7 PRE-SLEEP 41A overnight INCO
Provides the
necessary camera
2B SAW Retract Lighting pan/tilt angles for PDRS/
19 7 Information 47 viewing SAW retract ROBO
Changes due to poor
EMU water
H20 ACTIVITIES CUE recharging after EVA
20 7 CARD 48 1 EECOM
Table 101. Procedure update designations for STS-117 (Part 2 of 5).
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Procedure MSG Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Added to save power
in order to potentially
support extra days in
orbit due to ISS
MEDS POWER SAVINGS attitude control
21 7 CUE CARD 49A problems DPS
Updated to
accommodate OMS
22 7 EVA 3 TOOL GATHER 53 Pod Blanket Repair EVA
Added to prepare
tools for OMS Pod
OMS POD BLANKET Blanket Repair on
23 7 REPAIR TOOL PREP 54 EVA 3 EVA
Added to construct a
platform to simulate
OMS POD TPS
OMS POD BLANKET Blanket material and
REPAIR PRACTICE to practice repair
24 7 SESSION 55 method EVA
Updated to
accommodate OMS
25 7 EVA 3 INHIBIT PAD 57 Pod Blanket Repair EVA
Updated to
accommodate OMS
26 7 EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG 58A Pod Blanket Repair EVA
Added to
accommodate OMS
27 7 OMS POD REPAIR 59 Pod Blanket Repair EVA
Added to
SRMS OMS POD BLANKET accommodate OMS
28 7 REPAIR 60 Pod Blanket Repair PDRS
Added save power in
order to potentially
support extra days in
orbit due to ISS ACO/
attitude control EECOM/
29 7 GROUP C POWERDOWN 61A problems EGIL/GNC
SRMS OMS POD BLANKET Changes due to ISS
30 8 REPAIR 69B attitude problems PDRS
POST EVA RCS Changes due to ISS
31 8 RECONFIGURATION 69B attitude problems GNC/PROP
Updated to
accommodate extra
32 8 LiOH CUE CARD 71 days in orbit EECOM
DLA 2
VERIFICATIONS/SARJ
LAUNCH RESTRAINT
33 8 REMOVAL 72 New PGT Settings EVA
Table 102. Procedure update designations for STS-117 (Part 3 of 5).
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Procedure MSG Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
New powerdowns to
accommodate extra
34 8 PRE-SLEEP 74A days in orbit EGIL
POST EVA
RECONFIGURATION AND Changes due to
35 9 TRANSFER 81 addition of 4th EVA EVA
Added to
accommodate 4th
36 9 EVA 4 INHIBIT PAD 83 EVA EVA
Added to
accommodate 4th
37 9 EVA 4 EGRESS 83 EVA EVA
Added to
CP1 ETVCG STANCHION accommodate 4th
38 9 INSTALLATION 83 EVA EVA
DLA 2
VERIFICATIONS/SARJ Updated to be
LAUNCH RESTRAINT completed in 4th
39 9 REMOVAL 83 EVA EVA
Added to
S3 KEEL PIN/DRAG LINK accommodate 4th
40 9 STOW 83 EVA EVA
APFR RELOCATE/S4 Added to
MMOD SHIELD BOLT accommodate 4th
41 9 RELEASE 83 EVA EVA
Added to
MT/CETA PATH/S3 accommodate 4th
42 9 CLEANUP 83 EVA EVA
Added to
NODE/SM LAN CABLE accommodate 4th
43 9 ROUTING 83 EVA EVA
Added to
accommodate 4th
44 9 SASA GIMBAL LOCKS 83 EVA EVA
Added to
GPS ANTENNA #4 accommodate 4th
45 9 REMOVAL 83 EVA EVA
Added to
VENT VALVE accommodate 4th
46 9 OPEN/MMOD SHIELD 83 EVA EVA
Added to
accommodate 4th
47 9 EVA 4 CLEANUP/INGRESS 83 EVA EVA
Added to
accommodate 4th
48 9 POST EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 83 EVA EVA
H20 ACTIVITIES CUE Updated to reflect
49 10 CARD 91 extra docked days EECOM
Table 103. Procedure update designations for STS-117 (Part 4 of 5).
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Procedure MSG Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
POST EVA
RECONFIGURATION AND
50 11 TRANSFER 93A Items added EVA/ACO
Added as
HANDOVER ATTITUDE contingency
CONTROL ORBITER TO procedure in response
CMG-ONLY WITHOUT RS to ISS attitude ADCO/
51 11 SMTC 97 problems GNC
HEATER RECONFIG - Possibly due to warm
52 12 CONFIG B 100B attitude EECOM
Changes to prevent
the Sun from coming
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC into the field of view
53 12 SURVEY - STBD 100B of the IDC PDRS
Changed due to
earlier powerdowns
to preserve power
while ISS attitude ACO/
problems were EECOM/
54 12 GROUP C POWERUP 103 worked out EGIL/GNC
Removes
unnecessary step and
adds a missing step to
PAYLOAD open AC1 MAR 3
55 13 DEACTIVATION 114A phase circuit breaker ACO
Adds two missing
circuit breaker checks
(including a check to
PAYLOAD ENTRY ensure that AC1
SWITCH LIST/ MAR 3 phase is
56 13 VERIFICATION 114A open) ACO
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP Different coldsoak
57 13 CHECKLIST 114A initiation EECOM
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP Change due to MDM
58 13 CHECKLIST 114A OA2 Card 5 failure INCO
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP Change due to failed
59 13 CHECKLIST 114A PL Bay Flood light EGIL
Change to high pitch
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP noise from A6U
60 13 CHECKLIST 114A ANNUN BUS EGIL
ENTRY SWITCH LIST New cabin temp
61 13 VERIFICATION 114A controller config EECOM
Change due to failed
62 13 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 114A PL Bay Flood light EGIL
New cabin temp
63 13 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 114A controller config EECOM
64 13 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 114A PCS config EECOM
65 13 NH3 ACT 115 NH3 boiler config EECOM
66 13 NH3 RECONFIG 115 NH3 boiler config EECOM
Table 104. Procedure update designations for STS-117 (Part 5 of 5).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was to between issue of between When
be Executed update and issue Was
anticipated Identifiable and
execution When it was
updated
1 2 0 2 0 2
2 2 2 2 0 0
3 2 1 2 0 1
4 3 1 3 0 2
5 3 0 3 0 3
6 3 1 3 0 2
7 3 0* 3 0 3
8 3 1 3 0 2
9 4 3 4 0 1
10 4 0 4 0 4
11 5 4 5 0 1
12 5 4 6 1 1
13 5 4 6 1 1
14 5 4 6 1 1
15 6 5 6 0 1
16 6 4 6 0 2
17 6 0 6 0 6
18 7 5 7 0 2
19 7 6 7 0 1
20 7 4 7 0 3
21 7 6 7 0 1
22 7 1 8 1 6
23 7 1 8 1 6
24 7 1 7 0 6
25 7 1 8 1 6
26 7 1 7 0 6
27 7 1 8 1 6
28 7 1 8 1 6
29 7 6 7 0 1
30 8 6 8 0 2
31 8 6 8 0 2
32 8 4 8 0 4
33 8 0 8 0 8
34 8 6 8 0 2
35 9 4 9 0 5
36 9 4 10 1 5
37 9 4 10 1 5
38 9 4 10 1 5
39 9 4 10 1 5
40 9 4 10 1 5
41 9 4 10 1 5
42 9 4 10 1 5
43 9 4 10 1 5
Table 105. Key flight days for each STS-117 procedure update (Part 1 of 2).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was to between issue of between When
be Executed update and issue Was
anticipated Identifiable and
execution When it was
updated
44 9 4 10 1 5
45 9 4 10 1 5
46 9 4 10 1 5
47 9 4 10 1 5
48 9 4 10 1 5
49 10 4 10 0 6
50 11 4 11 0 7
51 11 6 11 0 5
52 12 0 12 0 12
53 12 0 12 0 12
54 12 6 12 0 6
55 13 0 14 1 13
56 13 0 14 1 13
57 13 0 14 1 13
58 13 5 14 1 8
59 13 1 14 1 12
60 13 10 14 1 3
61 13 0 14 1 13
62 13 1 14 1 12
63 13 0 14 1 13
64 13 0 14 1 13
65 13 0 14 1 13
66 13 0 14 1 13
*Likely being reworked or already finished at launch
Table 106. Key flight days for each STS-117 procedure update (Part 2 of 2).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Unanticipated
Changes to prevent the Sun Environmental/ISS
from coming into the field of Conditions (e.g.,
1 view of the IDC N/A temperatures)
Unexpected Software
2 Problems with STS7 N/A Behavior
Procedure changed to allow
more detailed inspection of the
thermal blanket tear on the Launch Damage (actual
3 port OMS Pod OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Reconfiguration of the OMS
POD heaters (perhaps due to Launch Damage (actual
4 the tear in the thermal blanket) OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Non-functional N2 Flow
5 Sensor N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Switch guard placed over
switch for a failed PL Bay Actuator "Failure" or
6 Flood light N/A Degradation
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure not ready by print Procedure Books and
7 deadline N/A before Launch
Procedure changed to allow
more detailed inspection of the
thermal blanket tear on the Launch Damage (actual
8 port OMS Pod OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Update sent to correct a step
that had been done incorrectly
9 on FD3 N/A Crew Procedural Slips
Unanticipated
Update to configure cameras Environmental/ISS
for monitoring SAW deploy Conditions (e.g.,
10 (per request from ROBO) N/A temperatures)
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Refinement of the Update Conditions (e.g.,
11 from Message 20 N/A temperatures)
PGT battery logistics changed
due to PGT power off Actuator "Failure" or
12 anomaly during EVA 1 N/A Degradation
PGT battery logistics changed
due to PGT power off Actuator "Failure" or
13 anomaly during EVA 1 N/A Degradation
Table 107. STS-117 update rationales (Part 1 of 4).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration and
Addition of a tool to cut the Actual Post-Launch
2B leader (the fact that it still Configuration (e.g.,
had a spring attached was packaging error,
14 reported on EVA 1) N/A manufacturing error, etc.)
Change due to MDM OA2
15 Card 5 failure N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Changes due to poor EMU Actuator "Failure" or
16 water recharging after EVA 1 N/A Degradation
Provides the necessary camera
pan/tilt angles for viewing Procedure Nominally
17 SAW retract N/A Updated in Real-time
Refinement of update from
Msg. 25. Changes made to Unanticipated
support transfer of Shuttle Environmental/ISS
camera images to ISS Conditions (e.g.,
18 overnight N/A temperatures)
Provides the necessary camera
pan/tilt angles for viewing Procedure Nominally
19 SAW retract N/A Updated in Real-time
Changes due to poor EMU Actuator "Failure" or
20 water recharging after EVA 1 N/A Degradation
Added to save power in order
to potentially support extra Use of Shuttle Resources
days in orbit due to ISS to Counteract ISS
21 attitude control problems ISS Attitude Problems Problems
Updated to accommodate Launch Damage (actual
22 OMS Pod Blanket Repair OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Added to prepare tools for
OMS Pod Blanket Repair on Launch Damage (actual
23 EVA 3 OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Added to construct a platform
to simulate OMS POD TPS
Blanket material and to Launch Damage (actual
24 practice repair method OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Updated to accommodate Launch Damage (actual
25 OMS Pod Blanket Repair OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Updated to accommodate Launch Damage (actual
26 OMS Pod Blanket Repair OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Added to accommodate OMS Launch Damage (actual
27 Pod Blanket Repair OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Added to accommodate OMS Launch Damage (actual
28 Pod Blanket Repair OMS Pod Blanket Tear or suspected)
Added save power in order to
potentially support extra days Use of Shuttle Resources
in orbit due to ISS attitude to Counteract ISS
29 control problems ISS Attitude Problems Problems
Table 108. STS-117 update rationales (Part 2 of 4).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Changes due to ISS attitude Conditions (e.g.,
30 problems ISS Attitude Problems temperatures)
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Changes due to ISS attitude Conditions (e.g.,
31 problems ISS Attitude Problems temperatures)
Updated to accommodate Consumable Management
32 extra days in orbit "Get Aheads" Replanning
Procedure Updated or Re-
evaluated after the Print
Deadline for the
Procedure Books and
33 New PGT Settings N/A before Launch
New powerdowns to Use of Shuttle Resources
accommodate extra days in to Counteract ISS
34 orbit ISS Attitude Problems Problems
Changes due to addition of 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
35 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
36 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
37 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
38 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Updated to be completed in "Get-Ahead" Tasks
39 4th EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
40 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
41 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
42 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
43 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
44 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
45 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
46 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
47 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Added to accommodate 4th "Get-Ahead" Tasks
48 EVA "Get Aheads" Scheduled
Updated to reflect extra Consumable Management
49 docked days "Get Aheads" Replanning
Table 109. STS-117 update rationales (Part 3 of 4).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
50 Items added "Get Aheads" Equipment List Revision
Added as contingency Use of Shuttle Resources
procedure in response to ISS to Counteract ISS
51 attitude problems ISS Attitude Problems Problems
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
52 Possibly due to warm attitude N/A temperatures)
Unanticipated
Changes to prevent the Sun Environmental/ISS
from coming into the field of Conditions (e.g.,
53 view of the IDC N/A temperatures)
Changed due to earlier
powerdowns to preserve Use of Shuttle Resources
power while ISS attitude to Counteract ISS
54 problems were worked out ISS Attitude Problems Problems
Removes unnecessary step and
adds a missing step to open
AC MAR 3 phase circuit
55 breaker N/A Typos and Omissions
Adds two missing circuit
breaker checks (including a
check to ensure that AC 1
56 MAR 3 phase is open) N/A Typos and Omissions
Procedure Nominally
57 Different coldsoak initiation N/A Updated in Real-time
Change due to MDM OA2
58 Card 5 failure N/A Sensor "Failure" or Bias
Change due to failed PL Bay Actuator "Failure" or
59 Flood light N/A Degradation
Change to high pitch noise Actuator "Failure" or
60 from A6U ANNUN BUS N/A Degradation
New cabin temp controller Procedure Nominally
61 config N/A Updated in Real-time
Change due to failed PL Bay Actuator "Failure" or
62 Flood light N/A Degradation
New cabin temp controller Procedure Nominally
63 config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
64 PCS config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
65 NH3 boiler config N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
66 NH3 boiler config N/A Updated in Real-time
Table 110. STS-117 update rationales (Part 4 of 4).
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DATA POINT MISSION ELAPSED NUMBER OF PROCEDURES
TIME (MINUTES) NEEDING AND BEING
REWORKED
Launch 0 16
Instant before OMS Pod Thermal Blanket 8 16
Tear
Instant after OMS Pod Thermal Blanket Tear 9 26
End of FD 1 360 29
End of FD 2 1770 27
End of FD 3 3210 23
Instant before ISS "Get Aheads" 4650 27
Instant after ISS "Get Aheads"/ End of FD 4 4651 44
End of FD 5 6090 43
Instant before ISS Attitude Problems 7320 42
Instant after ISS Attitude Problems 7321 49
End of FD 6 7500 48
End of FD 7 8940 36
End ofFD 8 10350 31
End of FD 9 11760 17
End of FD 10 13170 17
End of FD 11 14580 15
End of FD 12 15990 12
End of FD 13 17400 0
Table 111. The STS-117 data time history for the variable Number of Procedures
Needing and Being Reworked.
TYPES OF PROCEDURE UPDATES PROCEDURE UPDATE NUMBERS
Due to OMS Pod Blanket Tear and in Time Horizon 3
Due to OMS Pod Blanket Tear and Beyond Time 4, 8, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to the OMS
Pod Blanket Tear)
Due to refinements of previously submitted OMS None
Pod Blanket Tear related updates
Due to "Get Aheads" and in Time Horizon None
Due to "Get Aheads" and Beyond Time Horizon 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
(i.e., propagated reworks due to the "Get Aheads") 48, 49, 50
Due to refinements of previously submitted "Get None
Aheads" related updates
Due to ISS Attitude Problems and in Time Horizon 21 and 29
Due to ISS Attitude Problems and Beyond Time 30, 31, 34, 51, 54,
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to ISS
Attitude Problems)
Due to refinements of previously submitted ISS None
Attitude Problems related updates
Outside Time Horizon and Not Latent at Launch 6, 16, 18, 20, 58, 59, 60, and 62
(i.e., propagated reworks not due to a discrete event)
Procedures developed as a result of the rework 2, 6, 7, 17, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41,
process 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 51
Table 112. List of specially designated STS-117 procedure updates.
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FLIGHT MISSION ELAPSED NORMALIZED TIME TO UPDATES SINCE
DAY TIME AT END OF LANDING PREVIOUS FLIGHT
FLIGHT DAY PREPARATION AT THE DAY
(MINUTES) END OF FD 13
0 0 0 0
1 360 0.02069 0
2 1770 0.1017 3
3 3210 0.1845 5
4 4650 0.2672 2
5 6090 0.35 4
6 7500 0.4310 3
7 8940 0.5138 12
8 10350 0.5948 5
9 11760 0.6759 14
10 13170 0.7569 1
11 14580 0.8379 2
12 15990 0.9190 3
13 17400 1 12
Table 113. STS-117 update times normalized to the landing preparation time.
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STS-120 Data Tables
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
184 FD16 - EOM+3 Flight Plan Revision 15 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019885
183A Entry Summary Template 15 Disregarded
sources: N023866A, N023872
182B Entry Summary Message 15 Disregarded
sources: N023866A
181A FIW Summary 15 Disregarded
sources: F019281, F019821, F019908
180A Entry C/L Deltas 15 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: N023849, F019897, F019903A
179D Deorbit Prep Updates 15 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: N023854, F019906, F019907
178 Sunday Funnies 15 Disregarded
177 Entry Day Fluid Loading and Anti-G Suit 15 Retrieved from FD15 Execute Package
Ops
sources: F019880
176A Increased Middeck Air Circulation 15 Retrieved from FD15 Execute Package
sources: N023865
175 FD15 PAO Event Summary 15 Disregarded
sources: F19887
174 FD14 MMT Summary 15 Retrieved from FD15 Execute Package
sources: F019890
173 FD15 Mission Summary 15 Retrieved from FD15 Execute Package
sources: N23858, N23867
172B FD15 Flight Plan Revision 15 Retrieved from FD15 Execute Package
sources: N023863, N023865
171 FD15 Preliminary Summary Timelines 15 Disregarded
170 FD13 MMT Summary 14 Retrieved from FD14 Execute Package
sources: F019857A
169 Starboard Survey Page 7-16 Update 14 Retrieved from FD14 Execute Package
sources: F19855
168 OBSS Maneuver to Hover 14 Retrieved from FD14 Execute Package
sources: F019837C
167 FD14 Mission Summary (16-0228) 14 Retrieved from FD14 Execute Package
sources: N23798, N23802
166B FD14 Flight Plan Revision 14 Retrieved from FD14 Execute Package
sources: FO19839, N023776, N023800
165 FD14 Preliminary Summary Timeline 13 Disregarded
164 Undocking PAD and Event Summary 13 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019827
163 FD13 Sensor Checkout 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F19801B
162 FD13 ISS Stowage Info 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F019809
161A ESA-ASI PAO Event Summary Message: 13 Disregarded
Sky News Italia
sources: F19806A
Table 114. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 1 of 9).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
160 FD13 Transfer Message (16-0220) 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F19816
159 EVA Stow Procedure (16-0219) 14 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
158 Post EVA 4 BSA Battery Recharge 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
Graphic (16-0218)
sources: F019803
157 EVA Prep for Transfer to Shuttle (16-0217) 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
156 FD 13 EVA DELTAS (16-0216) 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F019810A
155B Handover Attitude Control Procedure 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
Update (16-0214B)
sources: F019140, N23742, N23746
154 FD12 MMT Summary (16-0213) 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F019814
153 FD13 Mission Summary (16-0212) 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: N23756, N23751, F19821
152B FD13 Flight Plan Revision 13 Retrieved from FD13 Execute Package
sources: F019766, FD019809, N023716,
N023717, N023737, N023747
151A FD13 Preliminary Summary Timeline 12 Disregarded
150 Revised Overview Timeline (16-0209) 12 Disregarded
149 Updated LiOH Cue Card 12 Retrieved from FD 12 Execute Package
sources: F019744
148 EVA 4 Frame of Reference (16-0208) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F019769
147 Middeck Stowage Maps 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F019750
146 FD12 Transfer Message (16-0205) 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019771
145A FD12 Post-EVA OBSS Handoff to 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
SRMS (16-0202A)
sources: F019749
144A FD12 Port OBSS Handoff to SSRMS (16- 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
0201A)
sources: F019748D
143 FD12 OBSS Maneuver From Undock to 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
Handoff (16-0200)
sources: F019747
142 10A EVA4 SAW Damage Diagram (16- 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
0196)
141 10A EVA4 Updated Detailed Timeline (16- 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
0195)
sources: F019745
140 Post EVA4 EMU Resize (16-0193) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
139 FD12 EVA DELTAS (16-0192) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F019765
138 FD11 MMT Summary (16-0191) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: F19764
Table 115. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 2 of 9).
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MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
137 FD12 Mission Summary (16-0190) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: N023677, N023678
136B FD12 Flight Plan Revision (16-0189B) 12 Retrieved from FD12 Execute Package
sources: N23652A, N23673
135A FD12 Preliminary Summary Timeline 11 Disregarded
134 EVA4: Safety tethering to OBSS - Procedure 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Deltas (16-0188)
sources: F019733
133 EVA S/G Tagup Agenda (16-0186) 11 Disregarded
sources: F019731
132 Russian Dino Taping Procedure (16-0185) 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019730
131 Exercise Protocol (16-0184) 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019728
130A DOUG Setup Notes (16-0183A) 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019727
129A SSRMS Support of P6 4B Blanket 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Repair (16-0182A)
sources: FO 19722
128A SSRMS OBSS Grapple at WS 8 (16-0181A) 12 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019725
127 OBSS Unberth, Handoff, and MNVR to Pre- 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Grapple at WS8 (16-0180)
sources: F019710A
126 EVA Tool Taping Procedures (16-0178) 11 Retrieved from FD 11 Execute Package
sources: F019711
125 SAW Repair Nomenclature and Cuff 11 Disregarded
Pictures (16-0177)
sources: F019713
124 EVA 4 SAW Repair Detailed 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Procedures (16-0176)
sources: F019724B
123A FD11 WS3 OBSS Handoff to SRMS 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F019703A
122 Date/Time Set for DCS 760 S/N1016 11 Retrieved from FD 11 Execute Package
sources: F19697
121A FD10 MMT Summary (16-0175A) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: F019700A
120 FD11 Transfer Message (16-0171) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: FO 19702
119 FD11 Mission Summary (16-0169) 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: N023576
118B FD11 Flight Plan Revision 11 Retrieved from FD11 Execute Package
sources: N23551, N23569, N23567, N23577,
F19698
117 Trash/Stowage Management for Extension 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Days
sources: F019677A
Table 116. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 3 of 9).
324
MSG MSG Title FD Status for Case Study
116A Preliminary FD11 Summary Timeline 10 Disregarded
115 FD11 EVA Summary (16-0168) 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019717
114 EVA 4 Translation Path (16-0165) 11 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019720
113 Needle Nose Pliers Modification (16-0164) 11 Disregarded
sources: F019721
112 FD11 and 12 Robotics - EVA Operations Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
Sequence (16-0162)
sources: F019664
111 EVA Get-Aheads FD10 (16-0161) 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019656
110 SSRMS MNVR to OBSS Pre-Grapple (16- Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
0159)
sources: FO 19663
109 SSRMS OBSS Unberth (16-0158) Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019663
108 Berthed OBSS Grapple From WS3 (16- Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
0157)
sources: F019663
107 Stowage Locations For Thu Plan (GMT 305, 10 Disregarded
FD10) (16-0150)
106 Solar Array Hinge Stabilizer 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Construction (16-0156)
sources: F019650
105B 15 Day Overview Timeline (FD12 EVA 10 Disregarded
4) (16-0160B)
sources: W017421B
104A 10A EVA 4 Solar Array No Touch 10 Disregarded
Briefing (16-0154A)
sources: F019646A
103 EMU Wrist Disconnect Taping 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Procedure (16-0153)
sources: F019643
102 EVA 4 SAW Repair Procedures (16-0152) 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F19641
101 FD09 MMT Summary (16-0151) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F19637
100 10A EVA 4 Summary Timeline and Tool 10 Disregarded
Config (16-0149)
099 FD10 EVA Deltas (16-0148) 10 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
098 FD10 Transfer Message (16-0144) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F019633
097 FD10 Mission Summary (16-0143) 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: N023493, N023497
096B FD10 Flight Plan Revision 10 Retrieved from FD10 Execute Package
sources: F19614, N23484, N23486
095 FD10 Preliminary Summary Timeline 09 Disregarded
Table 117. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 4 of 9).
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094 EMU Glove Recommendation For 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Parazynski (16-0136)
093 Initial Crew Package (16-0134) 09 Disregarded
092 Photo Technique for SARJ EVA 4 (16-0139) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019587
091 FD08 MMT Summary (16-0135) 09 Retrieved from FD09 Execute Package
sources: F019582
090 10A EVA 4 SARJ Briefing Package (16- 09 Disregarded
0133)
sources: F019589
089 10A EVA 4 Preliminary Detailed Disregarded
Timeline (16-0132)
088 Wheelock EMU Glove Reconfiguration (16- 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
0131)
087 10A EVA Tool Buildup (16-0130) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
086 Event Summary Message - ESA-ASI VIP 09 Disregarded
Call
sources: FO 19575
085 Event Summary Message - Discovery/Alpha 09 Disregarded
Joint Crew News Conference (16-0128)
sources: F019576
084 FD09 HAM Pass with Liceo Scientifico 09 Disregarded
G.Galilei (16-0127)
sources: N023042
083 FD09 Transfer Message (16-0126) 09 Retrieved from FD09 Execute Package
sources: F019585
082 FD09 Mission Summary (16-0125) 09 Retrieved from FD09 Execute Package
sources: N023414, N023427
081 FD9 EVA Deltas (16-0123) 09 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019588A
080B FD09 Flight Plan Revision 09 Retrieved from FD09 Execute Package
sources: F19579A, W17293, N23409,
N23412, N23429
079 Mission Overview 15 DAY TIMELINE 08 Disregarded
078A FD09 Preliminary Summary Timeline 08 Disregarded
077 10A EVA3 Detailed Timeline - NO 08 Retrieved from FD08 Execute Package
MBSU (16-0115)
076 FD8 EVA DELTAS (16-0114) 08 Retrieved from FD08 Execute Package
075 FD07 MMT Summary (16-0112) 08 Retrieved from FD08 Execute Package
sources: F019522
074A FD08 Mission Summary (16-0111A) 08 Retrieved from FD08 Execute Package
sources: N023343, N023348, N023356
073B FD08 Flight Plan Revision 08 Retrieved from FD08 Execute Package
sources: F19523, N23341
072A PGSC Reconfig Due to STS6 Monitor 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Problems
sources: FAO-F01956B
Table 118. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 5 of 9).
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071 EVA 3 Options for MBSU Time (16-0110) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: EVA-F019510
070 FD08 Preliminary Summary Timeline 07 Disregarded
069 EVA 3 Summary Timeline (Reflects Port 07 Disregarded
SARJ Inspection) (16-0106)
sources: F019494
068 10A EVA3 Port SARJ Inspect (16-0103) 07 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: F019492
067 FD07 PAO Event Summary (16-0102) 07 Disregarded
sources: F019478
066A FD07 Flight Plan Revision 07 Retrieved from FD07 Execute Package
sources: F019465, F019281, N023259,
N023268, N023280, N023285
065 FD07 Mission Summary (16-0099) 07 Retrieved from FD07 Execute Package
sources: N023294, N023286
064 FD07 MS4 Ham Pass with IIS Deambrosis- 07 Disregarded
Natta & University of L'Aquila (16-0098)
sources: N023041
063 FD7 EVA DELTAS (16-0096) 07 Retrieved from FD07 Execute Package
sources: F019486A
062B FD06 MMT Summary (16-0094B) 07 Retrieved from FD07 Execute Package
sources: F019480
061 Post EVA2 SARJ inspect questions (16- 06 Disregarded
0095)
060 FD07 Preliminary Summary Timeline 06 Disregarded
059 SRMS Mnvr to Pre-Cradle Position 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019438
058 FD6 EVA DELTAS (16-0090) 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019442
057 FD06 Transfer Message (16-0085) 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019437
056 FD05 MMT Summary (16-0084) 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019440
055 FD06 Mission Summary (16-0083) 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019439, N023232, N023237
054B FD06 Flight Plan Revision 06 Retrieved from FD06 Execute Package
sources: F019433, F019434, F019435,
F019441, F019444, F019445A, N023223,
N023229
053 SRMS MANEUVER TO NODE 2 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
VIEWING (16-0082)
sources: PDRS -FO 19425
052 FD06 Preliminary Summary Timeline 05 Disregarded
051 EVA 2 Notes and Updates (16-0080) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: EVA - F019421
050 EVA 2 Summary Timeline (16-0079) 05 Disregarded
049 10A EVA SARJ Cribsheet (16-0077) 05 Disregarded
048 10A EVA2 Detail Timeline Deltas (16-0076) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
Table 119. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 6 of 9).
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047 10A EVA SARJ Inspection Briefing 05 Disregarded
Package (16-0075)
046 FD05 PGSC Network Cabling Replacement 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: FO 19404
045B Node 2 Equipment Prep 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: F019401
044A FD05 FCMS Trouble Shooting 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: N023 166
043A PAO Event Summary Message - CBS News, 05 Disregarded
FOX News, WHAM-TV, Rochester,
NY (16-0073A)
sources: F019393
042 Handover Attitude Control Orbiter to CMG- 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
Only Without RS SMTC (16-0072)
sources: F019366
041 RCC PLUG HOUSING 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
REPLACEMENT (16-0070)
sources: F019384
040 FD05 EVA DELTAS (16-0069) 05 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
sources: F019407A
039 FD05 Transfer Message (16-0067) 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: F019400
038 FD04 MMT Summary (16-0066) 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: F019396
037A FD05 Mission Summary (16-0065A) 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: F019391, F019390, F019394,
N023195
036A FD05 Flight Plan Revision 05 Retrieved from FD05 Execute Package
sources: FO19371, F019386, FO19395,
N023112A; N023140B, N023152, N023159,
N023164, N023184
035 DCS760 Camera Issues 04 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: MMACS - F019376
034 FD5 Preliminary Summary Timeline 04 Disregarded
033B Manual WinDecom SpOC Update 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
Procedure
sources: F019357
032A FD04 EVA DELTAS (16-0056A) 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: FO 019347B
031 Background Information on the Naming of 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
"Harmony" (16-0055)
sources: F019345
030 FD03 MMT Summary (16-0054) 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: F019346
029A Water Ops Cue Card 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: N023139
028 FD04 Transfer Message (16-0052) 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: F019356
Table 120. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 7 of 9).
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027A FD04 Mission Summary (16-0051 A) 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: N023134, N023135
026B FD04 Flight Plan Revision 04 Retrieved from FD04 Execute Package
sources: F019344, F019352, N023113,
N023114, N023129, N023130, N023140
025 EMU Prebreathe Updates (16-0049) 03 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
024 FD04 Preliminary Summary Timeline 03 Disregarded
023 TCS Troubleshooting Procedure 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: F019311B
022 SODF Transfer Activity (16-0031) Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
021 FD03 RELMO and Maneuver Pads 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: N023061
020A FD03 EVA Deltas 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: F019294B
019 FD02 MMT Summary 03 Disregarded
sources: F019306
018 Stowage Locations For IWIS Accelerometer 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
Install
sources: F019302
016 FD03 Transfer Message (16-0037) 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: F019310
014 IWIS Installation Near Shuttle 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
Ergometer (16-0035)
sources: F019275A
013 FD03 Mission Summary 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: F019281, N023056,N023071
012A FD03 Flight Plan Revision 03 Retrieved from FD03 Execute Package
sources: F019300, F019302, F019305,
N023027, N023047, N023057
011 FD3 Preliminary Summary Timeline 02 Disregarded
010 FD2 Survey Times for Playback 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
sources: INCO- F0197276A
009 Rendezvous Event and Lighting Information 02 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/30/08
Summary
sources: F019267
008 FD02 EVA C/L and ISS EVA Systems C/L 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
Deltas
sources: F019259
007 Post EVA EMU Glove Photo Reference 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
Procedures (16-0030)
sources: F019261
006 FD02 Survey Deltas 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
sources: F019248A
005 FD02 Transfer Message 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
sources: F019255
Table 121. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 8 of 9).
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004 FD02 Mission Summary 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
sources: F019258, N02292, N022989
003B FD02 Flight Plan Revision 02 Retrieved from FD02 Execute Package
sources: F019207, F019239A, F019254,
F019257, F019260, N022986, N022988
002 FDI Timeline Updates 01 Requested & Delivered by JSC on 6/16/08
001 Test Message 01 Disregarded
Table 122. Listing of the electronic messages sent to the STS-120 crew (Part 9 of 9).
Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Mistakenly Omitted
from timeline for ACO/
1 1 DON ACTIWATCH 2 MS5 (Typo) SURGEON
Failed Flowmeter
(Failure occurred on
2 2 FC Purge - Manual 003B STS-116) EGIL
Improving IDC
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC Survey coverage of panels
3 2 - STBD 6 9R, 13R, 9L, and 12L PDRS
Improving IDC
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC Survey coverage of panels
4 2 - PORT 6 9R, 13R, 9L, and 12L PDRS
New procedure
developed in
response to glove
damage on STS-118.
This procedure was
not completed in time
to make it into the
ISS EVA Systems
Post EVA Glove Photos - C/L before the print
5 2 Required 7 deadline EVA
EVA PREP FOR TRANSFER
6 2 TO ISS 8 Logistical Changes EVA
EVA PREP FOR TRANSFER
7 2 TO SHUTTLE 8 Logistical Changes EVA
8 2 EVA STOW 8 Logistical Changes EVA
Details of this
procedure were not
IWIS INSTALLATION NEAR finalized until after
9 3 SHUTTLE ERGOMETER 14 print deadline ACO
FD03_TRANSFERLISTSTS1 PGSC Power cable
10 3 20 16 failure ACO
Tasks simplified by
ISS crew item
11 3 PRE EVA 1 TOOL CONFIG 020A prepositioning EVA
Table 123. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 1 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Serial numbers called
down by crew and
recorded on the cue
STS-120/10A Consumables card. Also, there was
12 3 Tracking Cue Card 020A a typo EVA
Bad TCS data cable
or improper
assignment of the
COM Port within the
TCS TROUBLE SHOOTING Windows operating
13 3 PROCEDURE 23 system. FAO
Details of this
procedure were not
finalized until after
14 3 EMU PREBREATHE 25 print deadline EVA
The lab window
shutter being closed
throughout the
EVA 1 INHIBIT PAD mission eliminated
LOCATION DEPENDENT the need for several
15 4 INHIBITS 032A steps EVA
EVAl INHIBIT PAD EVA 1
SPECIFIC INHIBITS - SSPTS
16 4 DEACTIVATION 032A Messages Omitted EVA
MANUAL WINDECOM PGSC Network
17 4 SPOC UPDATE PROCEDURE 033B problems FAO
Overexposed images
from DCS760
cameras (Note: this
may not be a
procedure update as
much as a
compliance
18 4 DCS SETUP Cue Card 35 verification) MMACS
Confusion over
whether to leave a
POST EVA 1/PRE EVA 2 tool on ISS or bring it
19 5 TOOL CONFIG 40 back EVA
Added tools for
20 5 PRE EVA 2 TOOL CONFIG 40 SARJ inspection EVA
Added tools for
21 5 POST EVA 2 TOOL CONFIG 40 SARJ inspection EVA
Added steps to
inspect the APFR (it
was thought that the
glove damage on
STS-118 and EVA 1
may be due to poor
EVA 2 CLEANUP AND A/L performance by the
22 5 INGRESS 40 APFR) EVA
Table 124. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 2 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Changed due to
S SFU CONFIG CINCH addition of SARJ
23 5 FIRING 40 Inspection EVA
Removed inhibits and
step 1 due to task
reordering to
accommodate the
addition of SARJ
24 5 PDGF INSTALL ON NODE 2 40 Inspection EVA
Details of this
procedure were not
RCC PLUG HOUSING finalized until after
25 5 REPLACEMENT 41 print deadline MMACS
This new procedure
is in response to the
ISS attitude control
problems
encountered on STS-
117. It probably did
HANDOVER ATTITUDE not make its way into
CONTROL ORBITER TO the procedure books
CMG-ONLY WITHOUT RS before the print ADCO/
26 5 SMTC 42 deadline GNC
FD05 FCMS TROUBLE PGSC Network
27 5 SHOOTING 044A Problems FAO
28 5 NODE 2 EQUIPMENT PREP 045B IMS update ACO
FD05 PGSC NETWORK PGSC Network
29 5 CABLING REPLACEMENT 46 Problems FAO
Step reprioritized and
reordered due to
addition of SARJ
30 5 NODE 2 OUTFITTING 48 Inspection EVA
CETA Rail damage
from MMOD
believed to be related
to EMU glove
AIRLOCK OPS AND CETA damage on STS-118
31 5 HANDRAIL INSPECTION 48 and EVA 1 EVA
32 5 SARJ INSPECTION 48 SARJ vibrations EVA
Removal of hardware
added in MSG 40
33 5 EVA 2 Tool Config 51 from the EVA EVA
Removal of hardware
added in MSG 40
34 5 SARJ Inspection cribsheet 51 from the EVA EVA
35 5 SARJ INSPECTION 51 Typo EVA
New translation path
necessitated a new
36 5 EVA 2 Inhibit Pad 51 inhibit. EVA
Table 125. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 3 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
SRMS MANEUVER TO Unexpected SRMS
37 5 NODE 2 VIEWING 53 shoulder temps. PDRS
Intermittent data
New process for recording from FCMS
38 6 FCMS data 55 application EGIL
Changed REBA
STS-120/10A Consumables Battery serial
39 6 Tracking Cue Card 58 numbers EVA
Changed REBA
STS-120/10A Consumables Battery serial
40 6 Tracking Cue Card 58 numbers EVA
Changed REBA
STS-120/10A Battery Recharge Battery serial
41 6 Plan Cue Card 58 numbers EVA
New LiOH canister
to accommodate a
longer EVA 3 (due to
STS-120/10A Consumables the tasks that were
42 6 Tracking Cue Card 58 moved from EVA 2) EVA
SRMS MNVR TO PRE- Unexpected SRMS
43 6 CRADLE POSITION 59 shoulder temps. PDRS
On Orbit Installable Handrail
44 7 Troubleshooting Procedure 63 Unreleased bolt EVA
Removal/
Reconfiguration of
equipment
added/reconfigured
POST EVA 2/PRE EVA 3 for EVA 2 SARJ
45 7 TOOL CONFIG 63 Inspection EVA
Removal/
Reconfiguration of
equipment
added/reconfigured
for EVA 2 SARJ
46 7 PRE EVA 3 TOOL CONFIG 63 Inspection EVA
Equipment stowage
plan change (due to
EVA 3 A/L EGRESS AND the addition of the
47 7 SETUP 63 SARJ inspection) EVA
New number of turns
on P6 strap (either
due to a typo or
48 7 ATTACH P6 to P5 63 reanalysis) EVA
Logistical changes
(due to reordering of
OUTBOARD RADIATOR tasks for the SARJ
49 7 CINCH RELEASE 63 inspection) EVA
Table 126. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 4 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
This procedure was
put "On Call" and
updated to include
steps for a possible
EV1 02 recharge due
P1 SFU CONFIG FOR CINCH to the addition of the
50 7 FIRING 63 SARJ inspection EVA
This procedure was
updated to include
steps for a possible
EV2 02 recharge due
to the addition of the
51 7 MBSU TRANSFER 63 SARJ inspection EVA
Steps removed to
prevent hot mics
during EVA
52 7 EVA PREP 63 Prep/Post EVA
Steps removed to
prevent hot mics
during EVA
53 7 EMU PURGE 63 Prep/Post EVA
Added to due debris
found during STBD
54 7 PORT SARJ INSPECT 68 SARJ inspection EVA
PGSC RECONFIG DUE TO STS6 monitor
55 7 STS6 MONITOR PROBLEMS 072A problems FAO
New process for Shuttle/ISS Failed primary
56 8 intercom 074A hardline intercom INCO
Step delayed due to
regeneration of
57 8 POST EVA 76 micropurification unit EVA
Contingency version
of the procedure
added in the event
that the MBSU
P1 SFU CONFIG POST Transfer task is
58 8 DEPLOY 77 deferred from EVA 3 EVA
Contingency version
of the procedure
added in the event
that the MBSU
HORSESHOE CONNECTOR Transfer task is
59 8 INSTALL 77 deferred from EVA 3 EVA
Contingency version
of the procedure
added in the event
that the MBSU
Transfer task is
60 8 RPCM S04B-C R&R 77 deferred from EVA 3 EVA
Table 127. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 5 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
IMU 1 problems and
inability to use star
tracker data due to
61 9 IMU reset 080B attitude and sun angle GNC
POST EVA3/PRE EVA 4
62 9 TOOL CONFIG 81 Logistical changes EVA
Anomalous data on
the sublimator of a
suit prompted the
MCC to look into
EMU resizing and
they found a few
EMU Contingency Resize mistakes in the resize
63 9 Matrix (STS-120/10A) 81 matrix EVA
Equipment Buildup
INSPECTION MIRROR for SARJ
64 9 CONFIGURE FOR EVA 87 Troubleshooting EVA
Wheelock EMU Glove Small tears in EMU
65 9 Reconfiguration 88 gloves EVA
Photo Technique for SARJ Added for SARJ
66 9 EVA 4 92 Inspection EVA
Added to alleviate
EMU Glove Recommendation blistering of EVI's
67 9 for Parazynski 94 hand EVA
The decision to use
older LiOH canisters
necessitated new
steps to prevent dust
from being spread
68 10 LiOH Cuecard 096B throughout the cabin EECOM
EMU battery change
to accommodate a
69 10 BATT SWAP 99 longer EVA EVA
Changes due to
addition of SAW
repair activity to
70 10 STS 120 EVA 4 INHIBIT PAD 102 EVA EVA
Changes due to
addition of SAW
EVA 4 NOTES, CAUTIONS, repair activity to
71 10 AND WARNINGS 102 EVA EVA
Changes due to
addition of SAW
repair activity to
72 10 PRE EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 102 EVA EVA
Changes due to
addition of SAW
EVA 4 A/L EGRESS AND repair activity to
73 10 SETUP 102 EVA EVA
Table 128. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 6 of 11).
335
Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS EVA/
for SAW repair ROBO/
74 10 SSRMS/OBSS SETUP 102 activity PDRS
SSRMS/OBSS
MNVR due to
addition of SAW EVA/
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR TO 4B repair activity to ROBO/
75 10 SAW 102 EVA PDRS
Changes due to
addition of SAW
4B SAW repair activity to
76 10 TROUBLESHOOTING 102 EVA EVA
SSRMS/OBSS
MNVR due to
addition of SAW EVA/
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR TO repair activity to ROBO/
77 10 APFR EGRESS 102 EVA PDRS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS EVA/
APFR EGRESS AND OBSS for SAW repair ROBO/
78 10 CLEANUP 102 activity PDRS
Changes due to
addition of SAW
EVA 4 CLEANUP AND A/L repair activity to
79 10 INGRESS 102 EVA EVA
Added to prevent
contact of metal
glove components
EMU Wrist Disconnect Taping with the solar arrays
80 10 for EVA 4 103 (electrocution hazard) EVA
SOLAR ARRAY HINGE Added to construct
STABILIZER stabilizers for the
81 10 CONSTRUCTION 106 damaged SAW EVA
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS
BERTHED OBSS GRAPPLE for SAW repair ROBO/
82 10 FROM WS3 108 activity PDRS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS
for SAW repair ROBO/
83 10 SSRMS OBSS UNBERTH 109 activity PDRS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS
SSRMS MNVR TO OBSS for SAW repair ROBO/
84 10 PRE-GRAPPLE 110 activity PDRS
Logistical changes
STS-120/10A Consumables due to SAW repair
85 11 Tracking Cue Card 115 EVA EVA
Table 129. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 7 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
DATE/TIME SET FOR DCS Camera resetting
86 11 760 S/N 1016 122 issues MMACS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS
FD11 WS3 OBSS HANDOFF for SAW repair ROBO/
87 11 TO SRMS 123A activity PDRS
Added to reduce
electrocution hazard
88 11 EVA Tool Taping Procedures 126 for SAW repair EVA EVA
Procedure added in
OBSS UNBERTH, HANDOFF, order to use OBSS EVA/
AND MANEUVER TO PRE- for SAW repair ROBO/
89 11 GRAPPLE AT WORKSITE 8 127 activity PDRS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS EVA/
SSRMS OBSS GRAPPLE AT for SAW repair ROBO/
90 12 WS8 128A activity PDRS
Procedure added in
order to use OBSS
SSRMS SUPPORT OF P6 4B for SAW repair
91 12 BLANKET REPAIR 129A activity EVA/ROBO
This procedure
allowed the crew to
view a DOUG movie EVA/
of the trajectory to ROBO/
92 11 DOUG Setup Notes 130 the SAW repair site PDRS
RUSSIAN EVA DINO Added to reduce
CUTTERS (NIPPERS) electrocution hazard
93 11 TAPING PROCEDURE 132 for SAW repair EVA EVA
Changes to the EVA
4 procedure due to
need to safety tether
94 11 Safety tethering to OBSS 134 to OBSS EVA
Refinement of this
SAW repair
95 11 STS 120 EVA 4 INHIBIT PAD 141 procedure EVA
Refinement of this
EVA 4 NOTES, CAUTIONS, SAW repair
96 11 AND WARNINGS 141 procedure EVA
Refinement of this
SAW repair
97 11 PRE EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 141 procedure EVA
Refinement of this
EVA 4 A/L EGRESS AND SAW repair
98 11 SETUP 141 procedure EVA
Refinement of this EVA/
SAW repair ROBO/
99 11 SSRMS/OBSS SETUP 141 procedure PDRS
Table 130. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 8 of 11).
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Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
Refinement of this EVA/
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR TO 4B SAW repair ROBO/
100 11 SAW 141 procedure PDRS
Refinement of this
4B SAW SAW repair
101 11 TROUBLESHOOTING 141 procedure EVA
Refinement of this EVA/
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR TO SAW repair ROBO/
102 11 APFR EGRESS 141 procedure PDRS
Refinement of this EVA/
APFR EGRESS AND OBSS SAW repair ROBO/
103 11 CLEANUP 141 procedure PDRS
Refinement of this
EVA 4 CLEANUP AND A/L SAW repair
104 11 INGRESS 141 procedure EVA
Equipment omissions
in the previously
transmitted version of
this SAW repair
105 12 PRE EVA 4 TOOL CONFIG 139 procedure EVA
Typos in the
previously
transmitted version of
4B SAW this SAW repair
106 12 TROUBLESHOOTING 139 procedure EVA
Missing EVA
overglove doffing
steps in the
previously
transmitted version of
EVA 4 CLEANUP AND A/L this SAW repair
107 12 INGRESS 139 procedure EVA
To return the EMU
used for EVA 4 back
to its original size for
use on a stage EVA
(as per message 62,
this EMU was resized
due so that EV 1
could use it as a
replacement for his
EMU, which had
108 12 Post EVA4 EMU Resize 140 sublimator problems) EVA
OBSS movements
FD 12 OBSS MNVR FROM added for SAW ROBO/
109 12 UNDOCK TO HANDOFF 143 repair EVA PDRS
OBSS movements
FD 12 PORT OBSS added for SAW ROBO/
110 12 HANDOFF TO SSRMS 144A repair EVA PDRS
Table 131. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 9 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
OBSS movements
FD 12 POST-EVA OBSS added for SAW ROBO/
111 12 HANDOFF TO SRMS 145A repair EVA PDRS
112 12 LiOH Cuecard 149 Logistical changes EECOM
113 13 AVIU Reconfig 152B Broken AVIU switch INCO
This procedure is in
response to the ISS
attitude control
problems
encountered on STS-
117. It probably did
3.11X HANDOVER not make its way into
ATTITUDE CONTROL CMG the procedure books
TA TO ORBITER VIA SPEC before the print ADCO/
114 13 205 155B deadline GNC
EVA TRANSFER TO Different EVA
115 13 SHUTTLE 156 batteries EVA/ACO
EVA PREP FOR TRANSFER Different EVA
116 13 TO SHUTTLE 157 batteries EVA/ACO
Battery information
STS-120/10A Battery Recharge updated to reflect
117 13 Plan Cue Card 158 EVA 4 EVA
Added to ensure that
OBSS still worked
118 13 FD13 SENSOR CHECKOUT 163 after EVA 4 PDRS
Additional photos
requested due to a
degradation of TCS
Undocking PAD and Event Reflector #1 noticed
119 13 Summary 164 on FD 3 RNDZ
Optimization of post-
separation trajectory
due to extra days at
120 13 SEP BURN 164 station RNDZ
Possibly due to
HEATER RECONFIG- warmer attitudes than
121 14 CONFIG B 166B expected EECOM
OBSS MANEUVER TO Added due to FD13
122 14 HOVER 168 Sensor Checkout PDRS
Comments added to
OBSS LDRI/IDC RCC reflect delays in the
123 14 SURVEY - STBD 169 procedure PDRS
Added to give crew
the optional
INCREASED MIDDECK AIR capability to increase
124 15 CIRCULATION 176A air circulation EECOM
Modified to give
crew the optional
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP capability to increase
125 15 CHECKLIST 176A air circulation EECOM
Table 132. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 10 of 11).
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Procedure Msg Console
Update FD Procedure Name # Rationale Position
PAYLOAD ENTRY SWITCH
126 15 LIST/VERIFICATION 179D Typo ACO
Mid Port Payload
NOMINAL DEORBIT PREP Bay Floodlight
127 15 CHECKLIST 179D Failure on FD12 EGIL
Mid Port Payload
Bay Floodlight
128 15 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 179D Failure on FD12 EGIL
PCS 1 configuration
129 15 DEORBIT PREP BACKOUT 179D changes EECOM
FINAL ENTRY SWITCH LIST Flash Evaporator
130 15 VERIFICATION 179D Configuration EECOM
Ammonia Boiler
131 15 NH3 ACT 180A Configuration EECOM
Ammonia Boiler
132 15 NH3 RECONFIG 180A Configuration EECOM
Updated due to extra
days in orbit and
change from
ascending to
OMS He PRESS/AV/BURN descending landing
133 15 TIME 180A opportunities PROP
Updated due to extra
days in orbit and
change from
ascending to
descending landing
134 15 PREBANK TABLES 180A opportunities GNC
Revised flight plan
EOM+3 FLIGHT PLAN due to landing
135 15 REVISION 184A waveoffs FAO
Table 133. Procedure update designations for STS-120 (Part 11 of 11).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable and
Executed anticipated When it was updated
execution
1 1 0 1 0 1
2 2 0* 2 0 2
3 2 1 2 0 1
4 2 1 2 0 1
5 2 0* 4 2 2
6 2 0 2 0 2
7 2 0 2 0 2
8 2 0 2 0 2
9 3 0* 3 0 3
10 3 1 3 0 2
11 3 2 3 0 1
12 3 0 3 0 3
13 3 1 3 0 2
14 3 0* 4 1 3
15 4 0 4 0 4
16 4 0 4 0 4
17 4 1 4 0 3
18 4 4 4 0 0
19 5 0 5 0 5
20 5 4 6 1 1
21 5 4 7 2 1
22 5 0 6 1 5
23 5 4 6 1 1
24 5 4 6 1 1
25 5 0* 5 0 5
26 5 0* 6 1 5
27 5 1 5 0 4
28 5 5 5 0 0
29 5 1 5 0 4
30 5 4 6 1 1
31 5 4 6 1 1
32 5 4 6 1 1
33 5 5 6 1 0
34 5 5 6 1 0
35 5 5 6 1 0
36 5 4 6 1 1
37 5 5 5 0 0
38 6 5 6 0 1
39 6 5 6 0 1
40 6 5 11 5 1
41 6 5 6 0 1
42 6 4 8 2 2
43 6 5 6 0 1
44 7 6 8 1 1
Table 134. Key flight days for each STS-120 procedure update (Part 1 of 4).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable and
Executed anticipated When it was updated
execution
45 7 4 7 0 3
46 7 4 7 0 3
47 7 4 8 1 3
48 7 0 8 1 7
49 7 4 8 1 3
50 7 4 8 1 3
51 7 4 8 1 3
52 7 6 8 1 1
53 7 6 8 1 1
54 7 4 8 1 3
55 7 7 7 0 0
56 8 7 8 0 1
57 8 7 8 0 1
58 8 4 8 0 4
59 8 4 8 0 4
60 8 4 8 0 4
61 9 0 9 0 9
62 9 4 9 0 5
63 9 8 9 0 1
64 9 4 9 0 5
65 9 8 10 1 1
66 9 4 10 1 5
67 9 8 10 1 1
68 10 9 10 0 1
69 10 8 10 0 2
70 10 8 12 2 2
71 10 8 12 2 2
72 10 8 11 1 2
73 10 8 12 2 2
74 10 8 12 2 2
75 10 8 12 2 2
76 10 8 12 2 2
77 10 8 12 2 2
78 10 8 12 2 2
79 10 8 12 2 2
80 10 8 10 0 2
81 10 8 10 0 2
82 10 8 11 1 2
83 10 8 10 0 2
84 10 8 11 1 2
85 11 8 12 1 3
86 11 0 11 0 11
87 11 8 11 0 3
88 11 8 11 0 3
89 11 8 11 0 3
Table 135. Key flight days for each STS-120 procedure update (Part 2 of 4).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable and
Executed anticipated When it was updated
execution
90 12 8 12 0 4
91 12 8 12 0 4
92 11 8 11 0 3
93 11 8 11 0 3
94 11 8 12 1 3
95 11 10 12 1 1
96 11 10 12 1 1
97 11 10 11 0 1
98 11 10 12 1 1
99 11 10 12 1 1
100 11 10 12 1 1
101 11 10 12 1 1
102 11 10 12 1 1
103 11 10 12 1 1
104 11 10 12 1 1
105 12 10 12 0 2
106 12 11 12 0 1
107 12 10 12 0 2
108 12 8 12 0 4
109 12 8 12 0 4
110 12 8 12 0 4
111 12 8 12 0 4
112 12 8 12 0 4
113 13 11 13 0 2
114 13 0 13 0 13
115 13 8 13 0 5
116 13 8 13 0 5
117 13 8 13 0 5
118 13 8 13 0 5
119 13 3 14 1 10
120 13 8 14 1 5
121 14 0 14 0 14
122 14 8 14 0 6
123 14 0 14 0 14
124 15 14 15 0 1
125 15 14 16 1 1
126 15 0 16 1 15
127 15 12 16 1 3
128 15 12 16 1 3
129 15 0 16 1 15
130 15 0 16 1 15
131 15 0 16 1 15
132 15 0 16 1 15
Table 136. Key flight days for each STS-120 procedure update (Part 3 of 4).
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Procedure FD FD When Issue FD When Number of FD Number of FD
Update Identifiable Update was between issue of between When issue
to be update and Was Identifiable and
Executed anticipated When it was updated
execution
133 15 8 16 1 7
134 15 8 16 1 7
135 15 15 15 0 0
*Likely being reworked or already finished at launch
Table 137. Key flight days for each STS-120 procedure update (Part 4 of 4).
Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Mistakenly Omitted from
1 timeline for MS5 (Typo) N/A Typos and Omissions
Failed Flowmeter (Failure Sensor "Failure" or
2 occurred on STS-116) N/A Bias
Improving IDC coverage of Launch Damage
3 panels 9R, 13R, 9L, and 12L N/A (actual or suspected)
Improving IDC coverage of Launch Damage
4 panels 9R, 13R, 9L, and 12L N/A (actual or suspected)
New procedure developed in
response to glove damage on Procedure Updated or
STS-118. This procedure was Re-evaluated after the
not completed in time to make it Print Deadline for the
into the ISS EVA Systems C/L Procedure Books and
5 before the print deadline N/A before Launch
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
manufacturing error,
6 Logistical Changes N/A etc.)
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
manufacturing error,
7 Logistical Changes N/A etc.)
Table 138. STS-120 update rationales (Part 1 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
manufacturing error,
8 Logistical Changes N/A etc.)
Procedure Updated or
Re-evaluated after the
Details of this procedure were Print Deadline for the
not finalized until after print Procedure Books and
9 deadline N/A before Launch
Actuator "Failure" or
10 PGSC Power cable failure N/A Degradation
Tasks simplified by ISS crew Procedure Efficiency
11 item prepositioning N/A Optimization
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
Serial numbers called down by (e.g., packaging error,
crew and recorded on the cue manufacturing error,
12 card. Also, there was a typo N/A etc.)
Bad TCS data cable or improper
assignment of the COM Port
within the Windows operating Unexpected Software
13 system. N/A Behavior
Procedure Updated or
Re-evaluated after the
Details of this procedure were Print Deadline for the
not finalized until after print Procedure Books and
14 deadline N/A before Launch
The lab window shutter being Unanticipated
closed throughout the mission Environmental/ISS
eliminated the need for several Conditions (e.g.,
15 steps N/A temperatures)
16 Messages Omitted N/A Typos and Omissions
Unexpected Software
17 PGSC Network problems N/A Behavior
Overexposed images from
DCS760 cameras (Note: this
may not be a procedure update
as much as a compliance Sensor "Failure" or
18 verification) N/A Bias
Confusion over whether to leave Equipment List
19 a tool on ISS or bring it back N/A Revision
Table 139. STS-120 update rationales (Part 2 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
SARJ Grinding Equipment List
20 Added tools for SARJ inspection Problems Revision
SARJ Grinding Equipment List
21 Added tools for SARJ inspection Problems Revision
Added steps to inspect the APFR
(it was thought that the glove
damage on STS-118 and EVA 1 Proactive Contingency
may be due to poor performance Preparation and/or
22 by the APFR) N/A Hazard Investigation
Changed due to addition of SARJ Grinding Task Deferral or
23 SARJ Inspection Problems Reprioritization
Removed inhibits and step 1 due
to task reordering to
accommodate the addition of SARJ Grinding Task Deferral or
24 SARJ Inspection Problems Reprioritization
Procedure Updated or
Re-evaluated after the
Details of this procedure were Print Deadline for the
not finalized until after print Procedure Books and
25 deadline N/A before Launch
This new procedure is in
response to the ISS attitude Procedure Updated or
control problems encountered on Re-evaluated after the
STS-117. It probably did not Print Deadline for the
make its way into the procedure Procedure Books and
26 books before the print deadline N/A before Launch
Unexpected Software
27 PGSC Network Problems N/A Behavior
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Conditions (e.g.,
28 IMS update N/A temperatures)
Unexpected Software
29 PGSC Network Problems N/A Behavior
Step reprioritized and reordered
due to addition of SARJ SARJ Grinding Task Deferral or
30 Inspection Problems Reprioritization
CETA Rail damage from
MMOD believed to be related to Proactive Contingency
EMU glove damage on STS- 118 Preparation and/or
31 and EVA 1 N/A Hazard Investigation
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
SARJ Grinding Conditions (e.g.,
32 SARJ vibrations Problems temperatures)
Removal of hardware added in SARJ Grinding Equipment List
33 MSG 40 from the EVA Problems Revision
Removal of hardware added in SARJ Grinding Equipment List
34 MSG 40 from the EVA Problems Revision
Table 140. STS-120 update rationales (Part 3 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
35 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
New translation path SARJ Grinding Unaccounted for
36 necessitated a new inhibit. Problems Inhibits
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Unexpected SRMS shoulder Conditions (e.g.,
37 temps. N/A temperatures)
Intermittent data from FCMS Unexpected Software
38 application N/A Behavior
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
Changed REBA Battery serial manufacturing error,
39 numbers N/A etc.)
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
Changed REBA Battery serial manufacturing error,
40 numbers N/A etc.)
Inconsistency between
Item's Expected Post-
Launch Configuration
and Actual Post-
Launch Configuration
(e.g., packaging error,
Changed REBA Battery serial manufacturing error,
41 numbers N/A etc.)
New LiOH canister to
accommodate a longer EVA 3 Consumable
(due to the tasks that were SARJ Grinding Management
42 moved from EVA 2) Problems Replanning
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Unexpected SRMS shoulder Conditions (e.g.,
43 temps. N/A temperatures)
Actuator "Failure" or
44 Unreleased bolt N/A Degradation
Removal/Reconfiguration of
equipment added/reconfigured SARJ Grinding Equipment List
45 for EVA 2 SARJ Inspection Problems Revision
Removal/Reconfiguration of
equipment added/reconfigured SARJ Grinding Equipment List
46 for EVA 2 SARJ Inspection Problems Revision
Table 141. STS-120 update rationales (Part 4 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Equipment stowage plan change
(due to the addition of the SARJ SARJ Grinding Equipment List
47 inspection) Problems Revision
Procedure Updated or
Re-evaluated after the
New number of turns on P6 strap Print Deadline for the
(either due to a typo or Procedure Books and
48 reanalysis) N/A before Launch
Logistical changes (due to
reordering of tasks for the SARJ SARJ Grinding Task Deferral or
49 inspection) Problems Reprioritization
This procedure was put "On
Call" and updated to include
steps for a possible EV1 02 Consumable
recharge due to the addition of SARJ Grinding Management
50 the SARJ inspection Problems Replanning
This procedure was updated to
include steps for a possible EV2 Consumable
02 recharge due to the addition SARJ Grinding Management
51 of the SARJ inspection Problems Replanning
Steps removed to prevent hot Crew Comfort
52 mics during EVA Prep/Post N/A Optimizations
Steps removed to prevent hot Crew Comfort
53 mics during EVA Prep/Post N/A Optimizations
Proactive Contingency
Added to due debris found SARJ Grinding Preparation and/or
54 during STBD SARJ inspection Problems Hazard Investigation
Actuator "Failure" or
55 STS6 monitor problems N/A Degradation
Actuator "Failure" or
56 Failed primary hardline intercom N/A Degradation
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Step delayed due to regeneration Conditions (e.g.,
57 of micropurification unit N/A temperatures)
Contingency version of the
procedure added in the event that Proactive Contingency
the MBSU Transfer task is SARJ Grinding Preparation and/or
58 deferred from EVA 3 Problems Hazard Investigation
Contingency version of the
procedure added in the event that Proactive Contingency
the MBSU Transfer task is SARJ Grinding Preparation and/or
59 deferred from EVA 3 Problems Hazard Investigation
Contingency version of the
procedure added in the event that Proactive Contingency
the MBSU Transfer task is SARJ Grinding Preparation and/or
60 deferred from EVA 3 Problems Hazard Investigation
Table 142. STS-120 update rationales (Part 5 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Unanticipated
IMU 1 problems and inability to Environmental/ISS
use star tracker data due to Conditions (e.g.,
61 attitude and sun angle N/A temperatures)
SARJ Grinding Equipment List
62 Logistical changes Problems Revision
Anomalous data on the
sublimator of a suit prompted the
MCC to look into EMU resizing
and they found a few mistakes in Actuator "Failure" or
63 the resize matrix N/A Degradation
Equipment Buildup for SARJ SARJ Grinding Equipment List
64 Troubleshooting Problems Revision
Actuator "Failure" or
65 Small tears in EMU gloves N/A Degradation
Proactive Contingency
SARJ Grinding Preparation and/or
66 Added for SARJ Inspection Problems Hazard Investigation
Added to alleviate blistering of Crew Comfort
67 EVI's hand N/A Optimizations
The decision to use older LiOH
canisters necessitated new steps
to prevent dust from being Crew Comfort
68 spread throughout the cabin N/A Optimizations
Consumable
EMU battery change to P6 SAW Redeploy Management
69 accommodate a longer EVA Problems Replanning
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
70 repair activity to EVA Problems Inhibits
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
71 repair activity to EVA Problems Inhibits
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
72 repair activity to EVA Problems Revision
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
73 repair activity to EVA Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
74 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR due to
addition of SAW repair activity P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
75 to EVA Problems Revision
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Conditions (e.g.,
76 repair activity to EVA Problems temperatures)
SSRMS/OBSS MNVR due to
addition of SAW repair activity P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
77 to EVA Problems Revision
Table 143. STS-120 update rationales (Part 6 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
78 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Changes due to addition of SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
79 repair activity to EVA Problems Revision
Added to prevent contact of
metal glove components with the
solar arrays (electrocution P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
80 hazard) Problems Inhibits
Added to construct stabilizers P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
81 for the damaged SAW Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
82 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
83 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
84 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Consumable
Logistical changes due to SAW P6 SAW Redeploy Management
85 repair EVA Problems Replanning
Unexpected Software
86 Camera resetting issues N/A Behavior
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
87 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Added to reduce electrocution P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
88 hazard for SAW repair EVA Problems Inhibits
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
89 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
90 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
Procedure added in order to use P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
91 OBSS for SAW repair activity Problems Revision
This procedure allowed the crew
to view a DOUG movie of the P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
92 trajectory to the SAW repair site Problems Revision
Added to reduce electrocution P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
93 hazard for SAW repair EVA Problems Inhibits
Changes to the EVA 4 procedure
due to need to safety tether to P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
94 OBSS Problems Inhibits
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
95 procedure Problems Inhibits
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Unaccounted for
96 procedure Problems Inhibits
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
97 procedure Problems Revision
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
98 procedure Problems Revision
Table 144. STS-120 update rationales (Part 7 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
99 procedure Problems Revision
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
100 procedure Problems Revision
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Conditions (e.g.,
101 procedure Problems temperatures)
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
102 procedure Problems Revision
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
103 procedure Problems Revision
Refinement of this SAW repair P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
104 procedure Problems Revision
Equipment omissions in the
previously transmitted version of P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
105 this SAW repair procedure Problems Revision
Typos in the previously
transmitted version of this SAW P6 SAW Redeploy
106 repair procedure Problems Typos and Omissions
Missing EVA overglove doffing
steps in the previously
transmitted version of this SAW P6 SAW Redeploy
107 repair procedure Problems Typos and Omissions
To return the EMU used for
EVA 4 back to its original size
for use on a stage EVA (as per
message 62, this EMU was
resized due so that EV1 could
use it as a replacement for his
EMU, which had sublimator Actuator "Failure" or
108 problems) N/A Degradation
OBSS movements added for P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
109 SAW repair EVA Problems Revision
OBSS movements added for P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
110 SAW repair EVA Problems Revision
OBSS movements added for P6 SAW Redeploy Equipment List
111 SAW repair EVA Problems Revision
Consumable
P6 SAW Redeploy Management
112 Logistical changes Problems Replanning
Actuator "Failure" or
113 Broken AVIU switch N/A Degradation
This procedure is in response to
the ISS attitude control problems Procedure Updated or
encountered on STS-117. It Re-evaluated after the
probably did not make its way Print Deadline for the
into the procedure books before Procedure Books and
114 the print deadline N/A before Launch
Table 145. STS-120 update rationales (Part 8 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Consumable
P6 SAW Redeploy Management
115 Different EVA batteries Problems Replanning
Consumable
P6 SAW Redeploy Management
116 Different EVA batteries Problems Replanning
Consumable
Battery information updated to P6 SAW Redeploy Management
117 reflect EVA 4 Problems Replanning
Proactive Contingency
Added to ensure that OBSS still P6 SAW Redeploy Preparation and/or
118 worked after EVA 4 Problems Hazard Investigation
Additional photos requested due
to a degradation of TCS Sensor "Failure" or
119 Reflector #1 noticed on FD 3 N/A Bias
Optimization of post-separation
trajectory due to extra days at P6 SAW Redeploy Procedure Efficiency
120 station Problems Optimization
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Possibly due to warmer attitudes Conditions (e.g.,
121 than expected N/A temperatures)
Proactive Contingency
Added due to FD 13 Sensor P6 SAW Redeploy Preparation and/or
122 Checkout Problems Hazard Investigation
Comments added to reflect
123 delays in the procedure N/A Typos and Omissions
Added to give crew the optional
capability to increase air Crew Comfort
124 circulation N/A Optimizations
Modified to give crew the
optional capability to increase Crew Comfort
125 air circulation N/A Optimizations
126 Typo N/A Typos and Omissions
Mid Port Payload Bay Actuator "Failure" or
127 Floodlight Failure on FD12 N/A Degradation
Mid Port Payload Bay Actuator "Failure" or
128 Floodlight Failure on FD12 N/A Degradation
Procedure Nominally
129 PCS 1 configuration changes N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
130 Flash Evaporator Configuration N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
131 Ammonia Boiler Configuration N/A Updated in Real-time
Procedure Nominally
132 Ammonia Boiler Configuration N/A Updated in Real-time
Table 146. STS-120 update rationales (Part 9 of 10).
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Discrete Event
Procedure Rationale Rationale
Update Rationale Categorization Categorization
Updated due to extra days in
orbit and change from ascending Consumable
to descending landing P6 SAW Redeploy Management
133 opportunities Problems Replanning
Updated due to extra days in
orbit and change from ascending Consumable
to descending landing P6 SAW Redeploy Management
134 opportunities Problems Replanning
Unanticipated
Environmental/ISS
Revised flight plan due to Conditions (e.g.,
135 landing waveoffs N/A temperatures)
Table 147. STS-120 update rationales (Part 10 of 10).
DATA POINT MISSION ELAPSED NUMBER OF PROCEDURES
TIME (MINUTES) NEEDING AND BEING
REWORKED
Launch 0 26
End of FD 1 360 32
End of FD 2 1800 26
End of FD 3 3240 21
Instant before SARJ Grinding Anomaly 4320 19
Instant after SARJ Grinding Anomaly 4321 40
End of FD 4 4680 40
End of FD 5 6090 31
End of FD 6 7500 28
End of FD 7 8940 19
Instant before SAW Redeploy Anomaly 10095 18
Instant after SAW Redeploy Anomaly 10096 55
End of FD 8 10380 55
End of FD 9 11790 49
End of FD 10 13290 44
End of FD 11 14760 28
End of FD 12 16230 20
End of FD 13 17730 12
End of FD 14 19200 11
End of FD 15 20640 0
Table 148. The STS-120 data time history for the variable Number of Procedures
Needing and Being Reworked.
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TYPES OF PROCEDURE UPDATES PROCEDURE UPDATE NUMBERS
Due to SARJ Grinding Anomaly and in Time 20, 21, 23, 24, 30, 32, and 36
Horizon
Due to SARJ Grinding Anomaly and Beyond Time 42, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, and
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to the SARJ 66
Grinding Anomaly)
Due to refinements of previously submitted SARJ 33 and 34
Grinding Anomaly related updates
Due to SAW Redeploy Anomaly and in Time None
Horizon
Due to SAW Redeploy Anomaly and Beyond Time 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82,
Horizon (i.e., propagated reworks due to the SAW 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 109, 110,
Redeploy Anomaly) 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 133, and
134
Due to refinements of previously submitted SAW 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
Redeploy Anomaly related updates 106, and 107
Outside Time Horizon and Not Latent at Launch 10, 13, 17, 27, 29, 108, 113, 119, 127, and 128
(i.e., propagated reworks not due to a discrete event)
Procedures developed as a result of the rework 13, 17, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 43, 44, 54, 55, 56,
process 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 108, 109,
110, 111, 113, 118, 119, 122, and 124
Table 149. List of specially designated STS-120 procedure updates.
FLIGHT MISSION ELAPSED NORMALIZED TIME TO UPDATES SINCE
DAY TIME AT END OF LANDING PREVIOUS FLIGHT
FLIGHT DAY PREPARATION AT THE DAY
(MINUTES) END OF FD 15
0 0 0 0
1 360 0.0174 1
2 1800 0.08721 7
3 3240 0.1570 6
4 4680 0.2267 4
5 6090 0.2951 19
6 7500 0.3634 6
7 8940 0.4331 12
8 10380 0.5029 5
9 11790 0.5712 7
10 13290 0.6439 17
11 14760 0.7151 18
12 16230 0.7863 10
13 17730 0.8590 8
14 19200 0.9302 3
15 20640 1 12
Table 150. STS-120 update times normalized to the landing preparation time.
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Tables of Data from All Flights Studied
REFERENCE NORMALIZED NORMALIZED UPDATE TIMES TOTAL UPDATES
MISSION UPDATE TIME (UPDATES SINCE LAST UPDATE SINCE LAST UPDATE
ELAPSED TIME) TIME
TIME IN STS- STS- STS- STS- STS- (AVERAGE)
DAYS 97 115 116 117 120
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
0.361* 0.031 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.017 2
(1) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0.4)
2 0.170 0.112 0.120 0.102 0.102 0.087 42
(17) (3) (6) (3) (7) (8.4)
0.157
(6)
3 0.255 0.210 0.219 0.186 0.185 0.227 49
(13) (13) (14) (5) (4) (9.8)
4 0.340 0.309 0.318 0.267 0.267 0.295 36
(7) (5) (3) (2) (19) (7.2)
5 0.426 0.407 0.417 0.349 0.35 0.363 19
(7) (0) (2) (4) (6) (3.8)
6 0.511 0.504 N/A 0.430 0.431 0.433 29
(5) (4) (3) (12) (5.8)
0.503
(5)
7 0.596 N/A 0.516 0.513 0.514 0.571 33
(4) (2) (12) (7) (6.6)
0.594 0.595
(3) (5)
8 0.681 0.602 0.614 0.676 0.676 0.644 73
(13) (10) (19) (14) (17) (14.6)
9 0.766 0.701 0.713 0.7573 0.757 0.715 32
(6) (4) (3) (1) (18) (6.4)
10 0.851 0.801 0.808 0.837 0.838 0.786 28
(7) (4) (5) (2) (10) (5.6)
11 0.936 0.900 0.903 0.917 0.919 0.859 26
(4) (7) (1) (3) (8) (5.2)
0.930
(3)
11.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 70
(13) (9) (24) (12) (12) (14)
13 1.106 1.08 1.10 N/A N/A N/A 4
(0) (4) (0.8)
*End of Startup Delay
Table 151. Update times and rates for all flights normalized to a set of reference
update times.
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Appendix 3: System Dynamics Model
Documentation
This appendix contains the necessary documentation for replication of the simulation
results in this dissertation. All of the simulation models used to construct original graphs
in this dissertation that were not explicitly described in the dissertation chapters are
documented below-with the exception of the Kampmann and Shantzis/Behrens models,
which are documented in Kampmann (1991). The syntax in which the documentation is
provided is the syntax for model construction in the Vensimo software package.
Basic Procedure Rework Model
The Basic Procedure Rework Model is used in this dissertation to investigate the core
dynamics of the Procedure Rework Process. The primary numerical integration
technique used for analysis of the model and graph development was Euler integration
with a fixed time step size. The simulation start time was 0 minutes (coinciding with
SRB ignition) and the end time was 18600 minutes.
Conversion Factors & Time Step:
Day to Minute Conversion Factor = 60*24
Units: Minutes/Day
Time Step = 0.25
Units: Minutes
Main Procedure Flow Structure:
Activation Rate for PNR = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, "Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Total Inactive Procedures * Total Initial Inactive
Procedures/(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Activation Rate for VP = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, ("Inactive
Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Total Inactive Procedures) * Total Initial Inactive
Procedures/(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Valid
Procedures (IVP)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Active Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event = 0
Units: Procedures/Minute [0, 500, 1]
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"Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)" = INTEG(Activation Rate for PNR +
Procedure Invalidation Rate - Procedure Rework Discovery Rate, Initial Number of
Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Active Valid Procedures (AVP)" = INTEG(Activation Rate for VP + Procedure Rework
Completion Rate - Procedure Completion Rate - Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial
Number of Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay = 30
Units: Minute [1, 500, 5]
Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate = 0.00069
Units: Procedures/Minute [0, 0.01]
Based on analysis of STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework = 200
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
"Completed Procedures (CP)" = INTEG (Procedure Completion Rate, Initial Completed
Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate = Procedure Rework Completion Rate * Day
to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Procedures/Day
Discrete Procedure Invalidation Rate = Active Procedure Invalidation Rate During
Discrete Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Rework Propagation Factor >= 0,
MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework,
("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete
Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)), MAX(("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" *
Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1), -"Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework))
Units: Procedures/Minute
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event = 0
Units: Procedures/Minute [0, 500, 1]
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"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" = INTEG(Inactive Procedure Invalidation
Rate - Activation Rate for PNR, Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" = INTEG(-Activation Rate for VP - Inactive
Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial Inactive Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Initial Completed Procedures = 0
Units: Procedures
Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 2000]
This initial value is 24.6 for the latent issues scenario
Initial Inactive Valid Procedures = 2500
Units: Procedures
Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 100]
This initial value is 6.6 for the latent issues scenario
Initial Number of Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 8]
Initial Number of Valid Procedures = 100
Units: Procedures
Mission Duration = "Mission Duration (in days)" * Day to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Minute
"Mission Duration (in days)" = 12.9
Units: Day [0, 500]
Procedure Completion Fraction for Mission = 0
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Procedure Completion Rate = MIN((Total Number of Procedures*Procedure Completion
Fraction for Mission)/Mission Duration, "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)"/Procedure
Completion Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The Fuzzy Min (Sterman 2000) structure prevents the number of Active Valid
Procedures from going negative.
Procedure Completion Time = 10
Units: Minute
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Procedure Invalidation Rate = MIN(Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate + Discrete
Procedure Invalidation Rate, "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)"/Procedure Completion
Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The Fuzzy Min (Sterman 2000) structure prevents the number of Active Valid
Procedures from going negative.
Procedure Rework Accumulation = Procedure Rework Completion Rate
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Completion Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Time > Startup Delay,
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework, 0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Discovery Rate = "Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)"/
Time to Discover Procedure Rework
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Time Horizon = 2000
Units: Minute [0, 5000]
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)"= INTEG(Procedure Rework Discovery Rate-
Procedure Rework Completion Rate, Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked)
Units: Procedures
Procedures Needing and Being Reworked = "Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" +
"Procedures Needing Rework (PNR)"
Units: Procedures
"Procedures Needing Rework (PNR)" = "Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)" +
"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"
Units: Procedures
Rework Propagation Factor = 0.605
Units: Dmnl [0, 5]
The fraction of inactive procedures that are invalidated when procedures are
reworked worked out to be roughly 51% of the total reworked procedures (not
including discrete events or latent updates at launch). The baseline number used
here leads to an end state in which roughly 51% of the total reworked procedures
were due to rework propagation. This factor is changes to 0.185 in the latent
updates at launch scenario.
Startup Delay = 520
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
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Time in Days = Time/Day to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Days
Time of Discrete Event = 100
Units: Minute [0, 10000, 5]
This value must be a multiple of the time step or else the discrete event will not
occur.
Time to Complete Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework +
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework * Rework Completion Time Attention
Shifting Factor * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")
Units: Minute
Time to Discover Procedure Rework = Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition
Delay + Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor * Baseline Flight
Controller Rework Recognition Delay * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)")
Units: Minute
Total Inactive Procedures = "Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" + "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"
Units: Procedures
Total Initial Inactive Procedures = Initial Inactive
Inactive Valid Procedures
Units: Procedures
Total Number of Procedures = Initial Number of
Procedures Needing Rework + Initial Number of
Initial Inactive Procedures
Units: Procedures
Procedures Needing Rework + Initial
Valid Procedures + Initial Number of
Procedures Being Reworked + Total
Total Procedures Reworked = INTEG (Procedure Rework Accumulation, 0)
Units: Procedures
"Valid Procedures (VP)" = "Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" + "Active Valid
Procedures (AVP)" + "Completed Procedures (CP)"
Units: Procedures
Flight Controller Attention Shifting Structure:
"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework (FRDPR)" =
INTEG(Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
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"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)" =
INTEG(-Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Rework Discovery)
Units: Dmnl
Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework = 1 - Initial
Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery
Units: Dmnl
Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery = 1
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked = 0.2
Units: Dmnl/Procedure [0, 1]
Rework Completion Time Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl [0.1, 5, 5]
Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl [0.1, 5, 5]
Shift in Focus to Rework = (Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards
Procedure Rework - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")/Time to Shift Focus
Units: Dmnl/Minute
Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards Procedure Rework = MIN(1,
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked)
Units: Dmnl
Time to Shift Focus = 1
Units: Minute [1, 5]
Light Delay Model
The light delay model is used in this dissertation to simulate the light delay over time on
a mission to Mars. In this model, a minimum energy transfer or Hohmann Transfer (Bate
et al. 1971, pp. 163-166) is assumed from a circular Earth Solar Orbit to Mars Perihelion.
Once the spacecraft arrives at Mars Perihelion, a maneuver is performed to insert the
spacecraft into Mars' elliptical orbit about the Sun. The primary numerical integration
technique used for analysis of the model and graph development was second order
Runge-Kutta integration with an automatically adjusted step size. The simulation start
time is 0 days (coinciding with the insertion maneuver into the Hohmann Transfer orbit).
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Conversion Factors & Time Step:
Seconds to Days Conversion Factor = 1/(60 * 60 * 24)
Units: Days/second
Time Step = 0.007812
Units: Days
Earth Solar Orbit Dynamics:
Change of X earth = Xdot earth
Units: Kilometer/Day
Change of Y earth = Ydot earth
Units: Kilometer/Day
Change of Xdot earth = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" *
X distance between Earth and Sun/Distance between Earth and SunA3
Units: Kilometer/(Day * Day)
Assumes negligible affect of gravity between Earth and Mars. Formula derived in
Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Change of Ydot earth = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" *
Y distance between Earth and Sun/Distance between Earth and SunA3
Units: Kilometer/(Day * Day)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars. Formula derived in
Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Distance between Earth and Sun = SQRT(X earthA2 + Y earthA2)
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of Sun and that the XY plane coincides with the orbital
plane
"Earths Orbital Velocity (if circular orbit)" = SQRT("Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)"/"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis")
Units: Kilometer/Day
"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis" = 1.49598e+008
Units: kilometers
Gravitational Parameter of Sun = 1.32712e+011
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(seconds * seconds)
From Bate et al. (1971, pp. 429).
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"Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" = Gravitational Parameter
of Sun * (1/Seconds to Days Conversion Factor)A2
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(Day * Day)
Initial X earth = 0
Units: kilometers
Initial Xdot earth = "Earths Orbital Velocity (if circular orbit)"
Units: kilometers/Day
Initial Y earth = -"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis"
Units: kilometers
Initial Ydot earth = 0
Units: kilometers/Day
X distance between Earth and Sun = -X earth
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of the Sun
X earth = INTEG (Change of X earth, Initial X earth)
Units: kilometers
Xdot earth = INTEG (Change of Xdot earth, Initial Xdot earth)
Units: kilometers/Day
Y distance between Earth and Sun = -Y earth
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of the Sun
Y earth = INTEG (Change of Y earth, Initial Y earth)
Units: kilometers
Ydot earth = INTEG (Change of Ydot earth, Initial Ydot earth)
Units: kilometers/Day
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars
Spacecraft Solar Orbit Dynamics:
Acceleration from Insertion Maneuver = IF THEN ELSE(Distance between Spacecraft
and Sun >= Maneuver Initiation Distance, Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit
Insertion/Time for Maneuver, 0)
Units: Kilometer/(Day * Day)
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Aphelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)" * (1/Mars Perihelion - 1/(2 * "Semi-Major Axis of Transfer
Orbit")))
Units: Kilometer/Day
Change of X spacecraft = Xdot spacecraft
Units: Kilometer/Day
Change of Xdot spacecraft = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step
units)" * X distance between Spacecraft and Sun/Distance between Spacecraft and SunA3
Units: Kilometer/(Day * Day)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars. Formula derived in
Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Change of Y spacecraft = Ydot spacecraft
Units: Kilometer/Day
Change of Ydot spacecraft = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step
units)" * Y distance between Spacecraft and Sun/Distance between Spacecraft and SunA3
Units: Kilometer/(Day * Day)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars. Formula derived in
Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = INTEG (-Acceleration from Insertion
Maneuver, Initial Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion)
Units: Kilometer/Day
Delta V for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = Perihelion Velocity of Mars-Aphelion Velocity
of Transfer Orbit
Units: Kilometer/Day
Distance between Earth and Spacecraft = SQRT((X earth - X spacecraft)A2 + (Y earth - Y
spacecraft)A2)
Units: kilometers
Distance between Spacecraft and Sun = SQRT(X spacecraftA2 + Y spacecraftA2)
Units: kilometers
Initial Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = -Delta V for Mars Solar Orbit
Insertion
Units: Kilometer/Day
This value is negative because the maneuver will occur when the spacecraft is
moving in the negative X direction.
Initial X spacecraft = Initial X earth
Units: kilometers
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Initial Xdot spacecraft = Perihelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit
Units: kilometers/Day
Initial Y spacecraft = Initial Y earth
Units: kilometers
Initial Ydot spacecraft = 0
Units: kilometers/Day
Maneuver Distance Margin = 0
Units: Kilometer
When using integration techniques other than second order Runge-Kutta
integration with automatically adjusted step size, it may be necessary to set this
parameter to a value greater than zero to ensure that the insertion maneuver at
Mars Perihelion occurs.
Maneuver Initiation Distance = Mars Perihelion - Maneuver Distance Margin
Units: Kilometer
Mars Perihelion = 2.06645e+008
Units: Kilometer
Source: http://www.marspedia.org/
"Mars Semi-Major Orbital Axis" = 2.27941e+008
Units: kilometers
From Howell (2002).
Perihelion Velocity of Mars = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for
time step units)" * (1/Mars Perihelion-1/(2 * "Mars Semi-Major Orbital Axis")))
Units: Kilometer/Day
Perihelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)" * (1/"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis"-1/(2 * "Semi-Major
Axis of Transfer Orbit")))
Units: kilometers/Day
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-16).
"Semi-Major Axis of Transfer Orbit" = ("Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis" + Mars
Perihelion)/2
Units: kilometers
Spacecraft Velocity = SQRT(Xdot spacecraftA2 + Ydot spacecraftA2)
Units: Kilometer/Day
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Time for Maneuver = 0.008
Units: Day
This number is roughly on the order of an eleven minute bum
Time of Flight = 3.14159 * SQRT("Semi-Major Axis of Transfer Orbit"^3/"Gravitational
Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)")
Units: Days
Formula from Bate et al. (1971, pp. 165).
X distance between Spacecraft and Sun = -X spacecraft
Units: kilometers
X spacecraft = INTEG (Change of X spacecraft, Initial X spacecraft)
Units: kilometers
Xdot spacecraft = INTEG (Acceleration from Insertion Maneuver + Change of Xdot
spacecraft, Initial Xdot spacecraft)
Units: kilometers/Day
Y distance between Spacecraft and Sun = -Y spacecraft
Units: kilometers
Y spacecraft = INTEG (Change of Y spacecraft, Initial Y spacecraft)
Units: kilometers
Ydot spacecraft= INTEG (Change of Ydot spacecraft, Initial Ydot spacecraft)
Units: kilometers/Day
Light Delay Calculation:
Speed of Light = 299792 * 60
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Source http://www.speed-light.info/
Light Delay = Distance between Earth and Spacecraft/Speed of Light
Units: Minute
Flight Specific Procedure Rework Models
The flight specific procedure rework models are used in this dissertation to calibrate the
general procedure rework model with flight specific data. The primary numerical
integration technique used for analysis of the model and graph development was Euler
integration with a fixed time step size. The simulation start time was 0 minutes
(coinciding with SRB ignition) and the end time depended on the duration of the mission
(16000 minutes, 17000 minutes, 18600 minutes, 20000 minutes, and 22000 minutes for
STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively).
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Conversion Factors & Time Step:
Day to Minute Conversion Factor = 60*24
Units: Minutes/Day
Time Step = 0.25
Units: Minutes
Main Procedure Flow Structure:
Activation Rate for PNR = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, "Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Total Inactive Procedures * Total Initial Inactive
Procedures/(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Activation Rate for VP = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, "Inactive
Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Total Inactive Procedures * Total Initial Inactive
Procedures/(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Valid
Procedures (IVP)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
"Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)" = INTEG (Activation Rate for PNR +
Procedure Invalidation Rate-Procedure Rework Discovery Rate, Initial Number of
Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Active Valid Procedures (AVP)" = INTEG(Activation Rate for VP + Procedure Rework
Completion Rate - Procedure Completion Rate - Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial
Number of Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay = 30
Units: Minute
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate = 0.0004014
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0.0006411, 0.0007065, 0.0008097, 0.0004014, and 0.001875 were used
for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively.
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Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework = 200
Units: Minute
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
"Completed Procedures (CP)"= INTEG (Procedure Completion Rate, Initial Completed
Procedures)
Units: Procedures
This state variable exists primarily for diagramming purposes.
Discrete Procedure Invalidation Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Rework Propagation Factor >=
0, MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework,
("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete
Procedure Rework + Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event One *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event One, 1) + Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete
Event Two * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event Two, 1) + Procedure Invalidation Rate
During Discrete Event Three * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event Three, 1),
MAX(("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to
Complete Procedure Rework + Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event One *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event One, 1) + Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete
Event Two * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event Two, 1) + Procedure Invalidation Rate
During Discrete Event Three * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event Three, 1), -"Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework))
Units: Procedures/Minute
Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay = Baseline Flight Controller Rework
Recognition Delay + Baseline Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay * Rework
Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller
Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)")
Units: Minute
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate = MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures
(IVP)"/Minimum Invalidation Time, ("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework
Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event One * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event One, 1) +
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event Two * PULSE(Time of
Discrete Event Two, 1) + Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event
Three * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event Three, 1))
Units: Procedures/Minute
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event One = 9
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 12, 7, 20, 9, and 14 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-
117, and STS-120, respectively.
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Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event Two = 17
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0, 0, 0, 17, and 37 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event Three = 5
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0, 0, 0, 5, and 0 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" = INTEG (Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate - Activation Rate for PNR, Initial Inactive Procedures Needing
Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" = INTEG (-Activation Rate for VP - Inactive
Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial Inactive Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Initial Completed Procedures = 0
Units: Procedures
Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework = 15
Units: Procedures
This initial value was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 34, 21, 31, 15, and 20 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS- 116, STS-
117, and STS-120, respectively.
Initial Inactive Valid Procedures = 2500
Units: Procedures
Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked = 1
Units: Procedures
This initial value was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 15, 9, 4, 1, and 6 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
Initial Number of Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures
Initial Number of Valid Procedures = 100
Units: Procedures
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Minimum Invalidation Time = 5
Units: Minute
Mission Duration = "Mission Duration (in days)" * Day to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Minute
"Mission Duration (in days)" = 13.841
Units: Day
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 10.8319, 11.7958, 12.8646, 13.841, and 15.0993 were used for STS-97,
STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively.
Procedure Completion Fraction for Mission = 0.7
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Procedure Completion Rate = MIN((Total Number of Procedures*Procedure Completion
Fraction for Mission)/Mission Duration, "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)"/Procedure
Completion Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The "fuzzy min" structure here (Sterman 2000) prevents the state variable "Active
Valid Procedures (AVP)" from going negative
Procedure Completion Time = 10
Units: Minute
Procedure Invalidation Rate = MIN(Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate + Discrete
Procedure Invalidation Rate, "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)"/Procedure Completion
Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The "fuzzy min" structure here (Sterman 2000) prevents the state variable "Active
Valid Procedures (AVP)" from going negative
Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event One = 1
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 3, 1, 0, 1, and 7 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event Two = 0
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0, 0, 0, 0, and 0 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
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Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event Three = 2
Units: Procedures/Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0, 0, 0, 2, and 0 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117,
and STS-120, respectively.
Procedure Rework Completion Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Time > Startup Delay,
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework, 0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Discovery Rate = "Active Procedures Needing Rework
(APNR)"/Time to Discover Procedure Rework
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Time Horizon = 2000
Units: Minute
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" = INTEG(Procedure Rework Discovery Rate-
Procedure Rework Completion Rate, Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked)
Units: Procedures
Procedures Needing and Being Reworked = "Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" +
"Procedures Needing Rework (PNR)"
Units: Procedures
"Procedures Needing Rework (PNR)" = "Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)" +
"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"
Units: Procedures
Rework Propagation Factor = 0.125
Units: Dmnl
This parameter was based on flight data (it was selected to reproduce the number
of propagated updates not due to discrete events that occurred on these flights)
and thus differed for each mission. Values of 0.145, 0.16, 0.177, 0.125, and
0.0735 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120,
respectively.
Startup Delay = 520
Units: Minute
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
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Time of Discrete Event One = 8
Units: Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 4200, 5640, 5325, 8, and 4320 were used for STS-97, STS-115, STS-
116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively.
Time of Discrete Event Two = 4650
Units: Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0 (N/A), 0 (N/A), 0 (N/A), 4650, and 10095 were used for STS-97,
STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively.
Time of Discrete Event Three = 7320
Units: Minute
This parameter was based on flight data and thus differed for each mission.
Values of 0 (N/A), 0 (N/A), 0 (N/A), 7320, and 0 (N/A) were used for STS-97,
STS-115, STS-116, STS-117, and STS-120, respectively.
Time to Complete Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework +
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework * Rework Completion Time Attention
Shifting Factor * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")
Units: Minute
Time to Discover Procedure Rework = Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay
Units: Minute
Total Inactive Procedures = "Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" + "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"
Units: Procedures
Total Initial Inactive Procedures = Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework + Initial
Inactive Valid Procedures
Units: Procedures
Total Number of Procedures = Initial Number of Valid Procedures + Initial Number of
Procedures Needing Rework + Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked + Total
Initial Inactive Procedures
Units: Procedures
Total Procedures Reworked= INTEG(Rework Accumulation, 0)
Units: Procedures
"Valid Procedures (VP)" = "Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" + "Active Valid
Procedures (AVP)" + "Completed Procedures (CP)"
Units: Procedures
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Flight Controller Attention Shifting Structure:
"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework (FRDPR)" =
INTEG(Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted
to Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)" =
INTEG(-Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Rework Discovery)
Units: Dmnl
Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework = 1 - Initial
Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery
Units: Dmnl
Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery = 1
Units: Dmnl
Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked = 0.2
Units: Dmnl/Procedure
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
Rework Accumulation = Procedure Rework Completion Rate
Units: Procedures/Minute
Rework Completion Time Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl
The final value of this parameter was derived from the iterative calibration
analyses performed with this model.
Shift in Focus to Rework = (Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards
Procedure Rework - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")/Time to Shift Focus
Units: Dmnl/Minute
Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards Procedure Rework = MIN(1,
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked)
Units: Dmnl
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Time to Shift Focus = 1
Units: Minute [1,5]
The Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model
The Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model is essentially the Basic Procedure
Rework Model with several structural modifications for implementing flow control. The
primary numerical integration technique used for analysis of the model and graph
development was Euler integration with a fixed time step size. The simulation start time
was 0 minutes (coinciding with SRB ignition) and the end time was 18600 minutes.
Rather than repeating the common elements of this model and the Basic Procedure
Rework Model, only the elements that represent additions or modifications to Basic
Procedure Rework Model are provided below.
Additions to the Basic Procedure Rework Model to implement flow control:
Accumulation of Resource Minutes = "Fraction of Resources Utilized for Inactive
Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)"
Units: Dmnl
Baseline Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = 30000
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
"Fraction of Resources Available for Inactive Procedure Rework Discovery (FRAIRD)"
= INTEG (-Resource Activation Rate, Initial Fraction of Resources Available for Inactive
Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
"Fraction of Resources Utilized for Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)" = INTEG
(Resource Activation Rate, Initial Fraction of Resources Utilized for Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
Inactive Procedure Rework Completion Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Resource Fraction per
Inactive Procedure Needing Rework > 0, "Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/
Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework, 0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Initial Procedure Rework Horizon = 2000
Units: Minute
Minimum Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete
Inactive Procedure Rework * Rework Time Improvement Factor
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
Procedure Rework Horizon Change Factor = 0
Units: Dmnl [0, 2.5]
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Procedure Rework Horizon Change Time = 14000
Units: Minute
Resource Activation Rate = (Target Resources Applied towards Inactive Procedure
Rework - "Fraction of Resources Utilized for Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)")/
Time to Activate Resources for Rework of Inactive Procedures Needing Rework
Units: Dmnl/Minute
Resource Fraction per Inactive Procedure Needing Rework = 0.5
Units: Dmnl/Procedure [0, 1]
Rework Time Improvement Factor = 0.02
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Target Resources Applied towards Inactive Procedure Rework = MIN(1, "Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" * Resource Fraction per Inactive Procedure
Needing Rework)
Units: Dmnl
Time to Activate Resources for Rework of Inactive Procedures Needing Rework = 30
Units: Minute [1, 30]
Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete Inactive
Procedure Rework - (Baseline Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework - Minimum
Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework) * "Fraction of Resources Utilized for
Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)"
Units: Minute
Total Resource Minutes for Inactive Procedure Rework = INTEG(Accumulation of
Resource Minutes, 0)
Units: Minute
Modifications to the Basic Procedure Rework Model to implement flow control:
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Rework Propagation Factor >= 0,
MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework,
("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete
Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)) + Inactive Procedure Rework Completion Rate *
Rework Propagation Factor, MAX(("Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" * Rework
Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1) + Inactive
Procedure Rework Completion Rate * Rework Propagation Factor, -"Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework))
Units: Procedures/Minute
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"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" = INTEG (Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate - Activation Rate for PNR - Inactive Procedure Rework Completion
Rate, Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" = INTEG (Inactive Procedure Rework Completion
Rate-Activation Rate for VP-Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial Inactive Valid
Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Procedure Rework Time Horizon = Initial Procedure Rework Horizon + STEP(Procedure
Rework Horizon Change Factor * Initial Procedure Rework Horizon, Procedure Rework
Horizon Change Time)
Units: Minute [0, 5000]
Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model
The Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model is used in this dissertation to investigate the
dynamics of the Procedure Rework Process during long duration missions to land on
distant celestial bodies. It assumes a Hohmann Transfer to Mars Perihelion and includes
a maneuver for insertion into Mars' solar orbit. The primary numerical integration
technique used for analysis of the model and graph development was Euler integration
with a fixed time step size. The simulation start time was 0 minutes (coinciding with
launch) and the end time was 347000 minutes (roughly coinciding with the insertion into
Mars' solar orbit).
Conversion Factors & Time Step:
Day to Minute Conversion Factor = 60*24
Units: Minutes/Day
Time Step = 0.25
Units: Minutes
Seconds to Minutes Conversion Factor = 1/60
Units: Minutes/second
Time in Days = Time/Day to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Days
Main Procedure Flow Structure:
Accumulation of Reworked Procedures = Procedure Rework Completion Rate
Units: Procedures/Minute
Activation Rate for PNR = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, "Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Total Inactive Procedures * Total Initial Inactive
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Procedures/(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Activation Rate for VP = IF THEN ELSE(Total Inactive Procedures > 0.1, "Inactive
Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Total Inactive Procedures * Total Initial Inactive Procedures/
(Mission Duration - Procedure Rework Time Horizon), "Inactive Valid Procedures
(IVP)"/Procedure Rework Time Horizon)
Units: Procedures/Minute
"Active Procedures Needing Rework (APNR)" = "Observable Procedures Needing
Rework (OPNR)"+"Unobservable Procedures Needing Rework (UPNR)"
Units: Procedures
"Active Valid Procedures (AVP)" = INTEG(Activation Rate for VP + Update
Observability Rate - Procedure Completion Rate - Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial
Number of Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate = 0.00069
Units: Procedures/Minute
Baseline Time for Flight Controllers to Recognize Rework = 30
Units: Minute [1, 500, 5]
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework = 200
Units: Minute [1, 1000, 5]
"Completed Procedures (CP)"= INTEG (Procedure Completion Rate, Initial Completed
Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Daily Procedure Rework Completion Rate = Procedure Rework Completion Rate * Day
to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Procedures/Day
Discrete Procedure Invalidation Rate = Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete
Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay = Baseline Time for Flight Controllers to
Recognize Rework + Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor * Baseline
Time for Flight Controllers to Recognize Rework * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller
Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)")
Units: Minute
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Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Rework Propagation Factor >= 0,
MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Minimum Invalidation Time, ("Procedures
Being Reworked by Ground (PBRG)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete
Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)), MAX(("Procedures Being Reworked by Ground
(PBRG)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete Procedure Rework + Inactive
Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1),
-"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework))
Units: Procedure/Minute
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event = 0
Units: Procedures/Minute [0, 500, 1]
"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" = INTEG (Inactive Procedure
Invalidation Rate-Activation Rate for PNR, Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" = INTEG (-Activation Rate for VP - Inactive
Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial Inactive Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Initial Completed Procedures = 0
Units: Procedures
Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 2000]
Initial Inactive Valid Procedures = 25000
Units: Procedures
Initial Number of Observable Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 0, 1]
Initial Number of Procedures Being Reworked = 0
Units: Procedures [0, 100]
Based on the assumption that no procedures are being reworked at the beginning
of the mission
Initial Number of Unobservable Procedures Needing Rework = 0
Units: Procedures
Initial Number of Valid Procedures = 100
Units: Procedures
Minimum Invalidation Time = 5
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
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Mission Duration = "Mission Duration (in days)" * Day to Minute Conversion Factor
Units: Minute
"Mission Duration (in days)" = 240
Units: Day [0, 500]
Observability Rate = DELAY FIXED (Procedure Invalidation Rate, Light Delay, 0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
"Observable Procedures Needing Rework (OPNR)" = INTEG(Activation Rate for PNR +
Observability Rate - Procedure Rework Discovery Rate, Initial Number of Observable
Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
Procedure Completion Fraction for Mission = 0
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Procedure Completion Rate = MIN((Total Number of Procedures * Procedure
Completion Fraction for Mission)/Mission Duration, "Active Valid Procedures
(AVP)"/Procedure Completion Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The Fuzzy Min structure (Sterman 2000) prevents the Active Valid Procedure
stock from going negative.
Procedure Completion Time = 10
Units: Minute
Procedure Invalidation Rate = MIN(Baseline Procedure Invalidation Rate + Discrete
Procedure Invalidation Rate, "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)"/Procedure Completion
Time)
Units: Procedures/Minute
The Fuzzy Min structure (Sterman 2000) prevents the Active Valid Procedure
stock from going negative.
Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event = 0
Units: Procedures/Minute [0, 500, 1]
Procedure Rework Completion Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Time > Startup Delay,
"Procedures Being Reworked by Ground (PBRG)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework,
0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Procedure Rework Discovery Rate = "Observable Procedures Needing Rework
(OPNR)"/Time to Discover Procedure Rework
Units: Procedures/Minute
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Procedure Rework Time Horizon = 2000
Units: Minute
"Procedures Being Reworked (PBR)" = "Procedures Being Reworked by Ground
(PBRG)" + "Procedures With Updates Unobservable on Spacecraft (PWUOS)"
Units: Procedures
"Procedures Being Reworked by Ground (PBRG)" = INTEG(Procedure Rework
Discovery Rate - Procedure Rework Completion Rate, Initial Number of Procedures
Being Reworked)
Units: Procedures
Procedures Needing and Being Reworked = "Active Procedures Needing Rework
(APNR)" + "Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" + "Procedures Being
Reworked (PBR)"
Units: Procedures
"Procedures With Updates Unobservable on Spacecraft (PWUOS)"= INTEG(Procedure
Rework Completion Rate-Update Observability Rate, 0)
Units: Procedures
Rework Propagation Factor = 0.605
Units: Dmnl [0, 5]
The fraction of inactive procedures that are invalidated when procedures are
reworked worked out to be roughly 51% of the total reworked procedures (not
including discrete events or latent updates at launch). The baseline number used
here is the same that was used in the Basic Procedure Rework Model.
Shift in Focus to Rework = (Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards
Procedure Rework - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")/Time to Shift Focus
Units: Dmnl/Minute
Startup Delay = 520
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
Time of Discrete Event = 100
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
This parameter value must be a multiple of the time step.
Time to Complete Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework +
Baseline Time to Complete Procedure Rework * Rework Completion Time Attention
Shifting Factor * (1 - "Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure
Rework (FRDPR)")
Units: Minute
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Time to Discover Procedure Rework = Flight Controller Rework Recognition Delay
Units: Minute
Total Inactive Procedures = "Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" + "Inactive Procedures
Needing Rework (IPNR)"
Units: Procedures
Total Initial Inactive Procedures = Initial Inactive Procedures Needing Rework + Initial
Inactive Valid Procedures
Units: Procedures
Total Number of Procedures = Initial Number of Valid Procedures + Initial Number of
Unobservable Procedures Needing Rework + Initial Number of Procedures Being
Reworked
Units: Procedures
Total Procedures Reworked = INTEG (Accumulation of Reworked Procedures, 0)
Units: Procedures
"Unobservable Procedures Needing Rework (UPNR)"= INTEG (Procedure Invalidation
Rate - Observability Rate, Initial Number of Unobservable Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
Update Observability Rate = DELAY FIXED(Procedure Rework Completion Rate, Light
Delay, 0)
Units: Procedure/Minute
"Valid Procedures (VP)" = "Active Valid Procedures (AVP)" + "Inactive Valid
Procedures (IVP)" + "Completed Procedures (CP)"
Units: Procedures
Flight Controller Attention Shifting Structure:
"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework (FRDPR)" =
INTEG (Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
"Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery (FRDRD)" =
INTEG (-Shift in Focus to Rework, Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources
Devoted to Rework Discovery)
Units: Dmnl
Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Procedure Rework = 1 - Initial
Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery
Units: Dmnl
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Initial Fraction of Flight Controller Resources Devoted to Rework Discovery = 1
Units: Dmnl
Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked = 0.1
Units: Dmnl/Procedure [0, 0.1]
Rework Completion Time Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl [0.1, 5, 5]
Rework Recognition Delay Attention Shifting Factor = 1
Units: Dmnl [0.1,5,5]
Target Flight Controller Resources Applied towards Procedure Rework = MIN(1,
Resource Fraction per Procedure Reworked * "Procedures Being Reworked by Ground
(PBRG)")
Units: Dmnl
Time to Shift Focus = 1
Units: Minute [1, 5]
Earth Solar Orbit Dynamics:
Change of X earth = Xdot earth
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Change of Xdot earth = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" *
X distance between Earth and Sun/Distance between Earth and Sun^3
Units: Kilometer/(Minutes * Minutes)
Assumes Negligible affect of gravity between Earth and Mars.
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Change of Y earth = Ydot earth
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Change of Ydot earth = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" *
Y distance between Earth and Sun/Distance between Earth and Sun^3
Units: Kilometer/(Minutes * Minutes)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars.
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Distance between Earth and Sun = SQRT(X earth^2 + Y earth^2)
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of Sun and that the XY plane coincides with the orbital
plane.
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"Earths Orbital Velocity (if circular orbit)" =SQRT("Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)"/"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis")
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis" = 1.49598e+008
Units: kilometers
Gravitational Parameter of Earth = 398601
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(seconds * seconds)
From Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 429).
"Gravitational Parameter of Earth (adjusted for time step units)" = Gravitational
Parameter of Earth * (1/Seconds to Minutes Conversion Factor)A2
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(Minutes * Minutes)
Gravitational Parameter of Sun = 1.32712e+011
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(seconds * seconds)
From Bate et al. (1971, pp. 429).
"Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)" = Gravitational Parameter
of Sun * (1/Seconds to Minutes Conversion Factor)^2
Units: Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer/(Minutes * Minutes)
Initial X earth = 0
Units: kilometers
Initial Xdot earth = "Earths Orbital Velocity (if circular orbit)"
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Initial Y earth = -"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis"
Units: kilometers
Initial Ydot earth = 0
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Universal Gravitation Constant = 6.67e-020
Units: (Kilometer * Kilometer * Kilometer)/(kilogram * seconds * seconds)
From Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 4).
X distance between Earth and Sun = -X earth
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of the Sun.
Xdot earth = INTEG (Change of Xdot earth, Initial Xdot earth)
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
383
X earth = INTEG(Change of X earth, Initial X earth)
Units: kilometers
Y distance between Earth and Sun = -Y earth
Units: kilometers
Assumes no movement of the Sun.
Y earth = INTEG (Change of Y earth, Initial Y earth)
Units: kilometers
Ydot earth = INTEG (Change of Ydot earth, Initial Ydot earth)
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars.
Spacecraft Solar Orbit Dynamics:
Acceleration from Insertion Maneuver = IF THEN ELSE(Distance between Spacecraft
and Sun > Maneuver Initiation Distance, Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit
Insertion/Time for Maneuver, 0)
Units: Kilometer/(Minutes*Minutes)
Aphelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)" * (1/Mars Perihelion - 1/(2 * "Semi-Major Axis of Transfer
Orbit")))
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Change of X spacecraft = Xdot spacecraft
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Change of Xdot spacecraft = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step
units)" * X distance between Spacecraft and Sun/Distance between Spacecraft and Sun^3
Units: Kilometer/(Minutes * Minutes)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars.
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
Change of Y spacecraft = Ydot spacecraft
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Change of Ydot spacecraft = "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step
units)" * Y distance between Spacecraft and Sun/Distance between Spacecraft and Sun^3
Units: Kilometer/(Minutes*Minutes)
Assumes negligible effect of gravity between Earth and Mars.
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-14).
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Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = INTEG (-Acceleration from Insertion
Maneuver, Initial Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion)
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Delta V for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = Perihelion Velocity of Mars - Aphelion Velocity
of Transfer Orbit
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Distance between Earth and Spacecraft = SQRT((X earth - X spacecraft)A2 + (Y earth - Y
spacecraft)A2)
Units: kilometers
Distance between Spacecraft and Sun = SQRT(X spacecraftA2 + Y spacecraftA2)
Units: kilometers
Initial Delta V Available for Mars Solar Orbit Insertion = -Delta V for Mars Solar Orbit
Insertion
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Initial X spacecraft = Initial X earth
Units: kilometers
Initial Xdot spacecraft = Perihelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Initial Y spacecraft = Initial Y earth
Units: kilometers
Initial Ydot spacecraft = 0
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Maneuver Distance Margin = 0
Units: Kilometer
Maneuver Initiation Distance = Mars Perihelion - Maneuver Distance Margin
Units: Kilometer
"Mars Orbital Velocity (if circular orbit)" = SQRT("Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)"/"Mars Semi-Major Orbital Axis")
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Mars Perihelion = 2.06645e+008
Units: Kilometer
Source: http://www.marspedia.org/
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"Mars Semi-Major Orbital Axis" = 2.27941e+008
Units: kilometers
From Howell (2002)
Perihelion Velocity of Mars = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun (adjusted for
time step units)" * (1/Mars Perihelion-1/(2 * "Mars Semi-Major Orbital Axis")))
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Perihelion Velocity of Transfer Orbit = SQRT(2 * "Gravitational Parameter of Sun
(adjusted for time step units)" * (1/"Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis" - 1/(2 * "Semi-
Major Axis of Transfer Orbit")))
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Formula derived in Howell (2002) and Bate et al. (1971, pp. 3-16).
"Semi-Major Axis of Transfer Orbit" = ("Earths Semi-Major Orbital Axis" + Mars
Perihelion)/2
Units: kilometers
Spacecraft Distance from Earth = 0
Units: Kilometer [0, 3.75e+008, le+006]
Spacecraft Velocity = SQRT(Xdot spacecraftA2 + Ydot spacecraftA2)
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Time for Maneuver = 1
Units: Minute
Time of Flight = 3.14159 * SQRT("Semi-Major Axis of Transfer Orbit"^3/"Gravitational
Parameter of Sun (adjusted for time step units)")
Units: Minute
Formula from Bate et al. (1971, pp. 165).
X distance between Spacecraft and Sun = -X spacecraft
Units: kilometers
X spacecraft = INTEG(Change of X spacecraft, Initial X spacecraft)
Units: kilometers
Xdot spacecraft= INTEG(Acceleration from Insertion Maneuver + Change of Xdot
spacecraft, Initial Xdot spacecraft)
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Y distance between Spacecraft and Sun = -Y spacecraft
Units: kilometers
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Y spacecraft = INTEG(Change of Y spacecraft, Initial Y spacecraft)
Units: kilometers
Ydot spacecraft = INTEG (Change of Ydot spacecraft, Initial Ydot spacecraft)
Units: Kilometer/Minutes
Light Delay Calculation:
Light Delay = IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Constant Distance from Earth = 1, Spacecraft
Distance from Earth/Speed of Light, Distance between Earth and Spacecraft/Speed of
Light)
Units: Minute
Speed of Light = 299792 * 60
Units: Kilometer/Minute
Source http://www.speed-light.info/
Switch for Constant Distance from Earth = 0
Units: Dmnl [0, 1, 1]
The Light Delayed, Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model
The Light Delayed, Flow Controlled Procedure Rework Model is essentially the Light
Delayed Procedure Rework Model with several structural modifications for
implementing flow control. The primary numerical integration technique used for
analysis of the model and graph development was Euler integration with a fixed time step
size. The simulation start time was 0 minutes (coinciding with launch) and the end time
was 347000 minutes (roughly coinciding with the insertion into Mars' solar orbit).
Rather than repeating the common elements of this model and the Light Delayed
Procedure Rework Model, only the elements that represent additions or modifications to
Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model are provided below.
Additions to the Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model to implement flow
control:
Baseline Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = 30000
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
"Fraction of Resources Available for Inactive Procedure Rework Discovery (FRAIRD)"
= INTEG(-Resource Activation Rate, Initial Fraction of Resources Available for Inactive
Procedure Rework)
Units: Dmnl
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"Fraction of Resources Utilized for Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)" =
INTEG(Resource Activation Rate, Initial Fraction of Resources Utilized for Procedure
Rework)
Units: Dmnl
Inactive Procedure Rework Completion Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Resource Fraction per
Inactive Procedure Needing Rework > 0, "Inactive Procedures Needing Rework
(IPNR)"/Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework, 0)
Units: Procedures/Minute
Initial Procedure Rework Horizon = 2000
Units: Minute
Minimum Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete
Inactive Procedure Rework * Rework Time Improvement Factor
Units: Minute [0, 1000, 5]
Procedure Rework Horizon Change Factor = 0
Units: Dmnl [0, 2.5]
Procedure Rework Horizon Change Time = 340000
Units: Minute
Resource Activation Rate = (Target Resources Applied towards Inactive Procedure
Rework - "Fraction of Resources Utilized for Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)")/
Time to Activate Resources for Rework of Inactive Procedures Needing Rework
Units: Dmnl/Minute
Resource Fraction per Inactive Procedure Needing Rework = 0.5
Units: Dmnl/Procedure [0, 1]
Rework Time Improvement Factor = 0.02
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Target Resources Applied towards Inactive Procedure Rework = MIN(1, "Inactive
Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" * Resource Fraction per Inactive Procedure
Needing Rework)
Units: Dmnl
Time to Activate Resources for Rework of Inactive Procedures Needing Rework = 30
Units: Minute [1, 30]
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Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework = Baseline Time to Complete Inactive
Procedure Rework - (Baseline Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework - Minimum
Time to Complete Inactive Procedure Rework) * "Fraction of Resources Utilized for
Inactive Procedure Rework (FRUIPR)"
Units: Minute
Modifications to the Light Delayed Procedure Rework Model to implement flow
control:
Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate = IF THEN ELSE(Rework Propagation Factor >= 0,
MIN("Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)"/Minimum Invalidation Time, ("Procedures
Being Reworked by Ground (PBRG)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete
Procedure Rework + Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event *
PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1)), MAX(("Procedures Being Reworked by Ground
(PBRG)" * Rework Propagation Factor)/Time to Complete Procedure Rework + Inactive
Procedure Invalidation Rate During Discrete Event * PULSE(Time of Discrete Event, 1),
- "Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)"/Time to Complete Procedure Rework))
Units: Procedure/Minute
"Inactive Procedures Needing Rework (IPNR)" = INTEG(Inactive Procedure Invalidation
Rate - Activation Rate for PNR - Inactive Procedure Rework Completion Rate, Initial
Inactive Procedures Needing Rework)
Units: Procedures
"Inactive Valid Procedures (IVP)" = INTEG(Inactive Procedure Rework Completion
Rate - Activation Rate for VP - Inactive Procedure Invalidation Rate, Initial Inactive
Valid Procedures)
Units: Procedures
Procedure Rework Time Horizon = Initial Procedure Rework Horizon + STEP(Procedure
Rework Horizon Change Factor * Initial Procedure Rework Horizon, Procedure Rework
Horizon Change Time)
Units: Minute [0, 5000]
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